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To Ellie
Huffing and puffing with correlation and function might give us a good account 
of  subdoxastic aboutness . . . [but it is unlikely to work for the content of doxastic 
states.]*
Martin Davies (pers. comm.), developed in Davies (2005)
* Not that the antecedent is easy. And even for the subpersonal case we may have to puff on a few more 
ingredients. But I too am optimistic that we can get a good account. This book aims to show how. 
Preface
The book is in three parts: introduction, exposition, and defence. Part I is introductory 
and light on argument. Chapter 1 is about others’ views. Chapter 2 is the framework 
for my own view. I don’t rehearse well-known arguments but simply gesture at the 
literature. The aim is to demarcate the problem and motivate my own approach. Part II 
changes gear, into more standard philosophical mode. It aims to state my positive view 
precisely and to test it against a series of case studies from cognitive science. Part III 
engages more carefully with the existing literature, showing that the account developed 
in Part II can deal with important arguments made by previous researchers, and arguing 
that the framework put forward in Part I has been vindicated.
There is a paragraph-by-paragraph summary at the end of the book. Readers who 
want to go straight to a particular issue may find this a useful guide. It replaces the 
chapter summaries often found at the end of each chapter of a monograph. The bibli-
ography lists the pages where I discuss each reference, so acts as a fine-grained index 
to particular issues. There is also the usual keyword index at the end.
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Introduction
1.1 A Foundational Question 3
1.2 Homing In on the Problem 8
1.3 Existing Approaches 12
1.4 Teleosemantics 15
1.5 Challenges to Teleosemantics 18
1.1 A Foundational Question
The mind holds many mysteries. Thinking used to be one of them. Staring idly out of 
the window, a chain of thought runs through my mind. Concentrating hard to solve a 
problem, I reason my way through a series of ideas until I find an answer (if I’m lucky). 
Having thoughts running through our minds is one of the most obvious aspects of the 
lived human experience. It seems central to the way we behave, especially in the cases 
we care most about. But what are thoughts and what is this process we call thinking? 
That was once as mysterious as the movement of the heavens or the nature of life itself.
New technology can fundamentally change our understanding of what is possible 
and what mysterious. For Descartes, mechanical automata were a revelation. These 
fairground curiosities moved in ways that looked animate, uncannily like the move-
ments of animals and even people. A capacity that had previously been linked inextric-
ably to a fundamental life force, or to the soul, could now be seen as purely mechanical. 
Descartes famously argued that this could only go so far. Mechanism would not 
explain consciousness, nor the capacity for free will. Nor, he thought, could mechan-
ism explain linguistic competence. It was inconceivable that a machine could produce 
different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately grammatical answer to 
questions asked of it.1 Consciousness and free will remain baffling. But another 
machine has made what was inconceivable to Descartes an everyday reality to us.
Computers produce appropriately arranged strings of words—Google even 
annoyingly finishes half-typed sentences—in ways that at least respect the meaning 
of the words they churn out. Until quite recently a ‘computer’ was a person who did 
calculations. Now we know that calculations can be done mechanically. Babbage, 
1 Descartes (1637/1988, p. 44: AT VI 56: CSM I I40), quoted by Stoljar (2001, pp. 405–6).
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Lovelace, and others in the nineteenth century saw the possibility of general-purpose 
mechanical computation, but it wasn’t until the valve-based, then transistor-based 
computers of the twentieth century that it became apparent just how powerful this 
idea was.2
This remarkable insight can also answer our question about thinking: the answer 
is that thinking is the processing of mental representations. We’re familiar with words 
and symbols as representations, from marks made on a wet clay tablet to texts appear-
ing on the latest electronic tablet: they are items with meaning.3 A written sentence is 
a representation that takes the form of ink marks on paper: ‘roses are red’. It also has 
meaning—it is about flowers and their colour. Mental representations are similar: 
I believe that today is Tuesday, see that there is an apple in the bowl, hope that the sun 
will come out, and think about an exciting mountain climb. These thoughts are all 
mental representations. The core is the same as with words and symbols. Mental repre-
sentations are physical things with meaning. A train of thought is a series of mental 
representations. That is the so-called ‘representational theory of mind’.
I say the representational theory of mind is ‘an’ answer to our question about thinking, 
not ‘the’ answer, because not everyone agrees it is a good idea to appeal to mental rep-
resentations. Granted, doing physical manipulations on things that have meaning is a 
great idea. We count on our fingers to add up. We manipulate symbols on the page to 
arrive at a mathematical proof. The physical stuff being manipulated can take many 
forms. Babbage’s difference engine uses gears and cogs to do long multiplication (see 
Figure 1.1). And now our amazingly powerful computers can do this kind of thing at 
inhuman speed on an astonishing scale. They manipulate voltage levels not fingers and 
can do a lot more than work out how many eggs will be left after breakfast. But they too 
work by performing physical manipulations on representations. The only trouble with 
carrying this over to the case of thinking is that we’re not really sure how mental repre-
sentations get their meaning.
For myself, I do think that the idea of mental representation is the answer to the 
mystery of thinking. There is very good reason to believe that thinking is the process-
ing of meaningful physical entities, mental representations. That insight is one of the 
most important discoveries of the twentieth century—it may turn out to be the most 
important. But I have to admit that the question of meaning is a little problem in the 
foundations. We’ve done well on the ‘processing’ bit but we’re still a bit iffy about the 
‘meaningful’ bit. We know what processing of physical particulars is, and how pro-
cessing can respect the meaning of symbols. For example, we can make a machine 
whose manipulations obey logical rules and so preserve truth. But we don’t yet have a 
clear idea of how representations could get meanings, when the meaning does not 
derive from the understanding of an external interpreter.
2 Developments in logic, notably by Frege, were of course an important intermediate step, on which 
Turing, von Neumann, and others built in designing computing machines.
3 We’ll have to stretch the point for some of my son’s texts.
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So, the question remains: how do mental states4 manage to be about things in the 
external world? That mental representations are about things in the world, although 
utterly commonplace, is deeply puzzling. How do they get their aboutness? The phys-
ical and biological sciences offer no model of how naturalistically respectable prop-
erties could be like that. This is an undoubted lacuna in our understanding, a void 
hidden away in the foundations of the cognitive sciences. We behave in ways that are 
suited to our environment. We do so by representing the world and processing those 
representations in rational ways—at least, there is strong evidence that we do in very 
many cases. Mental representations represent objects and properties in the world: the 
4 I use ‘mental’ broadly to cover all aspects of an agent’s psychology, including unconscious and/or 
low-level information processing; and ‘state’ loosely, so as to include dynamic states, i.e. events and processes. 
‘Mental state’ is a convenient shorthand for entities of all kinds that are psychological and bear content.
Figure 1.1 Babbage’s difference engine uses cogs and gears to perform physical manipulations 
on representations of numbers. It is used to multiply large numbers together. The components 
are representations of numbers and the physical manipulations make sense in the light of those 
contents—they multiply the numbers (using the method of differences).
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shape of a fruit, the movement of an animal, the expression on a face. I work out 
how much pasta to cook by thinking about how many people there will be for dinner 
and how much each they will eat. ‘Content’ is a useful shorthand for the objects, 
properties and conditions that a representation refers to or is about. So, the content 
of one of my thoughts about dinner is: each person needs 150g of pasta.
What then is the link between a mental representation and its content? The content 
of a representation must depend somehow on the way it is produced in response to 
input, the way it interacts with other representations, and the behaviour that results. 
How do those processes link a mental representation with the external objects and 
properties it refers to? How does the thought in my head connect up with quantities of 
pasta? In short: what determines the content of a mental representation? That is the 
‘content question’. Surprisingly, there is no agreed answer.
This little foundational worry hasn’t stopped the cognitive sciences getting on and 
using the idea of mental representation to great effect. Representational explanation is 
the central resource of scientific psychology. Many kinds of behaviour have been con-
vincingly explained in terms of the internal algorithms or heuristics by which they are 
generated. Ever since the ‘cognitive revolution’ gave the behavioural sciences the idea 
of mental representation, one phenomenon after another has succumbed to represen-
tational explanation, from the trajectories of the limbs when reaching to pick up an 
object, to parsing the grammar of a sentence. The recent successes of cognitive neuro-
science depend on the same insight, while also telling us how representations are 
realized in the brain, a kind of understanding until recently thought to be fanciful. 
Figure 1.2 shows a typical example. The details of this experiment need not detain us 
for now (detailed case studies come in Part II). Just focus on the explanatory scheme. 
There is a set of interconnected brain areas, plus a computation being performed by 
those brain areas (sketched in the lower half of panel (a)). Together that tells us how 
participants in the experiment manage to perform their task (inset). So, although we 
lack a theory of it, there is little reason to doubt the existence of representational content. 
We’re in the position of the academic in the cartoon musing, ‘Well it works in practice, 
Bob, but I’m not sure it’s really gonna work in theory.’
The lack of an answer to the content question does arouse suspicion that mental 
representation is a dubious concept. Some want to eliminate the notion of representa-
tional content from our theorizing entirely, perhaps replacing it with a purely neural 
account of behavioural mechanisms. If that were right, it would radically revise our 
conception of ourselves as reason-guided agents since reasons are mental contents. 
That conception runs deep in the humanities and social sciences, not to mention 
ordinary life. But even neuroscientists should want to hold onto the idea of represen-
tation, because their explanations would be seriously impoverished without it. Even 
when the causes of behaviour can be picked out in neural terms, our understanding of 
why that pattern of neural activity produces this kind of behaviour depends crucially 
on neural activity being about things in the organism’s environment. Figure 1.2 doesn’t 
just show neural areas, but also how the activity of those areas should be understood as 
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representing things about the stimuli presented to the people doing a task. The content 
of a neural representation makes an explanatory connection with distal features of 
the agent’s environment, features that the agent reacts to and then acts on.
One aspect of the problem is consciousness. I want to set that aside. Consciousness 
raises a host of additional difficulties. Furthermore, there are cases of thinking and 
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Figure 1.2 A figure that illustrates the explanatory scheme typical of cognitive neuroscience 
(from Rushworth et al. 2009). There is a computation (sketched in the lower half of panel (a)), 
implemented in some interacting brain areas, so as to perform a behavioural task (inset). The 
details are not important for present purposes.
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reasoning, or something very like it, that go on in the absence of consciousness. Just to 
walk along the street, your eyes are taking in information and your mind is tracking 
the direction of the path and the movement of people around you. Information is being 
processed to work out how to adjust your gait instant by instant, so that you stay on 
your feet and avoid the inconvenience of colliding with the person in front engrossed 
in their smartphone. I say those processes going on in you are a kind of reasoning, or 
are like familiar thought processes, because they too proceed through a series of states, 
states about the world, in working out how to act. They involve processing represen-
tations in ways that respect their contents. Getting to grips with the content of non-
conscious representations is enough of a challenge in its own right.5
The content question is widely recognized as one of the deepest and most significant 
problems in the philosophy of mind, a central question about the mind’s place in 
nature. It is not just of interest to philosophers, however. Its resolution is also import-
ant for the cognitive sciences. Many disputes in psychology concern which properties 
are being represented in a particular case. Does the mirror neuron subsystem repre-
sent other agents’ goals or merely action patterns (Gallese et al. 1996)? Does the brain 
code for scalar quantities or probability distributions (Pouget et al. 2003)? Do infants 
represent other agents’ belief states or are they just keeping track of behaviour (Apperly 
and Butterfill 2009)? Often such disputes go beyond disagreements about what causal 
sensitivities and behavioural dispositions the organism has. Theorists disagree about 
what is being represented in the light of those facts. What researchers lack is a soundly 
based theory of content which tells us what is being represented, given established 
facts about what an organism or other system responds to and how it behaves.
This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question for non-experts. 
I gesture at existing literature to help demarcate the problem, but proper arguments 
will come later (Parts II and III). So that I can move quickly to presenting the positive 
account (Chapter 2 onwards), this chapter is more presupposition than demonstration. 
It should bring the problem of mental content into view for those unfamiliar with it, 
but it only offers my own particular take on the problem.
1.2 Homing In on the Problem
The problem of mental content in its modern incarnation goes back to Franz Brentano 
in the nineteenth century. Brentano identified aboutness or ‘intentionality’6 as being a 
peculiar feature of thoughts (Brentano 1874/1995). Thoughts can be about objects and 
properties that are not present to the thinker (the apple in my rucksack), are distant in 
time and space (a mountain in Tibet), are hypothetical or may only lie far in the future 
(the explosion of the sun), or are entirely imaginary (Harry Potter). How can mental 
5 Roughly, I’m setting aside beliefs and desires (doxastic states) and conscious states—see §2.1. I use 
‘subpersonal’ as a label for mental representations that don’t have these complicating features.
6 This is a technical term—it’s not about intentions.
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states reach out and be about such things? Indeed, how do beliefs and perceptual states 
manage to be about an object that is right in front of the thinker (the pen on my desk), 
when the object is out there, and the representations are inside the thinker?
We could ask the same question about the intentionality of words and natural 
language sentences: how do they get their meaning? An obvious answer is: from the 
thoughts of the language users.7 The meaning of a word is plausibly dependent on 
what people usually take it to mean: ‘cat’ is about cats because the word makes people 
think about cats. That kind of story cannot then be told about mental representations, 
on pain of regress. In order to start somewhere we start with the idea that at least 
some mental representations have underived intentionality. If we can’t make sense of 
underived intentionality somewhere in the picture—of where meaning ultimately 
comes from—then the whole framework of explaining behaviour in terms of what 
people perceive and think is resting on questionable foundations. The most fruitful 
idea in the cognitive sciences, the idea of mental representation, which we thought we 
understood, would turn out to be deeply mysterious, as difficult as free will or as con-
sciousness itself.
When asked about the content of a familiar mental representation like a concept, 
one common reaction is to talk about other mental states it is associated with. Why is 
my concept dog about dogs?8 Because it brings to mind images of dogs, the sound of 
dogs barking, the feel of their fur and their distinctive doggy smell. We’ll come back 
to these kinds of theories of content in the next section, but for now I want to point 
out that this answer also just pushes back the question: where do mental images get 
their contents? In virtue of what do they represent the visual features, sounds, tactile 
properties and odours that they do? Underived intentionality must enter the picture 
somewhere.
The task then is to give an account of how at least some mental representations 
have contents that do not derive from the contents of other representations. What 
we are after is an account of what determines the content of a mental representation, 
determination in the metaphysical sense (what makes it the case that a representation 
has the content it does?) not the epistemic sense (how can we tell what the content 
of mental representation is?). An object-level semantic theory gives the content of 
mental representations in a domain (e.g. tells us that cognitive maps refer to spatial 
locations). Many information-processing accounts of behaviour offer a semantic 
theory in this sense. They assign correctness conditions and satisfaction conditions 
to a series of mental representations and go on to say how those representations are 
involved in generating intelligent behaviour. Our question is a meta-level question 
7 Another tenable view is that sentences have underived intentionality. For beliefs and desires, the claim 
that their content derives from the content of natural language sentences has to be taken seriously. But here 
I set aside the problem of belief/desire content (§2.1) to focus on simpler cases in cognitive science.
8 I use small caps to name concepts; and italics when giving the content of a representation (whether a 
subpropositional constituent, as here, or a full correctness condition or satisfaction condition). I also use 
italics when introducing a term by using (rather than mentioning) it.
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about these theories: in virtue of what do those representations have those contents 
(if indeed they do)? For example, in virtue of what are cognitive maps about loca-
tions in the world? Our task then is to formulate a meta-semantic theory of mental 
representation.
It is popular to distinguish the question of what makes a state a representation from 
the question of what determines its content (Ramsey 2007). I don’t make that distinc-
tion. To understand representational content, we need an answer to both questions. 
Accordingly, the accounts I put forward say what makes it the case, both that some 
state is a representation, and that it is a representation with a certain content.
We advert to the content of representations in order to explain behaviour. To explain 
how you swerve to avoid an oncoming smartphone zombie, the psychologist points 
to mental processes that are tracking the trajectory of people around you. A theory of 
content can illuminate how representations play this kind of explanatory role. One 
central explanatory practice is to use correct representations to explain successful 
behaviour. That assumption is more obviously at work in its corollary: misrepresenta-
tion explains failure. Because she misperceived the ground, she stumbled. Because he 
thought it was not yet eight o’clock, he missed the train. Misrepresentation explains 
why behaviour fails to go smoothly or fails to meet an agent’s needs or goals. When 
things go badly for an agent, we can often pin the blame on an incorrect representation. 
We can also often explain the way they do behave; for instance, misrepresenting the 
time by fifteen minutes explains why he arrived on the platform nearly fifteen minutes 
after the train left.
Misrepresentation is one of the most puzzling aspects of representational content. 
A mental representation is an internal physical particular. It could be a complex pattern 
of neural activity. Cells firing in the hippocampus tell the rat where it is in space so it can 
work out how to get to some food at another location. If the cell firing misrepresents its 
current location, the rat will set off in the wrong direction and fail to get to the food. 
Whether a representation is correct or incorrect depends on factors outside the organ-
ism, which seem to make no difference to how the representation is processed within 
the organism (e.g. to how activity of some neurons causes activity of others). Yet its 
truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness, is supposed to make a crucial explanatory 
difference. The capacity to misrepresent, then, is clearly a key part of what makes rep-
resentational content a special kind of property, a target of philosophical interest. Any 
good theory of content must be able to account for misrepresentation.
A theory of content need not faithfully recapitulate the contents relied on in psy-
chological or everyday explanations of behaviour. It may be revisionary in some 
respects, sometimes implying that what is actually represented is different than pre-
viously thought. Indeed, a theory of content can, as I suggested, help arbitrate disputes 
between different proposed content assignments.9 However, it should deliver reason-
ably determinate contents. A theory of content needs to be applicable in concrete cases. 
9 E.g. whether infants are tracking others’ mental states or just their behaviour.
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For example, reinforcement learning based on the dopamine subsystem explains the 
behaviour elicited in a wide range of psychological experiments. We can predict 
what people will choose if we know how they have been rewarded for past choices. 
Plugging in facts about what is going on in a concrete case, a theory of content should 
output correctness conditions and/or satisfaction conditions for the representa-
tions involved. The determinacy of those conditions needs to be commensurate with 
the way correct and incorrect representation explains successful and unsuccessful 
behaviour in the case in question. A theory of content would obviously be hopeless if 
it implied that every state in a system represents every object and property the system 
interacts with. Delivering appropriately determinate contents is an adequacy condition 
on theories of content.
The problem of determinacy has several more specific incarnations. One asks about 
causal chains leading up to a representation. When I see a dog and think about it, is my 
thought about the distal object or about the pattern of light on my retina? More point-
edly, can a theory of content distinguish between these, so that it implies that some 
mental representations have distal contents, while others represent more proximal 
matters of fact? A second problem is that the objects we think about exemplify a whole 
host of properties at once: the dog is a member of the kind dog, is brown and furry, is 
a medium-sized pliable physical object, and so on. The qua problem asks which of 
these properties is represented. Finally, for any candidate contents, we can ask about 
their disjunction. A theory may not select between that is a dog and that is a brown, 
furry physical object but instead imply that a state represents that is a dog or that is a 
brown, furry physical object. Rather than misrepresenting an odd-looking fox as a dog, 
I would end up correctly representing it as a brown furry object. If every condition in 
which this representation happens to be produced were included, encompassing 
things like shaggy sheep seen from an odd angle in poor light, then the representation 
would never end up being false. Every condition would be found somewhere in the 
long disjunction. We would lose the capacity to misrepresent. For that reason, the 
adequacy condition that a theory of content should imply or explain the capacity for 
misrepresentation is sometimes called the ‘disjunction problem’. The qua problem, the 
disjunction problem, and the problem of proximal/distal contents are all different 
guises of the overall problem of determinacy.
Since we are puzzled about how there could be representational contents, an account 
of content should show how content arises out of something we find less mysterious. 
An account in terms of the phenomenal character of conscious experience, to take 
one example, would fail in this respect.10 Standardly, naturalistic approaches offer 
accounts of content that are non-semantic, non-mental, and non-normative. I am aim-
ing for an account that is naturalistic in that sense. Of course, it may turn out that there 
10 That is not in itself an argument against such theories—it could turn out that intentionality can only 
be properly accounted for in phenomenal terms—but it is a motivation to see if a non-phenomenal theory 
can work.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 08/17/2018, SPi
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is no such account to be had. But in the absence of a compelling a priori argument that 
no naturalistic account of mental representation is possible, the tenability of the natur-
alistic approach can only properly be judged by the success or failure of the attempt. 
The project of naturalizing content must be judged by its fruits.
1.3 Existing Approaches
This section looks briefly at existing approaches to content determination. I won’t 
attempt to make a case against these approaches. Those arguments have already been 
widely canvassed. My aim is to introduce the main obstacles these theories have faced, 
since these are the issues we will have to grapple with when assessing the accounts of 
content I put forward in the rest of the book. Although the theories below were 
advanced to account for the content of beliefs, desires, and conscious states, the same 
issues arise when they are applied to neural representations and the other cases from 
cognitive science which form the focus of this book.
One obvious starting point is information in the weak sense of correlation.11 
Correlational information arises whenever the states of items correlate, so that item X’s 
being in one state (smoke is coming from the windows) raises the probability that item 
Y is in another state (there is a fire in the house). A certain pattern of neural firing 
raises the probability that there is a vertical edge in the centre of the visual field. If the 
pattern of firing is a neural representation, then its content may depend on the fact that 
this pattern of activity makes it likely that there is a vertical edge in front of the person.
Information theory has given us a rich understanding of the properties of infor-
mation in this correlational sense (Cover and Thomas 2006). However, for reasons 
that have been widely discussed, representational content is clearly not the same 
thing as correlational information. The ‘information’ of information-processing 
psychology is a matter of correctness conditions or satisfaction conditions, some-
thing richer than the correlational information of information theory. Sophisticated 
treatments use the tools of information theory to construct a theory of content which 
respects this distinction (Usher 2001, Eliasmith 2013). However, the underlying lib-
erality of correlational information continues to make life difficult. Any representation 
carries correlational information about very many conditions at once, so correlation 
does not on its own deliver determinate contents. Some correlations may be quite 
weak, and it is not at all plausible that the content of a representation is the thing 
it correlates with most strongly.12 A weak correlation that only slightly raises the 
11 Shannon (1948) developed a formal treatment of correlational information—as a theory of commu-
nication, rather than meaning—which forms the foundation of (mathematical) information theory. Dretske 
(1981) applied information theory to the problem of mental content.
12 Usually the strongest correlational information carried by a neural representation concerns other 
neural representations, its proximal causes, and its effects. The same point is made in the existing literature 
about beliefs. My belief that there is milk in the fridge strongly raises the probability that I have been thinking 
about food, only rather less strongly that there actually is milk in the fridge.
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chance that there is a predator nearby may be relied on for that information when 
the outcome is a matter of life or death. Representations often concern distal facts, 
like the presence of a certain foodstuff, even though they correlate more strongly 
with a proximate sensory signal. Furthermore, a disjunction of conditions is always 
more likely than conditions taken individually: for example, an object might be an 
eagle, but it is more likely that it is an eagle or a crow. So, content-as-probability-raising 
faces a particularly acute form of the disjunction problem. Correlational information 
may well be an ingredient in a theory of content (Chapter 4), but even the sophisticated 
tools of mathematical information theory are not enough, without other ingredi-
ents, to capture the core explanatory difference between correct representation and 
misrepresentation.
Another tactic looks to relations between representations to fix content. We saw 
the idea earlier that the concept dog gets its meaning from the inferences by which it 
is formed, such as from perceiving a brown furry object, and perhaps also from con-
clusions it generates, such as inferring that this thing might bite me (Block 1986). 
Patterns of inferences are plausibly what changes when a child acquires a new math-
ematical concept (Carey 2009). They are also the focus of recent Bayesian models of 
causal learning (Gopnik and Wellman 2012, Danks 2014). Moving beyond beliefs to 
neural representations, dispositions to make inferences—that is, to transition between 
representations—could fix content here too. If all inferences are relevant, holism 
threatens (Fodor and Lepore 1992): any change anywhere in the thinker’s total rep-
resentational scheme would change the content of all of their representations. There 
have been attempts to identify, for various concepts, a privileged set of dispositions 
that are constitutive of content (e.g. Peacocke 1992). However, it has proven difficult 
to identify sets of inferences that can do the job: that are necessary for possessing the 
concept, plausibly shared by most users of the concept, and sufficiently detailed to be 
individuative—that is, to distinguish between different concepts. For these reasons, 
inferential role semantics has not had much success in naturalizing content, except 
perhaps for the logical constants. The same concerns carry over when we move from 
beliefs to other representations relied on in the cognitive sciences.13
Relations amongst representations may be important for another reason. They 
endow a system of representations with a structure, which may mirror a structure 
in the world. For example, spatial relations between symbols on a map mirror spatial 
relations between places on the ground; and that seems to be important to the way maps 
represent. In the same way, Paul Churchland has argued that the similarity structure 
on a set of mental representations of human faces determines that they pick out certain 
13 Concepts (the constituents of beliefs) are usually thought to have neo-Fregean sense, as well as refer-
ential content (content that contributes to truth conditions). We may well have to appeal to inferential 
relations between concepts to account for differences in sense between co-referential concepts, and/or to 
vehicle properties (Millikan 2000, Sainsbury and Tye 2007, Recanati 2012). This book does not deal with 
concepts. I leave aside the issue of whether we need to appeal to neo-Fregean senses in addition to vehicle 
properties and referential contents.
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individuals (Churchland 1998, 2012). Taken on its own the correspondence idea 
produces an implausibly liberal theory of representation (Cummins 1989, Godfrey-
Smith 1994a, Shea 2013c). As we will see, however, structural correspondence is 
another plausible ingredient in a theory of content (Chapter 5).
Another group of theories are ascriptionist: they ascribe mental states to the whole 
person based on how she behaves, but don’t commit to mental representations being 
physical particulars. This eschews what I described above as the core insight of the 
representational theory of mind (RTM). I discuss ascriptionism here because it remains 
a viable alternative to RTM (Williams 2016, 2018), especially for beliefs and desires,14 so 
it will be important to be clear about the explanatory advantages that flow from the 
commitment to representations as physical particulars, when that commitment is war-
ranted (see §2.5). Donald Davidson’s version of the view derives from rational decision 
theory (Davidson 1974a, 1974b). The choices of an agent who obeys some minimal 
conditions of rationality can be modelled as if the agent has an ordered set of prefer-
ences about states of the world combined with a set of probabilistic beliefs about the 
likelihood of world states and the chance that actions she can perform would bring 
about other world states. According to Davidson, for an agent to be interpretable in this 
way is a key part of what it is to have beliefs and desires, to be a representer.
Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance is in the same family of views (Dennett 1981). 
He emphasizes that there is nothing irrealist about this approach. People and other 
agents are tied up in patterns of interaction with the world that we can predict and 
explain from the intentional stance—that is, by treating them as having beliefs and 
desires. We could not do so if these interactions were described in purely physical 
terms, for example in terms of energy transduced by sensory receptors, producing 
neural states, which generate movements of the limbs. I can arrange to meet a 
 colleague at a café in far-away Canberra three months hence. The intentional stance 
allows me to predict where they will be at 10 a.m. on 1 July in a way that would be 
impossible in practice by just keeping track of their moment-by-moment physical 
interactions with their environment. Even if it were not intractable, although a purely 
physical description would tell us, in physical terms, what is going to happen instant-
by-instant, it would miss out on real patterns that exist in the behaviour (Dennett 1991). 
Those real patterns only come into view when we take the intentional stance, but the 
patterns are there irrespective of whether we recognize them (see §2.3 and §8.2b). 
The ontology of patterns means there is an observer-independent fact of the matter 
about which systems are interpretable from the intentional stance.
Dennett’s ascriptionism is a tenable and substantial naturalistic account of repre-
sentational content.15 In this sense we already have a good theory of content. It is realist 
14 Neither Davidson nor Dennett claimed that their ascriptionism could be extended to the neural 
representations that are characteristic of the case studies we consider here.
15 He advances it not for neural representations but as an account of belief-desire content. Davidson’s 
account is not naturalistic in our sense. He argues that it is not possible to give an account of content in 
non-normative terms.
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about what it takes to be a representer. However, I will reserve the term ‘realism’ for 
accounts that are committed to there being real vehicles of content: individuable phys-
ical particulars that bear contents and whose causal interactions explain behaviour. 
As I have been describing the problem of mental content, realism about vehicles is a 
core part of what it takes to be a mental representation. There are many cases where we 
have good evidence for realism about mental representations. We have already seen 
some examples in passing; subsequent chapters go into detail about many more. 
Where there are vehicles, representational explanation can explain more (§2.5). So, my 
task is to formulate an account of content applicable to cases where we have good 
reason to be realist about mental representations.
1.4 Teleosemantics
Teleosemantics is the final stop on our whistle-stop tour of the problems faced by exist-
ing theories of content. We will look at this family of views in slightly more detail since 
teleosemantics is the closest precursor to the accounts presented in this book. 
Teleosemantic views are those that give etiological functions a content-fixing role. This 
does not exclude there also being a role for correlational information, inferential role, 
or structural correspondence. A second commitment of the teleosemantic views of 
Ruth Millikan and David Papineau is a central role for a representation consumer: an 
identifiable subsystem that takes representations as input and generates outputs in 
response (Millikan 1984, 1989, Papineau 1987, 2016).
Peter Godfrey-Smith calls a commitment to representation consumers the ‘basic 
representationalist model’ (Godfrey-Smith 2006). It goes beyond the standard repre-
sentational theory of mind (RTM), that is the commitment to representations as 
causally interacting particulars. The central idea of the basic representationalist 
model is that a representation is a stand-in that is relied on by a consumer to allow it 
to deal with some external state of affairs (see Figure 1.3). The consumer uses the state 
X as a guide to something else Y that it does not have access to directly. The idea is not 
that the consumer reads or interprets the representation, but simply that it reacts to 
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Figure 1.3 The basic representationalist model.
16 introduction
an intermediate state in a particular way. For example, ‘consumer’ honeybees observe 
dances of incoming bees as a guide to where nectar is located. In that case the repre-
sentation is out in the open. In most psychological cases the representation is internal 
and the consumer is a subsystem within the organism. Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic 
theory is also committed to there being an identifiable representation producer.
Informational approaches to content direct our attention to the way a representation 
is produced. Conditions in the world cause a representation to be tokened;16 the repre-
sentation having been produced raises the probability that those conditions obtain. 
Consumer-based views invert the picture. Downstream effects on a consumer both 
constitute states as representations and fix their contents. What a representation means 
depends on how it is used downstream, on what it is taken to mean by a consumer of 
the representation. If the organism is relying on R as a stand-in, the way the consumer 
behaves in response to R will betray what it is taking R to mean.17 Papineau’s version of 
this idea targets beliefs and desires in the first instance (Papineau  1987, but see 
Papineau 2003). To see what a person believes, see how they act to satisfy their desires. 
So, the content of a belief is roughly the condition under which the behaviour it 
prompts would satisfy the consumer’s desires. Sitting at my laptop, an electronic sound 
prompts an internal state R in me, which causes me to click on an icon to open my 
inbox. Given my desire to read messages sent to me, state R has the content there is a 
new email message for you. The representation R is separate from the consumer subsys-
tem. The content of the representation derives from the way the consumer reacts to R.
For Millikan, the content of a representation is the condition under which behaviour 
of the consumer, prompted by the representation, will be successful (Millikan 1984). 
The distinctive contribution of teleosemantics is to understand success in evolutionary 
terms. The behaviour of the consumer subsystem has evolutionary functions. Success 
is a matter of performing those evolutionary functions so as to promote survival 
and reproduction. The success conditions for a behaviour are the conditions which 
obtained when behaviour of that type was selected. They are conditions which explain 
why behaviour of that type led systematically to survival and reproduction.
Consider the way honeybees communicate about where to forage (Figure  1.4). 
Incoming bees that have found a source of nectar are producers. They perform a dance 
that indicates the location of the nectar. The direction of the dance correlates with the 
direction of nectar and the time spent waggling correlates with distance. Outgoing 
bees are consumers. They condition their foraging behaviour on the dance. The dance 
acts as a stand-in for the location of nectar, something the outgoing bees have no direct 
16 A representation is tokened when an instance of it is realized. E.g. the rat has an array of place cells that 
represent locations. One of these representations is tokened when a place cell is active.
17 The same idea is in Braithwaite (1933): I believe that p means that, under relevant external circum-
stances, relative to my needs, I will behave in a manner appropriate to p. Braithwaite also anticipated a 
naturalistic treatment of what it is for an action to be appropriate to a person’s needs: ‘satisfaction of these 
needs is something of which I do not despair of a naturalistic explanation’. Success semantics has the same 
structure (Whyte 1990).
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access to. The behaviour of the consumer is to fly off in a direction and for a distance 
that corresponds to the dance they have observed and then to start foraging at that 
location. This pattern of behaviour is very likely to be the result of natural selection on 
ancestor colonies of bees. For each type of dance there is an associated specific condi-
tion; for example, two seconds of vertical waggling might correspond to there being 
nectar 400 metres away in the direction of the sun. That is the condition under which 
behaviour of consumers in the past prompted by dances of that form led systematically 
to survival and reproduction. There being nectar 400 metres away in the direction of 
the sun is part of a direct explanation of why behaviour of that type has been stabilized 
by natural selection. (Millikan also places considerable weight on there being a sys-
tematic relationship between different dances and their corresponding locations, 
which I discuss further in §5.5.)
Figure 1.4 The dance of the honeybee indicates the location of a source of nectar.
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Millikan coined the term ‘Normal explanation’ for this kind of evolutionary 
explanation of how representation-prompted behaviour of the consumer was selected 
(Millikan 1984). What is evolutionarily Normal may be statistically rare, for example 
that a sperm actually fertilizes an ovum. The Normal cases are the ones that matter for 
natural selection. A complete Normal explanation would go into all kinds of details 
about the mechanism, and might also mention various background factors, like grav-
ity remaining constant. Millikan’s focus is the least detailed Normal explanation of the 
specific type of behaviour prompted by a representation R. For the bee dance, this 
mentions the presence of nectar 400 metres from the hive, but not details of the imple-
mentational mechanism, nor the fact that gravity remained constant.
Consumer behaviours will generally have a nested set of evolutionary functions: 
to fly off a certain distance and direction, to forage there, to obtain nectar, and to 
promote survival of the hive and production of offspring. Not all of these figure in 
the content-fixing story. It follows from what Millikan says about consumers making 
use of mapping rules that there will be different Normal explanations of different 
behaviours prompted by different representations. So, we can’t simply explain all the 
dances by the fact that there was nectar somewhere nearby when they were selected. 
Content is fixed relative to the behaviour of the consumer specific to each represen-
tational vehicle. That excludes general evolutionary functions of a behaviour like 
promoting survival of the hive. For the same reasons there is considerable specificity in 
the success condition associated with each type of behaviour: getting nectar 400 metres 
away rather than just getting nectar.
In short, teleosemantics founds content on evolutionary functions, and standard 
teleosemantics also depends upon there being a special kind of causal structure, a sep-
aration between representations and their consumers. Teleosemantics is the basis for a 
good account of content in some simple representational systems,18 of which animal 
signalling cases are a paradigm: macaque alarm calls, beaver tail slaps for danger, and 
the honeybee nectar dance.19
1.5 Challenges to Teleosemantics
Teleosemantics may be a good theory of content for animal signalling, and perhaps 
also for some kinds of internal communication that are the direct products of natural 
18 Even there, in my view standard teleosemantics needs to be supplemented with a further requirement, 
so that it is not just an output-oriented theory of content (Shea 2007b). The requirement is that a repre-
sentation should carry correlational information about the condition it represents (more carefully: that 
the putatively representational state should have carried correlational information at the time selection 
was taking place).
19 Ethological work on animal signalling identifies exactly the same factors as relevant to the content of 
an animal signal: what the signal correlates with, the behaviour that is produced in response, the evolu-
tionary function of that behaviour, and the conditions that matter for fulfilling that function (Searcy and 
Nowicki 2005, p. 3).
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selection, like hormonal signalling,20 but there are significant obstacles to applying the 
theory more widely, to mental representations in general. The purpose of this section is 
not to demonstrate that teleosemantics fails but, as with the other theories I have men-
tioned, to say what its main challenges are thought to be, so that the accounts of con-
tent I put forward in later chapters can be assessed against those challenges.
The first obstacle to consumer-based teleosemantics is the need to identify a repre-
sentation consumer with the right properties to play a content-constituting role (both 
to make it the case that some internal states are representations and to fix their contents). 
In real psychological cases behaviour depends on the interaction of several different 
representational vehicles. There need be no identifiable subsystem that takes this col-
lection of representations as input and produces behaviour as output. Instead, the 
whole organism relies on interactions between internal representations in order to 
initiate and guide appropriate behaviour. We could instead take the outputs to be 
internal: representations rather than behaviour. Then each layer of processing could 
act as a consumer for representations lower down in the hierarchy. But it is not clear 
whether there is a non-circular account of evolutionary success conditions if the 
outputs that constitute content are further representations.
Nor does psychological processing always divide into neat layers to allow it to be 
parcelled up in this way (as we will see in Chapter 4). Some of the most compelling 
support for realism about representations (for RTM) comes from cases where some-
thing is known about the neural states that drive behaviour. Representation in the 
brain is however particularly unsuited to the consumer-based treatment, for the reason 
we have just seen: it is very hard to see a principled way to identify representation con-
sumers in the brain, if consumers are devices whose output fixes content (Cao 2012). 
Even idealized diagrams of neural circuitry are notoriously interactive, consisting of a 
complex mix of feedforward, feedback, and lateral connections, some proceeding in a 
series of levels or layers, others cross-cutting or bypassing those layers (see Figure 1.5). 
That is reflected in information-processing accounts of how representations interact 
to drive behaviour. I don’t take this to be a knock-down argument against consumer-
based views, but it will be an advantage of my account that I do not have to appeal to 
consumers to play a content-constituting role (Chapters 3–5).
The second challenge for teleosemantic theories of content is to formulate a notion 
of etiological function that is suited to playing a content-constituting role. Both Millikan 
and Papineau appeal to biological functions. Biological functions are based on evolution 
by natural selection. Most representation-types we are looking at are learnt. They have 
not evolved directly by natural selection. Millikan argues that new vehicles produced 
by learning have derived functions, functions that derive from the purpose of the 
20 Also genetic information: it shows that genes carry semantic information, throws light on what gen-
etic information can be called on to explain, and also applies to other forms of inheritance systems, i.e. of 
signalling between generations (Shea 2007c, 2009, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, Shea et al. 2011).
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learning mechanism. For example, the mechanism in infants that tracks faces and 
learns patterns in visual input from faces plausibly has the evolutionary function of 
enabling the infant to reidentify individuals (more precisely, to behave in ways that 
depend on reidentifying the same individual again, e.g. its mother). That evolutionary 
function is relational. Which particular individuals it is supposed to track depends on 
who the baby has been interacting with. So, when the mechanism operates in baby Zeb 
and learns the pattern that is distinctive of his father Abe, the new representation has 
the derived function of tracking that particular individual, Abe.
This account works when the learning mechanism has a specific (relational) evolu-
tionary function. But much learning in higher animals, especially in humans, is the 
result of general-purpose learning mechanisms. For example, the function of classical 
conditioning is just to find patterns in the sensory input. Such general evolutionary 
functions do not ground specific functions for acquired representations. Suppose we 
hear a loon’s distinctive song. General-purpose learning mechanisms in the brain can 
track regularities in acoustic input. So, we learn the characteristic acoustic pattern of 
the song. On hearing part of the song, the mechanism can complete the pattern. Is this 
supposed to track loons in general, or an individual loon, or a distinctive pattern in the 
incoming sound waves or auditory neural input? The very general evolutionary function 
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of the learning mechanism does not decide between these. So relational evolutionary 
proper functions are not a promising basis for grounding all content.
Millikan argues that functions can also arise directly from learning when this 
involves a selection process in its own right (Millikan 1984, p. 45, see also Papineau 1987, 
pp. 65–7). She thinks this applies to instrumental conditioning. Dretske (1988) also 
puts forward a theory of content based on instrumental conditioning. An animal acts 
on a stimulus in a new way, which generates a reward, and so cements the disposition 
to act in that way. The reward is delivered because of some aspect of the stimulus; for 
example, the light indicated that there would be a peanut on the right-hand side, and 
the animal learnt to reach to the right-hand side in response to the light. The aspect of 
the correlational information carried by the stimulus which explains why this action 
tendency was stabilized constitutes the content of the new representation formed in 
the process.
Dretske’s account is not based on the evolutionary function of instrumental con-
ditioning. It is a basis of content determination, in a system that undergoes learning, 
that is not derivative from evolutionary functions at all. Nor does it depend on assimi-
lating learning to a process of generate-and-test like natural selection (Kingsbury 2008). 
It suggests that we should have a broader conception of the kinds of stabilizing pro-
cesses that can give rise to content. Indeed, Dretske’s theory is part of the inspiration 
for my approach whereby there are several different stabilizing processes that can 
ground content (Chapter 3). However, Dretske’s account of how content explains 
behaviour only applies to one kind of learning mechanism, instrumental conditioning 
(Dretske 1988, pp. 92–5; 1991, pp. 206–7). The question for teleosemantic theories 
of content is to specify which kinds of stabilizing processes give rise to the kind of 
 etiological functions that ground content—and to explain why a certain way of 
delimiting etiological function is the right one for theories of representation to rely on.
The third main challenge faced by teleosemantics is highlighted by the swampman 
thought experiment. Swampman is an imaginary molecule-for-molecule duplicate 
of  a person (created, let’s say, by random chance when lightning hits a swamp). 
Teleosemantics implies that swampman has no representational states, because he has 
no evolutionary history. Some have taken intuitions about swampman to be a basis for 
objecting to a theory of content. As we will see shortly, intuitions have little probative 
value for our kind of project (§2.2). Nevertheless, the swampman case is important, 
because it highlights an implication of the theory. It forces us to reflect on whether 
there are good reasons for representational content to be based on history.
At first pass, representational explanation does not seem to depend on evolutionary 
history at all. By recognizing that behaviour was driven by a representation of the loca-
tion of an object, say, it seems that the cognitive scientist is picking out a synchronic 
property of the organism. It also seems that the representational vehicle, for example a 
syntactic or neural state, is a synchronic cause of the behaviour. How internal process-
ing unfolds, and hence how the organism will make bodily movements, is caused 
moment-to-moment by the intrinsic properties of representational vehicles. It follows 
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that, if we take an organism that has evolved by natural selection and had a lifetime of 
interacting with its environment, make a duplicate with all the same internal proper-
ties, and place the duplicate in just the same environment, we will be able to make the 
same predictions about how it will behave.
Millikan argues that the intrinsic duplicate falls outside the real kind which under-
pins our inductive practices (Millikan 1996). Our inductions about people and their 
representational properties go right, to the extent that they do, because humans form a 
historical kind, sharing descent from a common ancestor, shaped by natural selection. 
That answer just pushes back the question however. It doesn’t say why there are not 
also non-historical kinds that would enter into the same kinds of explanation. The fact 
that predictions would go right for swampman suggests that there is some synchronic 
property shared by humans, that would also be shared by their intrinsic ahistorical 
duplicates, and which underpins inductions.
The teleosemanticist should pause at this point and ask us to focus on the explan-
andum, the thing which representational contents are called on to explain. We point 
to representations to explain how organisms and other systems manage to interact 
with their environment in useful and intelligent ways. The explanandum is a pattern 
of successful behaviour of a system in its environment. That explanandum is absent at 
the moment swampman is created. It’s not just that swampman has not yet performed 
any behaviour. (He already has dispositions to behave in certain ways.) It is that it’s 
quite unclear that some behaviours should count as successful and others not. So, the 
creature with no history has no contents but that is fine because it has nothing which 
contents are called on to explain.
The ‘no explanandum’ argument does not rescue standard teleosemantics, however 
(see §6.4). It may show that we have no explanandum at the moment of swampman’s 
creation, but it does not show that deep evolutionary history is needed for there to be 
an explanandum in place. As soon as an intrinsic duplicate starts interacting with its 
environment, stabilizing processes will begin to operate. It will do things that contrib-
ute to its persistence as an organism. It will undergo learning: behavioural patterns will 
be repeated or altered based on feedback. Doing things again that have been stabilized 
in the past looks like a kind of success—these are behaviours that have contributed to 
survival of the organism and the persistence of these behavioural dispositions (in the 
recent past). So, an organism’s individual history seems to be enough to set up an 
explanandum which representational contents could be called on to explain.
Dretske’s learning-based theory of content calls for individual learning history 
but not evolutionary history (Dretske 1988). It shows that there being something to 
explain—such as how the organism succeeds in getting food—does not depend on 
evolutionary history. So, an organism’s learning history, taken on its own, seems to be 
enough to ground: (i) an explanandum, concerning the organism’s interactions with 
its environment; and (ii) a kind of representational content suited to explaining those 
interactions. What thinking about swampman shows us is that teleosemantics lacks a 
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good account of why—given its explanatory role—representational content should 
be the kind of property that depends on evolutionary history.
Finally, I come to an objection that can be made to some teleosemantic accounts of 
content, and which also applies to varying extents to other naturalistic theories of 
content. How does content get its explanatory purchase? What does it add to a purely 
causal description of how a system operates and how it interacts with its environment 
to label some of its states with content? Dretske gave an answer to this question, argu-
ing that contents figure in ‘structuring cause’ explanations, explaining why a system is 
wired the way it is, rather than synchronic causal explanations (Dretske 1988). That is 
an exception, however. Most theories of content, while telling us how content is deter-
mined, have relatively little to say about why content determined in that way has a 
special explanatory role (e.g. Fodor 1991). We turn to this issue in the next chapter, 
which sets out a framework for content-determination specifically designed to eluci-
date the explanatory role of content. We return to it again in Chapter 8 once we have 
detailed accounts of content in hand.
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2.1 Setting Aside Some Harder Cases
This chapter sets out the framework within which I will develop my account of content 
(Part II). The focus is on exposition rather than a detailed defence of the approach. 
Nor do I mount arguments against other approaches. The framework needs to be 
judged by its fruits—by whether the accounts of content it underpins are satisfactory. 
Once that has been laid out in Part II of the book, I will return in Part III to discuss 
others’ views and to defend the framework developed here. I start in this section by 
homing in on the class of representation that forms the target of our enquiry.
Existing treatments of content have mostly started with everyday examples like 
occurrent beliefs and desires (doxastic states) and other conscious states. These are 
indeed paradigmatic cases, but they are not the only place where intentionality is mys-
terious and the need for a theory of content is pressing. In information-processing 
explanations in cognitive neuroscience the ‘information’ is in fact representational 
content (e.g. Franklin and Wolpert 2011, Yang and Shadlen 2007). Indeed, the cogni-
tive sciences in general extend well beyond doxastic states and conscious states. They 
are shot through with representations throughout. It is perfectly legitimate for these 
sciences to take the existence of representations—content-bearing physical particulars—
for granted. The sciences of the mind have been remarkably successful in predicting 
and explaining both behaviour and the goings on in the brain. That success goes a long 
way towards vindicating the foundational assumption that neural processes trade in 
mental representations. Nevertheless, the nature of representational content remains 
puzzling even in non-doxastic, non-conscious cases. It would be a considerable 
achievement to understand what makes it the case that these states have the kind of 
intentionality or aboutness presupposed by scientific theories.
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To do that I will set aside some features of everyday representations that make the 
content question more complex. Consciousness is one. I won’t deal with cases where a 
representation’s being conscious is relevant to fixing its content. A second feature of 
ordinary occurrent beliefs and desires1 is that they enter into epistemic relations: 
perceptual states justifying beliefs, beliefs justifying other beliefs, and so on. I set aside 
cases where a representation’s entering into relations of justification for the person are 
relevant to its content. A third feature, which is probably related, is that they are offered 
as reasons in the social process of explaining to others what we believe and why we act 
as we do. When acting together, these reasons or verbal reports feature heavily in delib-
erative joint decision-making. A fourth feature is the kind of constituent structure 
characteristic of natural language; for example, if there were a kind of representation 
only available to those capable of using genuinely singular terms.
To have a suitable shorthand, I will use the term ‘subpersonal’ to cover represen-
tations for which content-determination does not depend on those complicating 
features: consciousness, justification for the person, a role in reason-giving inter-
actions with other people, or being structured like natural language sentences. I am not 
concerned with the question of whether there is a fundamental personal–subpersonal 
distinction; for example, a division between incommensurate schemes of explanation 
(Hornsby 1997, 2000). Nor is ‘subpersonal’ supposed to connote a distinction between 
the whole organism and its parts. I use the term simply as an umbrella term for 
 disclaiming these four complicating factors.
Considerable progress was made on the content question in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
the time since then we have learnt much more about the way mental representations 
are realized in neural processes. A standard line then was that we would never discern 
vehicles of content amongst the messy workings of the brain (Fodor 1974, 1987a). The 
representational level of explanation was taken to be autonomous from the neural to 
the extent that we should theorize about it separately, without looking to facts about 
neural realization as a substantial evidential constraint. More recent progress in 
uncovering the neural basis of representation gives the philosopher of content some 
fantastic material to work with: cases where a well-confirmed account of the computa-
tional processing that generates behaviour can be married with a detailed understanding 
of the processes in which neural representations are realized. Two cases where there is 
a convincing computational explanation realized in a well-supported neural mechanism 
are the neural mechanisms for accumulating probabilistic information about reward 
(Yang and Shadlen 2007) and the neural circuit responsible for motor control (Wolpert 
et al. 1998, Franklin and Wolpert 2011). Figure 2.1 illustrates the latter case. The details 
need not detain us; it is enough to notice the characteristic pattern of explanation: the 
circuit is described both neuro-anatomically, and also computationally—in terms of the 
representational contents carried by those neural areas and the way their interactions 
1 Standing beliefs and desires are not conscious, but it is not clear whether there are representational 
vehicles for these contents.
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compute a useful function. Because of these developments, we now have a wealth of 
empirical data against which to formulate and test theories of neural representation.
Since non-conscious, non-doxastic neural representations raise the problem of 
content in a clear way, one central aim of the book is to provide a theory of content for 
them. Neural representations form the subject matter of some of our central case studies. 
Although I’m keen to endorse the idea of neural representation and show that it makes 
sense, calling the book ‘Representation in the Brain’ would be misleadingly narrow. 
The same issues arise in other parts of cognitive science, where there are good reasons 
think representations are causally interacting physical particulars, but where their 
neural realization is unknown and could prove intractable. Many of these cases are 
also subpersonal in the sense of lacking our complicating features. So ‘Representation 
for Cognitive Science’ is a better description. Cognitive science does of course also 
encompass doxastic and conscious states, so my account is not intended to apply to all 
of cognitive science. What I’m aiming for is an account that applies widely within the 
cognitive sciences, and which underscores the legitimacy of its reliance on a notion of 
representation. Hence: Representation in Cognitive Science.
My overall philosophical strategy, then, is to start with the subpersonal and work 
upwards. This inverts the normal approach.2 But the normal approach has not been 
entirely successful to date. If we are puzzled about how there could be space in the 
2 Cf. Karen Neander’s recent book which also focuses on simpler cases. Her target is non-conceptual 
representations (Neander 2017, pp. 27–46).
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Figure 2.1 Diagram of a leading theory of motor control (Wolpert et al. 1998), used here to 
illustrate what is characteristic of neural representations. Prescinding from the details, neural 
areas are picked out both anatomically and in terms of what is represented and computed.
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natural world for intentionality at all, then seeing how it arises in a range of cases in 
cognitive science will be a major step towards resolving the puzzle. Furthermore, see-
ing how representational content arises and earns its explanatory keep in these cases 
should prove a useful staging post on the way to tackling the more complex cases. So, 
an account of subpersonal representational content is part of a broader strategy for 
tackling the problem of intentionality. Given the starring role of representational 
notions in the cognitive sciences, it would also be a significant result in its own right.
2.2 What Should Constrain Our Theorizing?
The most widespread way to test theories of content has been to line them up against 
intuitions about what mental states represent. That method reached an impasse of 
conflicting and often theory-driven intuitions. Especially when focusing on the sub-
personal, it is clear that intuitions should be given little weight. For personal-level 
mental states, like beliefs and desires, we have some reason to rely on our intuitions 
about content, our judgements about what our thoughts mean. Even there, experimental 
results on the unreliability of intuition when people are giving common-sense explan-
ations of their behaviour should be make us cautious (Nisbett and Wilson  1977, 
Johansson et al. 2005, Carruthers 2011). When it comes to subpersonal representa-
tions, it is unclear why intuitions about their content should be reliable at all.
I take a different approach. A theory of content is answerable not to intuition, but to 
the role representations play in explaining behaviour. The rat finds its way back to food 
in a maze because it accurately represents its position and the location of food. 
Representing correctly explains successful behaviour and misrepresentation explains 
failure. A good theory of content should show how the contents it specifies are suited to 
explaining behaviour in that way.3
To do that we need to examine a range of cases where subpersonal representations 
explain an organism’s outputs.4 Experimental psychology and cognitive neurosci-
ence give us a large number to choose from. We’ll mostly look at the behaviour of 
organisms, but artefacts like computers and control devices also produce outputs in 
response to their environments as a result of representation processing. I’ll use 
‘behaviour’ as a neutral term for actions and other outputs (but not internal workings) 
and ‘system’ as an umbrella term for organisms and other entities whose behaviour is 
representationally generated.5
When a scientific explanation points to representational content to explain behaviour, 
we need to get inside that explanation to see how it works. That means getting into the 
3 I remain neutral on whether representation has further explanatory roles; for example, explaining why 
internal processing unfolds in a certain way.
4 In all of our case studies, outputs are actions and their consequences; but other kinds of output can 
also be considered; for instance, physiological, hormonal, and neurochemical outputs.
5 This includes some systems that have organisms as subsystems. The honeybee colony is a system in 
this sense. An individual consumer bee is a subsystem of this system.
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details of a behavioural profile and its causal underpinnings. Only with the details in 
view can we properly address the question: what kind of thing is representational 
content, to enable behaviour to be explained in that way? We should be open to finding 
cases where the attributed representational content is doing no work—it is just a way of 
understanding the system, a useful fiction—or where content is different from that 
attributed by the psychological theory. If our conclusions are going to have general 
applicability, we need to pursue a wide range of case studies so as to sample systems 
that have different features and operate in different ways: perceptual, motoric, and 
cognitive, in humans and in other animals. So, a seemingly innocuous desideratum—
that representational content should be characterized by reference to its explanatory 
role—turns out to be a prescription for getting into the details of a wide range of 
case studies from subpersonal empirical psychology. That is exactly what we will do 
in this book.
The project is to put forward one or more theories of content that tell us how the 
representations involved in these case studies get their contents. Rather than intuition, 
our theorizing is constrained by a desideratum, something we want to explain. What 
we want to explain is how adverting to representational content allows us to explain 
behaviour. We want an account of content which shows why content plays that propri-
etary explanatory role:6
Desideratum
An account of how representational content is constituted in a class of systems 
should allow us to show why recognizing the representational properties of such 
systems enables better explanations of behaviour than would be available otherwise.
Since we are investigating cases where there are real vehicles of representational 
content, individuable non-representationally, a causal account of the operation of the 
system in terms of vehicle properties will always be available in principle. The vehicles 
in a computer are electrical currents in semi-conducting chips, which causally interact 
in virtue of their electrical properties; similarly for neural vehicles consisting of 
 patterns of neural activity. Neural activity unfolds in virtue of electrical and chemical 
properties of neurons and synapses. Vehicle properties depend only on intrinsic phys-
ical properties of the system, its parts, and their interrelations. So, any interaction with 
the distal environment could in principle be ‘factorized’ into three components: the 
way the environment causes changes to intrinsic physical properties of inputs to the 
system; the way those inputs cause changes to other internal states of the system, issuing 
eventually in motor movements produced by the system; and the way those move-
ments of the system cause changes to its distal environment. To meet the desideratum, 
6 I call this a desideratum, rather than a necessary condition on the existence of content. If it were not 
met, it’s not clear that we would be forced to give up on there being representational content, rather than 
changing our expectations about the nature of content.
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representational content has to offer a better explanation of behaviour than such 
a ‘factorized’ explanation can provide (see §8.2).
To take an example from Ramsey (2007, pp. 138, 140–1), a rifle responds to a finger 
movement by discharging a bullet from the muzzle. There is an internal mechanism 
whereby movement of the trigger (input) causes movement of the firing pin, causing 
ignition of the primer in the cartridge, causing explosion of the propellant, causing the 
bullet to travel down the barrel and exit the muzzle at speed (Figure 2.2). The move-
ment of the firing pin is designed to correlate with movement of the trigger finger at 
input, and to lead to the firing of a bullet at output. A teleosemantic theory, based on 
deliberate design rather than evolutionary function, could treat the cartridge as a 
‘consumer’ for the state of the firing pin, implying that when the pin moves it represents 
the trigger has been pressed, fire a bullet. However here a representational explanation 
of the behaviour of the rifle would march exactly in step with a factorized explanation 
that simply describes the causal chain from finger to trigger to firing pin to primer 
to propellant to bullet—without mentioning content at all. The widely used example of 
magnetotactic bacteria is also a case where a factorized explanation marches exactly in 
step with the putative representational explanation. As standardly described in the 
philosophical literature the bacterium contains a little magnet which causes the whole 
organism to align with the direction of the earth’s magnetic field hence to swim in that 
direction (Dretske 1986): magnetic field causes alignment causes direction of motion. 
We will see that the bacterium will not satisfy our conditions for having representa-
tional content (§8.2b).
Our desideratum is to show why representational content allows for better explan-
ations than would be available otherwise. Theorists often make a stronger demand: that 
a theory of content should show why representational explanations are indispensable, 
Figure 2.2 The mechanism for firing a rifle (an example discussed by Ramsey 2007).
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allowing us to explain something that could not be explained otherwise (Dennett 1971). 
That is too strong. If appealing to representations offers a better or more perspicuous 
explanation of behaviour than would be available otherwise, that is a sufficient motiv-
ation for adverting to representations when explaining behaviour. This chapter puts 
forward a framework designed to meet the desideratum, but it is not until we have the 
positive accounts of content in hand that I will be able to show how content-based 
explanation captures something important that the factorized explanation misses 
(§3.6 and §8.2b).
I am not aiming to analyse the concept of representation: the everyday notion or the 
scientific notion. The theories discussed in Chapter 1 are often rejected as failing to 
accord with intuition. My test is whether they meet our desideratum. I take my task to 
be to define some technical terms and show that they are useful. Various kinds of 
content are defined in the chapters to come (UE information and UE structural corres-
pondence, both based on a variety of task functions). What I aim to show is that these 
terms are non-empty and that the properties they pick out are useful for explaining 
behaviour. They are properties of internal vehicles that allow for the explanation of 
successful and unsuccessful behaviour of an organism in terms of correct and incorrect 
representation. This does not imply that an organism only has content when it would 
be useful to treat it as having content. That is a different kind of theory, one which 
makes the very existence of content relative to its explanatory merits for an interpreter. 
I do aim to show how content, as I define it, gets a useful explanatory role in general, 
but that does not imply that every instance of content is explanatorily useful, nor does 
it make the existence of content relative to an interpreter. The properties defined by 
the terms I will introduce exist whether or not anyone is around to make explanatory 
use of them.
2.3 Externalist Explanandum, Externalist Explanans
As we saw in the last chapter, underlying the idea that the mind processes mental repre-
sentations (RTM) is a core insight: mental representations are physical particulars 
which interact causally in virtue of non-semantic properties (e.g. their physical form) 
in ways that are faithful to their semantic properties.7 Psychological processes like 
thinking, perceiving, planning, reasoning and imagining consist of causal processes 
taking place between representations with appropriate contents. Here I explain how 
I think that insight is best understood.
RTM is committed to there being real, individuable vehicles of content. The problem 
we have just seen then becomes pressing. A complete causal account of the operation of 
the system will be available in non-contentful terms. Proximal stimulation at input will 
cause the system to undergo various internal transitions that eventuate in movements 
at output. Intermediate entities at various stages of this process may have semantic 
7 §8.3 discusses the causal efficacy of semantic properties.
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properties, but content does not figure in the underlying causal story about internal 
transitions and bodily movements. We can see this very clearly when we look at a com-
putational system designed to calculate how money flows through the UK economy. 
Moniac is a computer that uses water in tanks to represent money. It is obvious that the 
various levels of water representing national income, imports, tax, and so on interact 
solely in virtue of the physical properties of water and of the mechanisms it flows 
through (Figure 2.3). The vehicles are much harder to observe in psychological cases, 
but the principle is the same—a non-semantic causal story is always available.
Contents come into view when we target a different explanandum. An organism 
interacts with the environment, bringing about distal effects in its environment, doing 
so by reacting to distal objects and properties in the environment. There are real pat-
terns in the environment and an agent’s interactions with it that would be invisible if 
we looked only at intrinsic properties of the agent.8 Those patterns call for explanation. 
They are an additional explanandum, beyond the question of how processes within an 
organism unfold over time—an explanandum concerning the organism’s interactions 
with its environment. Given an externalist explanandum, externalist properties 
of the system and its components are good candidates to figure in the explanation 
(Peacocke  1993). Which externalist properties? Plausibly content properties, if 
contents are externalist. Representational contents figure in explanations of how an 
organism interacts with its environment and achieves distal effects in its environment. 
So it makes sense that content should be externalist, determined partly by extrinsic 
properties of representational vehicles (cp. Ramsey 2007, pp. 95–6). Contents would 
then be suited to explaining real patterns that are the result of organism–environment 
interactions. They would then explain things which purely intrinsic properties of the 
system do not.
Not every possible interaction between a system and the environments it could be 
placed in calls for explanation in this way. The way a spider is swept down a river does 
not. Nor does every system enter into the sorts of interaction that representations are 
characteristically called upon to explain (none of a river’s interactions call for the river 
to be a representer). I take from teleosemantics the idea that it is when a system is 
performing a function (e.g. getting nectar for the hive) that representational explan-
ation becomes pertinent. Or at least, that explaining the performance of functions is 
one central way that representation gets its explanatory purchase. Chapter 3 develops a 
more general account, going beyond evolution by natural selection, of which input–
output behaviour generated by an organism counts as functional. I call these ‘task 
functions’. The important point for us now is that an organism with task functions 
achieves distal effects in its environment, can do so successfully or unsuccessfully, 
8 I adopt Dennett’s catchy terminology without aiming to capture exactly what he meant by ‘real pat-
terns’ (Dennett 1991). For me, real patterns are observer-independent approximate regularities occurring 
at some level of description whose existence allows us to describe the system in a more compact way at a 
more coarse-grained, less fundamental level (cp. Ladyman and Ross 2007, Ladyman 2017). Being more 
fundamental is a matter of applying at more scales (of length, time, or energy).
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Figure 2.3 ‘Moniac’ uses water to compute the way money flows through the UK economy.
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and does so by reacting to and interacting with distal objects and properties in its 
environment. A task function performed by an organism comprises an explanandum, 
about an organism’s interactions with its environment, to which representational 
explanations can be addressed.
A task function is mapping from some states to others. For example, a rat can take 
itself from a range of locations to a new location where there is food and ingest it. A 
person can take some materials and make them into a coat. The first is a mapping from 
one organism-environment relation to another, the second a mapping from one state 
of the environment to another. Both are mediated by the activity of the organism. For a 
given function, there are many possible ways to perform it. Doing arithmetic, people 
perform a function that takes written numbers as input (say) and produces a written 
number, their product, as output. There are many different ways of achieving that input–
output mapping. I might use long multiplication in columns with carrying. That is a 
way of producing the appropriate input–output mapping. The same is true for moving 
from one location to another or transforming some materials into a coat. Those map-
pings between states can be achieved in multiple ways, and there is a fact of the matter 
about how a particular organism does it.
David Marr’s algorithmic level specifies the way a function is carried out by a system 
(Marr 1982). Long multiplication in columns is an algorithm for multiplying together 
any two numbers. Stretching the term slightly, I am going to use the term ‘algorithm’ 
for the way an organism carries out functions of the kind I have just described 
(navigating its environment, getting food, making tools, etc.). In the multiplication 
case the organism is calculating the input–output function (from two numbers to their 
product), but in the other cases the idea is looser. The organism carries out an algo-
rithmic process over representations in a way that leads to it achieving the function 
(e.g. getting from one location to another and ingesting the food there). In my sense an 
algorithm is a sequence of operations between representations that leads to an organism 
performing a function.9 The sequence of operations is a computation carried out by 
the organism.10
In my usage algorithms are concrete. They are a way of processing representations 
that is realized in some organism or other system. An algorithm described in terms of 
transitions between contents is neutral about how those transitions are realized, save that 
there must be states of the system that carry the appropriate contents and undergo the 
9 The stipulation that algorithms must involve representations is just for convenience of exposition. 
I am not assuming a semantic view of computation individuation. A sequence of operations over non-
semantic states that can be carried out in a finite amount of space and time could also be described as 
algorithmic. On some views it could count as a computation irrespective of whether anything is repre-
sented. In that sense the rules for the flow of activity in a connectionist network would count as algorithmic, 
as would the learning rule. Which kinds of connectionist processing count as algorithmic in my sense 
depends on how it is appropriate to describe them representationally (Shea 2007a).
10 Some theorists reserve the term ‘computation’ for processes that deal in discrete states (Eliasmith 2010, 
p. 314), whereas others use it more broadly, so that the idea of analogue computation is not self-contradictory. 
I adopt the broader usage, covering all cases where representations are physical particulars, processed in 
virtue of their vehicle properties in ways that respect their semantics.
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appropriate transitions. Those transitions must also be describable non-semantically, 
in terms of the way the system moves between physical states—what is often called 
a syntactic description. It is this constraint which makes for a realist answer to the 
question: which algorithm is system S using to perform function F? Steps of the 
algorithm have to map onto causal transitions in the internal processing going on 
within the system.11 There are several ways the problem of achieving a given input–
output mapping could be broken down into intermediate steps (see Figure 2.4). A given 
system uses one of them. Vehicle realism means that the representational explanation 
of behaviour is an account of the particular way a system achieves a given input–output 
mapping, hence of how it manages to perform a task function.
In most examples from the cognitive sciences the inputs that the system responds to 
and the outputs being explained are not intrinsic features of the organism, but are 
partly externalist.12 Suppose we have a system that has been trained to track the direc-
tion of motion of surfaces and make a movement in the corresponding direction. One 
algorithm for doing that keeps track separately of the colour and motion of small 
portions of surface, and then combines that information to infer which portions of 
surface are parts of the same surface and what the overall direction of motion of each 
surface is (§4.7). Steps of the algorithm are described in terms of their representational 
content, such as representing the colour of the surface-portion at such-and-such 
location. Processing a series of representations with those contents is the way the 
system produces the distal input-output mapping.
As we just saw, if contents are going to explain how a system performs a distal func-
tion, we should expect content to be determined in part by extrinsic properties of the 
vehicles of content: relations those vehicles bear to objects and properties outside the 
system. Which relations? Here I draw on Peter Godfrey-Smith’s idea that representa-
tions bear exploitable relations to features of the environment (Godfrey-Smith 2006). 
Godfrey-Smith takes that to be part of his ‘basic representationalist model’, but the 
11 The processing has to undergo transitions that are called for by the algorithm, hence appropriate to 
the contents represented, but that does not imply that the causal processing is sensitive to content.
12 That feature is not widely noted in cognitive science. It is debated in philosophy (Egan 1991, Segal 1991).
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Figure 2.4 The input–output mapping produced by a system does not fix what goes on inside 
the box. The mapping could be generated by a look-up table and usually also by several other 
algorithms.
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idea is still applicable when we drop the requirement for a representation consumer 
(§1.5). The entire system processes a variety of representations, possibly in complex 
ways, so as to carry out a distal task function from some states to others. In order to 
perform that function, the system makes use of the fact that intermediate components—
vehicles of content—bear exploitable relations to distal features of the environment. 
One useful relation is to have a component that correlates with a relevant feature of the 
environment (Chapter 4); for example, that correlates with the colour of part of an 
object. Another useful relation is to have a structured set of components whose 
structure mirrors an important structure in the environment (Chapter 5); for example, 
to have a cognitive map of the spatial environment. The system as a whole makes use of 
these exploitable relations in calculating how to behave.
To be an implementation of an algorithm for performing a system’s distal functions, 
internal components must have two kinds of properties at once. Causal transitions 
between vehicles must be those called for by the algorithm. That is a matter of the 
intrinsic properties that drive internal processing. And components must also have 
extrinsic properties that give rise to the contents which are called for by the algorithm. 
(How that can be so is the subject of the rest of the book.) Those contents must be 
respected when the vehicles are processed: intrinsic properties of the vehicles and the 
system in which they are processed must be such that the transitions between vehicles 
make sense in the light of the vehicles’ relevant extrinsic properties. Exploitable 
relations are the link between internal components and the distally characterized task 
function which the organism is performing. It is the coming together of extrinsic 
properties and intrinsic properties in this way that gives rise to content.13
2.4 Representation Without a Homunculus
One alluring but mistaken way of thinking about mental representations is as being 
inner sentences that are understood by some internal homunculus. The model is the 
way we understand external sentences: we hear the words and attach meaning to them. 
It is a mistake to think we do something similar with mental representations: that 
when they occur in the mind we have to look up their meaning before we can reason or 
act appropriately. That would require some kind of inner interpreter of the mental 
representation, launching a regress.
The ‘homuncular functionalist strategy’ avoids the regress (Dennett 1978). First off 
let’s see how this works if we presuppose representation consumers, before generalizing 
the insight to my account. The consumer of a representation does not understand its 
meaning. It is just disposed to react to a representation by producing a certain behaviour. 
The consumer is not acting that way because the representation has a certain meaning. 
Rather, the fact that the consumer behaves in that way constitutes the representation as 
13 . . . gives rise to the kind of content we are investigating here (see point about pluralism below). That 
caveat is implicit throughout.
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having a certain meaning. Consumer honeybees don’t need to understand the dances 
they observe; they just need a causal disposition to fly off to the corresponding location. 
Their behaviour constitutes a dance as having a certain meaning.
The homuncular functionalist strategy is to show that a complex mental capacity 
arises from the interaction of simpler components, bottoming out in components 
whose causal operation does not presuppose any mentality or intentionality. My 
account of content (Chapters 3–5) does not rely on content-constituting consumers. 
But it still makes use of the homuncular functionalist strategy. Content arises out of the 
fact that a system has a certain kind of internal organization and is performing a certain 
function. Nothing in the system needs to interpret the internal representations or 
understand their content. Later chapters contain detailed proposals for the way content 
arises when functions, internal processing, and exploitable relations come together in 
the right way. These are all perfectly un-mysterious natural facts about an organism, 
computer or other system. The system’s interactions with its environment have stabil-
ized the performance of certain functions. It has a certain internal organization. 
Components correlate with or correspond structurally with distal features of the 
environment. If content is constructed out of these properties, as I claim, then content 
properties arise automatically when a system of the right kind is embedded in the right 
kind of task environment. They don’t presuppose an internal understander of repre-
sentational content.14
2.5 What Vehicle Realism Buys
In cases where realism about representation is justified there is a further question 
about whether it offers any explanatory advantages. This section offers a perspective 
on that question which fits with the account to come.15
According to RTM, transitions between mental representations are faithful to their 
contents, amounting to an algorithm by which a system achieves its functions. It is not 
just by chance, or through a look-up table, that the system instantiates a useful input–
output mapping. It implements an algorithm and, if more than one algorithm would 
produce the same mapping, there is a fact of the matter about which one the system is 
in fact using. That is underpinned by the commitment to there being real vehicles of 
content. The algorithm must operate over a set of vehicles that can be individuated 
non-semantically and must follow a series of processing steps that can be specified 
non-semantically. Thus, vehicle realism is needed for representations to be involved in 
explaining how a system achieves its task functions in the way discussed above (§2.3). 
14 Nor does content depend on an interpreter in a second sense: an external interpreter that treats the 
system as having contents. Having content of the kind described here depends on having a certain complex 
of observer-independent properties. Systems that have these properties are susceptible to a special scheme 
of explanation, but being so-explicable is not what makes it the case that a system has contentful represen-
tations: see §4.2b and §8.5a.
15 I return to these issues in Chapter 8.
38 Framework
That is the first of three explanatory advantages of vehicle realism: phenomena that it 
allows us to explain in a distinctive way.
The second is that it predicts a pattern in the way errors propagate. Not only does 
correct representation explain success and misrepresentation explain failure, but we 
can make predictions about patterns of failure. An incorrect representation will 
produce consequences in downstream processing: one error will propagate and lead 
to other errors downstream, errors that make sense in the light of the misrepresented 
content. Correlatively, parts of processing that occur before the misrepresentation, or 
are insulated from it, will not be driven into error thereby. Consider a mechanism that 
computes object motion by first representing the colour and local motion of small 
portions of a surface, and then integrating that information into representations of 
moving surfaces. A misrepresentation at an early stage, such as about local colour, is 
likely to lead to an error about global motion at a later processing stage. The converse is 
not true (in a case where only feedforward processing is involved): an error introduced 
at the stage of computing global motion will not cause errors at earlier stages, such as 
representing local colour. Ascriptionist views about content do not predict these kinds 
of systematic relations between incorrect representations.16 If representations were 
not real entities in the system, individuable non-semantically, we would lack a ready 
explanation of why errors should propagate and pattern in these ways.
Thirdly, vehicle realism explains a familiar pattern of stability and change in repre-
sentational capacities over time. A system tends to keep the same representational 
resources over time and, when they change, representations tend to be gained and 
lost piecemeal. Exploring an environment, we learn about new locations one at a time. 
If representational contents were just attributed as a useful summary of behavioural 
patterns, it would be unclear why changes to the system’s behavioural dispositions 
should go along with piecemeal rather than wholescale changes to the ascribable 
contents. In cases where this phenomenon is observed empirically, the representational 
realist has a ready explanation in terms of the gain and loss of representational vehicles.
Those three patterns of explanation depend on realism about representation: upon 
there being a substantial non-semantic sense in which an individual token counts as 
being the same representation again.17 What makes different tokens instances of the 
same representation is that their non-semantic properties ensure they are processed 
in the same way by the system. So representational vehicles can be individuated 
non-semantically, in terms of intrinsic properties of the system.
16 NB Davidson’s and Dennett’s views were not intended to apply to subpersonal representations.
17 Neo-Fregean senses would explain some phenomena of the second and third type (patterns of error 
and piecemeal change). (Recall that I’m leaving aside contents at the level of sense, if they exist, and just 
focusing on referential content.) Senses won’t replace vehicles. Vehicle realism is still needed to secure the 
first explanatory advantage. It is also needed to explain differences that go beyond modes of presentation, 
e.g. between different people who grasp the same sense, or a single thinker failing to identify two repre-
sentation tokens which have the same sense. I don’t here get into the converse question of whether the 
idea of vehicles and syntactic types allows us to do without senses (Millikan 2000, Sainsbury and Tye 2007, 
Recanati 2012).
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Care is needed with the idea of a vehicle. A vehicle is the particular that bears 
 representational content. Words on the page are vehicles of content. In referring to 
the word we don’t just pick out ink marks on the page, we individuate them as falling 
under a type. The word ‘barn’ is a type that includes ‘BARN’, ‘barn’ and ‘barn’. However, 
the way those marks get their meaning depends not just on their intrinsic shape, but on 
what language they’re being used in. The string of letters ‘barn’ in Swedish means child 
not barn. I will use the term ‘syntactic type’18 for the way of typing vehicles that aligns 
with content assignment: same syntactic type ensures same content.19 For a case like 
‘barn’ we would commonly say that the same representational vehicle means different 
things in English and Swedish. So, vehicles are not the same thing as syntactic types. 
The same vehicle can fall under different syntactic types in different contexts. Syntactic 
typing depends on the way a vehicle is processed. Analogously, the vehicle ‘barn’ is 
processed one way in English and another in Swedish. We are not looking at natural 
language and in our cases the way a vehicle is processed depends only on intrinsic 
properties of the organism/system doing the processing. So, although syntactic type 
need not be an intrinsic property of the representational vehicle, syntactic types can be 
individuated in terms of intrinsic properties of the system.
In short, vehicles are individual bearers of content picked out in terms of intrinsic 
processing-relevant non-semantic properties; and syntactic types are ways of typing 
vehicles into non-semantic types that are processed the same way by the system, and so 
are guaranteed to have the same content. In the brain, a distributed pattern of firing in 
a cortical layer can be a vehicle of content. Neural reuse means that the same pattern of 
firing may be put to different uses and processed differently when the organism is per-
forming different tasks. So, the same neural vehicle (pattern of firing) may fall under 
different syntactic types as its effective functional connectivity changes. It may repre-
sent spatial location when processing is set up one way, and episodes in the organism’s 
past when processing is set up another way.
Recall the dual nature of content (§2.3). Content arises from the convergence 
between an externally specified function being performed by a system and internal 
processing which implements an algorithm for performing that function. It follows 
that whether an internally specified state counts as a vehicle of content at all depends in 
part on the system’s environment. Being a representation is not dependent only on 
intrinsic properties of the system. Syntactic typing is therefore partly externalist. In 
Shea (2013b, pp. 504–7) I give an example where what counts as one vehicle for one 
task divides up into many vehicles when the system is performing a different task. Is 
syntactic externalism compatible with the explanatory advantages which I have just 
claimed follow from vehicle realism? Yes, because it still follows that instances of the 
18 Syntactic does not here imply that the representation has to have constituent structure. It connotes 
that aspect of syntax that is about individuating the content-bearers, doing so non-semantically. Given the 
problems with the term ‘vehicle’ there seems no better term than ‘syntactic type’ for the non-semantically 
individuated typing to which contents are assigned.
19 I am leaving aside problems of indexicality (§8.6).
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same syntactic type within a given system will share processing-relevant intrinsic 
 properties. That is what is needed to secure the advantages of realism: to give reality to 
the algorithm, to predict relations between errors within a system, and to explain 
stability and piecemeal change of representational resources in a system over time. 
Which intrinsic properties count as syntactic types in a given system will however 
depend on factors extrinsic to the system.20
Syntactic types can be based on properties of dynamical processes. Indeed, neural 
firing rate is a dynamical property. Dynamical systems theory is used to launch many 
different arguments against the representational theory of mind but, taken alone, the 
observation that dynamical processes are responsible for generating behaviour does 
not in itself undermine representationalism. Elements in a dynamical system can have 
vehicle properties that are calculated over so as to implement an algorithm for produ-
cing appropriate behaviour. To take an imaginary example, suppose walking depends 
on synchronizing the frequency of two dynamic loops, one involving each leg, the 
brain involved in both. The oscillation frequency of one leg-involving loop is not fixed 
by properties of motor neurons alone. It also depends on the weight of the leg, the 
physical properties of the bones and muscles, how they are coupled to each other, and 
their coupling to the brain via outgoing and incoming nerves. The phase offset between 
the oscillations in the loops for the right and left legs could be a vehicle of content; for 
example, an imperative representation of whether to speed up or slow down. It could 
interact in internal processing with other dynamic vehicles; for example, the recent 
rate of energy depletion (acting as a representation of urgency). There, dynamical 
properties would interact in ways that are faithful to representational contents.
It is of course a substantial question whether a dynamical system is a representa-
tional system and whether any dynamical properties are the basis for syntactic types. 
Useful behaviour can be achieved by some appropriately organized dynamical systems 
without any representations being involved at all. However, our framework applies 
very readily to dynamical cases and there is nothing in dynamicism as such which 
counts against dynamical properties being vehicles of content. Dynamical parameters 
like frequency, resonance, phase, impedance, and gain are all candidates.
I end this discussion of vehicle realism with a brief note about the underlying meta-
physics and its relation to reductive and non-reductive physicalism. One way of natur-
alizing content is by reducing it to something else: finding a property identity. On the 
reductive view, having the representational content p is identical to having some 
(possibly complex) non-semantic, non-mental, non-normative property. That would 
indeed show, in naturalistic terms, how content is determined. A naturalistic theory of 
content need not, however, be reductive. It is a familiar point that many special sciences 
20 Oron Shagrir makes the same argument about the nature of computation (Shagrir 2001), where simi-
lar issues arise. On his view (a version of the sematic view of computation), whether a system is performing 
a computation depends in part on factors extrinsic to the system (Crane 1990, Bontley 1998, Horowitz 2007).
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deal in properties that are not reducible to a more fundamental science. That is likely to 
be true of representational content as well.
Non-reductive physicalism is compatible with there being exceptions to the gener-
alizations which connect properties in different domains, with there being ceteris 
paribus bridge laws between different schemes of explanation. So, the account which 
says how other properties determine content properties could admit of exceptions, 
provided content supervenes globally on physical properties.21 A sufficient condition 
for content determination, although it has nomological force (it is a non-accidental 
generalization), may admit of exceptions where the condition is satisfied but there is 
no content, exceptions that can only be explained at some other more fundamental level.
Furthermore, it would be adequate to have a series of different content-determining 
conditions. Each would be a content-determining sufficient condition22 applicable to 
certain cases. That would be enough to show how an appropriate constellation of prop-
erties from other special sciences gives rise to content. There is no need to find a single 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions that covers all possible cases. Naturalism is a 
substantial requirement but it does not demand that we find a property identity.23
2.6 Pluralism: Varitel Semantics
So far I have set out a framework for realism about mental representation. The frame-
work has two variable elements: the source of the distal functions performed by a system; 
and the nature of the relations that elements in the system bear to the environment, 
which are exploited in order for the system to perform those functions. The case studies 
to follow will show how these arise in different ways.
Two types of exploitable relation cover all the cases we will consider: carrying 
correlational information (Chapter 4) and bearing a structural correspondence 
(Chapter 5). I am not committed to there being a single overarching property, bearing 
an exploitable relation, which covers both of these cases without over-generalizing, 
applying to too many other cases. I don’t take it to be an objection to the account that it 
offers more than one sufficient content-determining condition. So, I present the 
accounts disjunctively. Exploited correlational information appears in one set of suffi-
cient conditions (conditions for ‘UE information’, Chapter 4), exploited structural 
correspondence appears in another (conditions for ‘UE structural correspondence’, 
21 That is, there should be no content difference without a non-semantic, non-mental, non-normative 
difference somewhere. A case which counts as an exception to a ceteris paribus bridge law should be differ-
ent in some respect to those which fall under the law.
22 While aiming only at a sufficient condition, we still want to avoid otiose clauses or unnecessary 
requirements. Every requirement should be a necessary part of the sufficient condition.
23 A disjunction of such conditions, even if the list were closed, does not automatically amount to a 
reduction, since arbitrary disjunctions of properties may not be the right kind of thing to figure in a reductive 
property identity.
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Chapter 5). I am not attempting to define a single overarching technical term that 
 covers both cases. If a definition that would cover both cases applies beyond cases 
of correlation or structural correspondence, then there is a significant risk that the 
resulting notion would apply to too many cases. Liberality per se is not objectionable, if 
it is just generality, but liberality is an objection if it robs content of its distinctive 
explanatory purchase. Therefore, I carry out the project in a way that is open to pluralism: 
to content being constituted differently in different cases.24
Functions are a second source of pluralism within my framework. Different kinds of 
function can underpin content. I have already suggested the idea that stabilizing 
processes other than natural selection can underpin a distinction between successful 
and unsuccessful behaviour (§1.5). Dretske’s case of instrumental conditioning is one 
example (Dretske 1988). The next chapter argues that at least four different processes 
give rise to teleofunctions: evolution by natural selection, behavioural learning from 
feedback, contribution to persistence of an individual organism, and deliberate design. 
We can recognize that several different processes give rise to teleofunctions without 
being committed to there being a single overarching theory of function that covers all 
of the cases—without over-generating and hence robbing the category of its explana-
tory purchase.
I unite three of these teleofunctional processes under the label ‘stabilized function’ 
(§3.4), and all four under the label ‘task function’ (§3.5). This makes it seem as if I do 
have a single overarching account of function: task function. In fact, the label ‘task 
function’ is just a terminological convenience. Since stabilized functions and task 
functions have disjunctive definitions, they in effect generate a series of different 
conditions for content. That is a second source of pluralism, giving us 2 (exploitable 
relations) x 4 (functions) content-determining conditions. Those conditions bear a 
striking family resemblance to each other, but I am not committed to there being a 
single ur-theory which encompasses them all without being too liberal (i.e. which still 
ensures that there is something distinctive about content explanation). These are all 
properties that deserve the label ‘representational content’, but the result of pluralism 
is that I am not offering a single overarching set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for content.
A final source of pluralism is the simplifying move at the start of this chapter: setting 
aside representations at the personal level. I do think we will need a different theory to 
account for the content of beliefs and desires, and of conscious states; maybe more 
than one. But I don’t need to make an argument to that effect here. For now my claim is 
that content may be constituted differently at the personal level, so the accounts offered 
below should not be tested against the contents of personal-level states.
24 My pluralism was inspired by Godfrey-Smith (2004), although his pluralism about representation in 
cognitive science is based on variation in what scientists think the most fundamental basis of meaning is 
when they apply the basic representationalist model. My pluralism has a different motivation.
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I will not be making a positive argument for pluralism. The point of being open to 
pluralism is that it allows me to resist the pressure to find a single overarching neces-
sary and sufficient condition that covers all the cases. We may get one theory of content 
that gives us a good account of the correctness conditions involved in animal signalling, 
say, and another one for cognitive maps in the rat hippocampus. There is no need to 
find a single account that covers both.
When in the past I argued that a theory of content which combines correlational 
information with teleofunctions is applicable to some simple cases like animal signalling 
I gave the combination the label ‘infotel’ semantics (Shea 2007b). The framework devel-
oped here, as well as being different in some respects, is also more widely applicable. 
A variety of exploitable relations are involved: correlational information and struc-
tural correspondence. Indeed, it could turn out that other kinds of exploitable relation 
exist in other cases. A second source of variation is the range of different functions that 
can underpin content. So ‘varitel’ semantics seems like a good term, with the ‘vari’ 
marking both variations in the exploitable relations and variations in the teleofunc-
tions involved. The resonance with ‘varietal’ is apposite, registering the fact that my 
account of content comes in several non-overlapping varieties.25
This chapter has set out the framework of varitel semantics and motivated it as an 
approach to naturalizing content. It has several distinctive features. Pluralism is one, as 
is the focus on what I have been calling subpersonal contents. My account does not rely 
on a representation consumer that plays a content-constituting role. Eschewing 
intuitions about cases is also a move away from the earlier literature. Although looking 
at the explanatory role of representation is not new, the desideratum set out above is 
somewhat distinctive. I also offer my own particular take on realism about representa-
tions and its explanatory advantages; and on exploitable relations and the dual nature 
of content. That is the prospectus. We move now to details of the positive accounts 
(Chapters 3–5).
25 My neologism sounds in my head closer to ‘vary-tel’, a near-rhyme of ‘fairy-tale’ (although I’m hoping 
my account is not one of those).
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3.1 Introduction
Varitel semantics has two variable elements: functions and exploitable relations. 
Chapters 4 and 5 look at exploitable relations. This chapter deals with functions. To apply 
our framework, we need to specify what it is for there to be a task being performed by 
an organism or other system. These tasks are the functions it is supposed (in some 
sense) to perform. Philosophical work on function has mostly focused on naturalizing 
biological functions, for which the constraints may be different. We are after a notion 
of function that is suited to figure in a theory of content: function-for-representation. 
Philosophical theories of function are often tested against intuitions about what counts 
as a function, a malfunction, a side effect, or an outcome with no kind of function at all. 
Intuitions can bear little weight for our purposes. Instead, our theorizing is guided 
by the goal of explaining representational explanations of behaviour (the desider-
atum in §2.2).
I take from teleosemantics the idea that natural selection is a source of functions 
that are partly constitutive of content. However, evolutionary function is too narrow 
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(§1.5). When behavioural dispositions are the result of a general-purpose learning 
mechanism, the evolutionary function of the learning mechanism does not deliver 
specific functions for the newly learnt behaviours. This chapter argues that behaviours 
of an individual organism can acquire functions as a result of its interaction with its 
environment, independently of which evolutionary functions it has. Furthermore, 
swampman suggests that we can representationally explain the behaviour of complex 
organisms, interacting with an environment, irrespective of their evolutionary history. 
Neither of these considerations is a decisive objection to teleosemantics’ claim that the 
functions relevant to representation must ultimately find a basis in natural selection. 
However, they do motivate us to look for a way of specifying the task being performed 
by a system, for the purpose of varitel semantics, that does not depend on its deep evo-
lutionary history.
My account of function will combine two elements. These broadly correspond to 
the two strands of Aristotelian teleology: a functional outcome is a natural occurrence 
that comes about always or for the most part, and that is for the sake of something 
(Shields 2013). The first corresponds to my robust outcomes: an organism is disposed 
to achieve the outcome in a range of circumstances and tends to pursue the outcome 
in the face of obstacles until it is achieved. The second strand is consequence etiology: an 
organism produces an outcome because of the consequences that flow from it. How 
can behaviour be caused because of its consequences? That in turn is naturalistically 
explicable if the outcome has been the target of some stabilizing process: the outcome 
is caused now partly because of consequences of producing the same type of outcome 
in the past.
Rather than choosing between these two elements, as most philosophical theories 
of function do, my account combines them (§3.2). Robust outcome functions (§3.3) 
combine with stabilized functions (§3.4) to form task functions (§3.5), which are the 
functions-for-representation which I argue are a good basis for fixing content. Section 
3.6 explains how task functions give representational content its explanatory purchase 
and do so in a way that need not depend on evolutionary history. Finally, §3.7 briefly 
compares some rival accounts of function in the literature.
3.2 A Natural Cluster Underpins a Proprietary 
Explanatory Role
Humans and other animals are paradigmatic representation-using systems. Animal 
behaviour achieves a range of outcomes robustly. Complex internal workings (engaging 
representations) are involved in doing so. Those outcomes often contribute to survival 
and/or reproduction. And a consequence etiology applies: an animal has the dispos-
ition to produce these outcomes partly because outcomes of the same type have been 
produced in the past, when they contributed to survival of the individual, or were 
the targets of learning, or of natural selection. That is, they have been the target of 
stabilizing processes. The clustering of a certain kind of causation by internal workings 
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with robustness and stabilization underpins the explanatory purchase of representa-
tional explanation.
The cluster exists for a reason. When robustness is not due to external constraints, 
the disposition to produce outcomes robustly is not usually possessed by accident. 
Often a stabilizing process has been responsible for the system acquiring robust out-
come functions. An example that does not involve representations is sex determination. 
Since they produce an important outcome, mechanisms of sex determination have 
been the target of natural selection. A variety of backup mechanisms have evolved to 
ensure that the suite of traits needed to be a male, say, reliably come on stream together. 
Natural selection has made the outcome robust.
The most basic robustness tactic which evolution has hit on is survival itself. 
Survival of an individual organism is survival of its behavioural dispositions. Death of 
an organism is a form of non-robustness of all of its behavioural dispositions. It is no 
accident that producing outcomes robustly goes along with surviving, nor that robustly 
produced outcomes tend to contribute to the survival of the organism. One might 
object here that natural selection is really only about reproduction. Survival of the 
individual is at best subsidiary, and many traits are directed at reproduction in a way 
that compromises survival (Griffiths 2009). That is obviously correct: not all adapta-
tions are survival-conducive. However, our project is not to define the ambit of natural 
selection, but to look for patterns in nature. From that perspective, it is striking that so 
much behaviour in the animal kingdom is conducive to survival. That is because it has 
contributed to reproduction by contributing to survival. Because that way of being 
selected is so widespread, biologists typically conceive of natural selection in terms of 
contribution to reproduction and survival. Natural selection has given us a huge array 
of complex systems that maintain themselves in a state that is out of equilibrium with 
their environment (homeostasis) and act in ways that promote their own survival.
Evolution’s other great robustness trick, exemplified in animal behaviour, is learning. 
Learning when a particular behaviour promotes survival is a way of making survival 
more robust. Learning new ways to behave generates new routes by which outcomes 
can be produced—general outcomes like survival and reproduction, and also more 
specific outcomes like avoiding a predator or getting a foodstuff. Learning new cir-
cumstances in which to perform, or new routes to generating, a behavioural outcome 
is a way of making that outcome more robust. Learning, like evolution, is a stabilizing 
process by which behavioural outcomes come to be robustly produced.
These three stabilizing processes—natural selection, learning, and contribution to 
survival—are at work throughout the animal kingdom. Each is a way that production 
of an outcome in the past contributes to raising the chance that an outcome of the same 
type is produced again. That is, each is a form of consequence etiology. They are all 
processes, on different timescales, which make production of an outcome of a particular 
type more likely. Furthermore, both learning and evolution are ways that a particular 
behaviour can come to be produced more robustly: learning from feedback allows an 
organism to overcome obstacles or learn new routes to producing an outcome; and 
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evolution can canalize a selected outcome so it is produced more robustly. Contributing 
to survival is not on its own a mechanism by which behaviours come to be produced 
more robustly, but for a biological organism, which is a complex out-of-equilibrium 
self-producing system (§3.4b below), producing outputs that contribute to its own 
persistence is an indispensable prerequisite for survival, which as we have seen is biol-
ogy’s most basic robustness trick. These are the reasons why robust outcomes tend to 
have been the target of one or more of these stabilizing processes. Robustness and sta-
bilization come together in our cluster.
For example, one robust outcome function observed in the behaviour of mountain 
chickadees (Poecile gambeli) is their disposition to return to a previously cached item 
of food, doing so in a variety of conditions, from a variety of starting locations, and 
when the food is hidden in different ways (Pravosudov and Clayton 2001). Consider 
an individual chickadee, call her Jayla. Jayla’s having retrieved cached food in the past 
is a cause of her survival. So, when she retrieves a food item now, obtaining cached 
food in the past is a contributory cause. Obtaining food is such a basic need that it is 
also the target of several learning mechanisms. Jayla’s having this form of behavioural 
disposition now is partly explained by the outcomes it has produced in Jayla’s past, 
namely obtaining food. So, obtaining cached food is, on the basis of learning, a stabil-
ized function of Jayla’s behaviour. Furthermore, learning in this way has doubtless 
been the result of natural selection. Natural selection explains why chickadees are 
disposed to return to cached food locations and can do so robustly, doubtless in part 
through explaining why various learning mechanisms directed at getting food have 
been selected. So, natural selection partly accounts for the instance of these disposi-
tions we find in this individual, Jayla, around today. This is a paradigm case: all three 
stabilization processes have been at work. Each separately is a basis on which the out-
come of getting food is a stabilized function of the bird’s behaviour. Thus, having a 
stabilized function does not depend on having an evolutionary history (§3.6 below). 
Nor need all three stabilization processes be pulling in the same direction, as they are 
in this paradigm case.
In sum, there are natural reasons why, in biological organisms, robust outcome 
 functions also tend to be stabilized functions. These come together to constitute task 
functions. It is usual to talk of entities having functions, the function to produce a cer-
tain output or cause a certain outcome. The outcomes so produced are also sometimes 
described as functions. It will be convenient for us to adopt that (slightly strained) 
 terminology. So, task functions are outputs produced by a system. A type of output 
counts as a task function if it is robust (§3.3) and has been stabilized (§3.4). Outcomes 
can also be robust as a result of intentional design. That forms a further, alternative basis 
of task functions (§3.5).
Noting that robustness and stabilization converge still leaves open the question of 
how an organism manages to achieve outcomes robustly. What is the synchronic 
mechanism by which those outcomes are produced, and produced robustly in the 
face of variation in conditions encountered when they are initiated and while they 
are being executed? What was the synchronic mechanism that keyed those behaviours 
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into conditions in which they were stabilized through survival, learning, and/or nat-
ural selection?
Task functions need not be generated by representations of, for example, conditions, 
goals, or targets. Developmental outcomes can be robust in virtue of a collection of 
parallel and backup mechanisms without any representations being involved. 
Nevertheless, in many cases there is an internal-components explanation of how the 
system achieves its task functions, an explanation that falls within our overall frame-
work for representational content.1 There are internal components which stand in 
exploitable relations to aspects of the environment that are relevant to achieving an 
outcome (a task function), where an internal process performed over vehicles with 
those properties constitutes an algorithm for achieving the distally characterized out-
come successfully in a context-sensitive way.2 That is to say, the third element in the 
natural cluster is having the kind of internal organization that is characteristic of being 
a representational system of the kind we have been discussing. This third element of 
the cluster is made more precise in other chapters—in particular, Chapters 4 and 5 
specify the kinds of algorithm involved.
In short, we can observe that three features tend to cluster together: producing out-
comes robustly, those outcomes having been stabilized, and their being produced by a 
mechanism in which internal components stand in exploitable relations to relevant 
features of the environment (see Figure 3.1). It is the existence of this clustering that 
constitutes the internal components as being representations and gives representa-
tional explanation its distinctive explanatory bite. This collection of real patterns 
allows us to make a rich set of inferences when we recognize a system’s representational 
properties. When we come across instances of this cluster, a whole new explanatory 
scheme comes into a play, a scheme which supports a host of defeasible inferences—
inferences for example about ways of acquiring and weighing sources of information, 
of building constancy mechanisms, and of processing information optimally, to give 
just three examples from the host of findings catalogued by psychology, information 
theory and the other cognitive sciences. On one reading of the homeostatic property 
cluster view of natural kinds (Boyd 1991), having representational content in accord-
ance with this sufficient condition is a natural kind.3 Finding a system of this special 
1 The idea that the functions or capacities of a system can be explained through causal decomposition is 
familiar from Cummins (1984). Unlike our task functions, which are outputs of the system of interest, 
Cummins functions are activities of components, each playing its role in one of these causal decompos-
itions. Any capacity of a system is a candidate for analysis, so Cummins functions are very liberal. Without 
a principled way to identify privileged capacities of the system, the resulting theory of content is corres-
pondingly liberal (Cummins 1989, 1996), contra our desideratum.
2 Neander (2017) advances a theory of content based on contributions of components in a functional 
decomposition. Unlike Cummins, Neander does identify privileged capacities that call for such an explan-
ation (e.g. the toad’s prey-capture capacity). Contents are fixed directly by teleofunctions of components, 
e.g. a function to respond to small dark moving objects of a delimited kind in the environment, see §6.2h.
3 With Boyd, I reject the need for an underlying essence that explains why these features go together. 
(The explanation is the one we have seen.) However, I don’t take this core set of features to be flexible. My 
account requires all three features to be present. The many other properties that often go along with being 
a representer are however more open-ended and flexible, as with other homeostatic property cluster views 
of kinds. See also §8.2.
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type tells us a lot about it, allowing us to predict and explain it in ways that would be 
unavailable or less perspicuous in non-representational terms.
The next two sections characterize the two aspects of task function more precisely, 
illustrated by a case study from psychology on the mechanisms of motor control. We 
start with robust outcome functions and then move on to precisify stabilized functions.
3.3 Robust Outcome Functions
The first requirement on task functions is that they should be robust. This section 
develops the relevant notion of robustness. Robust outcome functions are roughly 
those outcomes that result from behaviour which we humans are inclined to perceive 
as being goal-directed. Think of the squirrel which raids nuts from a bird feeder on a 
pole, crawling along a thin branch, battling with the wind, losing balance and recover-
ing, overcoming the ‘squirrel-proof ’ collar on the feeder, and obtaining the food. It is 
impossible to watch the squirrel’s antics without its goal seeming obvious. The ten-
dency to see behaviour as goal-directed can in fact be activated by appropriate move-
ments of geometric shapes, as well as human and animal behaviour. It develops early in 
childhood and seems to be an important precursor to an explicit understanding of 
others’ mental states (Abell et al. 2000, Aschersleben et al. 2008, Biro and Leslie 2007, 
Frith and Frith 1999, Gergely and Csibra 2003). Although we tend to see them as such, 
not all robustly produced behavioural outcomes depend on represented goals. For our 
Stab. Rbst. Int.C.
Stab. Rbst.
Rbst.
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Stab. Rbst. Int.C.
Stab. Rbst.
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Figure 3.1 Outcomes produced by organisms/systems (black circles) can be robust (Rbst.), 
stabilized (Stab.) and/or produced as a result of the interaction of internal components bearing 
exploitable relations to the environment (Int.C.). Outcomes can have subsets of these features 
(labelled), or none (unlabelled black circles), however these features tend to cluster together, 
and do so for a natural reason (see text).
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purposes it is important to characterize robust outcome functions without presupposing 
that they are generated by goal-representations (or any other representations).
Motor control of reaching offers a paradigm example of robustly-produced out-
comes. This is a useful case study for us because experimental work has delivered a 
detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which movements of our limbs are con-
trolled subpersonally so as to reach their targets fluently. There is an online mechanism 
adjusting the action as it unfolds and a diachronic mechanism that tunes the online 
mechanism as a result of feedback. The online mechanism makes continual adjust-
ments to the movement while the action is being executed. If the target is displaced, the 
trajectory of the limb is adjusted so that the finger still reaches the target (Goodale et al. 
1986, Schindler et al. 2004, Milner and Goodale 2006). Those adjustments are made 
even when the target is shifted surreptitiously during a saccade, showing that con-
scious recognition that the target has been displaced need not be involved in this form 
of control (Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998, see Figure 3.2).
The diachronic mechanism tunes the online system so that it remains effective. 
Subjects fitted with prismatic goggles that shift all visual input 15 degrees to the left 
initially make mistakes when trying to touch a target, reaching nearly 15 degrees to the 
right. Over a series of trials their dispositions adjust so that they reach the target again 
(Redding and Wallace 1997, Clower et al. 1996). Online guidance control remains in 
place, with the in-flight adjustments now being appropriate to the new set-up. When 
the goggles are removed, an error in the opposite direction is observed and adaptation 
in the reverse direction begins. Similar adjustments over time occur if there is interfer-
ence at the output side by having subjects make their actions in an artificial force field 
(Thoroughman and Shadmehr 2000). This mechanism of adaptation recalibrates our 
reaching dispositions as we change and grow. Patients with damage to the cerebellum 
exhibit online guidance control of reaching but their behaviour does not adapt to 
prism goggles or an artificial force field (Smith and Shadmehr 2005, Bastian 2006).
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Figure 3.2 The task from Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998). Subjects adjust their reaching 
 trajectory during action execution even when the target is moved surreptitiously during a 
saccade.
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Motor control illustrates two key features of robust outcome functions: (i) the same 
distal outcome is produced in response to a variety of different inputs to the system; 
and (ii) the outcome is produced successfully across an array of relevant external con-
ditions. This corresponds to the way Ernst Nagel characterized goal-directedness (his 
‘system property’ view: Nagel 1977, pp. 271–6; crediting Sommerhoff 1950; see also 
Bedau 1992). Nagel separated out two kinds of variation across which the same outcome 
is produced or pursued: variations in initial conditions, and perturbations occurring 
during action execution. In many cases a perturbation can be considered as simply 
producing a new initial condition from which the organism may be able to reach the 
same goal. If our squirrel falls off the branch during its approach to the feeder, then its 
location on the ground is a new condition in which it will still be able to pursue the goal 
of getting the nuts. Other perturbations are external conditions that would prevent the 
system from reaching its goal, like the wind encountered when the squirrel is balancing 
along a fence. We can simply treat external circumstances encountered at the outset 
and during execution as specifying a complex condition under which the system may 
or may not reach a given target. Robust outcome functions are successful across a 
variety of such conditions, and the system is disposed to produce such outcomes in 
response to a variety of different inputs.
Some authors have proposed a further requirement for behaviour to count as goal 
directed: that the organism should bring about the outcome robustly by doing dif-
ferent things in different circumstances (Walsh 2012: selecting actions that are goal-
conducive from an available repertoire). Should that requirement be built into our 
account of robustness? It is indeed a feature of motor control. Online guidance means 
that different sequences of motor output are deployed depending on the obstacles 
and disturbances encountered during execution (Schindler et al. 2004). The previous 
paragraph advanced a more minimal condition. Whether the organism produces 
the outcome must be input-sensitive, and it must do so in response to different inputs. 
Should we also require that it should use a range of different means?
Counting against the stronger requirement, it is common for natural selection to 
result in a cover-all strategy, where producing the outcome is sensitive to relevant 
external circumstances, but the outcome is produced by just one means. For example, 
one way of getting a peg into a hole is to grab it with a rubbery arm that shakes indis-
criminately rather than targeting the hole.4 For a biological example, consider a plant 
that pursues a cover-all strategy to get a seed into a light gap in the forest: it distributes 
seeds indiscriminately in all directions. Natural selection will typically make that 
behaviour sensitive to a variety of different cues about the season, so that the behaviour 
is produced at an appropriate time. But the outcome is not brought about via a variety 
of behavioural outputs. The argument that stabilization and robustness are linked in a 
4 Thanks to Andy Clark for the example.
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natural cluster extends to such cases, so we should not require robust outcome functions 
to be produced by a repertoire of different means.
Notice that I did not say that the organism has to be targeting its behaviour on an 
object, still less that input sensitivity must be a matter of sensitivity to features of an 
object, like tracking its location. Cybernetic accounts of goal-directedness are mod-
elled on control systems that achieve a goal by interacting with a target (our simple 
motor control case is like that). Cybernetic accounts do not extend easily to behaviour 
when there is no target object present, for example foraging for an absent foodstuff 
(Scheffler 1959). Our account of robust outcome functions has no such limitation. Nor 
is automatic behaviour excluded by this account. Automatic and stereotyped behav-
iour, like the frog’s tongue protrusion in response to very specific fly-like visual stimuli, 
can in principle count, provided it is produced in response to different inputs and the 
behavioural outcome is achieved in a range of different external circumstances.
Nevertheless, not every kind of behaviour that is ‘robust’ in a pre-theoretic sense 
will qualify as a robust outcome function. A ball that simply shakes itself would reach 
the bottom of a rough shallow crater from many different initial positions. But it is not 
sensitive to inputs, either in when it produces the shaking behaviour nor in what kind 
of output it produces. The system is not in any way adapting its behaviour to its circum-
stances. Shaking indiscriminately in all circumstances is not the kind of behaviour 
that calls for representational explanation.
Taking stock, we have arrived at the following definition of when an output F counts 
as a robust outcome function produced by a system S. F is a type of output. S can be an 
individual system or a lineage of systems. In the second case ‘S’ picks out systems typed 
by the property in virtue of which they fall in the same lineage (e.g. being members of 
the same species). Recall that calling an output F a function is shorthand for S having 
the function to produce F (in certain circumstances).
Robust Outcome Function
An output F from a system S is a robust outcome function of S
iff
(i) S produces F in response to a range of different inputs; and
(ii) S produces F in a range of different relevant external conditions.5
‘Output’ is a neutral term that covers bodily movements, actions, and consequences of 
actions.6 As I use the terms, bodily movements can be characterized by purely intrinsic 
properties of the system, for example moving the eyes 12 degrees to the right is a bodily 
movement. Actions can be and usually are world-involving; for example, pulling a 
lever or moving to a particular location. Actions have consequences in the world which 
5 ‘S produces F’ must be true with some nomological modal force. I remain neutral on whether this 
should be cashed out in terms of dispositions, capacities or in some other way.
6 It could in principle cover any kind of effect, e.g. releasing a hormone, although movement is involved 
in all the cases we will consider.
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may or may not be further actions. Getting a pool ball into a pocket is an action; 
winning £50 as a result is a consequence. All of these are ‘outputs’ caused by the agent 
and could qualify as robust outcome functions.
For condition (i), we need to look at the facts of a particular case to assess what counts 
as a different input. They have to be differences that the system is sensitive to in some 
way (e.g. an undetectable difference cannot count). A generalization that follows from 
how a mechanism deals with one type of input is not sufficient either. For example, a 
mechanism that triggers an internal state R when a temperature of 20°C is detected 
might, without further elaboration, do the same at 19.5°C and 20.5°C. Evolutionary 
pressures could select for this kind of stimulus generalization. Nevertheless, these val-
ues would not count as different inputs. They specify the range of values that count as an 
input of the same type for this kind of mechanism. If, on the other hand, R is triggered 
by a temperature of 20°C and also an increase in light levels, then those do count as 
 different inputs.
The idea of different relevant external conditions in (ii) also needs careful handling. 
A different alignment of the planets is a different external condition but is not (usually) 
relevant to whether an outcome can be successfully produced. Relevant conditions 
are those that would impact on the system’s ability to achieve an outcome or would 
affect whether the outcome is likely to be successful. In the seed-scattering example, 
the difference in where the nearest light gap is found, and hence where the seedling 
germinates, is a difference in a relevant external condition.
3.4 Stabilized Functions: Three Types
(a) Consequence etiology in general, and natural selection
The second element in our cluster is the category of stabilized functions. They corres-
pond broadly to the second aspect of Aristotelian teleology: the idea that teleological 
outputs are produced because they lead to good consequences. In discussing the clus-
ter (§3.2) I argued that robust outcomes tend to go along with being the target of 
natural selection and/or of learning, and/or with contributing to the persistence of 
individual organisms. This section spells out those conditions more precisely. Taken in 
the alternative, they define our category of stabilized functions.
How can an output be generated because of the consequences it will produce? Of 
course, an agent can do that. But agency presupposes intentionality. For a long time 
it was not clear how to account for teleological causation without presupposing 
intentionality. Darwin famously showed that there is no mystery. An output is gen-
erated because of the good effect it will produce when, in an organism’s evolutionary 
history, outputs of that type have contributed to survival or reproduction. In that 
case the organism is producing this output now in part because of effects that the 
same type of output has had in the (evolutionary) past. Larry Wright generalized 
that idea: F is a function of S just in case (a) F is a consequence of S’s being there; and 
(b) S is there because it does F (Wright 1973). Wright’s definition covers processes 
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like feedback-based learning operating within the life of an individual organism as well 
as processes like evolution by natural selection operating over lineages of organisms.7 
It applies to any process where outputs in the past have had consequences that explain 
the current existence of a system disposed to produce outputs of the same type. I use 
‘consequence etiology’ to cover any output which satisfies Wright’s definition (see 
Figure 3.3).
Wright’s definition has long faced the objection that it draws the category of func-
tion too broadly (Boorse 1976). For our purposes that is problematic because the def-
inition is much broader than the kinds of stabilizing processes found in our natural 
cluster. It applies to a small rock that keeps its place on the river bed by holding a larger 
rock in place above it in a stream; also to a leaky gas hose that keeps on emitting gas 
because the gas poisons every person that comes near enough to fix it. Contribution to 
survival of an organism is perhaps the most widely applicable kind of stabilization in 
our natural cluster, but even that is a special case of Wright’s formula. It calls for an 
organism, one that acts to maintain or promote its survival in the face of changes to 
internal and external conditions.
Our task then is to delineate the class of stabilized functions in a narrower way than 
Wright, so as to coincide with the natural cluster that underpins representational explan-
ation. Since any single cover-all condition like Wright’s is liable to over-generate, I will 
adopt a disjunctive definition of stabilized functions. Evolution by natural selection is the 
first case. It is a well-understood basis for stabilized functions. I intend it to extend to 
cases where selection stabilizes the presence of a trait in a population but has not gone to 
fixation; also to selection on culturally transmitted traits. The next two subsections focus 
in turn on the other two kinds of consequence etiology that show up in our natural 
cluster: contribution to persistence of an organism; and learning with feedback.
(b) Persistence of organisms
The most ubiquitous way that natural selection has made outcomes robust is by 
inventing the organism: a complex system that is separated from and markedly out of 
7 E.g. it covers all the various kinds of dynamics studied in Skyrms-Lewis signalling games: replicator 
dynamics (with and without mutation), simple reinforcement learning, Roth-Erev reinforcement, Bush-
Mosteller reinforcement, etc. (Skyrms 2010).
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Figure 3.3 The most general treatment of consequence etiology. An output F occurs because a 
system S exists (right-hand side); and S exists because it, or its ancestors, have produced F in 
the past (left-hand side). Both causal processes may depend on certain environmental condi-
tions obtaining (C1, C2).
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equilibrium with its surrounding environment, and which continually creates the 
 conditions for its own persistence in that state.8 By continuing to exist, organisms are 
able to continue to produce the types of outputs they have produced in the past, enab-
ling robustness.
Philosophers have put forward several accounts of biological function in terms 
of contribution to persistence: staying alive (Wouters 1995, 2007), self-reproduction 
(Schlosser 1998), active self-maintenance (Edin 2008), or maintaining a differentiated 
organized system (Mossio et al. 2009). Christensen and Bickhard’s account of functions 
is in this spirit (Christensen and Bickhard 2002). According to them the task towards 
which functions are directed is a system’s capacity to generate the conditions for its own 
persistence when it is out of equilibrium with its surrounding environment. Functions 
of components of a system are Cummins-style contributions to this overall capacity.
Our stabilized functions are outputs of a whole system, rather than of components,9 
but they contribute to persistence in something like this fashion. Rather than starting 
with difficult concepts like self-maintenance and being out-of-equilibrium in the 
appropriate way, we can focus on the kind of persistence that figures in our cluster—
that is, the persistence of organisms. Organisms are a special kind of self-maintaining 
system. They resist the tendency to disorder by maintaining a boundary, moving energy 
across it, and continually rebuilding themselves to keep themselves in an improbable 
state of differentiated organization. Godfrey-Smith uses the term ‘self-production’ to 
distinguish organisms from other self-maintaining systems like a car that monitors its 
states and fixes some problems (Godfrey-Smith 2016, following ‘autopoiesis’: Maturana 
and Varela 1980). Organisms are also self-producing in a stronger sense than we find 
in cases like the leaky gas hose and the rock on the river bed. An account of what it 
takes to be an organism would open up debates about equilibrium, self-maintenance, 
and self-production which would distract us from our enquiry, so my definition will 
help itself to organism as a biological category. It is contribution to the persistence of an 
organism that should count as a stabilized function for our purposes.10
Chemotaxis in E. coli bacteria is a good illustration of the way behaviour can con-
tribute to the persistence of an individual organism. An individual swims in a straight 
line, but when it detects that the concentration of one of a number of harmful chem-
icals is increasing, it performs a random ‘tumble’ to a new direction of travel (Berg and 
Brown 1972). The effect of this behaviour is to take the bacterium away from danger-
ous chemicals (often enough), thereby contributing to its persistence. Moving away 
from harmful chemicals is a distal outcome of the bacterium’s behaviour, an outcome 
that contributes to its persistence. This is a typical case where robustness of the out-
come (safe location) in the face of variation in external and internal biochemical 
8 Reproduction of entities that don’t count as organisms/autopoetic systems is in principle possible, 
although there is debate about whether there was actually such a stage in the origin of life (Martin 2005).
9 See §3.3 (unless those components count as systems in their own right).
10 In what follows ‘persistence’ is always persistence of an organism, even when I omit the qualification 
for the sake of brevity.
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parameters (Alon et al. 1999) goes together with those outcomes contributing to the 
persistence of the individual organism.
Where an output has contributed to the persistence of an individual organism we can 
give a consequence etiology explanation of its current behaviour. It behaves a certain 
way now partly because it behaved in the same way in the past, which had consequences 
that kept it alive, raising the probability that there is something around now that will 
produce an output of the same type. We come across an instance of bacterial tumbling 
behaviour partly because that kind of behaviour has kept the individual bacterium 
alive, together with its disposition to tumbling behaviour. That is a historical rather than 
a forward-looking or counterfactual way of explaining behavioural outputs. Indeed, 
without the historical angle we would be back to the mystery of teleological causation, 
the mystery of how it is possible to explain a cause in terms of the type of effect it is likely 
to produce (without appealing to intentionality in the causal agent).
When an occurrence of F contributes to the persistence of an organism S, its effect is 
not specific to F. It raises the probability that any of S’s outputs will be produced (since 
S is still around to produce them all). That is unlike natural selection, which increases 
the probability of organisms producing F rather than alternatives; or feedback-based 
learning, which specifically raises the probability of S producing F in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, in an organism capable of feedback-based learning, contri-
bution to persistence has the effect of keeping an organism with the disposition to F 
around for long enough for learning to make F-production more robust, improving its 
discrimination about when to produce F or acquiring new means for bringing it about. 
Persistence is then an indirect route to making an outcome F robust.
(c) Learning with feedback
Returning to our motor control example, the way reaching adapts when subjects put 
on prism goggles illustrates the importance of learning in producing robustness. 
Reaching behaviour studied in non-human animals often leads to outcomes that con-
tribute directly to the persistence of the animal performing the experiment. A macaque 
receives food or juice as a result of where it reaches or moves its eyes, which contributes 
directly to the persistence of that individual organism (Kiani and Shadlen  2009, 
Chestek et al. 2007). Human subjects are generally rewarded with money or course 
credit rather than food. In that case the outcomes produced don’t directly explain the 
persistence of the individual organism.
Outcomes do, however, explain why a given behavioural tendency arises or persists 
in an individual. For example, a person in a reinforcement learning experiment might 
learn to press the ‘F’ key on a keyboard in response to some arbitrary image A and the 
‘J’ key in response to another image B. Those behaviours are reinforced because the 
subject is given points that will turn into a monetary reward at the end of the experi-
ment. If we focus on the disposition to press the ‘F’ key in response to image A, then an 
account of why that behavioural disposition exists in the individual mentions the out-
comes that have been elicited by pressing the ‘F’ key in the recent past. Learning can 
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also explain the robustness of a behavioural disposition; for example, the ability 
repeatedly to touch a screen within a small target area, across small variations in the 
initial conditions, and in the face of noise in the perceptual and motor systems 
(Wolpert and Landy 2012; see Figure 3.4). There is of course also a learning explan-
ation of the macaque’s reaching behaviour. It is stabilized both by learning and by con-
tribution to persistence.
Isn’t flexibility the converse of robustness? Learning is an interesting case because it 
shows how flexibility is important for robustness. We often find in biology that keeping 
some properties constant calls for sensitive flexibility in others. We see this in the way 
that motor control is constantly being retuned as the system’s input and output proper-
ties change (optical properties, weight of the limbs). Learning allows for plasticitiy in 
the circumstances in which, and means by which, an outcome in produced—leading 
stabilized outcomes to be produced with greater robustness.
Learnt behaviours have evolutionary functions that derive from the function of the 
learning mechanism (Millikan 1984). Humans readily learn to recognize conspecifics 
by their faces. Human infants look preferentially at faces, which allows them to learn 
the statistical patterns that are indicative of face identity (Johnson et al. 1991). If we 
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Figure 3.4 The rapid reaching task from Wolpert and Landy (2012). Subjects gained 100 
points for touching the screen within the right-hand circle (shown to subjects in green) and 
lost 100 points for touching in the left-hand circle (shown to subjects in red). Touching in the 
overlap therefore produced zero points. People mainly touch within the most rewarding area 
because they learn from feedback how to reach (observing previous outcomes).
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suppose for a moment that no social feedback is involved, then the reason the infant 
acquires a new behavioural disposition—for example, to track a new person A as they 
come and go—does not depend on any feedback the individual infant has received. 
The function of the mechanism is indeed to track person A, but that is an evolutionary 
function, deriving from the (plausible) evolutionary function of the learning mechan-
ism, namely to track conspecifics by their faces. This is a case where evolutionary func-
tions do deliver quite specific stabilized functions for the products of learning.
In other cases derived functions are much less specific. Classical conditioning is a 
very general learning principle. It enables organisms to reidentify statistical patterns in 
the inputs they receive. When an association has been learned, what is it supposed to 
track? The evolutionary function of the learning mechanism only tells us something 
very general. Its function is to track something useful that correlates with patterns in 
the input. Once a new association is put to use to condition behaviour, if that behav-
iour is stabilized then feedback-based learning may underpin a much more specific 
function, as we will see in a moment. But before being connected up to behaviour, the 
functions of a new association derive only from the evolutionary function of classical 
conditioning and are highly indeterminate. Basic sensitization, where a response is 
attenuated when a stimulus is repeated, is another case where the mechanism of 
behavioural plasticity has only a very general-purpose evolutionary function.
When an organism’s behavioural dispositions are modulated by feedback, learning 
underpins stabilization directly, irrespective of any evolutionary function. Feedback 
need not be in the form of a commodity that has an evolutionary function (a primary 
reinforcer). People will shape their behaviour to feedback in the form of money, or the 
promise of money, or tokens that will be exchanged for money; also for positive social 
feedback; and so on. A stabilization-based explanation need not descend to an explan-
ation of why monetary feedback stabilizes behavioural dispositions. If an agent’s 
behavioural dispositions are in fact stabilized by a variety of outcomes Oi, then we can 
explain a current behavioural disposition (e.g. to touch the region inside the green 
circle on the computer screen) by the fact that outputs of this sort in the recent past 
produced one such outcome, O1 say. It is then a further question as to why O1 rein-
forces behavioural dispositions in that agent.11 An answer to that question need not 
form part of a stabilization-based explanation of why the agent has a given behavioural 
disposition now (e.g. to touch inside the green circle).
Like natural selection, reinforcement can lead an organism to produce O more 
robustly by better detecting the circumstances in which its behaviour is likely to prod-
uce O; by adopting new means for producing O in new circumstances; or by increasing 
the robustness with which it can produce a particular means to producing O. Learning 
is more sophisticated than natural selection in some respects. One-shot learning is 
11 That need not be because the organism can represent the reinforcer. Nor does the learning-based 
explanation of an organism’s behavioural dispositions presuppose that learning depended on representa-
tions (of reinforcers or outcomes).
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possible in some cases. Then a single episode in the past explains why an individual has 
a behavioural disposition now. Nearby outcomes can be reinforcing. Where O is the 
target of learning, achieving an outcome that is close to O (along some relevant dimen-
sion) can make it more likely that the organism will achieve O on the next occasion. 
That is, outcomes that are closely related to O can contribute to likelihood that O will 
occur in the future. Where an outcome comes in degrees, like the quantity of juice 
received, the organism may shape its behaviour so as to increase the quantity delivered. 
Negative reinforcement is also common, for example a rat forced to swim in a Morris 
water maze will learn how to behave so that it has to swim for less time in the future. So, 
the stabilized function is getting to a submerged platform (O1) and the feedback which 
explains its stabilization is the unpleasant effect of not reaching the platform (¬O1). 
In these two cases, it is not producing O itself but producing outcomes closely related 
to O that has contributed systematically to the organism’s disposition to achieve O.
Learning by imitation is an interesting case. It takes several forms. Sometimes it is 
driven by social feedback; for instance, that people smile or give other signs of approval. 
That is a case of reinforcement and fits into the characterization we have just given. 
Or the learning may occur because the individual performs the behaviour and receives 
some other kind of reinforcing feedback, like food or warmth. In other cases people 
may acquire a behavioural disposition without feedback, just because they see others 
perform it. That disposition will not then have been stabilized through feedback-based 
learning, but there may well be another stabilization-based explanation; for example, 
the behaviour which is transmitted may have been stabilized in the person’s lineage or 
social group through cultural evolution.
It would take us too far astray to catalogue all the types of learning and to give an 
account of what characterizes the different kinds. For our purposes it is enough to 
point to the category of feedback-based learning, as used in the behavioural sciences, 
and to note that it is a strong form of stabilization that tends to go with robustness in 
our natural cluster.
(d) A ‘very modern history’ theory of functions
This section constructs my notion of stabilized function out of natural selection, learn-
ing, and contribution to persistence, and defends its historical character.
It would be handy if we could treat stabilization synchronically, on the model of 
forces that are holding a system in place. But dispositions an organism could exercise 
are not like forces or other outputs that are operating continuously. Our stabilized 
functions are not like the kinematic equilibria studied in physics. That makes it tempt-
ing to adopt a counterfactual or forward-looking approach. Stabilized functions would 
then be outcomes that would be stabilized were they to be produced, or that are likely 
to be stabilized in the future.
The difficulty is that it is a very open-ended matter whether an output would con-
tribute to the persistence of an organism, or would be stabilized by feedback-based 
learning, or would promote reproductive fitness. All outcomes that would contribute to 
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the persistence of an individual would count as being amongst its stabilized functions. 
However, whether an outcome will contribute to persistence is a notoriously open-
ended matter. It depends heavily on the context. And within a context, whether a 
behaviour will in fact be stabilized will depend upon accidental features of the process 
that ensues. Outputs that seem very unlikely to contribute to persistence might end up 
doing so through a series of compensatory accidents (as happens to the cartoon char-
acter Mr Magoo). Without some other constraints, there are just too many effects that 
would be stabilized in some circumstance or other, hence too many functions. Facts 
about what could contribute to persistence are much more open-ended than historical 
facts about what has actually contributed to the persistence of an individual organism. 
The same is true for natural selection and for learning.
A second strong reason not to rely on a forward-looking form of stabilization is 
that such functions are of the wrong kind to figure in causal explanations. Recall the 
mystery of teleological causation, namely of understanding how a good effect could 
‘draw out’ a cause suited to producing it. Wright’s way of making that un-mysterious, 
and Darwin’s, is to point to consequence etiology, in which functions are a matter of 
the effects that such outcomes have produced in the past. If we seek to explain why a 
system produced an outcome O, it is unilluminating to cite the fact that O is likely to 
be stabilized in the future (i.e. to cite a future-directed function). Functions based on 
stabilization history can figure in an explanation of why outcomes are produced; 
 forward-looking functions cannot (not straightforwardly). A historically based 
approach to function thus has better credentials to figure in casual explanations than 
a forward-looking approach to function does. Any explanatory purchase of forward-
looking functions would proceed through a historical generalization—that they tend 
to have been the result of some stabilization process. Furthermore, our functions 
need to connect with the natural cluster that underpins representational explanation. 
It is actual historical processes of stabilization that appear in that cluster.
What is relevant for our purposes, then, is contribution to stabilization through: 
natural selection over a lineage of systems, learning within an individual system, or 
persistence of an individual organism. Teleosemantics standardly appeals to the first 
two (although with some problems with the way learning is incorporated). I expand 
the category to accept the widespread suggestion (e.g. Christensen and Bickhard 2002) 
that functions can be a matter of contribution to the persistence of self-producing 
systems (for our purposes, organisms). I follow Godfrey-Smith’s insight that appeal-
ing to actual causal history is the right way to cut down on the problematic liberality 
of forward-looking accounts of function (Godfrey-Smith 1994b). Godfrey-Smith 
calls his appeal to the most recent evolutionary function of a trait a ‘modern history’ 
theory of function. We could then call ours, which includes the recent learning and 
persistence history of an individual organism, a ‘very modern history’ theory of 
function. These functions can arise just from the history of an individual organism, 
including very recent learning and contributions to its persistence, irrespective of 
any history of selection.
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Stabilized Function
An output F from a system S is a stabilized function of S
iff
producing F has been systematically stabilized:
(i) by contributing directly to the evolutionary success of systems S producing F; or
(ii) by contributing through learning12 to S’s diposition to produce F; or
(iii) where S is an organism, by contributing directly to the persistence of S.
The evolutionary condition is deliberately drawn so as to cover cases of cultural trans-
mission, which may have been important in human cognitive evolution and thus in 
generating representational content in many aspects of human psychological systems 
(Sterelny 2015). It also covers cases where selection has been operative but has not 
gone to fixation.
A system’s behaviour will generally result in a causal chain of outputs, which can vary 
in robustness along the chain. Stabilization homes in on only one or a small number of 
steps in this chain. When a macaque moves its arm to pick up a grape, getting the grape 
and moving the arm both make a causal contribution to that form of behaviour being 
stabilized, and to the individual persisting, but only getting the grape does so directly. 
On the other hand, idiosyncratic things may have happened in the individual’s history. 
Where a behavioural episode accidentally happens to produce some beneficial or rein-
forcing effect, and there is no systematic explanation of why that is so, then it does not 
even start to generate stabilized functions, even if the episode made some contribution 
to the persistence of the individual or the chance that it would produce a particular 
kind of behaviour in the future.
3.5 Task Functions
This section puts the pieces together and defines task function, which I argue is the 
right account of function to figure in accounts of content in our case studies. Task 
functions combine stabilization with robustness. There is a source of robustness which 
we have not yet considered, namely deliberate design. A human can design a system to 
perform a task; that is, to produce certain outcomes robustly in certain circumstances. 
Design need not involve any history of stabilization. Indeed, artefacts can be designed 
to produce an outcome robustly which would not be stabilized by feedback. For 
example, we could design a robot that would navigate to a power source and use the 
energy to blow itself up, with the ability to do so robustly from a variety of starting 
points via a variety of routes. So, we need to include design functions as an alternative 
to stabilized functions.
12 As discussed in §3.4c, this is intended also to cover nearby reinforcement, where producing an out-
come close to F (along a relevant dimension) accounts for S’s disposition to produce F; also negative 
reinforcement, where the disposition to do F has been stabilized by the negative consequences that have 
flowed from doing things contrary to F.
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Task functions based on design do not meet our criteria for naturalism. What a system 
has been intentionally designed to do depends on the mental states of the designer, so 
this is not a non-semantic, non-mental source of functions. It does not form part of 
our account of where underived content comes from. Nevertheless, it is worth recog-
nizing the products of design as having task functions since they  pattern with the other 
cases, before setting aside design in order to focus on the underived cases.
The kind of design we include is where a person has designed a system to produce 
certain behavioural outputs. Another way content can arise derivatively is more direct: 
a person can intend a representation to have a certain content. A sentence may mean 
what its writer intends it to mean. A computer database may represent what its pro-
grammer intends it to represent. Directly derivative content does not depend on task 
functions at all. It comes directly from the user’s intentions or beliefs about what a 
vehicle represents, so our definition of task functions does not cover these cases.
So, an output is a task function if it is robustly produced and is the result of one of 
the three stabilizing processes discussed above or intentional design:13
Task Function
An output F from a system S is a task function of S
iff
(a) F is a robust outcome function of S;
and
(b) (i)   F is a stabilized function of S; or
(ii) S has been intentionally designed to produce F.
I am not suggesting this as an analysis of biological function. Some have argued that 
representing correctly is genuinely normative, and that biological function is genu-
inely normative, and that the otherwise puzzling normativity of content can be dis-
solved by showing that it reduces to the normativity of biological function. It will be 
apparent that I am not engaged in that project. Both biological function and (subper-
sonal) representational content are descriptive categories (see §6.5). My definition of 
task function does however have several features that are familiar from biological 
functions. A system can have task functions that it is no longer able to perform. It can 
malfunction, which is different from not having a function at all. And it can produce 
outputs which are side effects, which regularly accompany task functions but have not 
been the target of stabilization or are not robustly produced.
Nor do I claim that task function is the only notion of function to which represen-
tational content can be connected (recall the pluralism). My claim is that task functions 
are suited to giving an account of representational content in many kinds of subper-
sonal psychological system. Task function is a necessary part of some sufficient 
conditions for content. (Since the definition of task function is disjunctive, and the 
13 Usually the contexts in which the output is produced robustly will largely coincide with the contexts 
in which it was stabilized.
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definition of stabilized function is disjunctive, it really generates several different 
sufficient conditions.)
Task functions are part of a natural cluster, a real pattern in nature that I will argue 
gives representational content better ways of explaining behaviour than would be 
available otherwise (§3.6, §8.2). However, task functions can vary in ways that affect 
the explanatory bite of the contents they generate. This is what we should expect in 
biology. Robustness comes in degrees. The more robust, the more explanatory value a 
task function is likely to have. Similarly, stabilization comes in degrees, from powerful 
or long-standing stabilized functions to marginal cases; for example, evolution where 
there has been some selection, but no fixation or other endpoint has been reached.
Another dimension of variation lies in the various bases of stabilized functions 
(clauses (i)–(iii) of the definition). In a paradigmatic case an outcome like obtaining 
food has been the target of natural selection, and learning from feedback, and has con-
tributed to persistence of the individual organism. But these may not line up. A rat that 
learns how to press a lever to deliver electrical stimulation directly to reward centres in 
the brain acquires new task functions (by (ii)), but ones that are evolutionarily disad-
vantageous (clause (i)) and do not contribute to the animal’s persistence (clause (iii)). 
In natural cases there will normally be connections between the three stories; for 
example, money becomes a positive reinforcer partly because of its connection with 
reinforcers like social feedback for which we can give a more direct evolutionary explan-
ation. When they dissociate, there will still be task functions, but there may be different 
task functions underpinned by the different clauses, and they may pull in divergent 
directions (see §3.7). Representational explanation will have greatest merit in the 
paradigmatic cases and less merit in these more marginal cases. Less paradigmatic task 
functions can underpin genuine representational content—they are not merely cases of 
‘as if ’ content—but if the penumbral cases were the only ones that existed in nature it 
would be unlikely that representational content, of the kind we have identified here, 
would be an important explanatory category. The marginal cases are not what makes 
our natural cluster explanatorily powerful, but they do get carried along for the ride.
When a property applies more widely, that is generally of explanatory benefit, but it 
trades off against the fact that more generally applicable properties tend to support 
fewer inductions. Although we can classify very many entities as physical object under 
10 kg, falling into the category tells us little about other properties an object is likely to 
have—it supports few inductions. The merit of our cluster is that, as well as being found 
widely in nature, it supports a rich set of inductions. Robustness also gives us general-
ity by grouping a range of different local properties together (§3.6, §8.2). A system’s 
reaction to light and sound might be lumped together because they are both means for 
tracking a distal property like distance. What can look like a variety of different pro-
cesses, if we considered only the local operation of the system, exhibit commonalities 
when treated in terms of task functions. This generality is not achieved at the cost of 
reduced inductive potential (as with object under 10 kg), since task functions key into 
our cluster and a rich set of world-involving inductions about the system’s interaction 
with distal features of its environment.
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3.6 How Task Functions Get Explanatory Purchase
(a) Illustrated with a toy system
In this section we look at a stylized toy system that captures some essential features 
of the mechanisms of motor control. It will illustrate why task functions underpin a 
proprietary explanatory role for content. Well-confirmed accounts of motor control 
appeal to a variety of interacting internal components including forward models, 
inverse models, and comparator circuits (Desmurget and Grafton  2000, Battaglia-
Mayer et al. 2014). The most basic kind of comparator circuit compares visual or 
proprioceptive feedback about the location of a limb with a specification of a target 
location in the same code, using the discrepancy between the two to update the motor 
program driving the limb (Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000). In this way the limb’s 
position is adjusted until the difference between its location and a target location is 
reduced to zero.
Smooth control of action also depends on making internal predictions of the likely 
effects of executing a motor command, and adjusting the motor command in 
response to discrepancies between the prediction and the target state, even before 
feedback from the world has been received (Wolpert et al. 2011, Bastian 2006). Since 
I can illustrate how representational content gets explanatory purchase even without 
these additional internal components, I will work with a simple toy model that only 
contains the first comparator circuit, the one based on external feedback. Figure 3.5 
illustrates this toy system S. It moves in just one dimension, along a line. From a range 
of initial conditions, it will move along the line until it reaches location T, where it 
interference
location x target T
velocity v
aa = f(δ)
t
r
drive
motion
detect
location
δ
δ = t – r
Correlations:
Input: r ∝ x
Output: δ ∝ a ∝ v
Figure 3.5 A system deploying a simple comparator mechanism.
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stops. If it is blocked or displaced along the line it will continue to move towards T 
when released. Reaching T is a robust outcome function of the system.
We can explain how the system achieves the outcome of reaching T by appeal 
to its internal organization and the relations that those internal components bear 
to features of the environment. S has an internal register r that correlates with its 
distance from the origin, and another internal register a that correlates with the 
velocity of its wheels. A third internal state δ correlates with the distance of the 
 system from T. That correlation is achieved by subtracting the activity of r from 
another fixed level of activity t. A monotonic transformation from this difference 
signal δ to a is such that the motion produced in the wheels drives S from any starting 
position to T, where it stops.
Reaching T is a distal outcome produced by S robustly using a variety of motor 
outputs—ways of changing the velocity of the wheels over time. What these different 
patterns of motor output share is that they all achieve the distal outcome of reaching T. 
Similarly, at input, S will reach T from a variety of different starting positions, and in 
the face of a number of ways of displacing S while it is executing its action sequence. So, 
reaching T satisfies the definition of being a robust outcome function of S. (The robust-
ness is not very great, and so representational explanation will not deliver very much 
additional explanatory purchase, but the case is sufficient to illustrate the point.)
To get stabilized functions into the picture, we have to supplement the case. Suppose 
the system needs to recharge its batteries periodically if it is not going to stop moving 
altogether. There is a power source at T. Now, if we encounter S, moving around, with 
its disposition robustly to reach location T, there is a consequence etiology explan-
ation of why. Reaching T in the recent historical past has contributed to the persistence 
of the system, with its disposition to reach that very location. We could also add a 
learning-based stabilized function. Suppose the internal state t is reset periodically at 
random, leading the system robustly to move to a new location; also suppose that when 
the system manages to recharge (by chance at this stage), that fixes the state of t. In 
future it will then robustly move to the recharge location T. Getting to T has then 
become a learning-based stabilized function. (We could add in the further capacity to 
adjust its dispositions over time in response to perturbations in the input and output 
mechanisms, as in the case of motor control—prism goggles and artificial force 
fields—a stronger form of learning which would produce greater behavioural robust-
ness.) Either way, reaching T becomes a task function.
We now have all the elements in place to explain the system’s behaviour using the 
standard explanatory grammar of representational explanation. S has various internal 
components that correlate with distal features of the environment (correlation being 
the relevant exploitable relation in this case). r correlates with S’s distance from the 
origin and δ correlates with S’s distance from T; t with the location of a power source. 
There are internal processes that transform r into δ, and δ into a and the velocity of 
its wheels. Given the way r and δ correlate with external features of the environment 
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(S’s distance from the origin and from T, respectively), these internal transformations 
constitute an algorithm for performing the distally characterized task of reaching T.
Now consider a particular episode of behaviour: the system is displaced and moves 
back to T where it recharges. How so? Because r and δ correlated on that occasion 
with S’s distance from the origin and from T, respectively. The next chapter shows 
how correlations are content-constituting when they explain task functions in the 
right way. So, the story I have just told effectively shows how the behaviour of success-
fully reaching T, the location of a power source, is explained by r and δ representing 
correctly. Conversely, suppose noise affects the input system and S stops at some other 
location T’. Then we can explain failure of the system to reach T in terms of misrepre-
sentation by r. Similarly, misrepresentation by δ  or a would explain unsuccessful 
behaviour. This pattern exemplifies the characteristic explanatory grammar of repre-
sentational explanation: correct representation explains success and misrepresenta-
tion explains failure.
(b) Swamp systems
To see why this really is a case of success and failure, consider a ‘swamp’ system, like S, 
but one that has assembled itself by chance when an earthquake struck an engineer’s 
workshop. This swamp system would be disposed to move up and down a line along 
the work bench, stopping when it reached some location T. Reaching T would be a 
robust outcome function of the system. But now consider what would happen if a ran-
dom event affected internal register t so that S became disposed to reach a different 
location T’ (and to do so robustly). Would that count as a failure, to be explained by 
misrepresentation? Or would it count as a success—success in achieving the system’s 
new function of reaching T’, to be explained by correct representations (with different 
contents)? There is nothing yet in the picture that allows us to answer that question one 
way or another.
If we now add that there is a power source at T and we observe the swamp system 
a  short time after the earthquake, when it has had a chance to move around and 
recharge, then we do have something in the story which underpins a notion of success 
and failure for that system. It is part of an explanation as to why that particular swamp 
system is around, with its disposition to reach T robustly, that it has reached T in the 
recent past, which has contributed to the persistence of S and its behavioural capaci-
ties. If noise now messes things up so that δ is calculated differently and it no longer 
reaches T, but robustly reaches T’, that is a failure, to be accounted for by misrepre-
sentation at δ.
The foregoing is effectively an argument from intuition. It trades on the intuition 
that there is no substantial distinction to be made between success and failure in a sys-
tem that has robust outcomes but no history (hence no stabilized functions from per-
sistence, learning, or evolution). That won’t do for our purposes. We could simply 
define robustly produced outcomes as successes and other outcomes as failures. 
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However, the cluster we have identified means that there is a deeper logic behind these 
intuitions. Robust outcomes, when not accidental or due to external constraints, are 
often explicable in two ways at once: both why and how they are produced. Why is 
explained by history, involving a consequence etiology, here contribution to stabiliza-
tion. How is explained synchronically, by internal components and exploitable rela-
tions. (This is fleshed out properly in Chapters 4 and 5.) Past episodes of stabilization 
can explain both how robust outcomes are produced now, and why the  system has a 
mechanism suited to producing those outcomes robustly. It is the combination of these 
elements which makes it the case that certain outcomes are successes and others are 
failures. Our intuition about the absence of success and failure in the swamp system 
before it has interacted with the world reflects the fact that the cluster of elements that 
give representational content its explanatory purchase is absent in that case.
How does this argument transfer from our toy system to organisms? Consider the 
motor system of a swamp macaque, produced at random by lightning striking a swamp. 
From the moment of creation it would have the same robust outcome functions as a 
regular monkey. So, if it sees a grape, the swamp monkey will grasp it and eat it. Consider 
also a second swamp macaque who just happens to have a robust disposition to grasp 
15 degrees to the right of any grape it sees. At the moment of creation there is nothing 
present that underpins a substantial sense in which one swamp monkey is getting it 
right and the other getting it wrong. However, as soon as they have had time to interact 
with the world for a while, there is an important difference. In one the disposition to 
reach and grasp grapes has contributed causally to its disposition to behave in that 
way—it has been the target of learning and has contributed to persistence—in the 
other the disposition to reach 15 degrees to the right of grapes has not. At the moment 
of creation neither monkey exemplifies the cluster of properties that underpins the 
explanatory purchase of representational content. Correspondingly, there is no sub-
stantial sense in which either one of them is getting it right or getting it wrong. Once they 
interact with the world, one monkey starts to exemplify the cluster, with which comes 
a substantial distinction between correct and incorrect behaviour; the other does not.
These thought experiments with swamp systems are not offered as intuitive  evidence 
in favour of my account of task functions, but rather to illustrate the consequences of 
the theory. Systems which are not the result of deliberate design and have no evolu-
tionary history, but do learn systematically from feedback, would begin to acquire task 
functions after a short period of interaction with their environment. The same goes for 
organisms whose actions contribute to their own survival. This illustrates the fact that 
functions based on current properties of the system (robust outcome functions) and 
recent causal contributions to learning or persistence (stabilized functions) can under-
pin representational content in a way that is independent of facts about why the system 
was designed or its deep evolutionary history. That would be so even for a system that 
does in fact have an evolutionary history—the swamp system thought experiment just 
serves to dramatize the fact that even in natural cases, stabilized functions can arise in 
a way that does not depend on evolutionary history.
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We can see that in the case of learning. Think of a child that learns to clap, based on 
social feedback from a parent. It produces outputs (ways of clapping) that make the 
parent smile and learns to perform the behaviour in appropriate circumstances (e.g. 
not at dinnertime). These outputs now have a stabilized function F: to make the parent 
smile. The child’s behaviour has that function irrespective of any facts about evolution-
ary history. Non-evolution-based stabilized functions are acquired gradually as an 
organism interacts with its environment and receives feedback that reinforces behav-
iour or contributes to survival. A swamp system would have no task functions at the 
moment of creation, but would acquire them piecemeal, and would soon have task 
functions, functions keying into aspects of the environment it has interacted with. As 
soon as a swamp system has some interactions with the environment, then there will be 
an explanandum at which content-explanation can be addressed (success and failure), 
and the system will begin to have contentful states.
Task functions are still partly historical, so I have to bite the bullet and accept that a 
swamp system has no contents at the moment of creation. As I have argued, however, 
that is the right result. In these subpersonal systems, at the moment a swamp system is 
created there would be no explanandum for content-based explanation to address. 
However, the bullet is a lot more digestible than that confronted by standard teleose-
mantics, which accepts that a system with no evolutionary history would have no 
contents even after a long life of interacting with and learning about its environment.
We can also see how the robust outcome aspect of task functions contributes to the 
proprietary explanatory purchase of representational content (see also §8.2b). Because 
reaching T meets the conditions on being a robust outcome function of S, there are 
world-involving distal patterns involving S that are less perspicuous when we con-
sider S’s behaviour only in terms of proximal sensory stimulation and proximal motor 
output. The same location is reached across a variety of patterns of perceptual input. 
Despite the simplicity of this toy system, there are real patterns in the way S interacts 
with distal features of its environment that generalize across proximal inputs. (In 
paradigm cases there will also be generalizations across proximal outputs, with multiple 
motor outputs eventuating in a common distal outcome, as discussed in §3.3 above.) 
Explanations of S’s behaviour would look more complex and disjunctive if we did not 
recognize those patterns.
Contrast the case of the rifle firing pin (§2.2). The pin does not enter into any pat-
terns involving distal features of the environment that are not perfectly matched by the 
proximal causal story. Movement of the trigger corresponds to movement of the pin 
corresponds to ignition of the primer, explosion of the propellant, and discharge of the 
bullet. Robust outcome functions ‘bridge’ to common outcomes across a range of dif-
ferent proximal conditions. That is absent in the case of the firing pin. (This is spelt out 
more carefully in §8.2b.)
Notice that standard teleosemantic accounts of content require a consequence 
 etiology but do not require robust outcome functions. That misses out on an important 
element of the cluster that gives representations their explanatory bite. The honeybee 
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nectar dance has evolutionary functions irrespective of any feedback that comes from 
collecting nectar. That qualifies as an (evolutionarily based) task function, but only if 
the distal outcomes (arriving at distant flowers and collecting nectar) are also robust 
outcomes. As a matter of fact, bees do rely on a variety of inputs before performing the 
waggle dance, and they do reach foraging locations robustly in the face of obstacles and 
variations in wind speed (Srinivasan et al. 1996). As far as I know there are also robust 
outcome functions in the other central examples relied on by Millikan. So, the cases do 
fall into a cluster that supports representational explanation. But Millikan’s definition 
of function does not include a condition that functions should be outcomes that are 
robustly produced. To characterize the functions that underpin representational con-
tent in the honeybee nectar dance, and other cases of directly evolved animal signal-
ling, we need to combine evolutionary functions with robust outcome functions for 
the same outcomes.14
3.7 Rival Accounts
Griffiths (2009) argues that analysing functions in terms of contribution to persistence 
delivers the wrong result in many cases (see also Artiga and Martinez 2016). Organisms 
have many phenotypes that are detrimental to their own survival and only make sense 
in terms of their contribution to fitness. Behaviour that promotes mating or feeds off-
spring at the expense of the individual’s wellbeing are obvious examples. Griffiths’s 
example is the heavy investment in a single mating season made by males of several 
species of small Australian marsupials, which greatly increases their risk of death 
(Bradley et al. 1980, Diamond 1982). An extreme example is the way some male  spiders 
engage in mating despite the fact that they will end up being eaten by their female mate 
(Andrade 1996, Forster 1992).
No doubt there are lots of these cases in nature, with many involving representation: 
signalling between organisms (e.g. to achieve mating) or internal representations (e.g. 
of the conditions indicating that now is the time to pursue a mate). Contribution to 
persistence cannot help to underpin representational content in these cases. Our plur-
alist framework will cover such cases if the behaviour produced has evolved directly by 
natural selection. As with animal signalling discussed earlier, representation in these 
cases will be underpinned by a task function which conjoins robust outcome function 
with evolution-based stabilized function.
Griffiths makes a rival proposal. He has a forward-looking evolutionary approach. 
Functions are causal role functions that will contribute to reproduction of the organ-
ism (Griffiths 2009, p. 25). This is similar to Bigelow and Pargetter’s earlier proposal 
14 Shea (2007b) argued that a similar move addresses the dormitive virtue problem with teleosemantic 
contents.
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that functions are effects that give an organism a propensity to succeed under natural 
selection (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987).15
Unfortunately, the two objections made earlier to forward-looking accounts of 
contribution to persistence (§3.4d) are also decisive objections to forward-looking 
accounts of contribution to fitness. Whether an effect will contribute to fitness is heav-
ily dependent on the context (of other organisms and the rest of the environment). 
Either evolutionary history comes back in to specify the relevant context (the one 
organisms of that type have evolved to deal with) or there are just too many effects that 
would contribute to fitness in some circumstance or other. Without relying on history, 
there is also considerable open-endedness about what should count as the system. This 
open-endedness is a good reason why accounts of evolutionary functions should be 
based on actual evolutionary history, not possible future or counterfactual contribu-
tions to fitness (Godfrey-Smith 1994b, Artiga 2014b). Nor is there any in-principle 
answer to the question of how we should count fitness prospectively (at the first gener-
ation, the second generation, or further).16 A forward-looking approach also makes 
functions unsuited to figuring in a causal explanation of why an organism behaves as it 
does, as argued earlier in relation to forward-looking contributions to persistence. 
These considerations make forward-looking evolutionary functions inappropriate as a 
basis for representational content.
Griffiths’s examples of behaviour that promotes fitness but is bad for persistence 
of the individual can be understood in terms of the (historically based) evolutionary 
function of the behaviour. This does mean that there will be cases where the two 
different approaches to function are pulling in different directions in the same organ-
ism. Representations involved in the spider’s mate-approaching behaviour get their 
content in virtue of achieving a task function based on the way behaviour of that type 
has promoted offspring-production (hence fitness) in its ancestors. At the same time 
representations involved in the spider’s homeostatic mechanisms can get their con-
tent from contribution to persistence, and also in virtue of having been reinforced by 
some basic learning mechanisms, both irrespective of their evolutionary functions 
(although in this case they are likely to have evolutionary functions as well). Intentional 
design can also produce task functions that conflict with evolutionary-based task 
functions. For example, by design we could use a glow worm as a light-sensitive switch 
to turn on the heating when it gets dark. So, our framework allows for task functions 
based on evolution which do not contribute to persistence (Griffiths’s case), and also 
15 Nanay (2014) makes a related proposal: that the functions which teleosemantics should rely on can 
be analysed in terms of subjunctive conditionals about fitness: effects that would contribute to fitness of 
the organism.
16 Standardly, fitness is measured in terms of expected long-run genetic contribution to the population, 
but whether that is the best measure for predicting evolutionary change over time will depend on the par-
ticular situation.
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for task functions based on learning or contribution to persistence that have conferred 
no reproductive advantage.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have been examining one of the two key elements of the frame-
work introduced in Chapter 2: the task being performed by a system. What counts as 
a system’s tasks or functions—the functions whose performance is to be explained 
representationally? Answering that question is usefully constrained by the desider-
atum that an account of content should show why adverting to representational 
content allows better explanations of behaviour than would be available otherwise. 
Representation in many subpersonal systems forms part of a real cluster in nature, in 
which three elements are instantiated together, better than chance and for a natural 
reason. This cluster is what gives representational content its explanatory purchase. 
A central element in the cluster is a system’s having a stabilized function: producing 
outcomes that have been stabilized by evolution, learning or contributing to the 
persistence of the organism that produces them. Stabilized functions tend also to be 
robust outcome functions, and the converse. The third element is that there is an 
internal mechanism which accounts for these outputs being stabilized and produced 
robustly, a mechanism in which internal components (representations) stand in 
exploitable relations to relevant features of the distal environment. In these cases we 
can see both how and why robust outcomes are successfully produced. The internal 
components are how, and the stabilization process is why. When the three elements 
are instantiated together, a sufficient condition for having representational content 
is met, and recognizing such contents affords better explanations of the behaviour of 
the system than would otherwise be available.
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4.1 Introduction
(a) Exploitable correlational information
Chapter 2 introduced a framework for understanding representational content. 
Chapter 3 filled in one half of the framework: the functions being performed by an 
organism or other system. The other half is having an internal organization that 
capitalizes on exploitable relations—relations between internal states and the world 
that are useful to the system. Not all task functions are achieved representationally. 
Representation arises where a system implements an algorithm for performing task 
functions. That in turn has two aspects: internal vehicles stand in exploitable rela-
tions to features of the environment which are relevant to performing the task; and 
processing occurs over those vehicles internally in a way that is appropriate given 
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those relational properties. Content is constituted in part by exploitable relations: 
internal processing implements transitions between vehicles which make sense in 
the light of these relational properties, transitions called for by an algorithm which is 
suited to producing the input–output mapping given by the system’s task functions. 
This chapter focuses on cases where correlation is the candidate exploitable relation. 
The next chapter looks at structural correspondence.1
The account shares with teleosemantics a reliance on teleofunctions (Chapter 3) and 
the insight that the way a representation is used downstream is important to fixing its 
content (for me, also the way it is produced). However, we will see that my account 
does not presuppose that there are dedicated representation consumers that play a spe-
cial role in constituting content. That is an advantage of my view over some standard 
teleosemantic treatments (§1.4, §1.5).
An object or process carries correlational information just in case one or more of its 
properties correlates with the properties of some other object or process. More formally:
Correlational Information
Item(s)2 a being in state F carries correlational information about b being in state G
iff
P(Gb|Fa) ≠ P(Gb)
When a carries correlational information, observing the state of a is potentially 
informative, at least to some extent, about the state of b. Such correlations are obviously 
useful, the more so the stronger they are; that is, the more a’s state changes the probability 
of b’s state.3 An organism which needs to condition its behaviour on whether some 
state of the world obtains, but can’t directly observe that state of the world, can instead 
condition its behaviour on the state of an item which carries correlational information 
about the relevant state of the world.
Our definition of correlational information relies on there being nomologically 
underpinned probabilities in the world (propensities, objective chances, nomo-
logically based frequencies, or the like). An organism that observes a positive correl-
ation between Fa and Gb can form an expectation, when next encountering an 
instance of Fa, that Gb is more likely. That expectation is well-founded if the reason 
for the correlation in the originally observed samples carries over to the new sample. 
It need not. Suppose that a particular shade of green that occurs on meat, green-123 say, 
1 We leave aside two other candidate exploitable relations because they don’t arise in our simple systems: 
subject-predicate structure of the kind found in natural language (genuine singular and general terms); 
and the semantic or inferential connections between concepts, which potentially play a content-constitut-
ing role there. There may be more.
2 I am deliberately neutral about what should count as an item. It could be a particular object, e.g. 
a = the flagpole on top of Buckingham Place and F = the Union Jack is flying. Or it could be a collection of 
objects or a type of object, e.g. a = human faces and F = having red spots. It could also be a process or a 
type of process.
3 This ‘change’ need not be causal—‘change’ is simply convenient way of saying that the conditional 
probability differs from the unconditional probability.
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is a sign of a bacterium which will multiply in the gut and lead to illness. A person 
could notice that eating something green-123 made them ill. They could well form the 
expectation that anything green-123 is poisonous and should not be eaten. As a result, 
they also avoid eating some vegetables. Suppose that, in plant leaves, green-123 happens 
to be a sign of a toxin produced by plants to discourage herbivores. Then green-123 in a 
leaf does indeed raise the probability that the leaf is poisonous to eat. But it is only by 
accident that the correlation that exists in meat extends to plants. An organism observ-
ing the correlation in meat and projecting an expectation to plants would get things 
right, but only by accident. There is no nomologically underpinned correlation which 
explains why the expectation formed in one case should carry over to the other.
We are interested in the correlations that can be exploited by an organism to learn 
from samples and project to new cases, so it should be non-accidental that correlations 
encountered in one region (in the history of the individual or its ancestors) should 
project to new cases. That point generalizes. We are going to rely on the way exploitable 
correlations figure in causal explanations of behaviour and its success. So, we need to 
have recourse to correlations where it is not an accident that the correlation extends 
from one region to another. The correlation must subsist for a univocal reason.
Correlations can be useful if they raise probability or if they lower probability, but 
not if they do so unpredictably. What is useful is if there is a region where probability is 
raised throughout that region, or if there is a region where probability is lowered 
throughout that region.
Accordingly, I define exploitable correlational information as follows:4
Exploitable Correlational Information
Item(s) a being in state F carries exploitable correlational information about b being 
in state G
iff
(i) there are regions D and D’ such that if a is in D and b is in D’,
P(Gb|Fa) > P(Gb) for a univocal reason
or
(ii) there are regions D and D’ such that if a is in D and b is in D’,
P(Gb|Fa) < P(Gb) for a univocal reason
‘Region’ is intended to connote a spatiotemporal region but can be understood 
more widely to include sets and other kinds of collection. Items a could be all mem-
bers of a species, or even all organisms, or just one individual. Where a is a particular 
object, the region will just be the places and times where a is (or the singleton set 
whose only member is a). The region could be smaller. Anya-while-adolescent may 
exhibit a correlation between a facial expression and a subsequent behaviour. The 
relevant region would then be Anya during adolescence. The items a may also be 
a type of object, such as human facial expressions. The restriction to regions means 
4 Modifying Millikan’s definition of ‘soft natural information’ (Millikan 2000, Appendix B).
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there is no need for universality. The correlation may be highly local, such as facial 
expressions of Hoxton twentysomethings in the early 2010s. It is of course implicit 
that the items carrying exploitable correlational information are only the ones 
drawn from the relevant region.
The definition above is point-wise: one state raises the probability of another. 
In many natural cases a can be in a range of states, each of which raises the probability 
of b being in one of a range of other states. For example, the number of rings in a tree 
core correlates with the age of the tree: there being two rings makes it probable that the 
tree is two years old; three rings, three years old; and so on. Then F and G above can 
take a range of values, with each value of F mapping to a corresponding value of G 
about which it raises the probability.5 An organism may learn or evolve to make use of 
this systematic relationship. It can then extend that expectation to new instances of the 
same overall relationship. A person could observe a few instances of the correlation 
between tree rings and age and then form the general expectation that tree age is equal 
to the number of rings. They may never have encountered forty-two rings in a tree core 
before; nevertheless, when they count forty-two rings and form the expectation that 
the tree is forty-two years old, that expectation is correct for an underlying univocal 
reason that extends from the cases they learnt about to the new case.6 A further feature 
is that the different states X that a may be in exclude one another: any particular a can 
only be in one of these states at a time. In many cases they form a partition, covering all 
the possibilities (e.g. all possible numbers of tree rings). We can define a notion of 
exploitable correlational information carried by a range of states as follows:
Exploitable Correlational Information Carried by a Range of States
Item(s) a being in states X carries exploitable correlational information about b being 
in states Y
iff
there are regions D and D’ such that, if a is in D and b is in D’, for a univocal reason, 
for every value F of X there is some value G of Y such that P(Gb|Fa) > P(Gb) or 
P(Gb|Fa) < P(Gb)7
5 This is closely related to Shannon’s theory of information, which connects a range of states of a receiver 
with a range of states of a source. Our point-wise correlational information is a special case of this. Shannon 
information additionally takes account of the probability distribution across this range of states.
6 Millikan (1984) made this important observation about evolutionary functions. Suppose that a bee 
dance of exactly 42.5° to the vertical has never been performed in the history of the honeybee. Nevertheless, 
this dance has the evolutionary function of sending consumer bees off at 42.5° to the direction of the sun. 
The function of the particular dance derives from the systematic relationship bees evolved to respond to 
(angle of dance to the vertical = direction of nectar in relation to the sun). I am making a parallel point about 
exploitable correlations. Where there is a univocally grounded, nomologically underpinned, systematic 
probability-raising relationship, expectations acquired for some values can be extended, non-accidentally, 
to other values drawn from the same system.
7 For a particular pair F and G, Fa must raise the probability of Gb across the region or lower it across 
the region; raising probability in some subregions and lowering it in others would not count. (This is 
explicit in the definition of exploitable correlational information above.) But the mapping from values of 
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Animal signalling is an obvious case where correlations are exploited in the service 
of a function—in those cases, an evolutionary function. If there is also robustness in 
how the outcomes prompted by the signals are achieved, which there often is, then 
these cases will fit squarely within our framework. As we saw in discussing teleose-
mantics (§1.4), the correlations that feed into an explanation of how behaviour prompted 
by signals achieves its evolutionary function are correlations with distal features of the 
environment (e.g. with the location of nectar). Skyrms-style signalling models also 
turn on correlations being exploited as stand-ins on which receivers can condition 
behaviour (Skyrms  2010, Shea et al.  2017). (These models abstract away from the 
machinery of robustness.) There, which correlations are relevant can be read off dir-
ectly from the payoff matrix: correlations with world states in which, given appropriate 
actions, payoffs are delivered.
The definition of exploitable correlational information is extremely liberal. There 
are very many different regions within which a correlation subsists. There will often be 
subregions where a correlation is stronger and larger regions where it is weaker; also 
partially overlapping regions. I don’t attempt to define a unique reference class with 
respect to which a univocally based correlation exists. There is exploitable correlational 
information with respect to any region within which a univocal reason extends, whether 
or not that reason also extends to a wider region. What counts is the region within 
which an organism operates: the instances of a it encounters and the instances of b on 
which success of its behaviour depends. The basis for the correlation is objective and 
independent of the organism, but the correlation strength that matters partly depends 
on the organism’s point of view.
For our purposes below, there has to be an exploitable correlation within the region 
where outputs were stabilized and robustly produced. And the correlation encountered 
there has to be strong enough to explain stabilization and/or robustness. What counts 
as strong enough will depend on the facts of the case.8 An extremely weak correlation 
might form an adaptive basis for avoiding predators, for example, because the costs of 
being eaten are so high. What matters in explaining stabilization is that the correlation 
is strong enough in the region in which stabilization occurs. If we are instead looking 
forward, predicting the likelihood that its behaviour will be successful, then it is cor-
relation strength in the region where the organism will be operating that is relevant.
Correlation has been the focus of a lot of scientific work on representation in the 
brain.9 At the level of individual neurons, neuroscientists have consistently looked 
X to values of Y may be such as to raise the probability for some values of X and Y and to lower it for other 
values of X and Y.
8 There are also several aspects of correlation strength that will be important in different ways: sensitivity, 
specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, etc. The following are always important: how 
likely the world state Gb is given the vehicle state Fa, i.e. P(Gb|Fa), and how informative the vehicle state is 
about the world state, i.e. how different P(Gb|Fa) is from the unconditional probability P(Gb).
9 In ‘information processing’ or ‘computational’ theories in psychology and cognitive science, the ‘infor-
mation’ is usually a matter of representational content rather than bare correlation.
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for correlations between neural firing rate and certain kinds of stimuli; for example, 
neurons that respond to an edge in a specific location in the visual field (Hubel and 
Wiesel 1962).10 In standard region-based fMRI the search has been for regions of the 
brain whose activity correlates with a particular type of stimulus or task. More recent 
multi-voxel pattern analysis looks for correlations between the distributed pattern of 
activation across a region of interest and a stimulus or task type. And model-based fMRI 
looks for regions whose activation varies parametrically in step with quantities that the 
brain may be computing.
All these techniques are probing the way neural activity carries correlational infor-
mation. Three features of these practices are worth noting. First, strength of correlation 
is always assumed to be important: carrying more information is, ceteris paribus, more 
useful; and so it is assumed that strong correlational information is a better candidate 
for what the brain is really representing. Secondly, the correlations being probed are 
very often with distal features of the environment: properties of the stimuli being 
presented or the task the organism is called on to perform. Thirdly, there often seems 
to be a tacit assumption that only information that is being used is relevant to under-
standing what the brain is computing (deCharms and Zador 2000). For example, there 
might be substantial information carried by the phase difference between neural firing 
rates, but that is of no interest unless there is a way for downstream neurons to detect 
and make use of those phase differences. That is at the level of the vehicle, and a similar 
constraint is often in the background at the level of the content. Incidental correl-
ational information that just happens to be carried by a pattern of neural firing is not a 
candidate to figure in the computational or information-processing story unless it is 
somehow relevant to how the organism is behaving (Hunt et al. 2012).
(b) Toy example
Before putting forward a concrete proposal about how correlational information gives 
rise to content, let’s look at a simple example in which correlation is being exploited by 
a system to perform a task. Consider the toy system from the last chapter which moves 
along a line until it reaches a point T, where it stops (§3.6a).
Our toy system has four internal vehicles, t, r, δ and a (Figure 4.1). In the final ver-
sion, t initially varies randomly across multiple episodes of behaviour, until its value 
is fixed by a recharge. Because of this, the value which t eventually adopts correlates 
with the location of a power source. The obvious useful correlations then are those 
given in Table 4.1:
10 One type of correlation is where maximum firing rate corresponds to a particular feature at a particu-
lar location, dropping off with distance or variation in the feature (e.g. rotation of a line). Another type of 
correlation is filtering, where it is not the maximum firing rate that is most important, but the sensitivity of 
changes in firing rate to changes in the stimulus. A neuron whose firing rate goes up and down substan-
tially as the orientation of a bar changes, say, will thereby carry fine-grained information about orientation. 
The orientation to which it is most sensitive will be somewhere in the middle of its range of firing rates, not 
at the maximum.
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Those correlations make the performance of the system intelligible. That is the 
heart of the reason why the vehicles listed on the left of Table 4.1 are representations 
and the conditions on the right are their respective contents. Firing rate (let us say) of 
vehicle r correlates with distance from the origin, of vehicle t with location of a power 
source. Therefore, vehicle δ, whose firing rate correlates with the difference between 
the firing rates of r and t, will correlate with the distance of the system from a power 
source. The firing rate of vehicle a is proportional to that distance. If that rate is lin-
early transformed in an appropriate way into velocity, then the system will move from 
any point along the line so as to reach the power source. Given that those four internal 
elements carry the correlational information listed above, internal processing over 
those elements, which proceeds in virtue of vehicle properties, constitutes an algo-
rithm for performing the distally characterized task being performed by the system 
(reaching T). These contents meet our desideratum (§2.2): they allow us to see why 
representational contents enable a better explanation of the system’s behaviour than 
would be available without them.
aa = f(δ)
r
drive
motion
δ
δ = t – rt
detect
location
Figure 4.1 Toy system discussed in the text.
Table 4.1. Useful correlations carried by components of 
the toy system
Vehicle Correlation
r system’s position on the line
t location of a power source on the line
δ distance of the system from a power source
a velocity with which the system moves along the line
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Those internal components carry lots of other correlational information—informa-
tion that is less relevant to explaining how the system performs the task. For example, 
r correlates with the activity of some sensory receptors just upstream on the system’s 
periphery. That correlation would also help explain performance, but only when sup-
plemented with the fact that activity of the sensory receptors correlates with position 
along the line. So the correlation between r and sensory stimulation would figure in a 
less direct explanation of how the system performs the task. On the output side, a cor-
relates with the speed of rotation of the wheels. That correlation is only explanatorily 
relevant because rotation of the wheels correlates with the velocity at which the system 
moves. So that too is less directly explanatory of how the internal components conspire 
together to allow the system to achieve its task function.
Suppose light falls on the engineer’s workbench from one side, diminishing in 
intensity along the bench. Then component r correlates with the intensity of light at 
the toy’s location and component t with light intensity at the power source. These distal 
correlations would also explain why the difference δ correlates with the distance of the 
system to a power source, but only when supplemented with the information that light 
intensity correlates with distance along the bench. So, this set of correlations carried 
by the internal components offers, collectively, a less direct explanation of how the 
system performs its task function.
We should beware of seeking determinacy where it’s the wrong place to find it. And, 
indeed, there is some indeterminacy in what this simple toy system represents, accord-
ing to my account. There are other collections of correlational information that are just 
as good for explaining task performance—that collectively figure in just as direct an 
explanation: between t and the location of something worth reaching (and between δ 
and the distance to something worth reaching) for example; or between t and the loca-
tion of a place where an outcome that reinforces behaviour and promotes persistence 
occurs (with a corresponding correlation at δ). These alternative contents are not 
equivalent, since they could come apart, but they make distinctions that are more 
fine-grained than those that are relevant to the system. In the life of this very simple toy 
system being a place worth reaching is coextensional with being a charging point. 
Component t is correlated equally strongly with both. As theorists we should say 
that the content represented by the system is indeterminate between these options.11 
We will deal with indeterminacy in more detail in §6.2, with the benefit of the positive 
accounts of content set out in this chapter and the next.
11 There are different ways of capturing that indeterminacy. One is to say the representation has a 
 correctness condition which is the disjunction of these conditions. An alternative is to say that the words 
we theorists use to describe the correctness condition are only an imperfect expression or model of the 
true correctness condition; and that each way of capturing the correctness condition using the fine-grained 
machinery of natural language is bound to be only approximate, each equally good.
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4.2 Unmediated Explanatory Information
(a) Explaining task functions
In looking at a toy example in the last section, we saw that not all correlations are on a 
par for the purposes of explaining how a system manages to achieve its task functions. 
Some correlational information carried by internal components figures directly in an 
explanation of how a system with such internal processing is able to perform the task 
and become stabilized by feedback; other correlational information is only more indir-
ectly explanatory; and some is explanatorily irrelevant. Recall that the underlying 
motivation for representationalism—the practice of adverting to content properties 
carried by real internal components to explain behaviour—is the idea that the system’s 
internal organization implements an algorithm for performing a task being carried out 
by the system. Correlations between internal elements and distal features of the 
environment show how a system’s internal organization is keyed into the world so as to 
perform the distally characterized task. Content fixed in that way would meet our 
desideratum (to produce a theory which allows us to see how contents explain behav-
iour). So, the correlations that are content-constituting should be those which explain 
how the system achieves task functions (i.e. stabilization and robustness).
The move I make here involves a subtle shift of perspective. One could hold that 
content is fixed directly by its role in representational explanation: a system represents 
whichever contents best account for the pattern of behaviour the system produces.12 
Rather than representational explanation, my account is founded on causal explanation. 
Which correlations figure in causal explanations of stabilization and robustness? The 
former approach makes a very tight connection between what contents are and what 
contents explain, generating considerable indeterminacy. Causal explanations of 
stabilization and robustness are less indeterminate (§4.1a, §6.2).
To put this more carefully, we first define the explanandum, using a term of art, 
‘explaining S’s performance of task functions’; then we define ‘unmediated explana-
tory information’, which is the correlational information that figures in the explanans. 
The explanandum has two elements, corresponding to the two elements of task func-
tion (§3.5). First, we can explain how outcomes have been stabilized (hence count as 
stabilized functions). Secondly, we can explain how outcomes are robustly produced 
(hence count as robust outcome functions). No single term is perfectly suited to 
encompass these two explananda. In a sense we are explaining why an outcome F is 
a task function of a system S, but that in turn calls for an explanation of how it was 
stabilized and robustly produced, so ‘why’ becomes somewhat misleading. ‘Explaining 
performance of task functions’ is neutral enough to cover both explananda. It also 
12 That would make it hard to meet our desideratum.
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emphasizes that we are focused on explaining how the system does or has done some-
thing (in its environment).
Explanandum
To explain S’s performance of task functions Fj is to explain:
(a)  how producing each of the Fj has been systematically stabilized through 
evolution,13 learning or contribution to persistence (see §3.4d);
and/or
(b)  how each Fj has been produced in response to a range of different inputs and 
achieved in a range of different relevant external conditions
Unmediated Explanatory Information
The UE information carried by a set of components Ri in a system S with task 
functions Fj
is
the exploitable correlational information carried by the Ri which plays an unmedi-
ated role in explaining, through the Ri implementing an algorithm, S’s performance 
of task functions Fj
The idea that some correlations play an unmediated role in an explanation calls for 
clarification. In the classic example of the frog’s fly-catching mechanism, the correl-
ation of retinal ganglion cell firing (R) with little black things figures in an explanation 
of how the system was stabilized by evolution, but that explanation also mentions the 
fact that being a little black thing (condition C) correlates with being a nutritious flying 
object (condition C’). Without that background correlation, it would be opaque how 
the correlation between R and C enabled frogs to achieve an evolutionarily beneficial 
outcome. So, the role of the R–C correlation in that explanation is mediated. There is 
another explanation of stabilization that adverts directly to the correlation between 
R and nutritious flying objects (C’). The role of the R–C’ correlation in that explanation 
is unmediated. A correlation between an item R and condition C plays a mediated role 
in an explanation if its role depends on the explanation adverting to a further correlation 
between C and some further condition C’; otherwise it plays an unmediated role.
The discussion in the last section effectively argued that the correlations set out 
in Table 1 qualify as UE information carried by the components of our toy system. 
(It also argued that this list is not exhaustive: there are other sets of UE information 
carried by the same components, hence some indeterminacy.) My claim is that, where 
correlation is the relevant exploitable relation, the correlational information that is 
content-constituting is UE information. More specifically, a sufficient condition for a 
vehicle to represent content p is that it carries UE information about p.
13 Recall that in this case ‘S’ picks out a lineage of organisms, typed by a lineage-based category (§3.3). 
Then we have explananda like how honeybees reach locations of nectar, or how E. coli bacteria avoid toxic 
chemicals. Species (e.g. honeybee, E. coli) are lineage-based classes of organisms.
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Condition for Content based on Correlational Information
If component R of a system S with task function or functions Fj carries UE informa-
tion about condition C,
then R represents C
There is no need for an account of content to accord with what scientists relying on 
content think it is. For example, scientists may have no idea that content is connected 
to functions which are partly historically based. Nevertheless it is interesting to see 
that my theory of how content is constituted closely parallels a recently developed 
method for finding out which computations are being performed in a neural system, 
the method of model-based fMRI (Corrado et al.  2009). The method starts with 
behavioural data. For example, subjects may be asked to choose between pairs of 
fractal images, where different images are more or less likely to be rewarded. Subjects 
learn through feedback which images are rewarded when. The probabilities change 
during the experiment and subjects’ behaviour adjusts accordingly. A large number 
of choices produces a rich source of data about how subjects’ choices are influenced 
by the history of feedback they have received for past choices.
The first step is to find which computations the subjects could be performing: algo-
rithms that are capable of producing the observed pattern of behaviour. In our terms, 
that is to find a list of candidate algorithms that could perform the task functions these 
organisms have been trained to perform. The second step is to go into the brain to see 
which potential algorithm is most consistent with neural activity. An algorithm calls 
for various quantities to be computed on the way to making a choice: expected reward, 
reward received at this time step, prediction error, adaptive learning rate, etc. The fMRI 
BOLD signal reflects the amount of neural activity in small areas of the brain, hence 
can reflect the quantities being represented by an algorithm implemented in the brain. 
We look to see if there are areas of the brain whose activity varies, trial-by-trial, with 
the varying quantities called for by a candidate algorithm. When areas show up as 
potentially representing quantities called for by the algorithm, we check that it is 
plausible, in terms of neural architecture, that they are computing those quantities in 
the right sequence. This process is repeated for other candidate algorithms and then a 
‘model comparison’ is performed to see which algorithm is most consistent with 
the neural data. There are many assumptions behind the method, not all of which are 
strongly supported yet, but nevertheless when algorithm A fits the behavioural and 
neural data better than rivals B and C, that gives us some reasonable evidence that 
the brain is implementing algorithm A rather than B or C (Mars et al. 2012). What is 
striking for our purposes is that the method is effectively looking for correlational 
information in the brain which explains how a person performs the task function 
observed in their behaviour. Model-based fMRI is looking for the properties which, 
according to varitel semantics, are constitutive of content.
An implementations of an algorithm has a dual character, one aspect purely local to 
the system and another that depends on relational properties of components of the 
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system. So, having components carrying relevant correlational information is only one 
half of what it takes to implement an algorithm. The other is that they should be pro-
cessed in the right way—in a way that makes sense in the light of the correlational 
information they carry and will thereby generate appropriate behaviour. That is, when 
the processing is characterized in terms of local properties, independent of correl-
ational information carried by the vehicles, it should proceed through the steps called 
for by the algorithm.
That in turn puts tight constraints on which correlations are likely to be explanatory, 
since an algorithm usually calls for different vehicles to be doing different things. 
For example, an algorithm might call for one vehicle that correlates with shape and 
another with colour, putting that information together in a third vehicle that correlates 
with object category. There would be an assignment of content to vehicles according 
to which all three steps simply register object category, quite noisily in the first two 
cases. But that set of correlational information carried by components implements a 
less explanatory algorithm—an algorithm that does a less good job of explaining 
how the system performs its task functions. For this reason, an algorithm that relies 
on different vehicles carrying different correlational information will generally be 
more suited to explaining task performance (§6.2f). We saw that at work in our toy 
example: an explanatory set of correlational information has r correlating with pos-
ition and δ with distance to the power source (rather than both registering distance 
to the power source, say). In the definition of UE information, ‘unmediated’ does not 
count against this. To count as explanatory, an algorithm will generally have differ-
ent contents at different stages. The computation of what to do is mediated through a 
complex series of internal states, but the job of each should be to keep track of an 
external condition directly, not in a way that depends on presuming a further back-
ground correlation holds.
UE information covers output correlations as well as those that are due to how a 
system responds to inputs. The algorithm in our toy system relies on the fact that a 
drives the toy with a certain velocity: it correlates with velocity by causing motion. 
Not all UE information can be about outputs, however. Part of explaining perform-
ance of a task function is to explain robustness, in particular how an output was 
produced in response to a range of different inputs. That will require some compo-
nents of the system to carry correlational information that they reflect rather than 
produce. To anticipate the distinction we will discuss in Chapter 7, components can 
have directive contents when UE information concerns outputs, but there has to be 
some descriptive content in the system somewhere.
Often output-based UE information will concern the means by which a task function 
is performed. In our toy example, moving with a certain velocity is a means by which 
the toy reaches a power source from a range of different starting positions. However, 
sometimes the relevant correlation will be to output an F which is itself a task function 
of the system. For example, humans have a learning-based task function of getting 
correlational information 87
sugar (in circumstances when it is needed and available). In calculating how to do that, 
it looks like we have an internal state in orbitofrontal cortex whose job is to correlate at 
input with whether we need sugar and to correlate at output with obtaining sugar 
(Rolls 2015, Rushworth et al. 2011, Alexander and Brown 2011). How can that output 
correlation be explanatory of the task function? Isn’t it identical with the task function? 
The answer is that UE information falls out of the way the whole internal mechanism 
explains how outputs are produced robustly and stabilized. That requires more than 
just producing output F. It requires producing F in a range of different circumstances 
and keying it into the environmental circumstances in which it was stabilized. 
The algorithm as a whole is explanatory of that. A component correlating with F is one 
part of the overall explanation, but only when combined with other components 
carrying other UE information, some of which will have descriptive content. (Recall 
again, we are not asking which contents would best explain the behaviour; UE infor-
mation is based on how an internal mechanism forms part of a causal explanation of 
robustness and stabilization.)14
This account of the way correlation can ground content is very much in the spirit of 
Dretske (1986, 1988). Dretske considers the case where an internal component correl-
ates with a feature about which the system is disposed to learn, in the sense that instru-
mental conditioning will shape the system so as to condition its behaviour on that 
feature. For example, it could be because an internal state correlates with the location 
of a peanut (on the left or the right) that the animal comes to condition its reaching 
behaviour on that internal state (reaching left or right, respectively). Dretske calls the 
correlation with the location of the peanut a ‘structuring cause’ of the system’s later 
behaviour.
That is one version of the idea that explanatory connections between correlations 
and the stabilization of behaviour are relevant to content determination. However, 
I have a more general account of why Dretske’s recipe produces the right answer in the 
case he deals with. It is because of the role of correlations in explaining stabilization 
and the establishment of task functions. Instrumental conditioning of the kind Dretske 
points to is one specific example of that. My account is more general in three respects. 
First, it applies to a wider range of cases than just those which involve instrumental 
conditioning.15 Secondly, my view does not require there to be pre-existing correlations 
14 A different kind of case is more straightforward to deal with. Sending consumer bees off foraging 
200 m away in the direction of the sun when there is nectar at that location is a task function of a bee col-
ony. It is an output that was stabilized by evolution and robustly produced. A dance of four waggles (say) 
in a vertical direction correlates with sending consumer bees foraging at that location. That output correl-
ation is with an F which is a task function. But it also explains how the colony achieves another, more 
general, task function: getting nectar (from a variety of different locations). So, some correlations with 
task-functional outputs get explanatory purchase through explaining other, related task functions.
15 Dretske does allow that natural selection can give an internal state the function of indicating some-
thing. The internal state can then be called a representation. But he argues, mistakenly in my view, that this 
is not a case where contents (reasons in his terminology) explain behaviour, since what the states indicate, 
‘is (and was) irrelevant to what movements they produce’ (1988, p. 94), see also Dretske (1991, pp. 206–7).
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between internal states and distal features. The correlations could develop at the same 
time as the system is being tuned to behave in a certain way. That is what happens when 
an artificial neural network is trained, for example. Thirdly, it applies to cases where 
several different correlational vehicles are involved in generating behaviour, as in the 
toy example we have been discussing. Dretske’s recipe only applies straightforwardly 
where one correlational vehicle comes to be wired up to drive behaviour in virtue of 
the correlational information it carries.
The latter point is important, because any plausible account of representation in the 
brain will have to deal with the fact that very many representational vehicles interact in 
complex ways to produce behaviour. In §4.4 we will see a variety of ways that can arise.
(b) Reliance on explanation
The definition of unmediated explanatory information (UE information) places 
heavy reliance on the concept of explanation (obviously). It bases content on causal-
explanatory connections. I am assuming a realist account of explanation according to 
which the causal-explanatory relations that figure in explanations are objective meta-
physical dependence relations.16, 17 This is not special pleading. Varitel semantics is mak-
ing use of a resource here which other sciences also take for granted. It is not the task 
of a theory of content to give a theory of why causal-explanatory relations are objective.
Recall that contents are fixed, not by the role of contents in representational 
explanations, but by the role of correlations in causal explanations. So, my theory of 
content is not interest-relative or pragmatic. If the definition of UE information is 
not empty, then it picks out a property in the world. UE information then exists, 
irrespective of whether anyone chooses to refer to it. It might be an interest-relative 
matter whether we go in for explanations that appeal to this property, that is, whether 
we go in for representational explanations. I have been arguing that UE information 
(and UE structural correspondence, in the next chapter) underpins a distinctive 
scheme of explanation, one where correctness explains success and misrepresenta-
tion explains failure. Our epistemic interests may affect whether we appeal to this 
scheme of explanation.
If I’m wrong to assume that causal-explanatory relations are objective, then my 
accounts of content necessarily inherit any interest-relativity of causal explanation. 
However, the same would then be true throughout the sciences. If causal-explanatory 
16 This is compatible with the view that explanations are semantic entities (e.g. sentences, models); as 
well as with the ‘ontic’ view of explanation (Salmon 1984, Craver 2014).
17 In causal explanations, ‘explains’ does not introduce an intensional context, in the sense that in an 
intensional context it matters how we pick out the properties referred to. A neuron in a macaque’s OFC that 
carries UE information about orange juice thereby carries UE information about my favourite juice (as it 
happens). Explanation does not of course in general allow substitution salva veritate of one property for 
another property which has the same extension. (In that sense causal explanations do not in general allow 
substitution salva veritate of coextensional property terms.)
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claims in all sciences are ineliminably interest-relative, then it would be no surprise 
that representational contents are no different.18
Defining a property in the way I have always raises another pressing question. 
It’s not enough to just show that the property exists (the definition is non-empty), and 
exists independently of anyone’s interests. Is the definition any use, does it pick out a 
worthwhile category? I say ‘yes’, of course. My argument is that UE information meets 
our desideratum. It allows us to explain how representational content can explain 
behaviour. UE information is thus a worthwhile property because, if I’m right, it is the 
property that figures in many explanations in cognitive science.
(c) Evidential test
Carrying UE information not only explains, but also makes it more likely that the 
system will achieve its task functions. That gives us another way of getting at the UE 
information carried by a vehicle: increasing the correlation strength of UE information 
should increase the likelihood of the system achieving its task functions; similarly, 
weakening the correlation should decrease it. So, we can supplement the constitutive 
condition above with an evidential test—a (fallible) way of working out what UE infor-
mation is carried by elements of a system.
Evidence of UE information
For component R in a system S performing a task function or functions Fj
the correlation of the state of R with a condition G involving natural properties 
and objects in S’s environment
whose strengthening most increases and whose weakening most decreases the 
likelihood of S achieving Fj
is a good candidate to be UE information carried by R
To see how this works, let’s go back to our toy system. Suppose there is some random 
noise in the system, so that each component has a small chance of going into a random 
state during an episode of behaviour. Then the probability that the system is at location x, 
say, when r is in a particular state R1, although high, is not certain. There will be some 
occasions when r is in R1 and the system is in fact at random other locations. On those 
occasions, the system would not achieve its task function of reaching T. If the correlation 
between r’s being in state R1 and the system’s being at location x were strengthened, the 
system would achieve its task function more often. Similarly, weakening that correlation 
(increasing the noise) would reduce the frequency with which the system would reach T.
Now consider the correlation between r and light intensity. Strengthening that 
correlation might increase the likelihood of the system reaching T, provided the light 
intensity gradient is reasonably stable, but not by as much as strengthening the 
correlation with the system’s location on the line would (since light intensity is not a 
18 As we’ve just seen, the relevant interests would be those related to giving causal explanations (of sta-
bilization and robustness), rather than interests related to giving content-based explanations.
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perfect correlate of location). So, the evidential test suggests that the correlation with 
light intensity is a less good candidate to be UE information.
Correlations on the output side can also be assessed using the evidential test. Where 
slippage in the wheels or noise in the motor system impairs performance, strengthen-
ing the correlation between component a and the velocity of the system will have the 
biggest effect in increasing the likelihood that the system performs its task function of 
reaching T.
The evidential test uses the effect of correlation strength on likelihood of achieving 
task functions as a proxy for how directly a collection of correlations carried by com-
ponents explains the achievement of those functions. However, those things are not 
bound to align. Nor is there a guarantee that there will be an item of correlational 
information that satisfies the evidential test. A correlation whose strengthening 
improves performance may not be such that its weakening reduces performance, for 
example if there is a backup mechanism that puts an effective floor on the likelihood of 
performing a function. Even when there is correlational information that satisfies the 
evidential test, that is no guarantee that carrying this information figures in an unme-
diated explanation of performing task functions.19
The evidential test is restricted to correlations with natural properties, in order to 
focus on correlations that are candidates to figure in a causal explanation of task 
performance. General principles about explanation will make complex disjunctive or 
gruesome properties poor candidates to figure in such explanations. (Other theorists of 
content have also pointed to such considerations as ruling out some problematic puta-
tive contents.) There will clearly be correlations with non-natural properties whose 
strengthening would do more to increase the likelihood of success. In our toy example, if 
the state of vehicle r correlated with the location of the system and there being no noise 
anywhere in the system, then success would become very much more likely. These kinds 
of constructed properties are much less good candidates to figure in a causal explanation 
of stabilization and robustness, and hence less good candidates for content.
To apply the evidential test, we need first to have a collection of candidate correl-
ations that assigns different correlations to different vehicles. As we’ve just seen, that is 
needed if implementing the algorithm (internal processing over components) is going 
to explain how outputs were produced robustly and stabilized by interactions with the 
environment. Then we fix on one candidate correlation, hold everything else fixed, and 
consider what would happen if the world were changed to make that correlation 
stronger. Rather than being at location x 95 per cent of the time when component r is in 
state R1, what would the effect on robustness and stabilization be if it were at location x 
100 per cent of the time when r is in R1? In that case, the task-functional output (getting 
to the power source) would have been produced more robustly and would still have 
19 Suppose a computational step depends on comparing the values of two noisy representations and 
selecting the larger (as in analogue magnitude comparisons, see §4.6a below). If the noise is asymmetric 
around the mean, then reducing the noise in one register might cause the system to select the wrong option 
more often.
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been stabilized. Strengthening the correlation of r with patterns of sensory input 
would have less of an effect on successful task performance, since sensory input is itself 
an imperfect correlate of location. So, the evidential test suggests that r carries UE 
information about the toy’s location.
It is most appropriate to assess these counterfactuals against the circumstances 
that obtained during episodes of stabilization. However, it is only an epistemic test. 
Assessing what would happen to the system in its current circumstances will also give 
us some evidence, to the extent that the system’s current environment is relevantly 
similar to the circumstances in which its behaviour was stabilized.
4.3 Feedforward Hierarchical Processing
In the next six sections we see how this account of UE information can be applied to a 
variety of case studies. The first case is where there is simply feedforward hierarchical 
processing of sensory input through a series of layers. Marr’s account of 3D vision is a 
well-known example: inputs are processed into an array of point-intensities, then into 
a ‘primal sketch’ involving detectors for blobs, edges, and so on, then on into detectors 
for local surfaces and their orientations, and so on (Marr 1982). Hierarchical structure 
is also found in the successive layers of the artificial neural networks that have used 
‘deep convolutional’ learning algorithms so effectively to categorize a huge array of 
natural visual scenes (Krizhevsky et al. 2012, Kriegeskorte 2015). To work with a simpler 
case, consider the ALCOVE neural network model (Kruschke 1992; see Figure 4.2).
The task of ALCOVE is to categorize objects, using its sensitivity to perceptual fea-
tures. To give it a clear task function, let us suppose that it has been trained to sort objects 
into boxes according to whether the object falls under category A or category B. The 
training regime gives rise to task functions because internal configurations of connec-
tion weights that tend to produce incorrect behaviour are replaced, and those which 
produce correct behaviour are stabilized. As a result of training, the system can use its 
input-sensitivity to brightness, size, etc. in order to sort objects into the correct box. 
Putting an object of category A into box A is then a task function of the trained system.
It performs that function by taking an intermediate step before performing the 
sorting action. Training produces an array of ‘exemplar nodes’ at the network’s hid-
den layer. These act a bit like names for individual objects. Activation of each correl-
ates with encountering a particular object. The network solves the problem by first 
recognizing which individual object it is faced with, then sorting that object into the 
appropriate category. Input nodes correlate with features of the objects. Output 
nodes correlate with whether the object falls under category A or category B; they 
also correlate with where the object gets placed. Consider the correlational information 
carried by one of the exemplar nodes. Its activation raises the probability that:
(i) input nodes are activated thus-and-so
(ii) the object encountered has visual features abc (those characteristic of 
exemplar 1)
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(iii) the object encountered is exemplar 1
(iv) the object encountered has visual features xyz (those characteristic of objects 
in category A)
(v) the object encountered belongs to category A
(vi) the object encountered will be placed in box A
Those correlations are presented in decreasing order of strength ((v) and (vi) are 
equal). Consider how these can be combined with the correlations carried at input and 
output so as to implement an algorithm for sorting objects into boxes. Correlation (iii) 
fits together with the input correlation with object features and the output correlation 
with object category to instantiate an algorithm for performing the task. The correl-
ation of hidden layer nodes with groups of perceptual features (ii) would make for a 
less explanatory set of correlations. An algorithm that correlated with object category 
(v) at the hidden layer and then again at the output layer would be less explanatory of 
how the system actually manages to compute what to do and perform robustly. So (iii) 
is UE information carried by the hidden layer. These considerations also imply that the 
output layer carries the UE information given by clauses (v) and (vi) above.
w
Category nodes.
Learned association
weights.
Learned attention
strengths.
Stimulus dimension
nodes.
Exemplar nodes.
α α
Figure 4.2 The ALCOVE network (Krushke 1992).
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How does the evidential test apply to this case? At the output layer, it is indeed the 
correlation with category whose strengthening and weakening most strongly affects 
the likelihood of success (excluding non-natural properties that would have an even 
tighter connection). At the input layer, it is reducing noise in the correlations with per-
ceptual features that would have the strongest effect. Making an input node correlate 
more closely with exemplar or category would help in some circumstances but hinder 
in others, since input nodes are activated by more than one exemplar and more than 
one category.
The evidential test is equivocal when applied to the hidden layer. Because there is a 
straightforward many-to-one mapping from exemplars to categories, mistakes at the 
hidden layer that confuse one exemplar for another in the same category do not com-
promise overall performance of the system. So, tightening the connection between a 
hidden layer node and exemplar (iii) or category (v) will both improve performance, 
and to the same extent. To decide between them we have to turn to the consideration 
just mentioned: one collection of correlations (perceptual features, exemplar, category) 
provides a better understanding of how the system performs its task function than the 
other (perceptual features, category, category), since the latter overlooks some of the 
internal structure used by the system to perform the task (see also §4.1a).
Basing content on UE information has two general effects in these cases. It can 
select amongst coextensive properties about which the system carries information so 
that the most explanatory one figures in the content. And, since it is connected with 
explaining distal results achieved by the system, it tends to deliver contents that 
concern distal properties—properties that are relevant to how the system performs 
its tasks. So if we take JIM, a more sophisticated development of ALCOVE with 
more layers of processing, there is a layer of processing that detects geons—certain 
configurations of 3D shapes that objects can exemplify (Hummel and Biederman 
1992). Does this layer represent properties of objects, or does it instead represent 
regular ways in which objects affect the system’s sensory apparatus? If content is fixed 
by UE information carried by the layer, then it will be representing the former: properties 
of the distal objects.
A further development of ALCOVE uses a network with feedback connections 
between layers (Love et al. 2004). This raises the problem of reciprocal processing con-
nections, which we will turn to with a different case study in §4.8 below.
It is worth noting that we have given an account of content for this system without 
having to give representation consumers a content-constituting role. Content comes 
out of how all the components interact to achieve task functions. In standard teleose-
mantics a consumer system is a special component, the evolutionary functions of 
whose outputs determine content. We noted above that it is not obvious how to extend 
the consumer idea to more complex cases (§1.5). That problem is not acute in this first, 
straightforward case study, but by eschewing a content-determining consumer even 
here we have an approach which is readily extendable to more complex cases.
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4.4 Taxonomy of Cases
In §§ 4.5–4.8 we see how the UE approach can be applied to various cases from 
the empirical literature. A quick look at a typical wiring diagram for even a simple 
neural processing system shows that representation processing in the brain takes 
place in complex ways. The diagram of the primate visual system below is represen-
tative (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3 Diagram of the primate visual system (from Felleman and van Essen 1991).
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I pick out four kinds of complexity that a theory of content will have to deal with—
ways that representations are processed that show up regularly in information process-
ing theories in cognitive neuroscience (Figure 4.4). Sections 4.5–4.8 then select case 
studies that exemplify each structure and show that the UE approach delivers appro-
priate contents. The cases are not exhaustive, but they do serve to demonstrate that the 
approach can be applied across a broad range of systems.
These cases also serve to highlight an important contrast with standard, consumer-
based teleosemantics. We saw in the previous section that teleosemantics already faces 
a problem when we move away from cases like animal signalling where a single repre-
sentational stage mediates between producer and consumer. When there are multiple 
layers of processing it faces a challenge in explaining why different stages represent 
different aspects of the problem. The consumer-based approach has an even bigger 
problem dealing with the kinds of cases taxonomized here, which are merely simplified 
treatments of some of the complex interconnections found in a typical neural processing 
diagram. The absence of a simple hierarchy and the presence of feedback loops make 
it very hard to identify, for each putative representation, a single consumer system which 
conditions its behaviour on that representation (Godfrey-Smith 2013; Cao 2012, 2014; 
cf. Artiga 2016).
The first kind of case shown in Figure 4.4 is where a single representational vehicle 
R, with a range of states Ri correlating with a range of properties, acts as input to two 
distinct subsystems conditioning their behavioural outputs on the state of R (Case 1). 
Case 1 (§4.5)
Case 3 (§4.7) Case 4 (§4.8)
Case 2 (§4.6)
Output
A
R1/
R2/
....
R1/
R2/
…
R1/
R2/
....
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R2/
…
if R’1
if R’2R’1/
R’2/
R’1/
R’2/
…
R’1/
R’2/
…
R”1/
R”2/
…
R”’1/
R”’2/
…
Output
B
Figure 4.4 The four kinds of cases exemplified in §§ 4.5–4.8, respectively. (Inputs to the repre-
sentational vehicles R and R’ are not shown.)
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The two subsystems may be acting for different purposes and so may be making use of 
different correlations carried by R. The second kind of case is the converse: two different 
representations are made use of by a single consumer (Case 2). For example, R may 
correlate with colour and also with motion, where in some contexts behaviour should 
be conditioned on colour and in others on motion. R’ indicates which context the 
system is in. In order to produce appropriate output, the organism conditions its 
behaviour on the conjunction of the state of R and the state of R’.
In the third and fourth cases, input influences output via more than one route. 
In Case 3 the two routes run in parallel. Like Case 2, the behaviour of the output sub-
system depends on two different representational vehicles, but the state of the second 
vehicle is also dependent on the state of the first. In Case 4 we incorporate feedback: 
the state of vehicle R’ is affected both by current input from R and also by input fed back 
from processing that took place on one of its own earlier states.
Real neural systems often include several of these elements at once. Below we pick 
out case studies that contain each in isolation. The aim is to show that none of them 
presents an obstacle to applying the UE approach.
4.5 One Vehicle for Two Purposes
A vehicle that carries correlational information about one state of affairs will usually 
carry information about many. Different downstream systems may be interested in 
different pieces of information: different correlations may be of use to each (Case 1 in 
Figure 4.4 above). There are many examples of that in animal signalling. A firefly pro-
duces flashes of light that signal its location to conspecifics. The signal means something 
like receptive female here. The signal also carries the information there is a small nutritious 
insect here. This second piece of information is capitalized on by predators.
In that simple case only one of the uses is part of a cooperative signalling system. 
Stegmann (2009, p. 873) gives an animal signalling example where both uses are at least 
partly cooperative. A chicken seeing a predator makes a distinctive call. This notifies 
conspecifics that there is a predator nearby so they can avoid it. It also notifies the 
predator that the chicken has seen it and could easily escape. Predator and prey share 
an interest in avoiding a pursuit if it will be unsuccessful. So, they share an interest in 
producing and acting on this signal. Conspecifics act on one piece of correlational 
information carried by the signal, potential predators on another.
When we turn to representations within a single organism, it is rarer that a represen-
tation is output to two entirely discrete consumer subsystems. Corollary discharge is 
perhaps one relatively clear case.20 The signal sent to the motor system to drive action is 
also sent to perceptual mechanisms, which rely on it for the information it carries 
about what the animal is about to do. Very roughly, to the motor system it means move 
thus and so and to perceptual systems it means I am actively moving thus and so. 
20 Thanks to Rosa Cao for suggesting this example.
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In Chapter 3 we saw that this second use of the motor signal, the efference copy, has an 
important role in enabling actions to be controlled smoothly.
Corollary discharge or efference copy is a very general principle of nervous systems, 
found even in the simplest organisms (Crapse and Sommer 2008). In more complex 
organisms like mammals it operates simultaneously at low levels (e.g. gating reflexes), 
and at higher levels (e.g. to allow predictive computations). A very simple example is 
found in the model organism C. elegans (widely studied because its nervous system 
has only 302 easily accessible neurons). When it senses pressure at the front, it produces 
a balancing motor response, which serves to stabilize its position. That reflex would 
get in the way when the animal pushes itself forward. So, the motor signal driving 
forward locomotion also serves to cancel the stabilizing reflex, freeing the animal to 
make forward progress. Thus, the corollary discharge signal both instructs the animal 
to move forward and informs the stabilization mechanism that the animal is going to 
move forward under endogenous control.21
That is a simple case of reuse, albeit one where arguably the two contents are of dif-
ferent kinds: one instructs that a world state be produced (directive content) and the 
other is designed to reflect the world (descriptive content). On another reading there 
are two kinds of directive content here: telling the motor system to push the animal 
forward and telling the stabilizing system to be inactive on this occasion. Chapter 7 
deals with the question of what makes a content descriptive or directive. The import-
ance of corollary discharge for now is that it shows how one vehicle can have two differ-
ent contents deriving from two different downstream uses.
There are also likely to be other cases where the two contents are both descriptive, as 
with the chicken case, rather than one being directive and the other descriptive. 
Section 7.4 discusses a case where that arises in a slightly subtle way. The cases we 
will look at below are ones where it turns out that two different systems are using the 
same representational content, relying on it for different (but overlapping) purposes in 
different contexts.
4.6 Representations Processed Differently  
in Different Contexts
(a) Analogue magnitude representations
One potential case of the same vehicle meaning different things in different contexts 
comes from the analogue magnitude system.22 It is used to represent numerosity, but it 
21 Where there is an efference ‘copy’ it may be that there are in fact two separate representational 
 vehicles, one instructing the animal to move forward and a separate descriptive representation telling the 
stabilization mechanism that the animal is going to move forward. In cases where there is just one signal, 
then there will be a single representational vehicle which plays both these roles.
22 I adopt the common label without making any claims about whether these representations qualify as 
analogue (rather than digital) in any useful sense; or about how best to draw the analogue–digital distinction 
and to characterize analogue computation.
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seems to be capable of representing different things in different contexts: numbers of 
objects, tones, light flashes, and so on. I will conclude that this is actually a case where 
there is a common representation of numerosity. So the case will show how representa-
tions with a common content can be processed differently in different contexts.
Analogue magnitude representations correlate with the number of objects perceived 
in various situations: moving visual objects, static arrays of objects, tones, taps, flashing 
lights, and so on. There is very good evidence showing how the  analogue magnitude 
system works in adults, infants, and non-human animals.23 It can be used to compare 
numerosity across modalities; for example, judging if the number of tones heard is 
more or less than the number of objects in a visually presented array. However, the 
correlation between the analogue magnitude register and numerosity is imperfect. The 
further apart two magnitudes are, the more accurate subjects will be in comparing 
them (5 vs. 10 is easier than 5 vs. 6), but the more things there are to compare, the less 
accurate the comparative judgement (5 vs. 10 is easier than 15 vs. 20). That is, the repre-
sentations follow Weber’s law: discriminability is a function of the ratio of the difference 
between quantities to the overall quantity being compared.
There is evidence for one common register in the parietal cortex in which these 
numerosities are being recorded (Piazza et al.  2004, Nieder and Dehaene  2009). 
Registering numerosity in a common code affords ready comparisons across modalities 
and explains various priming and interference effects. Activation of this register R 
correlates with the number of items in the array or sequence presented, be they visual 
objects, flashes, tones, etc. Could R be a representation that has different contents for 
different downstream processes: numbers of objects in some contexts, numbers of 
tones in others, and so on? Or does R represent something common—numerosity—
for all the uses to which it is put? Information about the types of item presented is not 
lost. Subjects can reach out to touch a flashing light, can follow moving objects with 
their eyes, can orient towards tones, and so on. So, there must be another component 
in the system somewhere with the functional role of telling downstream processing 
what kind of item it is dealing with, even if the number of items of that kind is recorded 
in a common register R. Simplifying considerably, let’s suppose that contextual infor-
mation about the kind of item is recorded in a separate register R’. Schematically, the 
set-up is the one we identified as Case 2 (Figure 4.5).
To home in on a task function, suppose people have been trained for monetary 
reward to report the number of items they have just been presented with. A visual 
array should be reported by pressing a button a corresponding number of times, and a 
sequence of tones is reported by moving a graduated slider on a screen. We can sup-
pose that this input–output behaviour is a task function as a result of feedback-based 
learning. (The system will also have a more general task function as a result: to obtain 
money.) States R1, R2, etc. are states of increasing activation of register R, correlating 
23 Barth et al. (2003) in adults; Xu and Spelke (2000) in infants; Brannon and Terrace (1998) in monkeys. 
For reviews see Dehaene (1997) and Carey (2009, pp. 118–31).
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with the number of items just presented. State R’1 correlates with the array being visual 
and R’2 with it being auditory. The output behaviour is proportional to the activation of 
R, but the type of behaviour produced depends on whether register R’ is in state R’1, 
which leads to button presses, or in state R’2, in which case the subject moves the slider.
When we look for UE information, this functional specialization is an important 
part of the algorithm that allows the system to perform its task functions. One register 
keeps track of item type and another deals with numerosity in general in a common 
register. That commonality is also crucial to the way the system is able to make cross-
modal comparisons of numerosity. So, R comes out as carrying UE information about 
numerosity and R’ about stimulus type. We could treat R as representing different con-
tents for different uses: visual objects for some downstream uses, auditory events for 
 others, and so on. However, recognizing that R is a common register for numerosity 
offers a more perspicuous explanation of how the system performs its tasks than if 
we were to treat it has having different representations for different downstream uses. 
So, the UE information approach suggests that R is simply representing the numerosity 
of the presented array.24 It is a common representation which combines with another 
representation R’ to generate different outputs in different contexts.
These kinds of considerations will often be at work in applying the UE framework to 
real systems. Where a register is deployed in a variety of contexts, that will push in the 
direction of its having a common content, one which abstracts away from particular 
24 There is a legitimate question here of what it is to represent numerosity, given that in many situations 
the domain being represented is discrete, whereas the vehicle of representation is either continuous-valued 
(e.g. a firing rate), or if it is discrete-valued (e.g. because it represents in terms of number of depolarizations, 
which are discrete events) then it has many more discrete values than there are integer values to be repre-
sented. Option 1 says that there are different values of the vehicle that all represent the same number of objects. 
Option 2 says that each state represents that the input has a certain non-integer magnitude (rational or real 
valued), and that it does so only approximately. How correctly or incorrectly it represents is given by 
the difference between the (real-valued) representational content and the (integer-valued) actual number 
of items; where degree of correctness can explain behavioural success and failure (e.g. the closer you are to 
getting it right, the more often the behaviour will be exactly appropriate to the number; and if appropriate-
ness falls off in degrees, the more appropriate your behaviour will be).
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sensory features of particular situations. That is, ‘triangulating’ on a common content, 
while not built into the framework, will often fall out of the explanatory considerations 
that underpin UE information. Perceptual representations will generally work like that. 
Being decoupled from any specific behavioural response also pushes in the direction 
of their having purely descriptive content, as we will see later (§7.4).
The analogue magnitude system also illustrates the idea that exploitable correlational 
information can be carried by a range of different states (§4.1a above). The activity of 
R varies and how active it is correlates with numerosity. That systematic relationship 
can extend to new cases. As a result of learning, R carries UE information according to 
a system that maps activity levels to numerosities: R1 to one item, R2 to two items, etc. 
Suppose that it happens that a numerosity of seven was never encountered during 
learning. R7 nevertheless forms part of the same systematic relationship, so it carries 
the UE information that there are seven items present. Thus, when there is exploitable 
correlational information carried by a range of states in a systematic way, UE informa-
tion can generalize beyond the instances that were encountered during stabilization 
(evolution, learning or contribution to persistence).25
(b) PFC representations of choice influenced by colour and motion
We are after a case where one and the same vehicle carries two kinds of correlational 
information, and intuitively one part of downstream processing makes use of it because 
of one kind of information that it carries, and another for another. In the previous 
example the functional specialization of the parietal cortex counted in favour of there 
being a dedicated common system for representing numerosity. So, we turn instead 
to the prefrontal cortex, which is less functionally specialized and carries information 
in a more domain-general way.
Mante et al. (2013) offer a model of information integration and context-dependent 
choice in the prefrontal cortex. Subjects (macaque monkeys) view an array of moving 
red and green dots (Figure 4.6). Sometimes the average motion is to the left, other 
times to the right, in each case with more or less coherence, making it more or less 
easy to judge the direction of coherent motion. Another dimension of variation is 
the proportion of dots of each colour: sometimes more red, sometimes more green. 
That discrimination is harder when the numbers of each colour are nearly matched. 
The task is either to judge the average direction of motion or to judge the preponderant 
colour. The task changes trial-by-trial, indicated by another stimulus (a yellow square 
or a blue cross at the bottom of the screen). The monkey responds by making an 
eye movement, either to a red circle on one side of the screen or to a green circle on 
the other side. When the ‘colour task’ stimulus is on, the monkey has to make an eye 
movement to the red circle if most dots are red, and to the green circle if most dots are 
green. When the ‘motion task’ stimulus is on, the monkey has to make an eye movement 
to the left if most dots are moving left, and to the right if most dots are moving right.
25 As noted above (§4.1a), this mirrors a point made by Millikan (1984), which she describes as a kind 
of systematicity.
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Mante et al. (2013) present neural and modelling evidence that the task is performed 
as follows. A network of neurons in the prefrontal cortex accumulates evidence about 
the majority colour and the preponderant direction of motion of the dots. We can 
think of this simply as having a representational vehicle that varies along two dimen-
sions, one corresponding to colour and the other to motion. The graded nature of these 
dimensions allows for evidence accumulation. The longer the monkey looks at a 
stimulus, the more information it gathers about which is the preponderant colour and 
direction of motion. So, the activity along these dimensions increases with time, and 
does so more rapidly when the difference in the array of dots (of colour or motion, 
respectively) is more pronounced.
Activity in this network evolves over time towards one of two states, corresponding 
to making an eye movement in one of two directions. In the context of the motion task, 
evolution towards one action or the other is driven by evidence accumulated along the 
motion dimension. Information along the colour dimension is preserved (indicating 
the proportion of dots of each colour), but it has little or no effect on which choice is 
(–50)(b)
(a)
(–15) (–5) (5) (15) (50)
(50)
(18)
(6)
(–6)
(–18)
(–50)
–d3
c3
c2
c1
–c1
–c2
–c3
–d2 –d1 d1 d2 d3
Left
Red
Green
C
ol
ou
r c
oh
er
en
ce
Right
Motion coherence
Fixation(0.3 s)
Targets(0.35 s)
Saccade
Delay(0.3–1.5 s)
Dots(0.75 s)
Figure 4.6 Behavioural task in Mante et al. (2013).
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programmed. The reverse occurs in the context of the colour task: the colour-based 
dimension of variation drives evolution of the network towards a choice; motion-
based information is preserved but non-efficacious. The contextual cue has the effect 
of selecting which dimension of variation of the representation will drive choice.
To capture the core of the case for our theorizing, let’s ignore the graded activation 
and accumulation of evidence and consider the simplified processing diagram in 
Figure 4.7 (Case 2 again). We can treat the system as having two vehicles. C1/C2 correl-
ates with the context cue indicating whether motion or colour will be the basis of 
reward in the current trial. The other vehicle can be in one of four states: R1 or R2 
( colour) can each be paired with either R3 or R4 (motion). A processing step takes 
these states as input and produces A1 or A2 as output, corresponding to the two pos-
sible actions (simplifying slightly, suppose that these just program a saccade to the 
left or right, respectively). When in state C1, R1 vs. R2 determines whether A1 or A2 is 
produced; R3 vs. R4 has no effect. The converse is true in state C2.
As a result of learning, this system has the task function of obtaining juice. To find the 
UE information, we need to know what worldly conditions have to obtain for the mon-
key to get this reward. That has been set up in this case in distal terms, in terms of prop-
erties of the stimuli. The training regime was that the left/right decision is rewarded on 
the basis of the preponderant colour of the stimulus in one context and the preponder-
ant motion in the other. Amongst all the correlational information carried by the com-
ponents, the correlations which directly explain achieving these rewards are:
C1:  colour will be rewarded (if preponderant colour is red a saccade to the red 
circle will produce juice, if . . .)
C2:  motion will be rewarded (if preponderant motion is left a saccade to the left 
circle will produce juice, if . . .)
R1: the preponderant colour is red
R2: the preponderant colour is green
R3: the preponderant motion is left
R4: the preponderant motion is right
We could consider a different set of correlational information, the correlations with 
sensory inputs. C1/C2 correlates with certain sensory states (going with the yellow 
square or blue cross at the bottom of the screen); states of R also correlate with activity 
C1
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C2
R1 or R2
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R3 or R4
A1
A2
if C1
if C2
Figure 4.7 Schematic representation of the processing in Mante et al. (2013).
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in the organism’s primary sensory cortex. But an explanation of task functions in terms 
of this set of correlations would not be unmediated. It would have to be supplemented 
with further information about how neural properties relate to worldly properties. Then 
the correlations with the worldly properties would be doing all the explanatory work.
Lumping the states of C and R together into a single vehicle on which behaviour is 
conditioned would be less explanatory, for the same reasons we saw in the analogue 
magnitude case: it would overlook an important aspect of how internal processing 
manages to perform the task. Another alternative is that the system represents in a 
context-dependent way. In C1, it represents motion information but nothing about 
colour (those are mere correlations); in C2 the converse. But that overlooks the way 
those vehicle properties make a difference in the converse case.
Nevertheless, content attributions based on UE information retain some indeter-
minacy in this case. We already saw that there are two ways of capturing the UE infor-
mation carried by components C: C1 with colour will be rewarded, or with if preponderant 
colour is red a saccade to the red circle will produce juice, if preponderant colour is green 
a saccade to the green circle will produce juice. There is also indeterminacy at R, for 
example R1 seems indeterminate between the majority of the dots are red and the colour 
density in the middle of the screen is predominantly red; or even the moving surface in the 
middle of the screen is mostly red. These collections of correlational information are 
equal candidates for explaining how the task of obtaining juice was performed robustly 
and stabilized by interactions with the environment. I would argue that finding this 
residual indeterminacy is the right result in this case.
4.7 One Representation Processed via Two Routes
The structure of Case 3 is illustrated again in Figure 4.8. Action is conditioned on two 
different representational vehicles, as in the previous section, but the second vehicle is 
also affected by the first. That is, the first representation affects behaviour via two routes.
Van Essen and Gallant (1994) produced an influential description of the primate 
visual system. One aspect of their account contains an example of the structure we 
are  interested in (see Figure 4.9). There are several interconnections, and lots of 
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connections into and out of the visual system that are not shown in Figure 4.9.26 We 
restrict our attention just to processes occurring within the visual system, and amongst 
those just to the stages circled in Figure 4.9. The ‘Thin stripe’ area in V2 processes 
wavelength information, which is input directly to MT, and also affects processing in 
‘Thick stripe’ V2 which in turn also affects processing in MT.
Van Essen and Gallant were primarily concerned to catalogue the functional connec-
tions in the visual system. Their claims about what information is being processed at 
each stage are more tentative and are a long way from being specified computationally. 
In order to have a concrete example to theorize about I will simplify and then fill in 
some details. That will give us a simplified but more specific case to work with.
Let us suppose that each box acts as a filter. Thin stripe V2 is tuned to colour dimen-
sions, with different cells for different parts of visual space (we can think of this as 
retinal space). Area MT contains four different filters, but we can focus on just one, the 
one for plaid motion. These cells are sensitive to the direction of motion of surfaces in 
the visual field. They integrate local motion information and thereby correlate with 
the overall direction of motion of a presented surface. In some circumstances when 
observing gratings, that fusion can be broken so that the observer sees two superim-
posed gratings moving in different directions—so-called ‘plaid’ motion (Adelson and 
Movshon 1982; Burr 2014, pp. 766–9). We are supposing that this is in part because 
MT contains cells that are sensitive to the direction of motion of more than one surface 
in roughly the same portion of the visual field. In other conditions the observer will 
see just one moving grating.
This sensitivity to the direction of motion of surfaces is affected by chromatic infor-
mation (Croner and Albright 1999; Thiele et al. 2001; Bell et al. 2014, p. 238). One route 
MT
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Thick
stripe
Thin
stripe
Inter-
stripe
Figure 4.9 A detail from the visual information processing network described by van Essen 
and Gallant (1994).
More recent work has altered this picture somewhat, but only serves to confirm that the feature we are 
interested in is indeed exemplified: not only is feedback vitally important, but it is also confirmed that vis-
ual processing does not occur in a strict hierarchy of subsystems or neural areas. Instead there are at least 
three streams that work in parallel, with interconnections between them (Shigihara and Zeki 2013).
26
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shown by van Essen and Gallant (1994) is direct, from Thin stripe V2 direct to MT. 
When portions of nearby space have the same colour they are more likely to be treated 
as parts of the same surface. There is also an indirect effect of chromatic information, 
from Thin stripe V2 to Thick stripe V2 and then on to MT. Chromatic information 
affects the way Thick stripe V2 calculates the local direction motion. That in turn affects 
MT’s calculation of where the surfaces are and how they are moving.
To theorize about content in this case I will simplify dramatically, so as to focus just 
on the dual route structure we are interested in. To give the mechanism a simple task 
function, suppose that the organism has been trained to reach out and intercept a 
moving object, doing so by tracking the direction of motion of observed surfaces. Then 
we can focus on one vehicle in MT, correlating with plaid motion direction, and sup-
pose that it acts as input to the motor system so as to produce correlative reaching 
behaviour. That is a plausible task function if the organism has undergone training 
with feedback. Then the internal processing will have been tuned to enable the organ-
ism to catch objects stably and robustly.
Which set of correlational information, carried by internal vehicles, is directly 
explanatory of the system’s ability to perform that task? The relevant MT activity correl-
ates with the direction of motion of the surfaces of presented objects. (In our simplified 
setting it also correlates at output with reaching direction.) Thick stripe V2 has an 
array of vehicles each of which correlates with the local direction of motion of one 
portion of the visual field. The chromatic information in Thin stripe V2 correlates with 
many relevant properties; for example, with the wavelengths reflected by local areas, 
and with the colours of local areas. It is useful for this task because, when nearby areas 
have the same colour, they are likely to be part of the same surface. What is important, 
then, is the way activity in Thin stripe V2 for a local part of the visual field correlates 
with some property of presented surfaces that tends to be invariant for a given surface. 
Call that a chromatic-surface-property.27
In reality each of these components is involved in very many different task functions, 
and that will much more tightly constrain their contents. Even with our simplification, 
it is still clear that UE information will concern aspects of the distal objects the system 
is interacting with (e.g. motion properties), and features of the behaviour it performs 
on them (reaching direction). Most importantly, it is clear that the UE information 
will differ as between the three components we are considering. They are doing more 
than simply indicating surface moving in such-and-such direction with different levels 
of reliability at different stages. The problem of catching the object has been split up by 
having vehicles that track a series of relevant properties and performing a computation 
over those vehicles which is suited to calculating where to reach.
The consumer-based approach could bundle together the outputs of Thin stripe V2 
and Thick stripe V2 and treat them as a single input, a vehicle which can be in a wide 
27 I won’t divert into considering whether these properties are identical to colour properties. In any event, 
there may well be some indeterminacy here: a range of surface properties that Thin stripe V2 activity cor-
relates with, each of which is an equally good candidate for explaining performance of this particular task.
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range of states, and on which the output of MT is conditioned. The behaviour-relevant 
contents that can be ascribed to this conjunctive system are simply correctness condi-
tions like there is an object in such-and-such region moving in such-and-such direction. 
Such contents offer no insight into how the system manages to compute the integrated 
motion of the surfaces of objects. It throws no light on the separate roles of wavelength 
information and achromatically driven local motion information in performing that 
computation. And it entirely overlooks the dual computations performed on wave-
length information in solving the problem.
In short, this is another case in which the UE information approach does a good job 
of elucidating the way representational explanation works—and does so without having 
to appeal to a content-constituting representation consumer. Varitel semantics has 
no difficulty dealing with cases where a representational vehicle has a dual effect on 
behaviour via two different routes.
4.8 Feedback and Cycles
The final case involves feedback and cyclical information processing (Bogacz 2015). 
Rafal Bogacz describes a fully specified computational model of how the brain calculates 
the probabilities used to decide between a number of available actions (Figure 4.10). The 
model is far from being definitively established as the truth about how the brain gener-
ates this behaviour, but it is well supported by current evidence and it suits our purposes 
because it is specified in enough detail to get our theorizing off the ground.
The computation specified in Figure 4.10 calculates the probability that each available 
action is the best one to perform in the current content. When one of the probabilities 
reaches a threshold (determined by an attempt to maximize speed at a given accuracy), 
that action is performed. So, let us suppose that the P(Ai) are inputs to a decision layer 
that detects when one of the inputs crosses a threshold and programs the corresponding 
action (added as a rectangular box in Figure 4.10). The computation shown calls for 
representations, not just of states of affairs, but of probability distributions over states 
of affairs. That is a new feature. Before getting into the details of the computation 
proposed by Bogacz, we need first to understand how the UE approach can apply to 
probabilistic representations.
A system can make use of the way its internal states carry probabilistic information.28 
In previous case studies we have only been concerned with the fact that a representation 
makes an individual world state more likely (R raises the probability that condition C 
obtains). But computations could make use of more fine-grained information carried 
by R: that when R is tokened, 75 per cent of the time the peanut is on the right and 
25 per cent of the time the peanut is on the left, for example. When calculating what to 
do, the system can make use, not just of the fact that R raises the probability of some 
condition C1, but of the fact that when R is tokened, the probability that C1 obtains 
is p, the probability that C2 obtains is q, and so on. When this kind of fine-grained 
28 Shea (2014b) works out this idea in a canonical model of probabilistic population coding in the brain.
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 correlational information figures in explaining a system’s performance of its task 
functions, internal states will end up having probabilistic representational contents.
To apply my account to these cases, all that’s needed is a straightforward extension 
of the definition in §4.1a of exploitable correlational information carried by a range of 
states. A putative vehicle of content can be in one of a range of mutually incompatible 
states, so it counts as a random variable X. Now consider any item in the world that can 
be in a range of mutually incompatible states. It is another random variable Y. There is a 
joint probability distribution p(x,y) relating the two states. For every possible state of 
the representational vehicle, this gives the corresponding probability of each of the pos-
sible states Y. One way to think about p(x,y) is just in terms of frequency: fix on one 
particular state of the representational vehicle and ask how often Y is then in each of its 
possible states; repeat for each possible vehicle state.29 A fine-grained exploitable correl-
ation carried by X about Y is a joint probability distribution p(x,y) between X and Y that 
subsists for a univocal reason. (In defining X and Y as random variables it is implicit that 
each is constituted by states of items within delimited regions D and D’, respectively. 
We are concerned with the probability distribution that subsists within those regions.)
29 As before (§4.1a), this account depends on there being nomologically underpinned probabilities in 
the world, so these would have to be non-accidental, nomologically based frequencies; or they could be 
propensities or objective chances.
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Figure 4.10 The neuronal computation proposed by Bogacz (2015) for deciding between available 
actions (adapted).
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The joint probability distribution thus counts as a species of exploitable correlational 
information. The definition of UE information applies without any modification. A rep-
resentational vehicle X enters into joint probability distributions with many different 
conditions in the world. When a system S encounters an object, the states of X might 
induce a probability distribution on possible sizes, possible directions of motion, 
possible categories of object, whether an object is animate or inanimate, and so on. For 
familiar reasons, X will also induce a probability distribution on more proximal facts 
like states of the retina and other brain states. All these probability distributions are 
candidates for UE information. Which qualifies depends on which figures in explaining 
S’s performance of its task functions. For example, the probability distribution over 
motion directions may be directly relevant, given the way states of X are transformed in 
internal processing; probability distributions over states of the retina are less relevant.
When we were previously just concerned with probability raising, P(C|R) was 
important, and so was how much R changed the probability, i.e. how much P(C|R) 
differed from the unconditional probability P(C). That is also relevant here. Random 
variable X changes the probability of worldly states Y by comparison to the uncondi-
tional probabilities of states Y. This is measured by the mutual information between 
X and Y.30 A set of conditions in the world about which a representational vehicle X 
carries more mutual information is, other things being equal, a better candidate 
to qualify as UE information carried by X.
We also need to generalize the idea of a correctness condition. The content repre-
sented by one of the values of X, x1 say, is a probability distribution (call it p^) over world 
states Y: p^(y|x1). When x1 is tokened its content would be completely accurate if  p^(y|x1) 
exactly matched the actual probabilities of world states given x1. When there is not an 
exact match we need a graded notion of accuracy/inaccuracy—of how close the content 
(represented distribution) is to the true distribution. There are various ways to meas-
ure how much the true distribution p(y|x1) differs from the represented distribution 
p^(y|x1). A standard measure is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. The Kullback-Leibler 
divergence of the true distribution p(y|x1) from the represented distribution p^(y|x1) 
measures how inefficient it is to assume that the distribution is p^(y|x1) when the true 
distribution is p(y|x1). It tells you how much more information (in bits) you would 
need in order to describe the true state of the world if you had represented it as p^(y|x1).31 
30 Taken on its own, the unconditional probability of Y is distributed across its possible states a certain 
way. That could be very indeterminate (e.g. all states of Y are equally likely) or already quite determinate 
(the unconditional probability of one or two states of Y is already quite high). This is measured by the 
entropy of Y, H(Y). Sharper distributions have lower entropy. States of X sharpen the distribution of Y, to 
a greater or lesser extent. That is to say, the entropy of the conditional distribution Y|X is less than the 
distribution of Y taken on its own (if X and Y are not wholly independent). This difference measures how 
informative X is about Y. So the mutual information between X and Y, I(X;Y) is given by the formula: 
I(X;Y) = H(Y) − H(Y|X).
31 The Kullback-Leibler divergence is given by:
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This is an appropriately graded notion of inaccuracy, going to zero when the world is 
exactly as it is represented to be.
Returning to Bogacz’s model, the computational steps are as shown in Figure 4.10. 
The quantities are represented on logarithmic scales so that multiplication of quan-
tities can be performed by adding firing rates. The system starts with prior prob-
abilities for each of the Ai. It then gets sensory input S. It can then calculate how 
likely action A1 is to be rewarded given S, P(A1|S), and so on. First it calculates 
P(A1) P(S|A1), P(A2)P(S|A2), etc. These then have to be normalized by dividing each 
by the sum of all of them so as to derive posterior probabilities for each action: 
P(A1|S) etc. So, the representations in frontal cortex are used in two ways. They go 
off to STN where they are summed, and the value of each is simultaneously pre-
served unmodified via the striatum, so that each separate value can be divided by 
this sum. If any of the P(Ai) exceed the threshold at this point, the corresponding 
action is programmed. If not, these resulting P(Ai) act as new priors for the next 
step of the calculation, performed on the next sensory input S.
For present purposes we are interested in the fact that information processing 
proceeds around a feedback loop before issuing in behaviour (Case 4, see Figure 4.11). 
The system has been tuned by learning to produce the action that is most likely to be 
rewarded given current sensory input, and to wait before acting in a way that gathers 
the optimal amount of sensory information to make a decision which optimizes a 
speed–accuracy trade off. It does so by tracking sensory information, processing it, 
and relying on that processing to program an action.
If the computational model above is well-supported, then it is likely to give the UE 
information carried by the components. According to the cognitive neuroscientists, 
organisms are acting near-optimally in a probabilistic environment in order to obtain 
the maximum amount of rewarding feedback. They look at how brain areas are 
 probabilistically connected to states of the world in order to explain how the brain 
can be calculating appropriately—making calculations so that the behaviour will 
produce reward as often as possible. So, the test of the cognitive neuroscientific model’s 
accuracy is the same as our test for UE information. If Bogacz (2015) is right about 
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the correlational information carried by the brain areas he points to, and if he is right 
that neural firing is transformed in the way he suggests,32 then his computational 
model is a good hypothesis about the UE information carried by these brain areas, 
and hence about their representational contents.
In short, the UE information approach does allow us to give a good account of why 
the components of this system have the contents they do, an account which in turn 
feeds into an understanding of why representational contents are suited to explaining 
behaviour. Here again, we had no need to appeal to a consumer system that plays a 
special content-constituting role. Internal processing involving feedback presents no 
obvious obstacle to applying the varitel framework.
4.9 Conclusion
Chapter 2 argued that representational content arises in many cases from the way 
relational properties of components of a system combine with facts about its internal 
processing. Taken together, internal processing over components standing in exploit-
able relations to features of the environment can amount to the implementation of an 
algorithm, an algorithm by which the system performs various input–output mappings. 
Turning this around, if we take a relevant input–output mapping, content is fixed by 
the exploitable relations carried by components which make the internal processing 
an implementation of an algorithm by which the system instantiates that mapping. 
Chapter 3 argued that task functions give us the input–output mappings that are relevant 
to content-determination. That was because of a cluster in which outcomes stabilized 
by natural selection, learning or contribution to persistence are also produced robustly 
and are generated by an algorithm that makes use of exploitable relations.
This chapter filled in the final part of the account, showing how correlational 
information counts as an exploitable relation within this framework. Correlations 
turn into content when they are exploited by a system—exploited in a very particular 
sense. Our definition of UE information pins down that sense: the content-constituting 
correlations are those which unmediatedly explain a system’s performance of its task 
functions. We saw in this chapter how the UE approach fixes content in a range of case 
studies from cognitive science. It does so without having to appeal to representation 
consumers whose outputs play a content-constituting role. In each case study, contents 
fixed in this way do a good job of underpinning the characteristic explanatory grammar 
of representational explanation: correct representation explains successful behaviour 
and misrepresentation explains failure.
The next chapter argues that another exploitable relation also plays a content-
constituting role, a relation in the ballpark of mirroring, isomorphism, or structural 
correspondence.
32 I.e. that neural activity in these areas is added and subtracted in the way set out in the model—a way 
that is suitable to implement multiplication and division of quantities that are carried, not linearly, but on 
a scale that is related logarithmically to activation.
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5.1 Introduction
Organisms and other systems make use of exploitable relations between their internal 
states and the world in order to perform their task functions. The previous chapter 
looked at correlation as an exploitable relation. This chapter argues that structural cor-
respondence is another exploitable relation. The existence of a structural correspond-
ence, of an appropriate kind, is part of what makes it the case that certain systems 
represent as they do.
Cartographic maps act as a model for theorizing about structural correspondence. 
Spatial relations between points on a map correspond to spatial relations between 
locations on the ground. Plausibly, it is because the structure of the map mirrors the 
structure of the world that the map gets to represent the world. A relation in one 
domain corresponds to a relation in the other. More carefully, a structural correspond-
ence is a relation-preserving1 mapping from one set of entities to another. Points on the 
page of an atlas map to cities, and the mapping preserves spatial relations. When point 
1 More generally, structure-preserving. Here we focus on relation-preserving correspondence.
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a in the atlas is closer to point b than point c, then that is also true of the cities to which 
they correspond.
A large body of work examines the idea that structural correspondence or 
 isomorphism should be an ingredient in a theory of content. A central problem is to 
specify which kinds of relation can enter into the correspondence. Just as there is a very 
thin notion of property, a very thin notion of relation is also available. On the thin 
notion of property, any arbitrary set of objects corresponds to a property. For a rela-
tion, we can capture the entities that fall under the relation with a set of ordered pairs. 
The relation taller than is captured by the set of all the ordered pairs of people where 
the height of the first is greater than the height of the second. On the thin notion of 
relation, any set of n-tuples corresponds to a relation (an n-place relation). The prob-
lem for theories of content is that the thin notion of relation makes the idea of a struc-
ture- or relation-preserving correspondence extremely undemanding. If we instead 
require natural relations on either side of the correspondence, it becomes too demand-
ing; and in any event something principled must be said about why some relations 
should be excluded and others should count. I will use the unqualified term ‘relation’ 
for the thin notion, and argue for restrictions to the candidate relations on both sides 
of the correspondence (representation, world).
It is a familiar point, but it is useful to recall why the existence of a structure-preserving 
mapping or functional isomorphism is a very liberal matter. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. There are very many such mappings between any two sets of the same size. 
Suppose we want a representation of relation H on a set of entities xi. H could be the 
hierarchical relation of dominance between a group of macaques. Take a set of putative 
representational vehicles vi of the same cardinality. For any mapping I of the vi onto the 
individual macaques xi, there is a relation V on the vi that corresponds to H: to see if V 
obtains between two vehicles, map them to the corresponding individuals under I, xi and 
xj, and see if xi is above xj in the hierarchy (i.e. see if H obtains between xi and xj). That will 
work even if we have fixed the mapping I from vehicles to macaques (vi to xi) in advance.
This liberality is one of the reasons why theorists have concluded that the bare 
existence of a structural correspondence cannot be the basis of content (Suarez 2003, 
Godfrey-Smith 1996, pp. 184–7, Goodman 1972; pace O’Brien and Opie 2004, Cummins 
1989). From our perspective the problem is that most of these correspondences are not 
exploitable by the system in question. Our overall desideratum is to make sense of rep-
resentational explanation. We do that by content being fixed by an exploitable relation 
between putative representations and the world, where the obtaining of that relation 
explains the system’s performance of task functions. The bare existence of a structure-
preserving mapping of the kind we have just seen is not something that will help a 
system perform a function. It is too insubstantial. So, our task is to identify a kind of 
structural correspondence which, when it obtains between vehicles and world, really 
amounts to an exploitable relation.2
2 There are confusingly many relations in play. The exploitable relation is the correspondence, not the 
relations that are preserved under the correspondence.
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We start with a case study: the cognitive map in the rat hippocampus (§5.2). This 
shows a substantive structural correspondence in action, enabling the rat to perform task 
functions. After some preliminary definitions (§5.3), I narrow down this more demand-
ing substantive sense, exploitable structural correspondence (§5.4a). I go on to say what it 
is for one of these to be exploited (§5.4b). It then counts as an unmediated explanatory 
structural correspondence (UE structural correspondence). It will turn out that, in some 
cases where there is a superficially attractive structural correspondence, that corres-
pondence is not being made use of (§5.5). These cases are contrasted with two further 
cases where an exploitable structural correspondence is exploited (§5.6). The final 
section (§5.7) discusses correlation vs. correspondence, approximate correspondence, 
and an evidential test for telling which structural correspondence is exploited.
5.2 The Cognitive Map in the Rat Hippocampus
One of the most important neuroscientific results in recent decades has been the 
discovery of ‘place cells’ in the rat hippocampus (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978, O’Keefe 
and Burgess 1996). Place cells are individual neurons whose firing is specific to the 
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Figure 5.1 Whatever relation H we choose on the represented entities xi (top panel), there is a 
corresponding relation V on the representational vehicles vi (bottom panel).
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animal’s location in space. Figure 5.2 shows the firing pattern of an array of place cells. 
Each panel shows the sensitivity of a single cell, with shading showing the rat’s location 
when that cell fires, darker shading representing more vigorous firing. So, there is one 
cell which is active when and only when the rat is in the top-right corner of the arena 
(describing it from an aerial perspective); another is specific for being half-way down 
the left-hand side, and so on.
The array of neurons as a whole gives a very accurate measure of where the rat is in 
the arena. That is a useful thing to have; for example, to learn by association that  certain 
features (smells, objects, foods) are found in certain locations (Deadwyler et al. 1996). 
The correlational information carried by the place cell for the top-right corner could 
Figure 5.2  Firing rate plots for thirty-two place cells (O’Keefe and Burgess 2005). All the grey 
squares represent the same square arena, each showing where a particular place cell is active as 
the rat moves freely around the arena. Darker shading represents higher firing rates. Different 
cells are tuned to different locations.
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be relied on in instrumental conditioning to learn that, when at that location, the rat 
should pull a lever to obtain a reward. But notice that this is not to make use of a  relation 
between the different place cells.
Indeed, taken on its own, the remarkable spatial sensitivity of the array of place cells 
does not depend on or give rise to any relation between the vehicles (cells). Nor are the 
cells spatially arranged in the hippocampus. They do not form a ‘topographic map’ like 
the retinotopic maps of visual space found in primary visual cortex. So, the remarkable 
discovery of the location-specific sensitivity of place cells does not, by itself, show that 
rats have a cognitive map. More recent work has shown however that there is an 
important relation on the place cells, the relation of co-activation. Cells  corresponding 
to nearby locations tend to activate one another.
When the animal is at rest or asleep, firing of the place cells is taken offline; that is, 
it is no longer directly driven by input about the animal’s current location (cp. stimulus-
independence: Camp 2009). Offline activity shows characteristic sequences, corres-
ponding to routes through space. ‘Replay’ occurs when offline sequences correspond 
to routes the animal has followed in the past (Wilson and McNaughton 1994, Foster 
and Wilson 2006, Diba and Buzsáki 2007). These connections could be built up asso-
ciatively when sequences of place cells are active online as the animal explores an 
environment. ‘Preplay’ is also observed, where sequences of cells are active in advance 
of the animal moving, corresponding to a route the animal is about to follow (Dragoi 
and Tonegawa 2011, 2013). These preplay sequences lead to locations associated with 
reward, either because the animal has experienced rewards there in the past (Pfeiffer 
and Foster 2013), or because they can observe that food has been placed in that location 
(Ólafsdóttir et al. 2015).3
The current evidence suggests that rats use this prospective activity to plan the route 
they are about to follow. Let’s suppose this allows them to select amongst possible 
routes, choosing a shorter one by selecting the shortest sequence of place cell firing. 
For simplicity, we can think of a process that activates several prospective sequences 
leading to a rewarded location and picks the shortest sequence as the one to follow. In 
fact, that search probably takes place in parallel across the whole array of place cells.4 
Either way, the co-activation structure over the place cells is being used as a proxy for 
3 There is parallel evidence in the human brain of similar kinds of preplay firing of sequences that 
 correspond to trajectories through space (Horner et al. 2016, Bellmund et al. 2016); and for grid cells in 
entorhinal cortex, which also show prospective activity in the rat (de Almeida et al. 2012) which is coordi-
nated with place cell activity at rest (Kropff et al. 2015).
4 Most models envisage a diffusion process that starts at the place cell associated with reward and 
 proceeds outwards in parallel across connected locations (Ponulak and Hopfield 2013, Khajeh-Alijani et al. 
2015). E.g. Reid and Staddon (1998, 1997) have a model in which a value signal diffuses in parallel across 
an array of place cells, resulting in local signals of the direction of a shortest route to a goal (discussed by 
Godfrey-Smith 2013). Samsonovich and Ascoli (2005) construct a connectionist model in which relations 
of phase precession between place cells are used to search through routes in parallel, in a ‘fan’ proceeding 
outwards from the current location to all nearby locations. And Corneil and Gerstner (2015) construct an 
attractor network where associations between place cells constrain activity directly so that the offline preplay 
sequence spontaneously follows the shortest route to reward in the place cell activation space.
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spatial relations between locations: this is a way of choosing an efficient route because 
place cells that co-activate each other correspond to locations that are close to each other 
in the arena.5
This case study fits squarely within the varitel framework. The animal has moved to 
a particular location T in the past and performed a behaviour there (e.g. pulling a lever 
and getting food). Its disposition to do that has been stabilized on the basis of feedback, 
because it received a food reward (let us say) at that location. It is then disposed and 
able to get to that location from a range of different starting points by a range of differ-
ent routes (Pfeiffer and Foster 2013). Getting to T and getting food there have thereby 
become task functions for that individual. There is an internal-components explan-
ation for performance of that task function: place cell activity makes use of correl-
ational information about the current location and then proceeds offline in sequences 
that are driven by the co-activation structure. The animal picks an efficient route to 
a goal by picking the sequence that takes the shortest time to unfold during preplay. 
It then follows that sequence. That algorithm has been stabilized by learning in part 
because of a structural correspondence between co-activation on the place cells and 
spatial proximity on locations, relied on to calculate the route. That correspondence 
also feeds into an explanation of robustness, of how the animal manages to reach 
rewarded location T from a number of starting points by a range of different routes. In 
short, that structural correspondence is exploited. It explains the rat’s performance of 
task functions. Therefore, I will argue, it is content-constituting: co-activation of place 
cells represents spatial proximity of locations.
In sum, the ‘cognitive map’ in the rat hippocampus illustrates how use of a structural 
correspondence to perform task functions can be the basis of representational content.
5.3 Preliminary Definitions
In this section I will say how I am using the terms ‘structural correspondence’ and 
‘structural representation’, and what it is for a structural correspondence to play a role 
in constituting content. We start with structural correspondence. In all of our case 
studies the candidate to figure in the correspondence is some kind of relational 
structure. So, I define structural correspondence in terms of relations. It is a mapping 
under which relations are preserved.
On the world side, I will use xi for entities and H for a relation between them. These 
are candidates to figure as representational contents. For example, a representation 
could represent that location-a is near to location-b. That would be to represent that a 
particular relation H obtains between two entities (locations) xi and xj. On the repre-
sentation side, we need a way to talk about putative representations, since whether 
5 Notice that there is no straightforward consumer for the offline activity of a single place cell. Its activity 
has to interact with the activity of many other place cells. The result is then used, in conjunction with other 
inputs about current location, to condition behaviour.
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they count as representations, and what they represent, flow from the obtaining of the 
correspondence relation. So I will call putative representations ‘vehicles’, vi. V is a 
 relation between the vi. So the vi potentially represent worldly entities xi, and relation 
V’s obtaining between vi and vj potentially represents that relation H obtains between 
xi and xj. For example, the activation of place-cell-a followed by place-cell-b potentially 
represents that location-a is near to location-b.
The toy example of a structural correspondence in Figure 5.1 was an isomorphism, 
a one-to-one mapping. There are the same number of worldly entities as there are 
 vehicles, and every worldly entity is mapped to by just one vehicle. I follow others in 
relying on the slightly looser notion of homomorphism. A homomorphism allows 
two vehicles to map to the same worldly entity. There can then be representational 
redundancy: two vehicles can represent the same entity. So, there may be fewer worldly 
entities than there are vehicles. An isomorphism is a function from some vi to some 
xi and its inverse is also a function. A homomorphism is a function from some vi 
to some xi, but its inverse need not be a function. Finally, we are interested in a 
homomorphism that preserves relational structure.6 Accordingly, I define structural 
correspondence as follows.
Structural Correspondence
There is a structural correspondence between relation V on vehicles vm and relation 
H on entities xn
iff
there is a function f which maps the vm onto the xn and
∀i,j V(vi,vj) ↔ H(f(vi),f(vj))
(mutatis mutandis for other polyadicities7)
There is an issue here about structural representations and their parts. A map is a 
structural representation and its parts are also representations. One part of a map 
might consist of two points separated by 6.5 cm, representing that Cardiff is 65 km to 
the east of Swansea. A point taken alone can also be a representation (e.g. of Cardiff—
an unsaturated representation). The definition of structural correspondence above 
does not require this. The vehicles taken alone need not be potential representations. 
This would allow for a representational icon whose parts are not themselves represen-
tations. The icon would represent in virtue of a structure over vehicles, and those 
 vehicles would be parts of the icon, without also supposing that the individual vehicles 
will qualify as representations in their own right. I don’t want to take a stance on 
6 If the homomorphism is not an isomorphism, then the relation H between worldly entities needs to be 
reflexive, at least for entities that are mapped to by two different vehicles. If the structural correspondence 
maps vi and vj to the same xk, then relation H has to obtain between xk and itself. For example, relation H 
could be being less than 5 cm away.
7 The definition can readily be generalized to cover any collection of relations and operations, of any 
polyadicities, following the mathematical definition of a relational homomorphism (although the latter are 
usually thought to range over mathematical objects).
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whether this is possible. In all of our case studies the parts are also representations. So, 
I will define terms that way, following the standard definition, to stop the language 
becoming unbearably complex. For now, I just note that my approach could in principle 
apply to structures whose parts are not themselves representations.
The standard definition of structural representation does take the parts to be rep-
resentations. What it takes to be a structural representation is that a relation on 
the representations represents a relation on the entities represented (Ramsey 2007, 
pp. 77–92; Swoyer 1991; Shagrir 2012). For example, spatial relations between points on 
a cartographic map don’t just correspond to, but represent, spatial relations between 
the locations picked out by those points. That is a first-order resemblance, but any 
relation on a set of representations could in principle represent a corresponding relation 
on the entities represented. The obtaining of a relation between two vehicles repre-
sents the obtaining of a relation in the world. The obtaining of the relation of being 
within 5 cm of between two points on a map represents, for example, that the relation 
of being within 5 km of obtains between two cities in the world.
Structural Representation
A collection of representations in which a relation on representational vehicles 
represents a relation on the entities they represent.
We are in fact interested in something slightly stronger than there being a structural 
representation. Our question is whether something’s being a structural representation 
is based on the obtaining of a structural correspondence: whether structural corres-
pondence is partly constitutive of content. One could set up a convention in which a 
structure happens to represent structure in the world, but then it would be the conven-
tion rather than the existence of the correspondence which is constitutive of content. 
For example, I could make a list of names and stipulate that the relative size of the 
fonts represents the relative heights of the people named. Then there is a relation on 
the vehicles (relative font size) which represents a relation on the people (relative 
height)—so it fits the definition of structural representation—but the structural cor-
respondence is not what is fixing content. The case studies in this chapter are stronger. 
The structural correspondence does fix content: the existence of a certain kind of 
structural correspondence is part of what makes it the case that a collection of vehicles 
are representations with a certain content.
Structural Correspondence as Content-Constituting
A structural correspondence I is content-constituting
iff
the existence of structural correspondence I, of an appropriate kind, between a 
relation V on putative representations vm and a relation H on the entities xn repre-
sented by the vm is partly constitutive of V on vm being a structural representation 
of H on xn.
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The varitel framework applies to cases where content arises out of a system’s making 
use of exploitable relations. So, if a structural correspondence is going to be content-
constituting, it has to be used by the system. In order for it to use a structural corres-
pondence, the system has to be sensitive in some way to the relation V between 
vehicles. That relation has to make a difference to downstream processing, and ultim-
ately to the behaviour produced.
For contrast, consider the vervet monkey’s system for signalling the presence of 
predators. Vervets make three types of alarm call for three types of danger: say R1 for 
aerial predators like eagles, R2 for ground predators like leopards, and R3 for snakes 
(Seyfarth et al. 1980). Conspecifics hearing the call make use of the fact that R1 cor-
relates with eagles in order to behave appropriately; similarly for R2 and R3. This is a 
classic case of making use of correlational information. But notice that there is also 
a  one-to-one mapping between representations and their correctness conditions 
(R1 to there is an eagle, and so on). And as ever, lots of relations are preserved by 
that mapping. Let’s focus on just one: how high off the ground the predator is usually 
found. Eagles are higher up than leopards, which are higher up than snakes. I pick 
that arbitrarily, just to make a point. There is no evidence that the calls are telling 
macaques anything about height off the ground.
So, we are concerned with a relation H, higher than, between worldly entities. H applies 
to just the following ordered pairs: <eagle, leopard>, <leopard, snake>, <eagle, snake>. 
Now, as we’ve seen, there will be a relation on the vehicles (alarm calls) that corres-
ponds to H. Call it V. V applies to just the following ordered pairs: <R1, R2>, <R2, R3>, 
<R1, R3>. So, there is a structural correspondence between relation V on the alarm 
calls and relation H on the predators. However, the existence of this structural corres-
pondence is of no significance to the vervets. They are not making use of it as they 
process the alarm calls. They are not sensitive to whether relation V obtains between 
the calls. Vervets have evolved to respond appropriately to calls that have the acoustic 
features of R1, but that does not depend on comparing R1 to R2 or R3, or making use of 
any relation between R1 and the other calls. The system exploits the correlations 
(between R1 and eagles, R2 and leopards, and R3 and snakes), but does not exploit the 
structural correspondence between V and H. The structural correspondence is not 
content-constituting. Nor is it a case of structural representation: the relation V on the 
alarm calls, defined above, does not represent higher than (or anything at all).
The requirement that a structural correspondence be used in order to be content-
constituting allows us to cut down very considerably on the problematic liberality of 
structural correspondence. To be content-constituting, a structural correspondence 
has to be exploitable. In the next section I pick out a class of structural correspond-
ences that are candidates to be exploited. This is the restricted notion we needed: it 
avoids wild liberality and is restricted in a principled way. I go on in §5.4b to say what it 
takes for a substantive structural correspondence of this kind to be exploited, hence to 
constitute content.
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5.4 Content-Constituting Structural Correspondence
(a) Exploitable structural correspondence
Recall that theories of content are faced with the problematic liberality of the general 
notion of structural correspondence, and hence need a more restricted notion that 
is substantive and well-motivated. If a structural correspondence is going to figure 
in varitel semantics, it has to be usable by the system, something that is a candidate 
to explain the system’s performance of task functions. This section spells out that 
substantive sense. I label it ‘exploitable structural correspondence’. (This is not going 
to be circular: it is not defined in terms of being exploitable.)
In the rat navigation case, the relation of co-activation on place cells (representa-
tions) was something that processing was sensitive to and was used in processing. That 
relation of course corresponds to very many relations in world, but it is the corres-
pondence with the relation of spatial proximity on locations that makes sense of how 
the animal manages to perform its task functions. Spatial proximity between places is 
directly relevant to the task of following shortest routes to reward.
When we examine this privileged, content-constituting structural correspondence, 
on one end it has a relation that downstream processing is sensitive to, and on the other 
it has a relation in the world that is of significance to the system, given the task func-
tions it is called on to perform. Although there being a structural correspondence is 
only a very weak requirement, that there should be a structural correspondence of this 
kind is very demanding indeed. It is a considerable achievement to have place cell 
activity organized in this systematic way—having a correspondence that the animal 
can make use of. This case exemplifies what it is for a structural correspondence to be 
exploitable.
Exploitable Structural Correspondence
An exploitable structural correspondence is a structural correspondence between 
relation V on vehicles vm in a system S and relation H on entities xn
in which
(i) V is a relation that processing in S is systematically sensitive to; and
(ii) H and xn are of significance to S.
Significance to S is significance relative to the way outcomes produced by S are 
stabilized and robustly produced. Sensitivity is also system-relative. Processing in rat 
hippocampus is sensitive to patterns of co-activation between place cells. It is not 
sensitive to the colour of the cell bodies of the place cells. Nor is it sensitive to where 
within a layer of the hippocampus the place cell happens to be located: connectivity 
not location of the cell is what counts. Primary visual cortex is structured retinotopically: 
the spatial arrangement of neurons corresponds to the spatial lay-out of retinal areas 
they respond to. However, the significance of the retinotopic organization is debated 
(Chklovskii and Koulakov 2004, Knudsen et al. 1987). A central issue in that debate is 
structural correspondence 121
precisely whether downstream processing is systematically sensitive to the spatial 
arrangement of neurons.
For place cells, the exploitable structural correspondence only exists because associ-
ationist learning has built up a co-activation structure. Only after that does the relation 
between vehicles—one place cell firing immediately after another—correspond to a 
relation between places which qualifies it as an exploitable structural correspondence 
(because only then does it have a relation on the world end, spatial proximity, which is 
of significance to the system). One might argue that the location-specific sensitivity 
of place cells is very useful even before this learning has taken place. After all, that is 
what allows simple associationist learning to construct a cognitive map. I don’t want to 
resist the idea that there is something exploitable in a broad sense even before the 
co-activation structure exists—the rat already has something useful. However, I use 
‘exploitable structural correspondence’ in a specific sense: it requires that a relation 
between vehicles already exists which downstream processing is sensitive to.
There is a danger of getting confused here amongst the various relations in play. The 
exploitable relation is the structural correspondence. The relation of co-activation 
between place cells is a different relation, a relation on one side of the structural corres-
pondence. It is not itself the exploitable relation.
Downstream processing has to be sensitive to a relation between vehicles if that rela-
tion is to form part of a structural correspondence which is exploitable by the system. 
Neural processing is certainly sensitive to relations between firing rates. In many cases 
it is also sensitive to fine-grained differences in the exact time that spikes are produced 
in different neurons. There are debates about whether some neural computations use a 
phase code, that is a code in which what counts is the time when a neuron fires in relation 
to a background oscillatory rhythm in the population of neurons. If so, phase differences 
are also candidates for the relation (V) on the representational side of an exploitable 
structural correspondence.
Plasticity can drive changes in the sensitivity of downstream processing. Then a 
relation between vehicles which previously did not count, because downstream pro-
cessing was not systematically sensitive to it, may turn into a candidate. In some cases 
it is feedback from stabilization that drives this plasticity. In that case the exploitable 
structural correspondence becomes established at the same time as it contributes to 
stabilization. So the exploitable correspondence that is made use of to perform a task 
function need not pre-exist the stabilization process which grounds the task function. 
As just mentioned, a wider notion of exploitability is available, which does not require 
that the system is yet sensitive to the relation between vehicles. The category of poten-
tially exploitable structural correspondence covers cases where a system can readily 
adjust so as to make downstream processing sensitive to a relation between vehicles, or 
can readily put vehicles into a relation (like co-activation) to which downstream pro-
cessing is already systematically sensitive. It may well be important that some systems 
have access to many potentially exploitable structural correspondences. The definition 
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of exploitable structural correspondence is narrower, however, because the aim is to 
home in on a content-constituting correspondence. We are concerned with the actual 
sensitivity of the system, as configured. The class of potentially exploitable relations 
may in any event be less well-defined.8 Potential exploitability certainly comes in degrees.
The definition of exploitable structural correspondence also requires that relation V 
should make a systematic difference to downstream processing. What this amounts to 
will depend on the types of processing in question. The general idea is that V should 
have downstream effects that operate according to common principles. So, when the 
same relation obtains between different pairs of vehicles (co-activation of two place 
cells), downstream processing should do the same thing in each case (treat this as a 
single step in calculating routes). If V comes in degrees, then processing should be 
systematically sensitive to those degrees. For example, if V is a difference in the time of 
firing, then there should be a systematic relation between the way downstream pro-
cessing treats differences of 1 ms, 2 ms, and 3 ms. One way of spelling this out is to say 
that V should figure as a projectable property in a special science law describing the 
processing of the system. Whether that is the right way to understand systematic sensi-
tivity is an issue about causation for philosophy of science more generally and not a 
proprietary problem for theories of content. In order not to pre-judge that issue, my 
definition simply makes use of the idea of systematic sensitivity, which is a resource 
needed throughout the sciences.
Turning to the other end of the correspondence, the things in the world being 
represented, the definition requires that the correspondence should be with entities 
xn and a relation H that is of significance to the system. What counts as significant for 
the system is relative to its task functions. In the cases we are considering signifi-
cance to the system narrows the candidates down to natural objects, properties, and 
kinds in the world. But I don’t need a general account of what naturalness amounts 
to: the significance requirement imports a system-relative constraint (which will 
require naturalness in many cases). As a result, it will mostly cut out gruesome and 
disjunctive properties as candidates for content, but does so in a system- or organism-
relative way.
Notice that there are different constraints on the two sides of the correspondence. 
An obvious restriction would be to introduce a naturalness constraint on both sides of 
the correspondence. But any restriction needs to be well-motivated. The motivation 
provided by the varitel framework calls for system-relative restrictions on both sides of 
the correspondence but different ones. On the vehicle side, the restriction is motivated 
by the role of inter-vehicle relations in downstream processing. On the world side, 
the restriction is motivated by whether relations in the world are significant for the 
8 There is a parallel here with exploitable correlations. It is useful to have a system that can create 
exploitable correlations by building associations between existing correlation-carriers, e.g. a new C that is 
active only if A and B are. The existing correlation-carriers A and B give the system the potential to track 
C. Only once the new correlate is created, however, is there a new exploitable correlation. (And it is still a 
further step, of course, for the system to make use of that exploitable correlation.)
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system (significant for its performance of task functions). That is why our exploitable 
structural correspondence has different restrictions on each side.
On occasions when an exploitable structural correspondence is being used, relation 
V is instantiated between some actual vehicles, and relation H is instantiated between 
some actual things in the world. When I talk of a structural correspondence being 
instantiated, what I mean is that an instance of the relation V is instantiated between 
two vehicles, together with an instance of relation H being instantiated between the 
two worldly entities to which they correspond.
So far, we have seen the following: out of all the very many structural correspond-
ences that exist, there are some that are ready to play a role in explaining task functions. 
In these cases it is a substantial achievement to have such a correspondence in place. 
This is the sense in which the Survey of India was such a major achievement (and such 
a powerful tool of colonial control). Why bother? After all, the haphazard distribution 
of pebbles on Horse Guards Parade already bore a structural correspondence to the 
settlements, mountains, and rivers of India (under certain mappings). What the 
Survey achieved was to create an artefact bearing a relation that users are readily sen-
sitive to (spatial separation on a sheet of paper) which corresponds to a relation on the 
ground of significance to the colonial regime (distance). An exploitable structural 
correspondence is useful to have and an achievement to create. Next, we see what it is 
for an exploitable structural correspondence to be made use of in performing task func-
tions: to be an ‘unmediated explanatory structural correspondence’.
(b) Unmediated explanatory structural correspondence
Our desideratum was to make sense of representational explanation, and the varitel 
framework achieves that by making content a matter of exploitable relations which 
explain performance of task functions (the explanandum spelt out in §4.2a). So, an 
exploitable structural correspondence constitutes content when it explains how certain 
outputs Fj were stabilized by one of the feedback processes in Chapter 3, and/or how 
they were robustly produced.
Unmediated Explanatory Structural Correspondence
A structural correspondence I between relation V on vehicles vm in a system S perform-
ing task functions Fj, and relation H on entities xn, is a UE structural correspondence
iff
(i) I is an exploitable structural correspondence; and
(ii)  instantiation of I plays an unmediated role in explaining, through vm and V 
implementing an algorithm, S’s performance of task functions Fj9
9 As before (§4.2a), being ‘unmediated’ is intended to rule out cases where I is explanatory because its 
targets fall under another structural correspondence I* with further objects and properties that are the 
ones which figure in a causal explanation of stabilization and robustness.
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I argued at the end of the last section that the rat’s algorithm for picking shortest 
routes exploits the structural correspondence between co-activation on place cells and 
relations of proximity between the places to which they are sensitive. Consider a loca-
tion T at which the rat has previously experienced a food reward. It can get back there 
from a variety of starting positions by a variety of different routes, so getting to T is a 
robust outcome function. Getting to T is a stabilized function of the system because 
getting to T in the past (and doing something there) led to getting food, a type of feed-
back which reinforced the disposition to go to T. This outcome probably has an evolu-
tionary function as well, deriving from the evolutionary function of the whole spatial 
navigation and learning mechanism. Getting to T and getting food there are also 
stabilized functions in virtue of contributing to survival of the organism. So, getting to 
T clearly meets the conditions for being a task function.
The structural correspondence between place cell co-activation and spatial relations 
figures in explaining how the rat gets to T robustly and how doing so was stabilized. 
Another part of the story is the UE information carried by the place cells when the rat 
is moving and they are online. That allows the rat to navigate from different starting 
points and to register when it has reached its target. Another important piece of the 
story is that the system carries correlational information about the location of previ-
ously encountered rewards. These correlations come together with the structural cor-
respondence to explain how reaching T was stabilized by reinforcement learning. So, 
this is a case of UE structural correspondence. The need for convergence between UE 
information and UE structural correspondence is an important source of the deter-
minacy of both kinds of content in these cases.
The final step is much shorter. UE structural correspondence is a sufficient condition 
for having content:
Condition for Content based on Structural Correspondence
If there is a UE structural correspondence between relation V on vehicles vm and 
relation H on entities xn
then V(vi, vj) represents condition H(xi,xj)
The existence of an exploitable structural correspondence is a necessary part of this 
sufficient condition for content. So, according to this theory, structural correspond-
ence (of an appropriate kind) is content-constituting.
The sufficient condition for content is formulated so as to be neutral between 
descriptive content (H obtains) and directive content (bring about H). That distinc-
tion is discussed further in Chapter 7. The structural correspondences discussed in 
this chapter all underpin descriptive contents: so when the relation V is instantiated 
between two vehicles vi and vj, this represents that the relation H obtains between 
two corresponding entities. For example, when two place cells are co-activated, this 
represents that the corresponding locations are close to one another in space. (Which 
location each cell is representing is fixed by UE information.)
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My overall approach may generate a suspicion of circularity. We want exploitable 
structural correspondence to be a resource that can be made use of, but the termin-
ology suggests that being usable is what makes something an exploitable structural 
correspondence in the first place. In fact, exploitable structural correspondence is not 
defined in terms of being exploitable, but in terms systematic sensitivity and signifi-
cance for the system. Nor does the definition of UE structural correspondence men-
tion exploiting a relation. So there is no definitional circle.
In most of our examples, content of the vehicles vm has been fixed independently of 
the relation V over them. Names on a map represent towns and cities by convention. 
Rat place cells represent locations because they correlate with locations and are used to 
perform appropriate actions at those locations. However, there can be cases where which 
entities are represented and which relations are represented are both fixed in parallel. 
Think of a cartographic map with unlabelled points at locations (see Figure 5.3). 
Arguably, each point refers to a particular location. The fact that a point on the map 
refers to a specific location is fixed by the spatial relations of that point to other things 
on the map (e.g. to other points, a coordinate grid, and/or a benchmark).10 Similarly, 
we could imagine introducing a new place cell into the co-activation structure of the 
hippocampus, but without its having any online sensitivity to location. That cell would 
acquire a content—would represent a location—in virtue of its co-activation relations 
to other place cells. So, a UE structural correspondence can determine content about 
entities (xn) and their relations (H) all at once.
10 I won’t attempt a careful treatment here of the appropriate compositional semantics for maps, e.g. 
whether absence of a symbol at a location represents absence of the corresponding property instance at 
that location. See Blumson (2012), Camp (2007), Rescorla (2009b, 2009a).
N
50 miles
London
Figure 5.3 A simple map. Notice that the unlabelled points pick out locations. They do so in 
virtue of their spatial relations to other things on the map.
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Another way a new exploitable structural correspondence can come into existence 
is by learning new relations on existing entities. We saw an example of that with the 
co-activation structure on place cells. A very different example of that is learning the 
sequence of count words. Taken as phonetic patterns, the count words ‘one’, ‘two’, 
‘three’, and so on are merely arbitrarily related. There is a relation on them which 
corresponds to the mathematical relation of successor, but for the child who has not 
learnt to count, that relation has no significance. Learning the count sequence by rote, 
however, gives rise to a new relation on these phonetic patterns. Once memorized, 
activating one in auditory-motor imagery tends to activate the next one in the count 
sequence. The child then has a relation it can make use of in downstream processing.11 
This is another way that a new exploitable structural correspondence can be estab-
lished over a set of putative representations, in this instance not by changing the 
sensitivity of downstream processing, but by altering the structures that exist over 
the representations.
At the personal level, mnemonics are a common way that we create structures that 
we can then use in reasoning. Once I’ve learnt a mnemonic for the first eight US 
presidents (will a jolly man make a jolly visitor?), I can use it to calculate temporal 
relations: van Buren came after Jackson and a long time after Washington. When a 
memorized sequence becomes automatized, like the count-word sequence, it may 
become possible for automatic and non-conscious processing to make use of the 
correspondence. And there are doubtless many cases like the rat place cells where sub-
personal learning processes produce a co-activation structure that can then be used 
for the way it corresponds to objects and properties in the world (as in §5.6b below).
So, an organism will typically have the potential to create very many different exploit-
able structural correspondences, more or less easily in different cases, by constructing 
new relations on representational vehicles or by making downstream processing newly 
sensitive to an existing structure on vehicles. Such changes take a potentially exploit-
able structural correspondence—a category that comes in degrees and we only need 
to gesture at loosely—and turn it into an exploitable structural correspondence, which 
we have defined precisely above (§5.4a). When an exploitable structural correspondence 
is used to perform task functions, either when it is constructed or subsequently, it 
becomes a UE structural correspondence, thereby constituting content.
5.5 Unexploited Structural Correspondence
This section goes a bit deeper into the question of which structural correspondences 
count and which don’t. In the rat navigation case an exploitable structural correspond-
ence is exploited—it plays an unmediated role in explaining the rat’s performance of 
11 This learnt relation plays an important role in Carey’s theory of the acquisition of number concepts 
(Carey 2009; see also Shea 2011c).
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task functions. I start by contrasting that with a case where an obvious structural 
correspondence is not in fact being exploited and is not part of the basis of content.
With familiar public representations, when there is an obvious structural corres-
pondence, we often use it. Indeed, the correspondence is often set up because of its 
ease of use. That is why maps use space as a representational vehicle. Many other ways 
of displaying data in charts and graphs also rely on space as a representational vehicle, 
using spatial relations to represent a very wide range of relations in the world (e.g. 
genetic relatedness, age, income, . . .).
Another common relational coding is colour. Colours are used on weather maps to 
represent temperature and on fMRI brain scans to represent blood flow. Relations 
between different regions are visible at a glance. Colours are also used in non-spatial 
ways of arranging data. A list of students in a class might be colour-coded by their recent 
test score along an axis from blue for low scores through green, yellow, and orange to red 
for the highest scores. Taken alone, that coding just associates a piece of correlational 
information with each name in the list. But the colours make it easy to compute using 
relations between the test scores; for example, to sort the class into three groups with 
similar scores, or to sort students into pairs with very different scores. These ways of 
using the data make use of the exploitable structural correspondence between colour 
space (on the representations) and relative test scores (of the individuals represented).
When the users are people, there is not much of a gap between a structural corres-
pondence being obvious and people starting to use it. In cases in cognitive science, 
however, it is relatively common that an obvious structural correspondence, even 
one that the system could easily become sensitive to, is not exploited. As I have 
argued previously, the structural correspondence that exists in the honeybee nectar 
dance is not being exploited in my sense (Shea 2014a, pp.128–30). Although there is 
an obvious relation between different dances, consumer bees are not making use of 
relations between different dances in deciding where to fly. As standardly described, 
the behaviour does not take more than one dance as input. Nor does the relation 
between dances enter into computations in other ways. This is a case of UE informa-
tion but not UE structural correspondence; indeed, it is not a case of structural rep-
resentation. There is no content-constituting structural correspondence. Condition (i) 
on being an exploitable structural correspondence in my sense is not met (§5.4a)—
downstream computations are not sensitive to the putatively representational relation 
on the representational vehicles.
The bee dance has a different property which is important, and worth dwelling on 
briefly. There are different dances for different directions, and it is not arbitrary which 
dance goes with which direction. There is a systematic relation between dances which 
mirrors the systematic relation between directions. The system of available signs exhibits 
what Godfrey-Smith has called ‘organization’ (Godfrey-Smith 2017, p. 279). Contrast 
a nominal sign system like the count words for numbers. Whether a sign system counts 
as organized or nominal depends on what qualifies as a systematic relation between 
signs, and on which relations in the world are candidates to be mirrored. Does the 
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systematic relationship between signs need to be a natural relation? Does the relation 
mirrored also need to be a natural relation? This is similar to the question of what 
counts as an exploitable structural correspondence (§5.4a), but I won’t attempt to 
resolve it here for the organized-nominal distinction.
We saw in the last chapter that often correlational information is not carried point-
wise, representation-by-representation, but is carried systematically by a range of 
representations about a range of states (see the definition of ‘exploitable correlational 
information carried by a range of states’ in §4.1a). That is important because it allows 
a compact mechanism to deal with a large number of different syntactic items repre-
senting many different directions of nectar (potentially continuum-many). It extends 
to new cases, beyond those on which it was stabilized, when they fall into the same 
system. It also makes the system error-tolerant, since a representation that is incor-
rect but approximately true will prompt behaviour that is close to being appropriate to 
the situation (flying off in roughly the right direction). When UE information is based 
on correlational information about a range of states, the need for a systematic account 
that applies to a range of different representations will effectively cut down content 
indeterminacy. So, organization, when it exists, is an important part of the way a system 
of representations does its job.
Organization is sometimes assimilated to structural representation, but they are 
distinct phenomena. Organized signs are tokened on different occasions, during dif-
ferent behavioural episodes. The relation between signs is useful because the different 
occasions are related in a systematic way (e.g. the behaviour called for is systematically 
related to the direction in which nectar is located). Structural representations have 
parts that are tokened together during a single episode of behaviour. The structure 
allows the organism to behave in a way that is appropriate to the occasion. A structural 
representation is a single representation with representational parts; an organized 
sign system is a series of different representations. A structural representation must 
have semantically significant constituent structure; a sign in an organized sign system 
need not.
The parts of a structural representation need not be tokened at the same time in 
order to count as parts of the same representation. Parts tokened at different times can 
be used to calculate what to do on a single occasion. For example, place cells are acti-
vated one after the other. Their activity need not overlap in time. This is also a feature of 
Robert Cummins’s well-known example of the driverless car (Cummins 1996, pp. 94–5; 
see also Ramsey 2007, pp. 198–9). The car’s wheels are steered by a pin driven along a 
slit in a card (see Figure 5.4). When the slit is to the right of centre, the wheels are steered 
to the right and the car turns right (the converse for left turns). If the car is placed in 
a track whose turns match the card in the right way, it will follow the track without 
 hitting the sides. Although it looks like there is a standing structural representation of 
the environment (the card), the way representations are tokened so as to drive behaviour 
is by the pin being located at different points along the card. It is the relation between 
these pin positions which enables the car to behave appropriately.
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The pin is driven along the card in a way that correlates with the movement of the 
vehicle along the track, forwards or backwards, at different speeds. To get a clearer view 
of the internal processing, imagine it unfolds step-wise, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. The 
car is not detecting where it is at any moment, so it needs to be started off at a location 
that correlates with the initial pin position. Suppose this is the start of the track. It then 
moves forward a certain distance. To work out how it should now align its wheels, it 
moves the pin forward a corresponding distance in the card and orients the wheels 
accordingly. This process takes two signals at input, one saying where the system is at 
the outset, the other correlating with how far it has moved (the turning of the cog 
wheels). It then makes use of spatial relations between positions on the card to move 
the pin to the appropriate position on the card, and thus to act appropriately.
GOAL
START
The Maze
From underneath: the 
car enters a turn
The cog wheels on the rear axle
that pull the card through the car.
The Card
top
Figure 5.4 Robert Cummins’s ingenious case of a driverless car guided by a slot in a card 
(1996, p. 95).
130 structural correspondence
To get to representational content we need to supplement Cummins’s case some-
what, so that navigating the track is a task function of the car. We can imagine it has a 
task function to navigate to the end of the track as a result of robustness plus deliberate 
design (§3.5). We have robustness if the car is able to get to the end of the track from a 
range of starting positions, which would be the case if there was a mechanism to ensure 
that the initial position of the pin in the card correlates with the initial position of the 
car in the track. These additions leave the basic structure of the case intact. The car then 
exploits two pieces of correlational information: between the initial position of the pin 
and starting location; and between the rotation of the cog wheels and the distance 
moved along the ground. Furthermore, the mechanism exploits the structural corres-
pondence between spatial relations on the card and spatial relations on the track. It is 
because spatial relations on the card correspond to distance that the system can update 
the pin position on the card on the basis of information about distance moved (received 
from the wheels). As a result of this internal computation, lengthways position of the 
pin on the card remains a correlate of where the car is. Widthways displacement of 
the pin is an instruction about how to act when at that position. Notice that if length-
ways position of the pin were to correlate with location because the car is constantly 
detecting its current location, rather than just doing so at the outset, the structural 
correspondence would not be being exploited.
In his influential book The Organization of Learning, Randy Gallistel advances a 
theory of content based on isomorphism. He says he uses representation ‘in its math-
ematical sense’, which he glosses as there being what he calls a ‘functioning’ isomorph-
ism between an aspect of the environment and a brain process that adapts the animal’s 
behaviour to it (Gallistel 1990, pp. 15–33). There is a functioning isomorphism when 
the correspondence is exploited to solve problems in one domain using operations 
belonging to the other. This is clearly very like—and indeed partly inspired—my 
notion of UE structural correspondence. Gallistel has a further requirement: that 
the isomorphism should be rich, in the sense that there are many operations in the 
wheels
re-aligned
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Figure 5.5 One step of the computation being performed in Cummins’s driverless car case 
(detail).
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representing domain that correspond to operations in the represented domain. 
However, in another way his requirement is much weaker than mine.
Gallistel distinguishes between direct and indirect isomorphisms. A direct isomorph-
ism exists where the material or process embodying the representation has properties 
formally the same as those of the represented material or process (e.g. space mirroring 
space). There is an indirect isomorphism when there is no formal similarity between 
the representation and what is represented. For example, a mapping of mass onto 
written numerical symbols is only an indirect isomorphism, since ‘there is no physical 
ordering of the numerical symbols’ (p. 28). Gallistel allows that indirect isomorphisms, 
where ‘the isomorphism is created only by way of an interpretive code’, are a sufficient 
basis for content (p. 28).
That is too liberal, because it would apply to a downstream process that operated 
something like a look-up table, programming a reaction to each symbol but without 
relations between the symbols having any significance for the processing. A similarity 
in the downstream reaction is a kind of relation on the symbols, albeit indirect. 
(Relations on the downstream outputs other than similarity could also count.) Then 
there would be an ‘indirect isomorphism’ on the symbols because of the ‘interpretive 
code’ constituted by the downstream reactions. If we allow the interpreter and its 
dispositions alone to define admissible relations between representations, then we 
are back to the problem of arbitrary relations between representations counting. 
We lose the sense of the system making use of an exploitable relation. So Gallistel’s 
indirect isomorphisms will not in general count as cases of exploitable structural 
correspondence.
However, I do think there is something right in Gallistel’s idea that which isomor-
phisms are relevant is relative to the sensitivity of downstream processing. If process-
ing in the rat hippocampus were not sensitive to the co-activation structure on the place 
cells, co-activation would not be the basis of an exploitable structural correspondence; 
if downstream processing then changed so that it became sensitive to relations of 
co-activation, the structural correspondence would become an exploitable relation. 
Changes to downstream processing can change which relations on vehicles are being 
systematically processed, but the relevant relation on vehicles cannot be a relation that 
exists just in virtue of similarities in the way downstream processing reacts to the 
vehicles. To be an exploitable structural correspondence, processing must be sensitive 
in some systematic way to a relation V between vehicles that exists independently of 
how they are used downstream. Sensitivity here is a causal notion, depending, for 
example, on the special science laws using projectable predicates that describe the 
operation of the system. That is important if there is to be a substantive sense in which 
the structural correspondence is a resource being used by the system. It is not entirely 
constituted by the way representational vehicles vi are used.
In short, although exploitable structural correspondence depends upon the sensi-
tivity of downstream processing, it cannot be constituted just by the way downstream 
processes react to vehicles. So, although exploitable structural correspondence is by 
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no means limited to Gallistel’s direct isomorphisms, it is much more limited than 
Gallistel’s category of indirect isomorphism.
5.6 Two More Cases of UE Structural Correspondence
(a) Similarity structure
Rat navigation gave us an example of UE structural correspondence (§5.2) and the 
previous section showed that seemingly obvious cases can fail to qualify. This section 
examines two more case studies in which a structural correspondence is exploited and 
is thereby constitutive of content, one involving similarity structure and the other 
causal structure.12
We can define a high-dimensional state space that captures the pattern of firing of a 
large population of neurons. The firing rate of each neuron in the population defines 
one axis in the state space. The pattern of activation distributed across the neurons at 
a time defines a vector in the state space. One measure of how similar two patterns of 
neural activity are is the distance between the two corresponding vectors in this state 
space (Figure 5.6). Paul Churchland is the leading proponent in philosophy of the idea 
that similarity in neural state space is important to the way mental representations 
function (Churchland 2012, 1998). Recent work analysing the distributed patterns of 
12 Another obvious case to think about is predication in a natural language sentence. Predication is a 
relation between representational vehicles (words) and thus is a candidate to form one end of a structural 
correspondence. Difficulties arise when we ask what relation in the world it corresponds to. Instantiation 
(of a property by an object) is the obvious candidate, but then the Bradley regress threatens. Since we set 
aside linguistic representation at the outset, I won’t get into those difficulties here.
S1
S2
S3
S4
Figure 5.6 Illustration of neural similarity space. The response of two notional neurons to four 
stimuli S1 to S4. Responses to S1 and S2 are similar to one another and different from S3 and S4. 
For example, S1 and S2 could be images of faces, S3 and S4 of inanimate objects.
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activation recorded from neurons in non-human animals (Kiani et al.  2007) and 
recorded by fMRI in humans (Huth et al. 2012) has found cases where the similarity 
structure of neural activations does indeed mirror the similarity structure of the stimuli 
presented; for example, of objects of different kinds seen while watching a film.
The existence of a similarity structure does not imply that those similarities are 
being used computationally, even if the similarities and differences are predictive of 
some observable effects like differences in reaction times, or repetition suppression in 
the BOLD response. However, some experiments require subjects to compute similarity; 
for example, if they are tasked with judging the similarity between various objects. 
People do so in their own idiosyncratic way. Those judgements are due in some way to 
how the objects are represented in the brain. Since there is good evidence that the 
particular structure of an individual’s similarity judgements is predicted by the idio-
syncratic structure of their neural activation space (Charest et al. 2014), it is likely that 
similarity between neural activation patterns is the basis on which the individual is 
making their similarity judgements. That is, subjects are relying on a computation that 
uses distance in neural activation space as a measure of how similar two objects are. 
Another experiment used silhouettes of birds that vary along two dimensions (leg length 
and neck length: Constantinescu et al. 2016). When tasked with morphing an initial 
silhouette into a given target, subjects revealed that they had grasped the similarity space 
of the samples on which they had been trained. Again, this corresponded to a neural 
similarity space that was extracted from patterns in fMRI activation.
In line with these findings, let us suppose that activation space is sometimes used to 
make similarity judgements. When a subject looks at two images in series, eliciting two 
distributed patterns of neural activation, a measure is taken of how nearby the two 
patterns are in activation space. Pairs that are close on this measure are judged to be 
similar; pairs with a larger neural distance measure are judged to be more dissimilar. 
Suppose further that subjects have received feedback for correctly judging similarity 
according to some property of the objects.13 Sorting objects according to similarity 
then becomes a stabilized function and, assuming some robustness, thereby a task 
function.14 Individual patterns of activation are then being exploited for their correl-
ation with the type of object being viewed; and the relation between two patterns in 
activation space is being exploited for the fact that it corresponds to the similarity 
of the objects represented by those two patterns. So, the correspondence between 
13 As in Constantinescu et al. (2016). In that case the dimension of similarity was objective, i.e. not 
determined by the way people tend to judge or experience the objects’ similarities and differences. However, 
the property could equally be intersubjective, i.e. dependent on how people in general tend to experience 
the objects (so not fixed by similarity and difference in this subject’s individual responses). If the task involves 
coordinating with others (e.g. in picking a colour scheme), then feedback, hence stabilization, depends on 
the individual’s similarity judgements accurately tracking this intersubjective response-dependent dimension 
of similarity.
14 This is a simplification. It would be more realistic to suppose that recognizing objective similarity and 
difference is a means to performing some different task function.
134 structural correspondence
distance in neural activation space and similarity in the space of objects/properties in 
the world is a UE structural correspondence.15
These experiments raise the issue of the role of subjectively experienced similarity 
space: similarities and differences in the kind of conscious experience prompted by 
different images or objects. The experimental findings concern neural similarity 
space not experiential similarity space; however, a common intuition is that we use 
experienced similarity when judging the similarity between different objects. That is 
not the claim made here. My claim that relations between patterns of neural activation 
can structurally represent similarity between objects does not depend on these simi-
larities and differences being experienced by the subject. The way content arises out of 
relations between vehicles does not depend on those relations being apparent at the 
personal level.
(b) Causal structure
The second case involves causal structure. The cognitive details are less clear, but the 
case is important because the ability to represent causal structure has been so signifi-
cant for the evolution of human cognition. It is through understanding causal struc-
ture that we are able to assess the effects of various interventions. For example, we can 
observe that a falling barometer needle predicts that it will rain but, understanding 
the causal structure, we wouldn’t try to make it rain by moving the barometer needle. 
Causal understanding is crucial to human tool use and technology.
Many animals can learn which action is best to perform in a situation. A simple way 
to do that is to keep track of the consequences of performing each action, and to value 
an action more when it produces good consequences. That way of learning does not 
record what the consequences were, just whether they were good or bad. It is called 
‘model-free’ or ‘habit-based’ learning. It does not involve a causal model of how actions 
produce their consequences. The animal gets into the habit of performing an action 
when it has repeatedly led to good consequences. Action A could get a high value 
because it leads to water and happened to have been performed when thirsty. If the 
animal is no longer thirsty, then getting water is no longer rewarding, but action A would 
still be chosen. It takes a number of trials to learn that action A now no longer leads to 
rewarding consequences. A system with knowledge of causal structure, by contrast, 
can represent that action A leads to water. This allows a person to calculate, when they 
are not thirsty, that the consequences of performing action A are no longer valuable. 
They can refrain from choosing it without having to experience the consequences. 
Decisions based on reasoning with a causal model of actions and their consequences 
are called ‘model-based’ or ‘goal-directed’ (Dayan 2014). The habitual tendencies 
15 If the neural activation space arises as a result of training, as in neural network models, then this 
is another case where the exploitable structural correspondence arises at the same time as it is stabilized 
(§5.4a).
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produced by the model-free system can be inhibited to allow the person to choose a 
model-based or goal-directed response.
A now-classic way to test for model-based reasoning, hence for knowledge of 
causal structure, is the two-step task (Gläscher et al. 2010). This adds probability into 
the picture. Suppose you are presented with sweets wrapped in black or white wrap-
pers, one colour for strawberry, the other for lemon, and you don’t know which is 
which. The sweets are in two jars, jar A has mostly black sweets, jar B mostly white. 
You like lemon and hate strawberry. You reach into jar A, which is mostly black, but 
happen to get a white sweet, and find that it is lemon-flavoured. Your action, reaching 
into jar A, was rewarded. So, the model-free system would incline you to do it again. 
Instead you reason that you are more likely to get the lemon flavour you want from jar 
B, because white sweets are much more numerous there. So you do the opposite of 
your previously rewarded action and reach into jar B. Experiments with this logic 
show that human subjects do select actions based on knowledge of causal structure 
(Gläscher et al. 2010, Daw et al. 2011). However, we have not yet reached structural 
representation, because the computations involved in this reasoning only require 
correlation-based representations of states and of transition probabilities between 
states (Daw and Dayan 2014).
A more complicated experiment does give us evidence that humans have structural 
representations of causal structure. Quentin Huys and colleagues trained subjects on 
the task structure illustrated in Figure 5.7 (Huys et al. 2012, Huys et al. 2015). Think of 
making a series of left–right choices as you move through a maze. Subjects had to make 
a series of three to five binary choices to pass between six boxes, with the cost or benefit 
of each choice dependent on which box the subject was in when choosing. For example, 
when in box 1 a left button press produces a reward of 140 pence and a right button 
press a reward of 20 pence. Subjects never see the structure of the task but have to learn 
it by making a series of choices and getting feedback.16 Huys et al. were able to test rival 
models of which calculations were driving subjects’ behaviour and obtained good evi-
dence that subjects were indeed evaluating in advance the overall benefit of possible 
sequences of choices before making their decisions. These calculations involve partial 
searches and maladaptive ‘pruning’: subjects overlook optimal sequences if they involve 
a large initial loss.
Causal planning is likely to depend on representations in the prefrontal cortex, 
especially when a hierarchy of steps is involved (Koechlin et al. 2003; Passingham 2008, 
pp. 168–70; Koechlin and Hyafil 2007; Balaguer et al. 2016). Understanding how a 
series of actions and events are causally linked may be an elaboration of the ability 
to represent the sequential order of events. We saw above that the rat hippocampus 
will replay activity corresponding to a sequence of locations the animal has visited. 
16 In many causal learning experiments, subjects have to learn about causal structure during reinforce-
ment, i.e. while they are learning how to behave in reliance on the structural correspondence which is 
being created, e.g. Goodman et al. (2007). So, these are further cases where the exploitable structural cor-
respondence comes into existence while it is being stabilized (cp. §5.4a).
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Similarly in a non-spatial task, when human subjects learn sequences of six visual 
images, brain activity during rest spontaneously revisits the states it was in when viewing 
the images, capturing the order in which the images were experienced (Kurth-Nelson 
et al. 2016).17 When sequential structure mirrors causal structure, that correspondence 
is exploitable for the purposes of causal reasoning.
The calculations ingeniously uncovered by Huys et al. (2015) clearly depend on sub-
jects representing the relations between the six states, reasoning through sequences of 
them, and sometimes cutting that reasoning short when they encounter a large loss. 
There is not a rich neural story of how the step-by-step reasoning occurs, but the find-
ings of Kurth-Nelson et al. (2016) are suggestive. So, let us suppose that subjects have 
brain states that occur in sequential order; for example, the state for box 1 potentiates 
the states for box 2 and box 4, each conditional on a different action (left and right, 
respectively). When a subject calculates that box 5 is accessible within two steps from 
17 In this experiment the repeatable patterns were measured across the whole brain. The hippocampus 
alone is unlikely to be coding the images directly, but may be coding the position of an image in a sequence: 
a distributed pattern of firing specific to an object at a location can be decoded from hippocampal activity 
(Hsieh et al. 2014).
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Figure 5.7 The top panel shows the structure of the task studied by Huys et al. (2012, 2015). 
Arrows starting at each box are labelled with the reward or cost of choosing the left option 
(solid arrow) or right option (broken arrow) at that step. E.g. choosing right in box 1 produces 
a small gain of 20 pence and leads to box 4. The bottom panel shows one of the decision trees 
which subjects think through when they are evaluating possible paths through the structure 
starting from box 3. Subjects don’t evaluate the left-hand branch (solid line) beyond the first 
step, since it involves incurring a large initial loss (−70 pence), even though it would be the 
optimal choice (left, right, left for +50 pence in aggregate).
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box 1, that calculation makes use of the sequential structure of brain states, and of the 
fact that it corresponds to causal structure in the world in which she is making her 
choices. That would then be a case of UE structural correspondence. The sequential 
order of neural states is being exploited for its correspondence with the relation of 
causal accessibility between world states. In the absence of detailed understanding of 
the neural vehicles, this is more of a ‘how-possible’ case study. It does show how UE 
structural correspondence could be a suitable resource to form the basis of structural 
representations of causal structure.
5.7 Some Further Issues
(a) Exploiting structural correspondence cannot be assimilated  
to exploiting correlation
An objection to basing content on UE structural correspondence runs as follows: 
any exploitable structural correspondence carries correlational information and in 
fact it is the correlational information that is playing the content-constituting role. 
I agree that in very many cases the relation V involved in a UE structural corres-
pondence will also carry correlational information about the relation H it represents. 
The relation of co-activation between place cells is learnt. It’s being instantiated 
raises the probability that the two corresponding locations are near to one another. 
Even if a structure is acquired by evolution, and is not subject to learning during the 
lifetime of an individual organism, there is still often a sense in which it carries cor-
relational information: had the world been different, the structure would have been 
different. So, the structure being as it is raises the probability that various relations 
obtain in the world.
However, the fact that a relation V between representations vi and vj carries correl-
ational information does not imply that V’s carrying information is being exploited, 
nor further that it is being exploited for carrying information about the obtaining of a 
relation between the entities represented by vi and vj. Think about hierarchical process-
ing; for example, Marr’s theory of the stages of processing in the visual system 
(Marr 1982). Activity at one layer in the hierarchy depends on the activities of vehicles 
lower down the hierarchy, in particular on relations between them. For a simplified 
example, consider the way angular disparity between the two eyes is used as a depth 
cue (see Figure 5.8). When the eyes focus on an object, the more their viewing angles 
converge, the closer the object is. Various signals in the brain correlate with eye gaze 
direction: let’s suppose state A is a firing rate that correlates with and represents the 
horizontal angle of the left eye, state B of the right. The difference between rate A and 
rate B correlates inversely with the distance of the object of focal attention. That is, a 
relation between A and B, call it C, correlates with the distance of the object. Suppose 
downstream processing makes use of this relation C in a way that depends on the dis-
tance of the object; for example, by programming reaching movements that correlate 
with C. Is C thereby a structural representation?
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To qualify as a structural representation, the relation C on vehicles A and B would 
have to represent a relation on the entities represented by A and B (see definition in 
§5.2 above). That is not the case here. The content of C is something like the attended 
object is at distance x. A and B represent eye direction (e.g. something like the left eye is 
pointing at angle θ). C is not representing a relation between the entities that figure in 
the contents carried by A and B. Hierarchical processing will make use of relations 
between representations to extract further useful information from them. That involves 
coming to represent a new condition that could be inferred probabilistically from the 
conditions already represented. It does not generally involve representing a relation 
between entities already represented.
A different line of objection is that my account of UE information already trades on 
a second-order resemblance theory of content. I have a collection of internal vehicles 
performing a computation. The functional relations between vehicles seem to corres-
pond to relations between the entities they represent. For example, vehicles represent-
ing local motion and local colour are transformed into a vehicle representing coherent 
motion (§4.7). That functional transition seems to correspond to a relation in the 
world: surfaces exhibiting such-and-such local chromatic patterns tend to be moving 
thus-and-so. Doesn’t the whole story about internal vehicles implementing algorithms 
depend on functional resemblance fixing content; that is, on a second-order corres-
pondence at the level of computational structure (see O’Brien and Opie 2004)? The 
answer is that a computational step is not itself a structural representation. It does not 
represent that a relation obtains in the world. The utility of a computational step might 
depend on the presupposition that p (e.g. that such-and-such chromatic properties are 
a sign of sameness of surface). We could even say that the system implicitly represents 
that p (Shea 2015). But this is not a content for which there is a vehicle. The information 
A B
C = |A-B|C
Figure 5.8 Firing rates A and B correlate with the current orientation of the left and right eyes, 
respectively. The (unsigned) difference in firing rates C correlates inversely with distance to the 
current object of focal attention.
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that p obtains is not available to be calculated with, to be used in other computational 
steps. You can call this a ‘computational structure’ if you like, but that does not entail 
that structural representations are involved.
So, most cases where a relation between representations is exploited for its correl-
ational information, and therefore carries UE information, do not qualify as cases of 
structural representation. Exploiting structural correspondence is a special kind of 
case, which makes it worthwhile to pick it out and analyse it separately. And, indeed, 
the way content is constituted works differently.18 That has two consequences. The first 
consequence we saw with place cells: a new place cell would have content in virtue of its 
place in the co-activation structure, irrespective of any online correlational properties. 
With structural representations based on UE structural correspondence, since the 
same relation has a systematic significance across a range of representational vehicles, 
new representational vehicles that fall under the relation can acquire content in a way 
that is independent of their correlational properties. The second consequence is exem-
plified by the way co-activation is used to calculate efficient routes: the relation is avail-
able to be used in computations across a range of vehicles in a systematic way. Neither 
of these features necessarily accompanies UE information.
Furthermore, it is at least conceptually possible for there to be a UE structural cor-
respondence that carries no correlational information at all. An ant crawling in the 
sand could by chance trace a figure that looks like Winston Churchill (Putnam 1981, 
p. 1). The sand figure would carry no correlational information, but someone noticing 
the structural correspondence could use the figure to make calculations (e.g. compar-
ing eye separation to nose length). Similarly, in subpersonal cases, a structure that 
happened just by chance to correspond in useful ways to significant entities and prop-
erties in the world would be useful to an organism, even though the structure’s being 
that way is accidental—it carries no information about relations in the world of sig-
nificance to the organism. It is not so far-fetched that there could be accidental struc-
tural correspondences that neural computations can make use of. Neural activity can 
organize spontaneously into cycles, automatically proceeding through a repeating series 
of steps.19 Such a cycle bears a structural correspondence to all kinds of cyclical pro-
cesses in the world (recall the liberalism) without carrying information about them. 
For example, a ten-stage neural cycle corresponds to ten major stages in the life cycle 
of a perennial plant. Neural processing can readily become sensitive to the time that 
it takes to transition between states of a rapid neural cycle. Then temporal relations 
18 Karen Neander’s recent book makes second-order resemblance constitutive of content in some cases 
(e.g. for perceptual states); however, she sees second-order resemblance as a supplement to her causal-
teleosemantic theory (Neander 2017, pp. 175–215), where I take structural correspondence to be an alter-
native basis of content. (Also, my notion of structural correspondence is not limited to relations that meet 
the conditions for being a similarity/distance relation.) Neander’s account has the same attractive conse-
quence that it fixes content for new representational vehicles that fall under the same relation.
19 The repeating hexagonal pattern of grid cells is another candidate (Constantinescu et al. 2016). This 
structure can be used for its correspondence to relations in the world with the same structure, when that is 
relevant to a new task, even though that is not why the neural structure exists.
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between stages in the plant cycle could be computed by using the (much shorter) 
 temporal relations between states in the neural cycle. In this way a purely accidental 
correspondence would come to be a UE structural correspondence.
In sum, there are good reasons for a theory of content to pick out UE structural 
correspondence separately from UE information as a basis for the existence of repre-
sentational content.
(b) Approximate instantiation
The definition of structural correspondence we have been using is an exact one. That 
is an idealization. The way that a structural correspondence explains task functions is 
that instances of it are instantiated20 on occasions when the task function is stabilized 
and robustly produced. The correspondence does not need to be exact on those 
occasions in order for the structural correspondence to be explanatory. (Similarly, 
a  correlation does not need to be perfect for correlational information to be 
explanatory.) A correspondence with two locations being roughly 10cm apart during 
stabilization can explain an organism’s performance of task functions.
Consider a structural correspondence I that maps co-activation to distance with a 
certain metric, and consider a certain co-activation delay V that occurs between the 
activity of two place cells vi and vj. I maps these to locations xi and xj and maps V to a 
spatial separation of 1 cm. We can say I is approximately instantiated on occasions 
when the actual distance between xi and xj is approximately equal to the distance to 
which V maps under I, in this case 1 cm. The explanandum is near-optimal behaviour, 
and the fact that I is approximately instantiated can explain why the rat chooses a near-
optimal route that passes through xi and xj.
If we didn’t include structural correspondences that are approximately instanti-
ated, then the existence of an exploitable structural correspondence would be a very 
demanding constraint indeed. The definition of exploitable structural correspond-
ence puts strong restrictions on the relations that are candidates on both sides of the 
correspondence. In the real world it will almost never be the case that there is an exact 
correspondence between these relations. Requiring that such a tightly restricted cor-
respondence should be exactly instantiated, in order for our theory to have recourse 
to it, would be an overly demanding constraint.
However, once we allow approximate instantiation we open up a whole class of can-
didate exploitable structural correspondences. Distance is a relation of significance to 
the rat, but co-activation maps smoothly to distance in continuum-many ways, placing 
different metrics on the locations represented. Which of these mappings gives the 
content? We answer that by looking for relations that play an unmediated role in 
explaining S’s performance of task functions, allowing for approximate instantiation. 
For each exploitable structural correspondence I, we can ask how approximately or 
exactly it was instantiated across the range of cases that were involved in stabilizing 
20 Defined at the end of §5.4a above.
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the system’s task functions and producing them robustly. Suppose I maps V(vi,vj) to 
H(xi,xj). We can consider all the occasions when tokening of representational vehicles 
figures in the explanation of task functions and calculate how closely the actual relation 
between xi and xj matches H across those occasions (e.g. how nearly their actual spatial 
separation matches the distance H given under I).21 The sum of those values across 
instantiations (possibly weighted for their significance) measures how accurately or 
approximately I was instantiated across those occasions.
By repeating this process for all the many candidate correspondences, we get a measure 
for each. Generally, instantiation being less approximate will make a correspondence a 
better candidate for being a UE structural correspondence. But just as the content-
constituting correlation needn’t be the one that maximizes accuracy (Godfrey-Smith 
1989), the content-constituting correspondence needn’t be the least approximate one. 
We are in the business of explaining robustness and stabilization, so the degree to 
which the UE structural correspondence is approximately instantiated during sta-
bilization should match the extent to which episodes of behaviour did eventuate in 
stabilization-producing feedback. As well as metrical changes, there are also corres-
pondences with different degrees of determinateness. There is a mapping of co-activation 
to precise distances (e.g. 12.4 cm apart) and another mapping to determinables like far 
apart and quite close. Here too we are looking for a degree of determinacy that matches 
the degree to which instantiation contributed positively to stabilization.22 These con-
siderations may not settle on a unique candidate, but only arrive at a family of equally 
explanatory UE structural correspondence relations (e.g. with slightly different met-
rics), in which case there will be an equivalent degree of indeterminacy in the content.
The degree of approximate instantiation is only a subsidiary consideration in homing 
in on UE structural correspondence. The primary concern remains finding a corres-
pondence with objects and properties that figure directly in a causal explanation of 
robustness and stabilization: how robustly produced outcomes had consequences in 
the world that produced effects on the organism which stabilized this behavioural 
tendency and the mechanism which produced it. Approximate instantiation comes in 
when we are deciding between different mappings to explanatory objects and properties, 
for example different metrics for mapping temporal differences in neural firing onto 
spatial differences between locations. Suppose, hypothetically, that a mapping from rat 
place cell co-activation to light intensity differences was more accurately instantiated 
than the mapping to space when its task functions were stabilized. That mapping 
would be a less good candidate because light intensity differences could only provide 
a mediated explanation of spatial route-finding behaviour. Locations, distances, and 
21 In cases considered at the end of §5.4 above, where the referent of the vehicles vi and vj is not already 
fixed (e.g. by UE information), we also need to consider how permutations of their referents would affect 
accuracy.
22 Optimality is a special case of this. One approach to representation in cognitive science is to lean heavily 
on optimality. Organisms are said to represent contents that make them cognitively optimal in some sense 
(e.g. Bayes rational). From our perspective that is a special case of this more general principle.
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rewards at locations figure directly in a causal explanation of how rat navigation 
behaviour is stabilized. Light intensity could only be explanatory because it correlates 
with these causally relevant properties.
This way of handling the approximation inherent in occasions when a real organism 
performs real behaviour can, I think, also handle representational redundancy. The 
definition of structural correspondence we have been working with follows the math-
ematical notion of homomorphism. Since the mapping need not be one-to-one, two 
vehicles may be mapped to the same entity (e.g. vi and vj both to xi).23 But suppose two 
place cells map to the same location, and that one activates the other. Co-activation 
would then represent that they are some small distance apart, which of course cannot 
be the case if they both map to the same location. So, this would be a case where 
the relation represented under the mapping (being a small distance apart) is only 
approximately instantiated on the occasions that go into explaining task functions 
(where there is no distance between the locations mapped, since they are both the 
same location). Thus, representational redundancy will increase the extent to which a 
structural correspondence is only approximately instantiated, but mappings that 
contain some redundancy are not excluded from being candidates for a UE structural 
correspondence. Similarly, we can compare approximateness between correspondences 
under which the mapping of vehicles vi to worldly entities xj has been permuted.
(c) Evidential test for UE structural correspondence
The idea of approximate instantiation gives us another useful tool. When discussing 
UE information in the last chapter, I suggested a rough-and-ready evidential test 
(§4.2). The correlation whose strengthening and weakening is most directly tied to 
the likelihood of the system achieving its task functions is a good candidate to be 
UE information. We now have the tools to formulate a similar evidential test for UE 
structural correspondence. Here we look at how accurately or approximately a cor-
respondence obtains on occasions when it is instantiated. We then apply the same 
idea. For a candidate structural correspondence I, we see what the effect would be if 
it were instantiated more accurately. Would the system be more likely to achieve its 
task functions? A correspondence for which the accuracy of its instantiation is more 
directly connected to the likelihood of achieving task functions is a better candidate 
for content.
Evidential test for UE structural correspondence
The exploitable structural correspondence defined on putative vehicles of content 
in a system S performing task functions Fj  which is such that
being less approximately instantiated most increases and being more approxi-
mately instantiated most decreases the likelihood of S achieving Fj
is a good candidate to be a UE structural correspondence.
23 I.e. homomorphism allows functions that are not surjective.
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As we saw before, this test may be empty, indeterminate, or of little practical use. But 
it will often home in on content. Something like it is often at work epistemically in 
assigning content in real cases in cognitive neuroscience. The varitel framework allows 
us to see why that should be. The test also helps with some of the questions about inde-
terminacy we saw in the last section. Rat place cells have a less determinate and a more 
determinate mapping to distance (quite far away vs. 22.4 cm away). The evidential test 
counts against the less determinate mapping.
As before, the test is only applied to objects and properties in the world that are of 
significance to the organism, so it is in some ways subsidiary to constraints deriving 
from causal explanations of task functions. It is important to note that it does not imply 
that content is given by the most accurate correspondence (the one which is least 
approximately instantiated). It tests for how much changes in accuracy would impact 
on the likelihood of S producing task functions Fj and receiving stabilizing feedback. 
For example, prey animals frequently dart away from noises. The occasions which con-
tribute to stabilization, that is when a predator is present, are much rarer (Godfrey-
Smith 1991). However, on those occasions it is the relation with predators that has the 
most direct effect on whether the hapless prey achieves the task function of avoiding 
predators.
To see the test in action, let's revisit the experiment performed by Constantinescu 
et al. (2016). They obtained evidence that subjects had learnt a two-dimensional space 
for a series of cartoon birds, with the dimensions defined by leg length and neck length. 
They found that distance N in neural activation space corresponds to similarity S2D 
in  that two-dimensional feature space. Furthermore, this correspondence explains 
how subjects are able to move from a starting state to a target image with the minimal 
amount of adjustment. Now consider a different (but closely related) candidate struc-
tural correspondence: the correspondence between neural activation distance N and 
the leg-length dimension taken alone S1D. How accurately or approximately neural 
distance N mirrors leg-length would also have an impact on the likelihood of the 
subject achieving an efficient adjustment to reach the target image. But it would have 
less of an effect on achieving that outcome than the correspondence between N and 
S2D. Consider another even weaker candidate: the correspondence between N and the 
overall size of the image. Instantiating that correspondence more accurately when per-
forming the task would have a negligible effect on task performance, it might even 
decrease it. So, in this case the evidential test plausibly picks out the UE structural 
correspondence (the 2D feature space).
5.8 Conclusion
Representations are stand-ins. What better stand-in than symbols that are isomorphic 
to the domain you are reasoning about? It is a small step from that observation to the 
claim that content is based on isomorphism, homomorphism or structural corres-
pondence. That cannot just be a matter of first order resemblance, but once we cast the 
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net more widely, it is unclear where to stop: the standard objection is that second-order 
resemblance, isomorphism, and other correspondence relations are too liberal to con-
tribute any substantial restriction to a plausible theory of content. If content were 
ubiquitous it would lose its explanatory purchase. From our perspective—in which a 
theory of content is constrained by the explanatory role of representation—this liber-
ality is a symptom of a deeper problem. The vast majority of structural correspondences 
which exist are not usable. And even where there is an obvious and sometimes 
exploitable structural correspondence, it is often not being used by the system doing 
the representing. On the other hand, where a system is systematically sensitive to a 
relation on a collection of vehicles, having that relation correspond to a relation in the 
world that matters to the organism—that is significant for the performance of task 
functions—is a very substantial achievement indeed. In this chapter we saw that 
instances of such an exploitable structural correspondence can take centre stage in 
explaining how an organism performs task functions. By this route, structural corres-
pondence is a basis of content: it is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for content 
determination.
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6.1 Introduction
The positive story is now on the table. We have seen how different accounts of content 
are suited to dealing with the representations involved in different cases. For each case 
study, the aim was to give a theory of content that is empirically well-supported and 
accounts for the way contents are used to explain behaviour. The varitel framework 
was also designed to produce accounts of content which overcome the most important 
objections to teleosemantic and other existing theories of content. This chapter will 
address those challenges explicitly, referring to the existing literature in more detail 
than when setting out the positive accounts above.
Section 6.2 shows how the approach deals with problems of indeterminacy: dis-
tality, disjunction, the qua problem, and so on. The accounts do not deliver perfectly 
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determinate contents, but I will argue that the level of determinacy achieved is appro-
priate to the nature of the systems whose behaviour is being explained. Section 6.3 
turns to systematicity and productivity, pointing out that the systems we have been 
discussing do not generally show the kind of compositionality present in natural lan-
guage sentences. In §6.4 we look at swampman and related challenges to the idea 
that representational content should depend on a system’s history. Finally, in §6.5 we 
briefly ask what kind of normativity attaches to representational contents of the kind 
we have been discussing here and consider the objection that the normativity of 
representation is categorically different from, and so cannot be based on, the norma-
tivity of function (which has not been my aim).
6.2 Indeterminacy
(a) Aspects of the problem
A few examples are standardly used to pose indeterminacy problems for theories of 
content, most prominently the frog’s tongue-dart reflex. I will use that example to 
illustrate the way my approach deals with various aspects of indeterminacy. Then I will 
raise and answer those problems for two of our case studies: analogue magnitude 
representations (in §6.2(b) and (c) below) and cognitive maps (in §6.2(d) below).
I follow the literature in simplifying the frog case. This stylized treatment serves to 
illustrate the key philosophical issues. So, let us suppose that the frog’s tongue dart is 
triggered by the activity of an array of neurons in the retinal ganglion. Each neuron 
triggers a tongue dart to a particular location when its activity crosses a threshold. 
There is mutual inhibition so that only one cell crosses the threshold at any one time.
Consider the putative representation R constituted by the firing of the cell which 
triggers a tongue dart to location (x, y, z). In typical cases this is caused by a passing fly. 
Light reflected off the fly and its surroundings passes through the air, through the frog’s 
eye and hits the retina. The pattern of light and shadow hitting the retina excites the 
retinal ganglion cell R. This causes the tongue to dart out towards the fly at (x, y, z), which 
is trapped and ingested by the frog. Nutrients from the fly contribute to the frog’s 
survival, and may thereby contribute to the number of offspring it produces. The tongue- 
dart response is specific to stimuli with tightly delineated characteristics, nevertheless 
the sensitivity of the system is such that the frog will also snap at little black things that 
are not flies, like a moving pellet on the end of a fine wire.
The distality problem is to specify which stage of this causal chain contents are 
concerned with: at the fly or other passing object, or further along the causal chain to 
the frog’s retina and retinal ganglion. At the other end, content could concern prox-
imal effects like the firing of motor neurons or the movement of the tongue, or more 
distal effects like catching the fly, digesting its nutrients, or eventual continued survival 
and reproduction.
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The specificity problem arises for a given stage in this causal chain. For example, a 
passing fly has many properties. It is a little black thing, a fly (biological taxon), a flying 
nutritious object (ecological category), something worth eating, something good 
for the frog, and something that will promote reproductive fitness. R’s being tokened 
increases the probability that every one of these conditions obtains at location (x, y, z). 
They are not coextensional:1 R can be set off by little black things that are not flies. 
Another aspect of specificity arises particularly with teleosemantics, because of its reli-
ance on conditions under which behaviour prompted by R promoted survival and 
reproduction. That seems to let all sorts of non-specific conditions into the picture: 
that the prey is not poisonous, that there is no predator nearby that will be alerted to 
the frog’s presence; also background conditions like the presence of air between frog 
and prey, and normal gravitational forces.
Finally, there is a disjunction problem in that any two or more of these conditions 
can be put together to produce another condition with which R also correlates. For 
example, R correlates with: flying nutritious object at (x,y,z) or little black pellet at (x,y,z). 
In its specific form the disjunction problem is the problem that, for any two worldly 
conditions C1 and C2 which are candidates for the content of R, C1-or-C2 is a candidate. 
If R carries correlational information about each condition it will more strongly prob-
abilify their disjunction: P(C1vC2|R) ≥ P(C1|R). ‘Disjunction problem’ is often used 
more broadly as an umbrella term for all these kinds of indeterminacy. I call them all 
instances of the problem of determinacy or indeterminacy.
In the past, discussions of indeterminacy have got bogged down in swapping intu-
itions about what is represented in a given case. Where the representations in question 
are things like beliefs, desires, and conscious states, we at least have some reason to 
think that our intuitions about content could get some traction. With the firing in the 
frog’s retinal ganglion cells, we have no such reassurance. There is little reason to give 
any weight to intuitive judgements about what is represented. The same applies to the 
case studies we have examined. Instead we have been asking how representations explain 
behaviour, and what representational contents can underpin those explanations. In 
Chapter 2 I argued that these explanatory practices are an appropriate constraint on 
theorizing about content. So, the test of a theory is not that it should deliver intuitive 
content attributions, but that it should deliver content attributions suited for the 
explanations of behaviour in which representations figure. Whether or not the contents 
are appropriately determinate needs to be assessed in that light.
1 Success conditions and satisfaction conditions generally involve the instantiation of a property by a 
particular. Since we are leaving aside neo-Fregean sense, it does not matter how those properties and par-
ticulars are picked out. Different descriptions can pick out the same success condition, e.g. fly at (x,y,z) or 
fly at my favourite location pick out the same success condition (assuming I particularly like location (x,y,z) 
for some reason). Where the property picked out differs, the success conditions are different, even if those 
properties happen to have the same extension, e.g. renate animal at (x,y,z) ≠ chordate animal at (x,y,z).
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(b) Determinacy of task functions
Our first resource is the determinacy of task functions. Recall that task functions are 
robust outcomes that have a stabilized function or a design function. Out of all the 
factors that do or could affect the internal processing that produces an outcome F or 
the consequences that flow from producing F, only a few would be cited in a causal 
explanation of how F was produced and systematically stabilized by natural selection, 
learning, or contributing to the persistence of the organism (§3.4d).2 That is a very 
substantial restriction on candidate contents.
To apply my framework to the case of the frog, we need to identify task functions and 
the internal mechanisms that subserve them. The fly-capture mechanism gives the frog a 
disposition to catch passing flies, which is robust in the face of perturbations and differ-
ent starting positions. That is, a robust outcome function of the behaviour prompted by R 
is to trap a fly at (x, y, z). Plausibly, this disposition is the result of selection: past organisms 
achieving the output of capturing flies is part of the explanation of why there are systems 
around today with this robust disposition. So catching a fly at (x, y, z) is a task function of 
R. This task function is achieved synchronically by having an internal mechanism that 
gathers incoming information, activates one of a range of possible intermediate states 
(R), and executes a tongue strike in a corresponding direction. That is a simple algo-
rithm, which makes use of the correlation between R and the location of flies on the input 
side, and between R and the direction of a tongue dart on the output side.3
There are a variety of ways of describing the outcome that contributed to selection; 
for example: catching a fly, a flying nutritious object, or a little black thing. Fodor 
has argued that, if the categories fly and little black thing were coextensional in the 
history of the frog, then considerations based on natural selection cannot choose 
between them (Fodor 1990, p. 72). That is mistaken. Selection is a causal process. 
Causal explanation does not in general permit substitution of coextensional properties. 
Facts about what has been selected for are based on these causal explanations 
(Godfrey-Smith 1994a, p. 273;  2008)4. Only some of the downstream effects of 
tokening R have been responsible for that disposition’s contribution to survival and 
reproduction. Properties like being small and black do not cause the frog to survive or 
reproduce (cp. Price 2001, ch. 5, §2). It is because something nutritious was captured 
that the behavioural disposition was selected. This excludes little black thing. It also 
excludes something that will promote fitness, since that is a restatement rather than an 
explanation of how an outcome leads to survival and reproduction.
Considerations about selection/stabilization are sometimes thought to generate 
very detailed contents: R represents that there is a flying nutritious object at (x, y, z) 
2 I leave aside design function in the following discussion, but appealing to the intentions of a deliberate 
designer is obviously another way to secure determinacy.
3 Without computations over internal components, this case has the same structure as animal signalling 
cases like the honeybee nectar dance (Chapter 1), which are more straightforward for consumer-based 
teleosemantic views to deal with.
4 Sober (1994) makes the distinction between selection of and selection for.
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that is not poisonous, contains proteins needed by the frog’s physiology, is not moving 
too fast to be caught, etc. These conditions are of course relevant to whether behaviour 
prompted by R was stabilized. However, it is a general feature of causal explanations 
that they do not mention all potentially relevant details, still less the absence of 
potential defeaters. Explanation has something to do with capturing patterns and 
generalizing across many events. That counts against picking out events in very fine-
grained ways. This is not the place for a general theory of causal explanation, so I rest 
with the observation that task functions inherit the determinacy of causal explan-
ations of stabilization. That also counts against background conditions figuring in the 
content, conditions like fly at (x,y,z) and gravitation is normal, or fly at (x,y,z) in air or 
some similar light-transmission medium.
This deals with some specificity issues but leaves others open. It does not choose 
between the following as the type of object to be captured at (x, y, z): fly, flying nutri-
tious object, or object worth eating. We need to look at how task functions converge 
with correlational information to choose between these contents, at least between 
some of them (see next subsection).
Let’s see how the determinacy of task functions helps in one of our case studies of 
UE information (Chapter 4). Consider the analogue magnitude system. It is deployed 
in situations where behaviour is conditioned on the relative numerosity of collections 
of objects, doing so by using internal correlates of numerosity and comparing them. 
We can make the plausible assumption that behaviour involving this system results 
from reward-based learning, where the rewards arise from acting based on the numer-
osity of the objects tracked. For example, the animal or person has had the chance to 
learn that, across a range of different rewarding collections of objects, selecting the 
more numerous collection leads to higher reward. In animal experiments the reward 
schedule is devised by the experimenter so we can be confident that numerosity is the 
basis of reward. It is plausible that some natural learning situations also have that 
structure, and that learning of this kind, aversive as well as appetitive, underpins 
behaviour driven by the analogue magnitude system. If we simplify to consider just 
these comparative situations, the analogue magnitude system is an intermediate in 
achieving the task function of selecting the more numerous collection of objects. That 
goes a considerable way to making numerosity, rather than other related properties, 
figure in the contents represented.
(c) Correlations that play an unmediated role in explaining task functions
So, determinacy of content flows in part from task functions not being unduly inde-
terminate. Further determinacy derives from the requirement that the correlations 
that are content-constituting are those which play an unmediated role in explaining 
the system’s ability to achieve its task functions. This calls for a convergence between 
correlations and task functions. As a result, the appropriate level of distality is con-
strained by the task function being explained. With the frog, that place is at the loca-
tion of the fly. The correlation between R and the location of a fly offers an unmediated 
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explanation of the ability to capture flies at (x, y, z). The correlation between R and a 
pattern S of light and shadow on the retina could be used to explain fly capture, but 
less directly: because S correlates with there being a fly at (x, y, z), R’s correlation with 
S can help explain how the frog manages to catch flies. Even though the correlation 
between R and S may be tighter, this is a mediated explanation. At the input it is the 
correlation between R and something distal, at the location of the fly, which plays an 
unmediated role in explaining the achievement of the task function. At the output 
end, R correlates with producing the distal result (capturing a fly) which is the task 
function. When asking why the whole R-involving mechanism was stabilized, the fact 
that R correlates with catching flies figures unmediatedly in the explanation. The same 
considerations imply that R does not end up representing all the intermediate links in 
the causal chain from fly to R to fly capture.
The same reasoning applies to the analogue magnitude system. It is activated on 
the basis of prior internal states that track individual objects (or events or other 
entities). So, its states correlate with prior internal states, as well as with patterns of 
light on the retina, or sound in the ear, etc.; also with causal intermediates between 
the array of objects and the organism. However, the correlations which directly 
explain how the organism achieves the task function of selecting the more numerous 
collection are correlations with a property (numerosity) of the collections being 
selected amongst.
Some indeterminacies left open by considering task functions and causal explan-
ations of stabilization are resolved when we ask how a collection of correlations carried 
by a collection of components explains how task functions are performed. We just saw 
that causal explanations of stabilization might not choose between fly at (x,y,z) and 
object worth eating at (x,y,z). But the frog’s fly-capture tongue-dart mechanism is just 
one of the ways it gets prey. Other internal states correlate with other types of object 
worth eating to allow the frogs to ingest those. Saying they all just represent object 
worth eating would not capture relevant differences. So, the correlation with flies offers 
a more perspicuous explanation of how the whole organism achieves its suite of task 
functions: different mechanisms subserve different tasks and do so in virtue of differ-
ent correlations.
Varitel semantics does not require that the organism should be able to discriminate 
the conditions it represents. The frog cannot distinguish flies from little moving black 
things. Nevertheless,  R’s UE information concerns flies but not little moving black 
things. R correlates with flies by being sensitive to sensory features that are a good-
enough but imperfect sign of flies, but exploitable correlational information is not 
restricted to the conditions that a vehicle is the most sensitive or specific sign of. 
Neither the definition of UE information (§4.2a), nor our evidential test (§4.2c), imply 
that a stronger correlation trumps a weaker one in constituting content.5
5 We noted in Chapter 3 that cognitive scientists often take strong correlation to be an indication of what 
a vehicle represents, but that is because strong correlation is an indication of what a system has evolved or 
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There has to be convergence between correlation and stabilization, which means 
contents need to concern conditions that can figure both in causal explanations of 
stabilization and nomologically based correlations. Perhaps the tongue-dart behav-
iour in some species of frog has in fact been stabilized in evolution because of trap-
ping just three different fly species S1, S2, and S3 that are prominent in its ecological 
setting. Then the behaviour was stabilized by catching S1s at (x, y, z), and by catch-
ing S2s and (x, y, z), and by catching S3s at (x, y, z). Turning to the correlations carried 
by R, however, a disjunctive category like S1-or-S2-or-S3 is unlikely to figure in UE 
information since disjunctive properties are generally poor candidates to figure in 
causal explanations.6 The non-disjunctive category fly (the biological taxon), or the 
ecological category flying nutritious object, look to be  better candidates to figure in 
nomologically based generalizations about what correlates with what. Thus, the 
need for convergence homes in on more determinate contents than task functions 
alone would.
Some indeterminacy remains. The biological taxonomic category fly and the eco-
logical category flying nutritious object look to be equally good candidates, both to 
figure in causal explanations of stabilization, and to figure in the causal underpinnings 
of exploitable correlational information. So the content of R will be indeterminate 
between fly at (x,y,z) and flying nutritious object at (x,y,z). Furthermore, there is some 
indeterminacy about the biological taxon fly. Is the category restricted to insects (e.g. 
the order Diptera) or should it include other flying invertebrates? Should the biological 
taxon be understood cladistically (i.e. in terms of shared descent) or in some other way 
(e.g. in terms of shared phenotypic features or shared DNA)? The content of R is likely 
to be indeterminate between these options. If we use the term ‘flyish’ loosely for flying 
insects, flying invertebrates and flying nutritious objects, then we can say that R repre-
sents something flyish at (x,y,z)—with the caveat that contents in all of our case studies 
will be somewhat less determinate than suggested by the very precise tools (i.e. words) 
we use to express them.
Greater determinacy is achieved in the analogue magnitude case because the 
mechanism has been stabilized in a wider range of situations. Looking for correlations 
that are explanatory of comparative choice behaviour across a range of different objects 
homes in on the correlation with numerosity. That is what the system represents. 
learnt to track. Strength of correlation is not a way of deciding between contents that are equally good 
from the point of view of explaining stabilization. The evidential test in §4.2c concerns not the strongest 
correlation, but the correlation changes in whose strength have the greatest impact on achieving task 
function performance.
6 It might also fail to qualify as exploitable correlational information, through lack of a univocal reason. 
Does R carry exploitable correlational information about there being an object b which is S1 or S2 or S3? 
That requires there to be regions such that P(S1-or-S2-or-S3(b)|R) > P(S1-or-S2-or-S3(b)) for a univocal 
reason. The property being disjunctive counts against there being a univocal reason. Suppose S1-or-S2-
or-S3 forms a proper subset of the category being a fly and P(fly(b)|R) > P(fly(b)) for a univocal reason. 
That same reason is unlikely to connect to the disjunctive category, except because S1 is a kind of fly and 
S2 is a kind of fly and S3 is a kind of fly. Mentioning this additional factor would make the reason underlying 
probability-raising for the disjunctive category non-univocal.
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Analogue magnitude states correlate somewhat with other features, like total quantity 
or total surface area of an array of objects, but it is the correlation with numerosity that 
explains their common role across a range of contexts (as tested in many ingenious 
experiments). An accumulator system which operates synchronically just like the 
 analogue magnitude system could be present in simpler organisms, and deployed by 
them in naturally selected behaviours whose acquisition does not depend on learning. 
If so, those behaviours could have been selected for more specific functions, e.g. to fol-
low the more numerous shoal of fish. If so, the task function serviced would concern 
something more specific, like the number of conspecifics, rather than numerosity in 
general. (There are even simpler accumulator systems that do not depend on prior 
individuation of objects, and simply reflect mass or quantity. Their functions concern 
quantities but not numerosity.)
Notice that the account does not rely on a representation being caused by what it 
represents, for example there being a causal connection between the fly and R. It 
depends only on R carrying correlational information. Suppose R were activated, not 
by flies directly, but by patches of light on the ground, and that when a patch of light 
appears, a prey item is likely to land there a short time later. Then P(prey at (x, y, z) | R) 
would be high, but prey would play no causal role in the tokening of R. The framework 
would still entail that R represents the location of prey.
This example has the same structure as Paul Pietroski’s case of the snorfs and kimus 
(Pietroski 1992). Kimus are imaginary creatures that are attracted to the red colour of 
the sun, causing them to climb hills at dusk, thus avoiding their predators the snorfs, 
who hunt only in the valleys. Pietroski invites the intuition that kimus must be repre-
senting redness, rather than something like snorf-free zone this way. He argues that the 
creatures cannot be representing anything about snorfs, since they have no causal 
sensitivity to snorfs. (The only kimus that have causally interacted with snorfs are his-
torical ones—the kimus that were eaten, hence selected against.) In my view we should 
give little weight to intuitions about these cases. In any event, our intuitions doubtless 
draw on imagining a richer picture in which the kimus have conscious sensory experi-
ences and see redness. Once we drop that, the case is wide open. Given my approach to 
content, all the correlations which R enters into are candidates for content, irrespective 
of the causal route to tokening R. Correspondingly, if Pietroski’s kimus are as simple as 
the systems in our case studies, they would end up representing the snorf-free direction, 
even though they have no causal sensitivity to snorfs.
In short, the need for convergence between exploitable correlational information 
and causal explanations of stabilization is a source of considerable determinacy.
(d) UE structural correspondence
Turning to UE structural correspondence (Chapter  5), the determinacy issues are 
similar and are answered in a similar way. The cognitive map in the rat hippocampus 
represents spatial relations between locations. We relied on UE information carried by 
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place cells to explain route planning, so the convergence we have just discussed 
between correlation and task function is at work there. Distal correlations with loca-
tions figure in an unmediated explanation of task function performance, whereas cor-
relations with sensory features would only offer an indirect explanation. Location is 
somewhat indeterminate, however, and there is matching indeterminacy in the struc-
tural correspondences in play. The co-activation structure on an array of place cells 
corresponds to absolute locations and the absolute distances between them; to abso-
lute locations and relative distances; to locations picked out relative to some landmarks 
and their absolute or relative distances; and to locations picked out relative to one 
another and their absolute or relative distances. There may be general metaphysical 
reasons why some of these are preferred in a causal explanation of task performance, 
but that only goes so far. If multiple location- and distance-related features are good 
candidates for causal explanation in general, then our theory will generate contents 
that are indeterminate between them.
There is a further, more subtle distinction that we can make with linguistic represen-
tations, which may or may not arise with our simpler representations. Place cells act 
like singular terms, picking out particulars. They could do so indexically, like ‘this’, 
‘that’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ in natural language, or non-indexically like ‘London’ or ‘2°W, 
10°S’. Individual place cells are clearly saying something more than I am here now, 
since they are reused offline with the same content when calculating shortest routes. 
But we can ask whether the array of place cells is picking out an array of locations 
indexically, as something like the locations around here now, or non-indexically, with 
singular terms that work like names for locations. I can think of three possible answers. 
The first is that there is a general answer about all these kinds of simple systems; for 
example, that none of the representations is indexical (or conceivably that they all are). 
The second answer is that cognitive maps represent in a way that is indeterminate 
between indexical and non-indexical representational contents. Or thirdly, it may be 
that the question itself is ill-posed, when asked about a system that does not support a 
distinction between different ways of picking out its referents. I remain neutral 
between these answers, accepting that this may be a source of indeterminacy in our 
case studies.
(e) Natural properties
Since content in these cases is fixed by reference to causal explanations, natural prop-
erties will be better candidates. This makes some disjunctive properties unsuited to 
figure in the content. Arbitrary disjunctions are not good candidates to feature in 
causal explanations.
This consideration also resists the objection based on ‘reduced content’ (Peacocke 
1992, pp. 129–32). R correlates with there being a fly at-(x, y, z)-and-within-the-
organism’s-lightcone. That condition certainly applied on all occasions when ancestor 
frogs interacted with flies in their selection history. However, causal explanations do 
156 standard objections
not in general appeal to these kinds of ‘reduced’ properties. To give a general charac-
terization of the kinds of properties that are candidates to figure in causal explanations 
would take us beyond the scope of the present enquiry. It suffices to note here that it is 
facts about causal explanation that rule out reduced contents.
These points only apply to the kinds of simple systems we are considering here. It is 
clear that more esoteric contents are not ruled out in more sophisticated representa-
tional systems, like human conceptual representation. We persons can represent prox-
imal properties as well as distal properties, contents like fly and within my lightcone, 
and disjunctive contents. Those abilities depend upon the greater complexity of our 
representational apparatus, especially the combinatorial power of concepts.
(f) Different contents for different vehicles
A final factor at work here is the soft constraint that different representational vehicles 
should have different contents. That is not an explicit part of what it takes for a cor-
relation to amount to UE information, but it follows in many cases. UE information 
focuses in on correlational information that is exploited in order to perform a task 
function. Different vehicles have different effects on downstream processing, so 
ascribing the same contents to a whole range of different vehicles could miss out on 
important aspects of the way the system performs task functions, hence would be 
less explanatory.
For example, suppose we treated all retinal ganglion cells in the frog as having the 
same content. They carry the information that there is a fly somewhere nearby and 
trigger catching behaviour. Getting a fly is arguably a task function of all the tongue- 
dart responses. Retinal ganglion cells carrying information about flies does help to 
explain how that outcome is achieved. But there are also more specific task functions 
that go with more specific responses: the function of catching a fly at (x, y, z) is a task 
function of the response prompted by a particular ganglion cell R. The correlation of 
R with the coarse-grained condition there is a fly nearby could be partly explanatory of 
achieving that function, but the correlation with there is a fly at (x,y,z) is more explana-
tory. So, the latter gives the content.
Millikan has a similar requirement. Built into her idea of ‘most proximate Normal 
explanation’ and ‘derived adapted proper function’ is the idea that different representa-
tions, acted on differently by the consumer, should have different contents (Millikan 
1984, pp. 44–5, 97). In my case the requirement is not that every representation within 
an organism should have a different content. But when there is a stage of processing 
that admits of a range of mutually incompatible vehicles whose differences make a dif-
ference to downstream processing, an explanation of how that processing contributes 
to performing task functions will generally point to correlational information that is 
different across those vehicles.7
7 In many cases that is because a range of mutually incompatible vehicles will carry correlational infor-
mation about a range of states in the sense defined in §4.1a.
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Soft Constraint: Different Contents for Different Vehicles
When a stage of processing can adopt a range of mutually incompatible states Ri, 
each affecting downstream processing in a different way, correlational information 
which is different for each of the Ri will generally be a better candidate to be UE 
information, other things being equal.
In the frog case, it follows that the different retinal ganglion cells represent flies at 
different locations, rather than all simply representing something like fly nearby. In the 
analogue magnitude case it follows that numerosity is being represented rather than 
something more coarse-grained like many and few.
The soft constraint applies to mutually incompatible representational vehicles. There 
is also the question of whether different components within an overall computational 
process, elements that can be tokened at the same time, can carry the same content. 
That does arise, for example the visual system contains multiple representations of 
the location of an observed object. The soft constraint does not rule out such cases. 
Nevertheless, if we want to see how internal processing carries out computations that 
are suited to performing task functions, that will generally require different steps to 
carry different contents.8 So there are general explanatory reasons that somewhat count 
against different elements carrying the same content, without ruling it out in a suitably 
articulated system.
(g) The appropriate amount of determinacy
A final consideration is to ask what the appropriate amount of determinacy is. In these 
simple cases quite a high degree of indeterminacy may be expected. Lacking many of 
the moving components of richer representational systems like those found in human 
belief-desire psychology, it should be no surprise that lower-level systems have more 
indeterminate contents. In systems with more components those components will 
often be playing more specialized roles.
In giving representational explanations we are appealing to relational properties 
of component parts in order to explain the system’s behaviour. Components will 
often stand in a family of closely related relations to a family of closely related distal 
properties. In the frog, these include the taxonomic biological category flying insect 
and the more physiological category flying nutritious object. There is no reason to 
expect this simple system to support a distinction between representing flying insects 
and flying nutritious objects. That is a kind of indeterminacy that flows from the 
limited complexity of the system.
How best to capture this indeterminacy? One approach is to say that the system 
carries each of these closely related rival contents, and that we can appeal to any of 
them in explaining its behaviour. Alternatively, it could be that there is a single natural 
8 Cp. the argument in §4.7 that the UE information in the plaid motion system homes in on different 
correlations for different components.
158 standard objections
property in the vicinity of both candidates that figures in the content, but that we are 
unable to pick it out exactly, because the language we use is unsuited for doing so, 
being too precise.9 On the second option content is not strictly indeterminate, but it 
consists of a determinate success condition that can only be picked out approximately 
or disjunctively using the tools of natural language. I don’t propose to arbitrate 
between these options. I rest with the claim that the indeterminacy that remains at 
this level is unobjectionable.
We noted that less indeterminacy is likely to arise in systems with multiple inter-
acting components. There is also a distinction to be made between indeterminacy at 
the level of an individual vehicle and indeterminacy at the level of the whole system. 
This is best illustrated with an example. Recall the system in the prefrontal cortex for 
deciding the preponderant direction of motion of visual stimuli in one context and 
the preponderant colour in another context. We saw in §4.6b that applying varitel 
semantics to this system leaves some residual indeterminacy. The content of the 
input representation for colour, R1, is indeterminate between (a) the majority of dots 
are red, and (b) the colour density is predominantly red. There is corresponding inde-
terminacy in the representation C1 that registers context: between (a) reward will be 
based on the colour of the majority of dots on the screen, and (b) reward will be based 
on the predominant  colour density on the screen. However, to be explanatory, a correlation 
carried by R1 needs to go with a correlation carried by C1: (a) with (a) or (b) with (b). 
There is one set of exploitable correlational information carried by the whole collec-
tion of components which includes the two (a) clauses as UE information. There is a 
second set which includes the two (b) clauses. A disjunctive assignment of (a)-or-(b) 
to R1 at the same time as (a)-or-(b) to C1 will not be UE information. Putting R1’s 
registering (a) together with C1’s registering (b) is a poor explanation of why the 
system makes the choice it does. In any event, disjunctive conditions are poor candi-
dates to be exploitable correlational information in the first place (§6.2e above).
So, there are indeterminacies about the overall UE information carried by a system 
that are not simply recapitulated, component-by-component. Furthermore, the need 
for UE information to align between components, so that interactions between com-
ponents make sense in the light of their contents, is a significant constraint on indeter-
minacy in systems with multiple interacting components. These are both reasons why 
the residual indeterminacy implied by varitel semantics varies with the complexity of 
the system in question. That is an appropriate result.
(h) Comparison to other theories
My approach to indeterminacy adopts many of the elements relied on by Millikan’s 
teleosemantics (Millikan 1984, 1989, 1990, 1995, 2004). Contents for Millikan derive 
from the ‘most proximal Normal explanation’ of how behaviour prompted by a 
9 Naturalness considerations make that unlikely as between flying insect and flying nutritious object, 
but the point may apply in other cases, e.g. for locations.
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 representation led to survival and reproduction. Directive content is the output 
specific to a representation that features in such an explanation. Descriptive content 
is the condition, specific to a representation, which explains how those outputs led 
systematically to survival and reproduction. My own focus is on unmediated explan-
ation of the performance and stabilization of task functions. This may cover a wider 
range of systems, but retains the merits of Millikan’s view: indeterminacy is constrained 
since causal explanation does not generally allow substitution of coextensional 
properties salva veritate; and also by setting aside mediated causal explanations of 
stabilization. This makes non-natural or disjunctive properties poor candidates for 
content for Millikan (1990, p. 334), but as with my account, indeterminacies remain 
as between properties that have equivalent causal-explanatory significance (Godfrey-
Smith 1994a, p. 274).
My requirement for convergence between correlational information carried and 
task function performed is an additional source of constraint (§6.2c and Shea 2007b, 
cf. Millikan 2009). I am also perhaps more explicit about the requirement that different 
representations in the same range should have different contents, and about why that is 
so (§6.2f). Since I do not attempt to apply my account to conceptual representations or 
conscious states, I have an argument that the indeterminacies which remain are an 
attractive feature of the account, rather than a failing (§6.2g). Furthermore, as we saw 
in Chapter 4, giving up the consumer requirement allows us to deal with systems with 
multiple interacting components—which thereby have relatively determinate contents—
more easily.
Papineau also advances a consumer-based teleosemantic theory. For him the theory 
applies in the first instance to belief-desire psychology. He argues that desires have 
determinate contents and act as consumer systems for beliefs, which inherit that deter-
minacy. He used to think that, outside the belief-desire system, teleosemantics results 
in considerable indeterminacy because multiple systems are equally good candidates 
to count as consumers (Papineau 2003). He now thinks an idea of Neander’s can solve 
that problem (Neander 1995). A component in a system will indeed have many differ-
ent nested functions (derived from evolution and/or learning), but teleosemantics 
should only appeal to its specific function, outputs that it produces on its own in the 
lowest level description in which it appears as an unanalysed part. This leads to a view 
in which malfunctions only arise from the failings of the component itself, not from 
interactions with other components (Papineau 2016). My view goes in a somewhat dif-
ferent direction here, as we will see in a moment.
I follow Price in thinking that the way representational properties feature in the 
explanation of behaviour should help us to characterize their nature (Price 2001, ch. 4 , 
cp. my desideratum §2.2), also in requiring representations to carry correlational infor-
mation (for me, in one class of cases). Price adopts Neander’s useful distinction between 
‘high church’ and ‘low church’ teleosemantics (Neander 1995). High church teleoseman-
tics ties content to explanation of the success of behaviour prompted by a representation. 
Low church teleosemantics focuses on the way representations are produced and ties 
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content to the actual discriminative capacities of the organism. Pietroski’s argument 
about the snorfs and the kimus was a push in the low church direction. Millikan and 
Papineau argue for the high church view. Dretske (1988) and Ryder (2004) are also in 
the high church, since they tie content to properties that explain successful behaviour.
Price herself adopts a high church view. She argues that teleological considerations, 
supplemented with some plausible principles, can deliver determinate contents (2001, 
ch. 3). Price’s immediacy and abstractness conditions have a similar effect to my focus 
on correlations that enter into an unmediated explanation of how the system performs 
its task functions. Like Papineau, Price relies on Neander’s idea that the relevant func-
tions of a device are things that it can do by itself (in servicing a wider mechanism, or 
‘governor’). My approach has a rough analogue of this when there are multiple compo-
nents since I ask what each component contributes to an algorithm realized in the sys-
tem so as to perform its task functions (Chapter 4). However, my task functions are 
decidedly not limited to outputs for which a single component is responsible. They are 
outputs of the whole organism and depend on interactions amongst its components. 
Nor do I think a vehicle is only misrepresenting when something goes wrong with the 
component responsible for producing that vehicle. Many cases of misrepresentation 
are caused by malfunction in upstream components; and even when all the internal 
processing is operating as it was designed to, misrepresentation can occur when the 
environment is uncooperative (i.e. unlike it was during stabilization). (I also differ 
from Price in giving up on the need for a consumer, and in the pluralism that allows for 
different kinds of exploitable relations and different kinds of functions.)
Karen Neander is the leading proponent of low church teleosemantics (Neander 
1995, 2006, 2017). She argues that content concerns the objects and properties an 
organism is causally sensitive to and should be tied to conditions that it can discrim-
inate between. One argument is based on the idea that a component has not itself 
malfunctioned if the external environment is uncooperative (Neander 1995). So, for 
example, if a frog snaps at a little black thing that’s not a fly, that should not be counted 
an error, because there is no malfunction within the detection mechanism.10 But I have 
argued that facts about how components of a system interact with one another are not 
enough to get content explanation off the ground (§2.3). We need to look at how they 
are designed to interact with the distal environment. Long-armed functions can go 
wrong when the environment is uncooperative without that being attributable to the 
failure of any of the internal workings.
A second argument is based on ‘response functions’ and a detailed case study of the 
science of prey capture in the toad (Neander 2006, 2017). Neander rightly observes that 
scientists have been concerned to discover how the toad manages to track prey. That is a 
different explanandum (2017, p. 119). I link content to explanation of behaviour. The 
scientists are trying to work out how the toad manages to track—I say represent—prey 
in its environment accurately enough to survive (2017, p. 108). I don’t see why long-
armed etiological functions need be tied to discriminative capacities, and I certainly 
10 Note that varitel semantics does not equate misrepresentation with malfunction (see §6.5).
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reject the verificationist claim that an organism with non-conceptual representations 
can only represent what it is capable of discriminating (2017, p. 120). We might well be 
interested in how an organism manages to discriminate the things that it represents, 
but to formulate that question we need to leave room for a gap between the things it 
represents and the way it discriminates those things. Verificationist contents are poor at 
explaining unsuccessful behaviour—for example, explaining why things go badly for 
a toad when it moves into an environment rich in little black moving things that are 
not flies. Basing content on discriminative capacities also means that Neander has to 
add a special purpose principle to make contents come out as distal (2017, p. 222).
Does my account entail, then, that organisms will never represent perceptual features 
like being a little black thing and will only ever represent properties like fly? Surely the 
human perceptual system represents features of an object, like its size, shape and vel-
ocity, on the way to categorizing it as a fly? My account agrees. A suitably articulated 
system does end up representing more sensorily specific features of an object on the 
way to representing it under more general categories. We saw that for the visual system 
in §4.7, where my account delivered representations of chromatic properties and 
local motion properties. That flows from applying the varitel framework to a system in 
which information-processing is broken down into multiple interacting components; 
especially when, as in the human perceptual system, a single perceptual representation 
feeds into many different kinds of downstream processing and behaviour. So, on my 
view contents can concern perceptual features of objects, and perceptual systems in 
complex organisms will typically represent features which they then use to track 
behaviourally significant categories of object. None of that is found in the toad’s simple 
prey-capture mechanism, at least in the stylized version described here.
Other authors have different proposals about which properties are good candidates 
for representational content. Ryder works this out with respect to a particular mech-
anism, SINBAD, whose function is to detect statistical regularities in patterns of input 
(Ryder 2004). As a result, SINBAD’s states end up referring to properties that explain 
those regularities. Martínez makes an ontologically more committed version of a simi-
lar move (Martínez 2013). He argues that homeostatic property clusters are privileged 
candidates to figure in representational content.11 Artiga generalizes that view: content 
is given by a subset of properties which explain why candidate properties tend to 
co-occur, even when there is no homeostatic property cluster (Artiga in submission).
The problem with all three of these proposals is that they focus on the way the infor-
mation that the system is responding to is generated: the homeostatic property cluster 
(if there is one) that underlies the incoming information, or the source of statistical 
dependencies amongst sources of information. This property need not be the same as 
the property or properties that constitute and explain successful behaviour. Speaking 
loosely, an organism does not care what the most informative property is; it cares about 
what needs to be in place for its behaviour to be successful. For example, consider a 
rainforest frog that spawns in small pools of water which, in its habitat, are almost all 
11 Martínez (2015) develops and generalizes the view in information-theoretic terms.
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found in Nepenthes pitcher plants. The frog recognizes spawning locations by detect-
ing the sight, smell, and typical locations of Nepenthes plants. The property underlying 
this regular statistical structure is the presence of the genus Nepenthes. However, the 
success of its spawning behaviour just turns on finding a suitable pool of water. 
Spawning in a pool that happened not to be in a pitcher plant would not count as a 
failure. My theory implies that the frog is representing the location of water rather than 
the location of Nepenthes plants.
In short, while taking much inspiration from earlier teleosemantic treatments, my 
account departs from them in important ways.
6.3 Compositionality and Non-Conceptual 
Representation
An important feature of the representations found in the human belief-desire system is 
that they make use of concepts. Concepts are reusable elements which do not make 
claims or set goals taken individually: they are unsaturated. Only when put together do 
they form a saturated representation with a complete correctness condition or satisfac-
tion condition. This book does not attempt to deal with concepts and how they get 
their content. Concepts do, however, have several features which are also found in 
some of our case studies: semantically significant constituent structure, unsaturated 
components and (limited) generality.
I reserve ‘concept’ for the unsaturated personal-level representations that are 
expressed in language and combine to form beliefs and desires.12 ‘Non-conceptual’ covers 
all representations that not are concepts or constructed out of concepts. Therefore, all 
the representations in our case studies are non-conceptual, although as we will see some 
share some features of conceptual representations.
Concepts obey a wide-ranging generality constraint: they can be recombined liber-
ally with other concepts in the thinker’s repertoire. For example, any one-place predicative 
concept, F, can be combined with any singular concept, a, to produce a saturated repre-
sentation, Fa, which is a candidate for belief. If the thinker can also think Gb, then they 
have four reusable components, so for example they automatically have the capacity to 
think Fb.
I will use the term ‘saturated’ so as to include non-conceptual representations with a 
complete correctness condition or satisfaction condition, whether or not they are con-
structed out of unsaturated elements. So, for example, an output node in the simple 
feedforward connectionist network in §4.3 is a saturated non-conceptual representa-
tion even though it has no semantically significant constituent structure (its complete 
correctness condition is: the object encountered is in category A).
12 This is related to the ‘state view’ rather than the ‘content view’ of non-conceptual representation 
(Byrne 2005).
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Predication is involved when unsaturated concepts are put together to form a satur-
ated representation. Predication is absent from most of our case studies, with the 
exception of offline use in the rat hippocampus. However, many of the case studies do 
exhibit semantically significant constituent structure of a simpler kind. They also 
exhibit some local recombinability, and thus some limited generality. None meets the 
kind of wide-ranging generality constraint met by concepts.
Consider the visual system which detects plaid motion (§4.7). One layer represents 
chromatic properties at locations in the visual field, another layer represents motion 
direction at locations. This gives the system a limited kind of systematicity: for each 
location, it can represent that location as having a range of colours and it can represent 
that location as having a range of motion directions. But this is the systematicity of a 
list. There are no a singular terms representing locations and nothing acts as a recom-
binable representational constituent. Nor are the colour and motion representations 
tied to the same vehicle. If the vehicles representing motion direction in one part of 
space were selectively lesioned, the system would retain the capacity to represent col-
ours at those locations. Each layer independently forms saturated representations 
about colour and motion respectively.
Now consider the case in §4.6: a single distributed representation in prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC) represents both the colour and the average direction of motion of an array of 
moving dots. This vehicle represents colour and motion at the same time. The well-
known bee dance example is similar: a single dance represents both the direction and 
the distance of a source of nectar. In both cases the system exemplifies a limited form of 
systematicity. A range of direction representations can be combined with a range of 
distance representations. But they do not involve anything like predication. There are 
no unsaturated components, that contribute to the semantic value but fail to have a 
correctness condition on their own. If the dimension that goes with colour is removed 
in the PFC case (as it is effectively, in direction choice trials), the remaining dimension 
still represents that the array is moving in a certain direction. If the number of waggles 
were indistinct or ignored, a bee dance would still represent the direction of a nectar 
source. Each dimension is acting like an independent saturated representation with a 
complete correctness condition.
An important question to ask is whether a representation has semantically signifi-
cant constituent structure. The plaid-motion system has two different representational 
vehicles, neither of which has semantically significant constituent structure. The PFC 
colour-motion system has a single vehicle with two semantically significant dimen-
sions of variation. That is semantically significant constituent structure. There are a 
range of syntactic states each of which can represent both the colour and the average 
direction of motion of a stimulus. The correctness condition for these representations is 
something like: the currently presented array is of colour abc and is moving in direction r. 
Two elements of that correctness condition correspond to two dimensions of vari-
ation of the vehicle (colour and motion direction). Other elements of the correctness 
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condition do not correspond to any dimension of variation in the representational 
vehicle: e.g. which stimulus bears these properties and when.
The ability to vary two features independently is an important kind of semantically 
significant structure and a notable source of the representational power of that system 
in the PFC. But it is important to distinguish this from having unsaturated constitu-
ents. In the PFC case and the bee dance case, neither dimension of variation is predi-
cated of the other. Each on its own is capable of making a saturated claim. The human 
conceptual system by contrast makes use of unsaturated elements and predication.
Unsaturated elements can arise when there are multiple dimensions of variation 
corresponding to different features and there is no stabilization story to be told about 
how each could prompt behaviour independently. Conditions for successful behav-
iour only arise when all are tokened together. (Perhaps no behaviour is produced at 
all when one dimension of the vehicle is tokened on its own, or such behaviour as is 
produced played no role in stabilizing the mechanism.) Offline place cell activation 
may be like this (§5.7b). Nothing functional follows from the activation of a single 
place cell offline in isolation. Co-activation of two or more place cells is required for 
the offline system to contribute towards the system’s task functions. In such cases 
neither vehicle, tokened on its own, has a complete correctness condition. It is only 
when two place cells are active that the relation of co-activation is instantiated. 
The activation of the two place cells then forms a representation with a complete 
correctness condition (e.g. location 1 is near location 2). One explanation for this is 
that offline place cell activation is unsaturated: each cell contributes a location, and 
only co-activation has a complete content. (I want to remain cautious about whether 
this is predication in the sense in which sentences involve predication, or whether it 
is a different way in which components can be unsaturated—a different kind of func-
tion application.13) A second explanation is that offline activation of a place cell has 
suppositional content. It says something like suppose you were at location 1. I explore 
that idea further in the next chapter, when we look at descriptive, directive, and 
other modes of representing (§7.5b).
The third notable feature of the human conceptual system is its compositionality: 
any of the unsaturated representations can be combined with any other of the right 
kind to form a saturated representation. That is, the compositionality of representa-
tional vehicles leads the system to obey a wide-ranging generality constraint (Evans 
1982), i.e. to exhibit systematicity (Fodor 1987b). The honeybee nectar dance has two 
semantically significant dimensions (corresponding to distance and direction). Any 
value of one can be combined with any value of the other. This is only a very limited 
kind of systematicity. The PFC colour-motion case also displays this kind of limited, 
domain-specific systematicity. The distributed PFC representation can combine any 
13 One obvious difference is that the predicative element (the relation of co-activation) cannot be tokened 
without tokening the singular terms. A natural language predicate (e.g. ‘red’) can be tokened without tokening 
a singular term.
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claim about colour with any claim about motion. Furthermore, given its flexibility, the 
PFC is likely to have the capacity to also to represent other objects, properties, features, 
and events. But this is not the wide-ranging systematicity of concepts, where any rep-
resentation can be put together with any other. The cognitive map and even the PFC 
system meet only a limited, domain-specific generality constraint. But this is a step in 
the direction of the full-blown generality constraint obeyed by concepts.
Millikan claims that time and place of production are constituents of simple signs 
like the honeybee nectar dance. Time and place may figure in the correctness condi-
tion, but as with some other elements in the correctness or satisfaction condition of 
a non-conceptual representation, there is no syntactic type in my sense which corres-
ponds to time or place. For example, there is no singular term picking out location in 
the way activation of a place cell picks out a location in the rat’s cognitive map. 
Variations in a vehicle are semantically significant when they can take a range of values 
and their variation makes a difference to downstream processing and/or behaviour. 
The representational theory of mind is based on the idea that aspects of a vehicle are 
being exploited for the relation they stand in to features of the environment. Where the 
mechanism is not able to do different things for different times of tokening, but oper-
ates in just the same way whenever the vehicle is tokened (as in the PFC and bee dance 
cases), time of tokening is not a semantically significant aspect of the representation. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how time of production could be causally effective in down-
stream processing unless it is marked or measured in some way.
Another important feature of these cases also sometimes gets the label ‘systematic’, 
which is that they form an organized sign system (§5.5; Godfrey-Smith 2017, p. 279). 
There is a straightforward mathematical relationship between a dimension of vari-
ation of the vehicle and the content represented. More activation along one dimension 
represents a greater amount of motion. Similarly, there is a straightforward mapping 
from direction of the bee dance to the direction of nectar. Learning or evolution pro-
duced a mechanism that follows the mapping. As a result, intermediate values, which 
may never have been exemplified during learning or evolution, come to have appropri-
ate contents. That, too, could fairly be called a kind of systematicity: there are facts 
about the mechanism as a whole from which it follows that novel representational 
vehicles carry determinate contents. Having a single mechanism that can respond to a 
range of cases in a systematic way is also doubtless an advantage for the system. 
However, the phenomenon of intermediate values having contents is importantly dif-
ferent from the power that comes from the ability to recombine different representa-
tional components, particularly the power of being able to do so in a very general way, 
as with human concepts.
Representational content derives in part from the situations in which a representa-
tion is formed and then acted on to produce behaviour. We saw that the way analogue 
magnitude representations are produced and used by multiple systems gives them 
considerable determinacy and establishes reference to numerosity rather than other 
closely related properties. When we get to concepts, we have syntactic items that are 
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reused across a wide range of situations as they are combined with other concepts. This 
gives a wide range of uses involved in fixing their contents—giving them scope to have 
more specific contents. For example, the concepts hope and want are used across a 
wide range of circumstances, for understanding others’ behaviour and planning one’s 
own. That is part of what allows them to refer to different but closely related psycho-
logical properties. The representations in our case studies are not deployed across such 
a wide range of uses and so are likely to have less determinate contents than conceptual 
representations have.
To recap, I have picked out three features of conceptual representations and shown 
how they each occur in some way in some of the non-conceptual representations in 
our case studies: semantically significant constituent structure, unsaturated constitu-
ents, and (limited) generality. The simple feedforward connectionist system (§4.3) 
and our simplified version of the visual mechanism for detecting plaid motion (§4.7) 
involve only representations without semantically significant structure. In both cases 
the system can token more than one representation at once, but these are separate 
vehicles—what I have called the systematicity of the list. The PFC colour-motion 
system (§4.6b) and the honeybee nectar dance exhibit semantically significant con-
stituent structure. A single representation has two independent dimensions of 
variation, each a saturated representation with a complete content. They do not have 
unsaturated constituents. When place cells are used offline to calculate shortest 
routes they arguably function as unsaturated constituents, combining so that their 
co-activation represents spatial proximity. Finally, the systematicity involved in the 
place cell, PFC colour-motion and honeybee nectar dance representations means 
that each exhibits some limited domain-specific generality. None of these systems 
obeys the kind of wide-ranging generality constraint met by concepts.
6.4 Objection to Relying on (Historical) Functions
(a) Swampman
Perhaps the most prominent objection to teleosemantic theories of content targets 
their defining characteristic: relying in part on etiological functions to fix content. 
Etiological functions depend on history: a history of selection, learning, or other inter-
action with the environment. My accounts of content face this challenge because task 
functions depend partly on history, and task functions play a role in fixing content.
The challenge is made vivid in the literature by considering a ‘swampman’—an 
intrinsic duplicate of a human, but one who arises by complete chance as a result of 
lightning striking a swamp. Swampman would look and behave like a person with 
mental states, but any theory of content relying on a historical notion of function will 
imply that he does not have mental representations, states with content, at least at the 
moment of creation. Where task functions are based on natural selection, only a sys-
tem that is the result of selection will thereby have content; where task functions are 
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based on learning or contribution to persistence, a swamp system will not have content 
until it has undergone some interaction with its environment involving learning or 
helping the organism to persist. Chapter 3 set out that consequence, illustrated with a 
toy example (§3.6). This section (i) offers a positive argument that this is the right 
approach, and (ii) compares my response to others in the literature. I will leave aside 
task functions based on deliberate design, but they too require history: that a system 
has been designed or co-opted for certain functions.
We could imagine a swamp system that is an intrinsic duplicate of any of the cases 
set out in Chapters 4 or 5. The swamp system would have the same behavioural dis-
positions, so would have robust outcome functions. For example, a swamp duplicate of 
the system in §4.7 would have a disposition robustly to catch a partly obscured moving 
object producing plaid motion. It would do so making use of a structure of internal 
processing, where those internal elements stand in appropriate exploitable relations to 
distal features of the environment. Since there are robust outcomes involving distal 
objects and properties, which proceed via a multitude of different proximal routes, 
there will be distal-involving real patterns in the way the object would interact with its 
environment, patterns that do not depend on history (which is what I relied on in 
§3.6). If content did not depend on stabilized functions, but only on the robust out-
come function aspect of task functions, then content would inhere in the swamp sys-
tem. Why isn’t that a perfectly good notion of content?
Recall the distinctive ‘explanatory grammar’ of representational explanation: correct 
representation explains successful behaviour and misrepresentation explains failure. 
It is because the success or failure of actions does not depend just on intrinsic properties 
of the organism or its bodily movements that I argued that this explanandum called for 
explanation by relational properties of the system (here, relational properties of 
internal components of the system). What I want to argue now is that, without appeal 
to history, in the simple cases we are considering here, there are no other ingredients to 
draw on to make it the case that some consequences should count as successes and 
others not. That is, the thing which contents are called on to explain—success and failure 
of behaviour—is absent in a simple system that lacks history (cp. the ‘no explanandum’ 
argument, §1.5).
Consider a swamp system corresponding to the plaid motion object catcher in 
§4.7—call it ‘Catcher’. Compare Catcher to another swamp system that happens to 
have the robust disposition to reach out just to the outside of the direction of motion of 
a moving object, so that the object bounces off the edge of its hand and passes by; call it 
‘Misser’. Misser robustly achieves the outcome of glancing the edge of its hand off pass-
ing objects, and will do that from many starting positions, adjusting in real time for 
perturbations in the path of the object. If content were founded just on robust outcome 
function plus appropriate internal mechanism, both Catcher and Misser would have 
content. Catching the object would count as a success for Catcher, and were it occa-
sionally to miss, that would count as a failure. The converse is true for Misser—the 
occasional catch would count as a failure.
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An appropriate tweak of internal workings would turn Catcher into Misser. Suppose 
that too happens by chance. If Tweaked-Catcher now interacts with an object and 
drops it, is it successfully achieving the same robust outcome function as Misser, or is it 
misrepresenting the trajectory of the object and so failing to achieve the robust out-
come function it had before it suffered the tweak? If content were founded just on 
robust outcome functions, then whatever the system is disposed to achieve robustly 
would count as success. So, Tweaked-Catcher would not be misrepresenting, but would 
be successfully performing the same robust outcome function as Misser. A swamp 
duplicate of a human that happened to be disposed robustly to pick and eat a type of 
berry which is poisonous would count as behaving successfully, even if it would soon 
die or learn to avoid the fruit. We want our theory to allow that there are cases where 
error leads a system to pursue a poor outcome robustly; for example, a guided missile 
that systematically misrepresents its location and so robustly arrives a kilometre north 
of its target. There is no room for such cases if content is based just on current robust 
outcome functions. That notion of function does not furnish the resources to consti-
tute some robustly produced outcomes as genuine successes and others as failures.
An approach that builds history into the notion of function can make this distinction. 
Task functions are established by the convergence of stabilized function with robust 
outcome function at the time of stabilization. If damage or a tweak to the system alters 
its robust outcome dispositions, then it will be robustly disposed to produce unsuc-
cessful outcomes—outcomes which are not amongst the task functions of the system. 
Indeed, it is a strain to apply the notion of success just on the basis of robust outcome 
function. For a moderately complex system like the one in §4.7, very many different 
outcomes could be robustly produced through small changes to the internal operation 
of the system. With such a wide array of outcomes potentially counting, it seems ten-
dentious to label each a potential way of distinguishing successful from unsuccessful 
behaviour. Too many behaviours potentially count as successful. What is missing is 
any connection with doing good for the system—the sense that successful behaviours 
are ones that are or have been beneficial. It is the historically based notion of stabilized 
function that makes success, as constituted by task functions, retain a connection with 
goodness or benefit.
That is just an intuition, but it mirrors the argument in Chapter 3 which was based 
on the underlying motivation for representationalism. Representations get their 
explanatory bite in these simple systems because there is a real cluster in nature where 
selection, learning, and contribution to an organism’s persistence go along with having 
dispositions to produce certain outcomes robustly, and with doing so by having 
internal processing that exploits relational properties of internal components. Severing 
the connection between function and some kind of consequence etiology takes us out-
side that cluster. Similarly, a forward-looking notion of benefit or consequence is not one 
of the items that found the cluster. (Recall also the positive arguments against forward-
looking accounts offered in §3.4d and §3.7. ) It is the existence of a consequence etiology 
in the past, even the very recent past, which goes along with producing certain outcomes 
standard objections 169
robustly—not the fact that those outcomes would (or might) lead to good conse-
quences for the system in the future.
That is an argument for keeping consequence etiology, hence history, in the picture. 
The kind of history that counts may be very recent. In most of our case studies the sta-
bilized function is based on a history of learning, and is not derivative from evolution-
ary history. As soon as a swamp system starts interacting with its environment and 
learning, it will rapidly acquire task functions. So, it won’t be long before there is a basis 
for counting some outcomes as successful and others as unsuccessful, and then we can 
start explaining the success and failure of its behaviour in terms of correct and incor-
rect representation.
Similarly, a swamp human will start with only as-if memories but will soon acquire 
genuine memories of its interaction with the swamp. It will start by having only an 
empty simulacrum of relations with other people, but will soon start building up 
friendships with the people it interacts with. The swamp human is importantly disan-
alogous to swamp versions of our simple systems, since the extra sophistication of its 
cognitive apparatus, and/or the fact that it is conscious, may make it a genuine repre-
senter from the moment of creation. But the analogy serves to illustrate that it is not 
unusual that mental properties should depend on interaction with the environment 
and build up very quickly in a swamp system. When we turn to our case studies, like 
the reaching system in §4.7, a small amount of interaction with falling objects, with 
feedback serving to fine-tune the system’s dispositions, would be enough to constitute 
catching objects as a task function of the system. So, it wouldn’t be long before a tweak 
to the system which turned a Catcher into a Misser would count as a failing, with 
unsuccessful behaviour in the latter rightly blamed on its disposition systematically to 
misrepresent the location or trajectory of objects in its environment.
In short, my answer to the swampman challenge—the objection to content being 
partly historically determined—is to cut down the scope of the objection and then 
accept the consequence, offering a positive argument that, in these simple systems, 
content should depend partly on history. The scope of the objection is curtailed in two 
ways. First, because my view does not imply that a swamp human would lack content-
ful conscious states or thoughts. Content of personal-level representational states may 
indeed be fixed ahistorically. Secondly, because even in our simple case studies, some 
contents would soon be established once the system has had a chance to interact with 
its environment.
(b) Comparison to Millikan and Papineau
My answer to the swampman challenge is different from those previously given by 
Millikan and Papineau, but not radically so. Millikan argues that a swamp creature 
would not be part of a real kind, and so generalizations from real humans to swamp 
creatures would be unsupported (Millikan 1984, pp. 93–4; 1996). They could at best be 
right by accident. Humans are part of a real kind, but that is a historical kind, the spe-
cies Homo sapiens. According to popular cladistic views of biological classification, 
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species are constituted by shared descent, not by any current property of a population 
of organisms like shared DNA.
The trouble with this response is that it does not tell us why generalizations about 
content should go with the historical kind Homo sapiens. Human organisms are also 
physical objects, and as such they obey the laws of gravity. Those generalizations apply 
to them on the basis of membership of a currently constituted category. So generaliza-
tions about how a human falls from a cliff would unproblematically extend to swamp-
man. Why should content properties go in the historical camp? That is particularly 
puzzling given that swampman looks and talks as if he is susceptible to non-historical 
generalizations based on attributing representational states in standard ways. And it is 
agreed on all sides that expectations about behaviour, so formed, would be fulfilled 
with swampman just as they would be for his real human doppelganger.
Varitel semantics gives us the resources to explain why the generalizations that 
found content do not extend to swamp duplicates of the systems in our case studies. 
Duplicates do not fall into the pattern whereby robustness of outcome goes together 
with internal workings, exploitable relations, and a history of selection, learning, or 
contribution to an organism’s persistence. We could do as-if representational explan-
ation, to some extent, with systems that do not fall into this cluster. But when that 
worked, it would not be because they exemplify the collection of properties that give 
content-based explanation its bite. We can still, of course, explain their behaviour in 
terms of internal workings and how those components are affected by inputs so as to 
give rise to outputs. As with explaining the trajectory of a falling human in terms of 
physics and gravitation, that would be to move to a different kind of explanation. It is 
not because Homo sapiens is a historical category that content-based generalizations 
are inapplicable to the swamp system. It is because the cluster that makes content-
related properties project to new cases better than chance is not present. If we do pro-
ject from real systems to swamp systems, we are relying on currently constituted 
properties that are much more widely applicable—that apply very liberally in the nat-
ural world—and our explanation correspondingly has considerably less explanatory 
purchase.
Papineau answers the swampman case in a different way (Papineau 2016). He argues 
that the etiologically based account of content is an a posteriori reduction of our every-
day notion. It captures the features which, as a result of scientific discoveries and philo-
sophical theorizing, we have discovered to be important for tying our everyday notion 
together. If there were lots of swamp creatures around, then our explanatory practices 
would turn on something else. But in the actual world our explanatory practices are 
based on the existence of historically constituted properties. Papineau concedes that 
we could explain and generalize in terms of current properties, and that such general-
izations would apply to swamp systems, but he argues that nothing would be gained in 
the actual world thereby, since swamp systems do not occur here.
My approach is in the spirit of Papineau’s observation about an a posteriori reduc-
tion. But he shouldn’t concede that equally good generalizations in terms of current 
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properties are available. If there were simply a tie between the explanatory power of 
currently constituted compared with historically constituted contents, then the 
absence of swamp creatures in the actual world would not be a decisive consideration. 
Either pattern would be available as the basis for prediction and explanation. So, I think 
Papineau’s argument needs to be supplemented with the observation that the currently 
constituted properties that are available for explaining the behaviour of actual creatures 
and swamp creatures in a unified way are much less satisfactory. They hook on to pat-
terns that exist in those creatures, but that are also found much more widely in nature, 
and in various degrees. The distinctive explanatory purchase of representational explan-
ation arises because there is a more tightly delineated cluster of properties that arises 
when consequence etiology gives rise to robust outcome functions supported by 
internal workings. Swamp creatures fall outside that pattern—if we are restricted to 
current properties, we cannot explain their behaviour, in this characteristic way, by 
reference to it.
6.5 Norms of Representation and of Function
(a) Systematic misrepresentation
Another major line of objection to teleosemantic theories is that they do not deliver 
the kind of normativity that is characteristic of mental content. As I have characterized 
representational content in the chapters above, the difference between correct and 
incorrect representations can be captured descriptively. It is a descriptive difference 
to which norms can readily be applied, just as whether a friend waves or not when we 
see them is a non-normative fact which can be the basis of praise or censure. Normative 
properties are not an inherent feature of content. Misrepresentation is one way of 
explaining a failure to perform task functions. So, if we took it to be a good thing that 
an organism should fulfil its biological functions, then there would be something 
wrong with misrepresenting when doing so produces behaviour that fails to fulfil its 
task functions. But biological well-functioning is just another descriptive distinction. 
It does not bring genuine normativity into the picture. A descriptive distinction to 
which norms can be applied is all we should expect in the kinds of cases we have been 
considering. Norms in a stronger sense—connected to what one ought to do—may 
arise for representations that are connected to language use or otherwise embedded in 
a social context, but that is not in play here.
Critics have argued that teleosemantics mistakenly elides misrepresentation with 
malfunction. That objection needs to be taken seriously even if both distinctions are in 
the end purely descriptive. Since it is sometimes in an organism’s best interests system-
atically to misrepresent how things are in the world, the objection runs, correctness of 
a representation cannot be equated with promoting fitness, or indeed with any kind of 
biological well-functioning. My answer comes in two parts. As we will see shortly, 
varitel semantics does not equate misrepresenting with malfunctioning. It allows for 
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malfunctions that are not caused by misrepresentation, for misrepresentations that do 
not lead to malfunction, and also for misrepresentations that are produced systemati-
cally in the organism’s evolutionary interests. However, Peacocke puts forward a case 
which suggests that there is a deeper gulf between misrepresentation and malfunction 
than my account allows. My answer to that is that we have no reason to think that such 
cases arise in the kind of subpersonal systems dealt with by varitel semantics. I deal 
with that first.
Peacocke’s example is a case in which a creature systematically misrepresents a 
predator which is 30 feet away to be only 20 feet away (Peacocke 1993, pp. 224–5). 
The creature runs away faster as a result and gains a selective advantage by doing so. 
In that particular example, if there were no other behaviours involved in fixing content, 
and if the flight response at that speed had indeed been the best trade off of costs and 
benefits for predators at 30 feet, then Millikan’s theory implies that the content is that 
the predator is 30 feet away (i.e. that it is not misrepresenting). If the details were filled 
in a bit more so that my account in Chapter 4 applied to this case, then it would have 
the same result.
These examples do however typically assume that the representation in question is 
involved in some further pattern of behaviour which fixes its content (see Figure 6.1).14 
That could certainly be the case when we get to human beliefs and desires, which may 
offer an explanation as to why, in their verbally reported explicit beliefs, human sub-
jects systematically over-estimate the efficacy of their own actions (in contrast with 
so-called ‘depressive realism’: the more accurate estimates typically offered by people 
with clinical depression: Moore and Fresco 2012). If behavioural dispositions to act on 
a set of representations are formed in one context, and are relatively developmentally 
fixed, then it may make sense to ‘trick’ the system when deploying it in other contexts, 
if the behaviours appropriate to the new context would be different.
14 Peacocke mentions another behaviour prompted by these representations: throwing a stone aimed 
at 20 feet. That would indeed fix a different content, although it is hard to see how the two behavioural 
 dispositions would evolve at the same time. It is more likely that one or other behaviour falls outside the 
pattern in virtue of which selection has occurred, in which case there is likely to be a directive content 
which goes unsatisfied, given that the descriptive representation of the situation correctly represents the 
target predator as being 30 feet away.
Fleeing 
behaviour
Reaching 
behaviour
R1/
R2/
...
Figure 6.1 The structure of the case from Peacocke (1993, pp. 224–5).
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However, our simple case studies do not have that kind of structure. In our cases a 
system has been stabilized for doing a range of things in one context. There is not a 
second context where benefit is pulling in a different direction so that two different 
kinds of correctness can become established. Where there are two different routes to 
behaviour, each of which has been stabilized in different circumstances, then two con-
tents can arise, and they can conflict.15 Where there is just one route to behaviour, the 
kind of conflict between correctly representing and well-functioning pointed to by 
Peacocke does not arise. At least it has not been shown that the intuitive case for the 
challenge, based as it is on thought experiments where there is more than one route to 
content, can be extended to our simple cases.
A reason to think that it cannot is that, without further articulation, content ends up 
being fixed so as to align with whatever story is told about selective or evolutionary 
benefit. Here is an analogy. Representation theorems in decision theory fix a person’s 
degrees of belief based on the pattern of their choice behaviour. This makes it impos-
sible for a person whose choices obey some basic principles to systematically misrep-
resent subjective probabilities. A different pattern of choice behaviour would imply a 
different pattern of degrees of belief. It is only if there is further structure, for example a 
system of explicit, conscious beliefs expressed verbally by the subject, that those beliefs 
can come to misrepresent systematically, which in this case would be to say that the 
explicit beliefs differ from the probabilistic beliefs attributable to the person on the 
basis of their non-verbal behaviour.
Although I reject the kind of radical disconnect between correctly representing 
and biological functioning suggested by Peacocke’s case, varitel semantics does not 
elide misrepresentation with malfunction or equate the two. Representational con-
tent calls for a constellation of factors, amongst which task functions are just one 
component. Representing correctly does not reduce to performing task functions 
successfully, nor does misrepresenting reduce to malfunctioning. (This is the source 
of the disagreement with Neander discussed in §6.2h above.) A behaviour may have 
unsuccessful consequences even if the organism is representing everything correctly, 
for example if something goes wrong with the execution or the environment is 
uncooperative. Conversely, an organism can misrepresent but through luck produce 
entirely successful behaviour in accordance with its task functions. Neither distinc-
tion reduces to the other. Furthermore, varitel semantics allows for systematic mis-
representation. The costs and benefits of behaviour may be such that selection or 
learning is tuned to produce many false positives: to be liberal in representing p 
when p might be the case (Godfrey-Smith 1989, 1991). Then the organism will often 
be misrepresenting, and acting unnecessarily, although it is operating in just the way 
evolution has designed it to.
15 Corollary discharge is in one sense like that (§4.5, §7.4), although there the contents that exist relative 
to the two different uses are closely related.
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In short, varitel semantics allows for some kinds of disconnection between correct 
representation and biological well-functioning, and there is no reason to think that a 
more radical disconnection could arise in the kinds of subpersonal systems it targets.
(b) Psychologically proprietary representation
The role of normativity also marks a deep difference between my account and the 
theory put forward by Tyler Burge in Origins of Objectivity (Burge 2010). Burge presents 
an account of the nature of perceptual representation which, although based firmly 
in the natural sciences, is very different to the approach I have adopted here. Burge 
 presents his theory in opposition to naturalistic approaches that reduce representa-
tional content to a combination of information and function. His first argument against 
these approaches is that misrepresenting is not necessarily counter to an organism’s 
fitness or biological interests. We have just seen how I address that concern.
Burge’s second argument is that teleosemantic accounts are too liberal, setting the 
border of intentionality too low, and thus allowing in cases where content has no real 
explanatory value. I disagree. My account of the explanatory purchase of representa-
tional content is based on an externalist explanans (one which carries a distinction 
between behavioural success and failure), together with an explanandum that appeals 
to externalist properties of internal vehicles (§2.3). It calls for instances of the natural 
cluster identified in Chapter 3 (§3.2), which is not unduly liberal. But it is true that this 
account does not depend on the representing system being particularly sophisticated, 
so it does potentially apply quite widely. This does not set the lower border on repre-
sentation too low, however. Content-based explanation does indeed have explanatory 
purchase in this wide class of cases, as I will argue in Chapter 8 (§8.2, §8.5).
Burge makes a third, related argument: that representation proper is proprietary to 
psychological systems, and is normative. Our accounts of content are thus inadequate 
for two reasons. They do not capture something distinctively psychological—varitel 
semantics can in principle apply to non-psychological systems. And they account for 
content in non-semantic, non-mental, non-normative terms, thereby missing the con-
stitutively normative nature of mental representation.
Given my pluralism, I’m happy to allow that the content of some kinds of mental 
representation might be importantly different from the subpersonal and from non-
psychological cases. Burge may well be right that something different and more 
sophisticated is needed to characterize the content of personal-level perceptual states; 
and indeed of beliefs and desires. And there may indeed be something normative going 
on there, given the way thought and language is embedded in social practices. There 
is clearly an important difference between our views, however, since I argue that my 
approach is adequate to account for some genuinely psychological representations, 
the subpersonal representations in my case studies. I see no good reason to think that 
subpersonal representational content, of the kind widely relied on in experimental 
psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the other cognitive sciences, is a kind of 
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content that is proprietary to the psychological. Indeed, we have good reason to think 
that it exists more widely, in computational systems that have the same functional 
profile. Therefore, given our explanatory target, I reject the need for a psychologically 
proprietary account.
What of normativity? Burge’s approach is deliberately non-reductive: he character-
izes what it is to be a representation in terms of having correctness or veridicality con-
ditions, which he characterizes in turn in terms of being a representation, rather than a 
mere sensory state or informational registration. It is important for Burge that percep-
tual representations show constancy effects (they are formed by a many-one mapping 
from sensory inputs). But he doesn’t in the end want to characterize that many-one 
mapping causally, but to do so in normative terms. A state that is formed in a common 
way in response to a variety of inputs would not count as showing a constancy unless it 
had genuine veridicality conditions (i.e. unless it were a representation). Burge is 
happy for his account to contain this tight explanatory circle because he rejects the 
need to ‘naturalize’ representational content. He argues that the notion of representa-
tion does not need naturalizing, if that requires that representation be explained in 
other terms. It is an entirely un-mysterious property that plays a central role in the 
successful science of perceptual psychology and is fully vindicated thereby.
Burge’s thought here would be, I think, a good response to the claim that we should 
doubt whether there are any representations. Their central role in the sciences of the 
mind gives us good prima facie evidence that there are representations. But my project 
is directed at a rather different problem: not of showing that there are representations, 
but of trying to understand their nature better. Burge’s theory does something to char-
acterize their nature, by locating them in a small local holism involving correctness, 
constancy, and content, but my hope is that we can do more. An account of representa-
tional content in terms that are non-mental, non-semantic, and non-normative tells us 
considerably more about their nature. Of course, it could have turned out that Burge’s 
account is all that can be said to illuminate the nature of representation. But for the 
kinds of cases discussed in the foregoing chapters, that would be to give up too soon, 
since more illuminating accounts of content are available.
6.6 Conclusion
Varitel semantics has several resources for dealing with indeterminacy. It gives rise 
to more determinate contents than informational semantics or consumer-based tele-
osemantics. The remaining indeterminacy is a virtue: it is what we should expect in 
simpler systems with fewer interacting components. Some of the non-conceptual 
representations in our case studies exhibit some features exemplified by concepts: 
semantically significant constituent structure; unsaturated components; and limited, 
domain-specific generality. However, they lack the wide-ranging generality of personal-
level concepts. Since the content of a concept is fixed by reference to a wide range of 
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uses, in combination with many other concepts across many different contexts, con-
ceptual content is likely to be more focused, and thus more determinate, than the 
contents determined by the simpler interactions and recombinations exemplified in 
our case studies.
Task functions import a historical component into content determination. That is 
needed to bring the explanandum into view, the explanandum to which representational 
explanation is directed, namely explaining successful and unsuccessful behaviour. 
A history of stabilization operates to constitute some outcomes as being successes—
beneficial results—and others as failures, so that even outcomes that are now robustly 
produced can count as failures in some circumstances. So, we should not expect 
representational explanation to get a grip, in these simple cases, unless the system has 
some history of interaction with its environment. However, after even a short period 
of interaction, some task functions, hence some contents, will begin to be established. 
So, historically based functions play an ineliminable role in the accounts of content 
advanced in previous chapters. Varitel semantics does not reduce misrepresentation 
to malfunction. Misrepresentation does not imply failure to perform a task function, 
nor the converse.
In short, varitel semantics does a reasonable job of addressing the standard chal-
lenges in the literature.
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7.1 Introduction
The representations we have discussed so far have in fact come in two distinct kinds: 
those with descriptive content and those with directive content. Speaking informally, 
descriptive representations are supposed to match the way things are in the world and 
are correct or true when they do. Directive representations are also associated with a 
worldly condition—a condition they are supposed to bring about. A directive repre-
sentation is satisfied when its condition comes to obtain. This chapter engages with the 
long-standing philosophical debate about how that distinction should be drawn.
It has proven difficult to characterize the distinction precisely (Humberstone 1992) 
and I don’t aim to do so in a theory-neutral way here. However, there is a clear distinc-
tion, in the right neighbourhood, which can be made within the varitel framework. 
Section 7.2, following some preliminary points of clarification (this section), gives my 
account of the distinction. Section 7.3 shows how the distinction works in our case 
studies. Section 7.4 compares my way of drawing the distinction to others in the litera-
ture. Section 7.5 briefly considers some further kinds of sophistication that arise in the 
case studies.
Many previous treatments have used the terms ‘indicative’ and ‘imperative’ for 
descriptive and directive content. However, those terms are used in linguistics and 
philosophy of language to label the grammatical mood of a sentence, which need not 
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align with its content (e.g. ‘the door is open’ is an indicative sentence that can have 
the directive content shut the door). Using ‘descriptive’ and ‘directive’ is designed to 
avoid confusion.
Beliefs and desires, respectively, are the paradigmatic examples of descriptive and 
directive representations. There are other types of propositional attitude at the personal 
level; for example, supposing, entertaining, and imagining. Although our case studies 
are simpler, it is not obvious that they are restricted to only having the descriptive 
or directive mode of representing. In §7.5b we will see that something like suppos-
itional content may arise in one of our case studies, when representations are used in 
conditional reasoning.
I have characterized the descriptive–directive contrast as a difference in content. 
Others would say this is a difference in attitude between states that could have the same 
content. According to that usage, content is a worldly condition and the descriptive or 
directive is the attitude in which that content is represented. That picture derives from 
the model of beliefs and desires, where the same representational vehicle can be 
deployed in the attitude of belief (put in the ‘belief box’), in the attitude of desire (put in 
the ‘desire box’), in the attitude of intention, and so on. An account of the difference 
between belief and desire is given in terms of a representation with the same content 
figuring in two different functional roles (Fodor 1987a). These states share content in a 
restricted sense (e.g. that p), while differing in attitude.
I prefer to use ‘content’ for the full representational import of a state, so as to include 
a specification of its mode of representing. Used this way, a correctness condition like 
the door is open and a satisfaction condition like open the door are different contents. 
The functional role of a putative representation fixes this full specification, and it is 
part of the problem of content to say how that can be so. A theory of content that only 
delivered content in the more restricted sense would be incomplete. Furthermore, my 
terminology stops us simply assuming reusability. It’s not always the case that the same 
attitude-neutral vehicle can be reused in different functional roles so as to give it different 
modes of representing. That is a plausible hypothesis about beliefs and desires, making 
the content–attitude distinction useful there. However, it is not a general feature of the 
systems we have been considering. It does arise in certain cases (§§7.4 and 7.5 below). 
That can be captured by giving a full specification of the content, so as to include the 
mode of representing, while making clear that the same vehicles are reused in different 
functional roles, so that representations in different modes deploying the same vehicle 
involve the same worldly condition.
Another terminological choice is to talk about directive contents concerning a con-
dition C. That encompasses outputs that are movements of the system and actions 
performed by the system. It is slightly awkward to call the movement of a body part a 
‘condition’ produced by the organism, so it is worth emphasizing that I do intend the 
term to cover these cases. Limb movements can be individuated in terms of intrinsic 
properties of the system, but the limb moving that way counts as one type of condition 
C which the system brings about.
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7.2 An Account of the Distinction
The accounts of content offered in Chapters 4 and 5 do not make a distinction between 
descriptive and directive contents. They home in on conditions whose obtaining or 
otherwise is important for explaining successful behaviour, without distinguishing 
between conditions which the system causes to obtain and conditions that obtain ante-
cedently. Recall the central idea: an exploitable relation figures in an unmediated 
explanation of how a system performs task functions. In some cases that exploitable 
relation is a matter of receptivity: the system makes use of inputs in order to go into a 
state or states that stand in the exploitable relation, and the relation is exploited by 
relying on those states in further processing or by conditioning behaviour on them. 
In other cases the exploitable relation is a relation to outputs that the system produces: 
the role of the vehicle in achieving a task function is to bring about a certain result.
Exploitable relations that are part of an unmediated explanation of how a system 
achieves its task functions can be of either kind. Although the accounts of content do 
not differentiate between descriptive and directive modes of representing—nor need 
they do so in order for the obtaining or otherwise of the content-condition to explain 
success and failure of behaviour—we can supplement them so as to classify whether 
the exploitable relation plays a descriptive or directive role (or both, or neither).
A tempting first thought is that representations whose tokening is caused by inputs 
to the system are descriptive and those that cause outputs are directive. And that asym-
metry does indeed exist in many cases. For example, the analogue magnitude system 
carries UE information about the numerosity of collections of objects, that correlation 
exists because of how the system is sensitive to objects in the world (§4.6a), and the 
representations do indeed have descriptive content (about the number of objects 
presented). Motor programs, by contrast, carry UE information about bodily move-
ments and actions caused by the agent (§4.5), and they have directive content.
However, in varitel semantics content is based on explanatory considerations, not 
simply facts about causal sensitivity and causal effects. So, the descriptive–directive 
distinction should turn on whether producing condition C or reflecting condition 
C figures in the explanation (in an unmediated explanation of how—through the 
representations implementing an internal algorithm—S performs task functions Fj). 
Furthermore, there is no requirement in the theories above that the objects and prop-
erties represented should play any causal role at input. (Recall from §6.2c: the frog’s 
retinal ganglion cell firing could carry correlational information about and represent 
the location of flies even if the cause of cell firing were patches of light that attract, and 
so precede, the presence of flies.)
Rather than causation by C, what is characteristic of the descriptive role is that the 
correlation of R with C, and hence C’s obtaining better than chance, enters into the 
explanation of how downstream effects of R have or achieve their task functions. 
Contrast the directive case, where what is important is producing C. In the directive 
case, there would be no point tokening R if C obtained already. In the descriptive case, 
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the whole point of tokening R is that C does obtain already, or at least that it is likely to 
obtain at the point when behavioural outputs prompted by R occur.
A complication arises because there are cases of corollary discharge (§4.5) where a 
(directive) motor program acquires an additional descriptive content (having both 
modes of representing, it is a pushmi-pullyu representation). As well as having the job 
of causing a bodily movement, it also has the job of telling other subsystems that the 
movement is about to take place, so that they can produce appropriate outputs, such as 
balancing movements. To deal with this complication it is easier to define the directive 
mode of representing first.
Directive Content (based on UE information)
For internal component R carrying UE information about condition C in a system S 
with task function or functions Fj:
if R’s producing C is part of an unmediated explanation of S’s performance of task 
functions Fj,
then R has the directive content: produce C
Recall that we defined the explanandum, ‘S’s performance of task functions Fj’, as 
including both the question of how outputs Fj have been stabilized (through evolution, 
learning, or contribution to an organism’s persistence) and the question of how they 
have been robustly produced (§4.2a). Directive contents arise where exploitable 
correlational information becomes UE information because of R’s role in causing a 
condition C to obtain. R’s role in the mechanism that was stabilized and produces 
outputs robustly was to cause condition C to obtain.
We should recall a subtlety discussed in Chapter 4. Output-based UE information 
may concern the means by which a task function is brought about, as with a motor 
program that is used to bring about a task functional output F. But there are also direct-
ive representations that concern task functions directly, such as get sugar. So then the 
internal computations involve two directive representations: one that selects a task 
function to be achieved in the current context (get sugar) and another that programs 
the means to that end (move the right hand to (x,y,z)).1 The correlation in the former 
case is simply a matter of production of a task functional outcome, rather than an 
explanation of how the system produces that outcome. We saw in §4.2a that the output 
correlation can nevertheless form part of an explanation of how the whole system 
comes to produce this outcome in a way that was stabilized and robust.
Having identified the UE information that is constitutive of directive content, we 
can now turn to descriptive content. The basic idea is that the explanatory role of a 
correlation in the descriptive case is to raise the probability that some condition C, 
relevant to how the system performs task functions, obtains. But an obvious complication 
1 An output that is a means for producing a task functional outcome, e.g. moving the eyes thus-and-so, 
need not itself be a task functional output, e.g. if it does not meet the robustness condition.
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arises. The job of a directive is to bring about a certain output. In doing that it raises the 
probability that a certain condition will obtain (namely that the output is produced). 
The directive representation get sugar should not automatically be counted as also 
being a descriptive representation just because its satisfaction condition obtaining (the 
organism getting sugar) is part of an explanation of how the mechanism was stabilized. 
So, we need to exclude this kind of case in defining descriptive content. Descriptive 
content concerns a condition C whose obtaining when R is tokened figures in an 
unmediated explanation of robustness and stabilization, but not in virtue of R’s having 
the causal role to produce condition C.
Descriptive Content (based on UE information)
For internal component R carrying UE information about condition C in a system S 
with task function or functions Fj:
if C’s obtaining when R is tokened is part of an unmediated explanation, that does 
not go via R’s producing C, of S’s performance of task functions Fj,
then R has the descriptive content: C obtains
Now we can return to the issue of corollary discharge. While we don’t want our 
definition of descriptive content to automatically constitute every directive represen-
tation as also having descriptive content (as a pushmi-pullyu), we don’t want to rule 
out that a directive representation can also acquire descriptive content, in virtue of a 
second functional role in plays in the system.
Consider a motor command which correlates with the production of a particular 
bodily movement, holding the right arm out horizontally. That is a role the motor com-
mand is supposed to play so it is a representation with directive content. Other motor 
systems react to this state by producing balancing movements that stabilize the body; 
for example, tensing muscles in the legs and pelvis (Bouisset and Zattara 1981). These 
movements are performed before any sensory feedback has come in to report that the 
right arm has gone up. They are based on the motor program, since it is a reliable sign 
that the arm will shortly be up, and hence of the need for compensatory adjustments. 
These compensatory adjustments are motor outputs, and a condition involved in 
explaining why they are stabilized is that the right arm is up (otherwise they would be 
a waste of effort and destabilize the body in the other direction). The motor program 
itself carries the correlational information that this condition is about to obtain. 
I would argue that that correlation figures in an unmediated explanation of how the 
organism achieves the task function of remaining upright. So, the motor command, in 
virtue of a second functional role that it plays in the system, also carries the descriptive 
content that the right arm is raised.
Does our definition of descriptive content allow that there is also descriptive content 
in this case? The organism performs the task function of staying upright. It does that 
when the arm is raised by producing balancing movements of the muscles of the legs 
and torso. It produces those balancing adjustments in appropriate circumstances by 
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relying on an internal vehicle R that correlates with the arm’s being raised (condition C). 
So, R looks to have the descriptive content that the arm will shortly be raised. What 
about the caveat that the explanation ‘does not go via R’s producing C’? R does in fact 
produce C (i.e. cause condition C to obtain). But the way the obtaining of condition C 
combines with balancing movements to explain performance of the task function of 
remaining upright does not depend on R’s producing C. It would work just as well if the 
correlation of R with C depended on R’s detecting some other sign of C and R had no 
role in producing C. The correlation does not fall under the exception, so qualifies as 
descriptive: the motor program does indeed have a second, descriptive content. So, 
this definition of descriptive content allows that representations can have both descrip-
tive and directive content in appropriate cases, without going too far and entailing that 
all directives also carry descriptive content.
We can make a parallel descriptive–directive distinction within the account of UE 
structural correspondence (Chapter 5). In the case of structural representations, a rep-
resentation is tokened in virtue of two or more vehicles standing in a certain relation 
within the system. So, a particular representation R1 is realized when a relation V holds 
between two vehicles v1 and v2 (e.g. one place cell is activated after another). Under 
the UE structural correspondence which gives the content of the set of representations 
Ri which includes R1, the two vehicles v1 and v2 stand for two entities in the world, say x1 
and x2, and the tokened relation V stands for a relation between x1 and x2, call it H. R1 
then represents condition H(x1,x2).
Directive Content (based on UE structural correspondence)
For representation R1 from a set of representations Ri bearing the UE structural 
correspondence to relation H on a set of entities xk under which R1 corresponds to 
H(x1,x2),
if the fact that the Ri produce relation H on the entities xi is part of an unmediated 
explanation of S’s performance of task functions Fj,
then R1 has the directive content: produce H(x1,x2)
Descriptive Content (based on UE structural correspondence)
For representation R1 from a set of representations Ri bearing the UE structural 
correspondence to relation H on a set of entities xk under which R1 corresponds to 
H(x1,x2),
if the obtaining of relation H on the entities xk when a representation Ri is tokened is 
part of an unmediated explanation, that does not go via Ri producing relation H on 
the entities xi, of S’s performance of task functions Fj,
then R1 has the descriptive content: H(x1,x2) obtains
Consider the spatial navigation system in the rat hippocampus. It exploits the 
correlation of a place cell with location to tell the rat where it is. Then it makes use of the 
co-activation structure to run through a series of routes offline until one joins up with 
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a rewarded location, selecting the shortest such route by selecting the shortest or fastest 
offline sequence. We have been supposing that this structure arises through learning 
because it has led rats to follow efficient routes to worthwhile locations, food sources 
say. Getting to previously encountered sources of food are then outcomes Fj that have 
been stabilized by learning. To explain how they were stabilized we point to the fact 
that, when the co-activation relation is tokened on place cells, the corresponding rela-
tion of spatial contiguity tends to exist on the corresponding locations; for example, 
that location y is near to location x. The co-activation relation therefore descriptively 
represents that y is near to x.
7.3 Application to Case Studies
(a) UE information
In this section I say briefly how my way of drawing the distinction applies to the 
case studies discussed in previous chapters. It agrees with Millikan’s verdict about very 
simple throughput cases like the honeybee nectar dance. Those intermediates are 
pushmi-pullyu representations with both descriptive and directive content. Signalling 
evolved by natural selection and was stabilized because the dances have a tight correl-
ation with the location of nectar at input and with the flight of foraging bees at output.
In the ALCOVE model (§4.3), the output representations are also pushmi-pullyu. 
The system exploits the fact that they correlate tightly with the category of object 
presented and with which box they cause the system to place the object in. I argued 
that the layer of exemplar nodes should not be seen as simply recapitulating with less 
fidelity the correlations used at the output (since that is less explanatory of how the 
system works). So, the explanatory correlation at the exemplar layer is with the identity 
of the exemplar, and not with any particular behaviour. They have descriptive content; 
similarly for the input nodes. Notice that the pushmi-pullyu representation at output 
has different (but related) conditions in the descriptive and directive contents (the object 
is of type A; place the object in box A). That is also true of the honeybee nectar dance.
There are also pushmi-pullyu representations where descriptive and directive 
content concern the same condition. Using motor programs to drive compensatory 
bodily movements gave us one example (§7.2 above). Corollary discharge will in many 
cases, for the same reason, have contents like this (§4.5). The predictive comparator 
mechanisms involved in motor control, discussed in §3.6a, are also somewhat like this 
in structure (Desmurget and Grafton 2000, Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000), except 
there the motor content is a pure directive and is transformed before a corresponding 
descriptive content is represented.
The schematic structure of a predictive comparator mechanism is illustrated in 
Figure 7.1 A motor command is used simultaneously to drive behaviour and to predict 
the sensory feedback that is likely to result. The discrepancy between predicted sen-
sory feedback and desired state is used to adjust the motor command even before any 
184 Descriptive and Directive Representation
sensory feedback has had time to arrive (processing steps above and to the left of the 
diagonal dashed line in Figure 7.1). However, there the predictive descriptive repre-
sentation (‘model state estimate’) is the result of a further processing step after the 
motor command, so the motor program itself will not have descriptive content. It is a 
pure directive. The fact that it correlates with outputs means that it can be relied on in 
order to generate another state with descriptive content about those outputs.
Recall the PFC colour/motion choice system described by Mante et al. (2013) 
(§4.6b). The computation involves two vehicles at input. One, the context representation, 
correlates with whether it is currently in a ‘colour context’ or a ‘motion context’ (i.e. 
whether colour or motion is going to be the basis of reward). The other vehicle, call it 
RI, has two dimensions of variation, one corresponding to the colour of the stimulus 
and the other to the motion of the stimulus. RI is then transformed into a one-dimensional 
vehicle that drives behaviour (left or right), which is formed by preserving the dimen-
sion of RI that is relevant to choice behaviour on the current trial (colour or motion) 
and collapsing the other. RI thus descriptively represents both the preponderant colour 
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Figure 7.1 A predictive comparator model from Miall and Wolpert (1996, adapted). A copy of 
the motor command is fed into a mechanism that estimates the likely world state that will result 
(the ‘model state estimate’). That estimate is then compared with the target state (‘desired state’) 
so that the motor command can be adjusted even before sensory feedback is received (the 
processing steps above and to the left of the diagonal dashed line).
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and the direction of motion of the current stimulus. The context representations are 
descriptive representations of whether colour or motion will be the basis of reward in 
the current context. RI is transformed into a directive representation RO which drives 
an action to the left or right. RO also correlates with a disjunctive input condition (e.g. 
the majority colour is red or the majority direction is left), but since there are other com-
ponents of the mechanism correlating more tightly with colour, motion, and choice 
context, the fact that this internal component correlates with this further disjunctive 
condition offers no additional explanatory purchase. It does not figure in an unmedi-
ated explanation of stabilization. Thus, even in this simple case, there are separate 
descriptive and directive representations, and no pushmi-pullyu representations.
Pure descriptive contents are found in many of the case studies. Analogue magnitude 
representations of numerosity are pure descriptives, as discussed in §7.2 above. 
Representations of individuals in the face recognition system are another clear case 
(§3.4c). No output behaviour at all need be involved in acquiring a representation of a new 
individual. The plaid motion detection system (§4.7) descriptively represents motion 
properties (in thick stripe V2) and chromatic properties (in thin stripe V2). It transforms 
these into a register R in MT that correlates with the direction of motion of surfaces. The 
system makes use of that correlation to condition behaviour that is appropriate to the 
motion direction, so R has descriptive content about the direction of plaid motion. In our 
stylized treatment we supposed that R is used directly to condition behaviour (a reach-
ing movement in the corresponding direction). If the connection were that direct, R 
would also have directive content, however in the human visual system behaviour is 
likely to be highly context-dependent, so no such directive content would arise in MT.
In §4.8 we looked at a simple system that accumulates evidence and computes the 
probability that various available actions will be rewarded. We explained its operation 
in terms of exploited input correlations, taking into account probability distributions. 
Only its outputs have directive content, programming one or other action. This case 
shows that a vehicle of descriptive content can be activated with various strengths, with 
stronger activation representing that a worldly condition is more likely. That raises the 
possibility that directive representations could also come in varying strengths, an idea 
we will return to in §7.5a below.
(b) UE structural correspondence
I turn finally to our cases of UE structural correspondence. In the rat navigation case, 
the correspondence between co-activation structure on place cells and spatial struc-
ture on the corresponding places is used to calculate shortest routes. The rat doesn’t 
put the locations into spatial relations. The behaviour it performs relies on the corres-
pondence holding when it calculates a route. So, they have descriptive content.
It is harder to find simple cases of UE structural correspondence with directive content. 
We are familiar with high level cases like using a blueprint to build a building. A blueprint 
represents the way parts should be put into certain spatial relations. Chris Eliasmith’s 
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spiking neuron model for solving the Tower of Hanoi problem uses representations of 
relations amongst discs and calculates over these relations in working out which disc 
to move when (Eliasmith 2013, pp. 191–8). These are arguably structural representations 
of spatial relations. The representation of the target end state uses this structure to 
represent an arrangement of discs. It is then a structural representation with directive 
content. There may be lower-level cases involving causal relations. If an organism plans 
a sequence of actions and represents them with some kind of directed causal graph, 
which it then consults in order to execute the actions in the right sequence, that causal 
graph would have directive content about the causal structure of the sequence of 
actions to be performed.
Dan Ryder’s SINBAD model uncovers statistical structure in the world (Ryder 2004, 
Ryder forthcoming). Ryder claims that SINBAD constructs structural representations. 
A clever and attractive feature of the model is that it can be inverted so that representa-
tions can be used in directive mode so as to drive and guide action. The model discovers 
statistical regularities in the input, so that it ends up with individual cells that are tuned 
to underlying causes of statistical regularity (Ryder’s ‘sources of mutual information’); 
for example, to natural kinds. When it encounters a series of kinds to which it is tuned, 
a corresponding series of cells will be activated. Ryder calls the way cell activity mirrors 
the sources of mutual information encountered a ‘dynamic isomorphism’.
The network can also learn which kinds are correlated with which, through forming 
lateral associative connections. So, if cell B is normally activated by sensory inputs 
when cell A is, the system will learn that association. Cell A will now activate cell B 
even in the absence of sensory inputs to cell B, and the converse (in Ryder’s model 
learning produces bi-directional connections). That allows the network to ‘fill in’ with 
predictive activity in line with patterns it has encountered in the past. Ryder shows 
how this network can be taken offline and used in a directive mode of operation 
(Ryder forthcoming). One cell is specified as a target state. The rest of the network is 
allowed to adjust, in the absence of input, to reach values that would produce this 
target state. When the system is operating in this functional role, activity of each node 
has directive content. Directive content about a target sets off a chain of simple infer-
ences until the system arrives at directive content that it can execute (which thereby 
acts as an intention or motor program).
As described so far, no structural correspondence between cell activity and conditions 
in the environment is doing any work. The system is exploiting a collection of vehicles 
carrying correlational information, both input correlations and output correlations. 
We saw an example of the way exploitable correlational information about a distal 
output like getting sugar can depend, for its existence, on an exploitable correlation 
with a more proximal output; for example, with pressing the left-hand button. Similarly, 
SINBAD has some exploitable output correlations that depend on others. Once it 
has undergone learning, the system has a vehicle which correlates with producing 
a distal outcome, getting hot water, and that correlation proceeds via another vehicle 
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which correlates with producing a more proximal outcome, turning the left-hand tap. 
Just as input information is transformed through a series of correlational vehicles 
(e.g. in the perceptual hierarchy) output information can also depend on intermediate 
transformations. The complete computation is making use of multiple correlational 
vehicles at output as well as at input, and the way they are computed over instantiates 
an algorithm for performing task functions. That is not yet a case of structural repre-
sentation (§5.7a).
A more sophisticated model of the same type might contain structural representa-
tions. Suppose the chains of activity between cells correspond, not to co-instantiation 
of kinds, but to regularly encountered causal sequences. Suppose further, that when 
the network is used in directive mode, the steps of activity produced by the inverse 
model are acted on in sequence. T is set as a target, which in directive mode activates 
A1, then A2, and so on. Rather than connecting all of these to action simultaneously, 
the system deploys them in serial order, first doing the action driven by A2, then that 
driven by A1. (To work like this something more sophisticated than the simple bidirec-
tional associations suggested above would have to have been learnt.) Using the network 
in this way would make use of the correspondence between the temporal order of acti-
vation (in the network) and the causal sequence of events (in the world). If this temporal 
order was important to the reasoning in some way (as described in §5.6b), then it would 
be a structural representation of the causal order of events.
A notable feature of this case is that there is something like a content–attitude 
distinction: the same vehicle can be redeployed in descriptive or directive mode. 
I noted above that this feature, characteristic of beliefs and desires, is not a necessary 
feature of representational systems in general. It is interesting to see that it can never-
theless arise in a case that is simpler than the belief-desire system.
In fact, the rat navigation system too may take place cells, whose descriptive content 
we have already captured, and redeploy the same vehicles in a different role which 
gives them directive content. Consider what happens once the rat has calculated a 
shortest route and needs to set off. It should follow a path corresponding to the 
sequence it has just calculated. It does that by putting its place cell system online again, 
so that its activity reflects the rat’s current location. Now let’s make a supposition, just 
to illustrate the point. Suppose that the place cell for the next step in the shortest route 
sequence becomes active, and the difference between that activity and the currently 
active place cell is calculated. If the rat moves so as to minimize this error signal, it will 
tend to move to the next location, where the process is then repeated. When active as a 
target, the place cell has a directive (correlational) content: move to location y. When 
activated by an input signal, a signal which is changed by movement, a place cell has 
descriptive (correlational) content: I am at location x. The same cell has directive or 
descriptive content about the same location, depending on its current functional role. 
(Note that the representational relation—co-activation—has descriptive (structural 
correspondence) content throughout.)
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7.4 Comparison to Existing Accounts
In this section I compare my account with three broad approaches found in the literature: 
(i) canonical teleosemantic accounts, which like my account appeal to an asymmetry 
in the way conditions explain successful behaviour; (ii) accounts based on decoupling 
at input and output; and (iii) accounts based on the system being able to detect when a 
directive representation has been satisfied (i.e. when a goal has been reached). I also 
reply to an objection that has been made to teleosemantic approaches.
Canonical teleosemantic accounts of the descriptive–directive distinction (sometimes 
referred to as ‘direction of fit’) appeal to the existence of a producer and a consumer of a 
representation (§1.4), something that is not available in my framework. Nevertheless, 
my distinction is closely related to the canonical teleosemantic treatment. According to 
teleosemantics, a representation R has directive content C when it has the function of 
causing a consumer system to produce outcome C (Millikan 1984, ch. 6). (It follows 
that R itself has the function of producing C, by that means.) A representation R has 
descriptive content when it is produced by a producer mechanism that has the func-
tion of producing R when condition C obtains, which in turn means that C’s obtaining 
figures in an explanation of how behaviour of the consumer, prompted by R, led sys-
tematically to survival and reproduction.2
My definition takes from teleosemantics the core idea that directive contents are 
outputs which a system generates and which explain why a pattern of behaviour was 
stabilized; and that descriptive contents are other conditions whose obtaining explains 
how those outputs are produced and lead to stabilization. (Stabilization for me is not 
restricted to selection; and I add explanation of robustness.) My approach covers cases 
with multiple interacting internal components (so does not require a producer and a 
consumer). It also has a correlation or correspondence requirement at input (Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5). The obtaining of an exploitable relation (correlation or correspondence), 
in virtue of which the representations had systematic connections with external 
conditions, figures in the explanation of task functions—not just the fact that those 
conditions happened to obtain on occasions when behaviour had results that led to its 
stabilization. However, when dividing approaches to mode of representing into broad 
camps, my approach falls into the same family as canonical teleosemantics.
Marc Artiga argues that Millikan’s account of directive content entails that all 
representations have directive content, which is implausible (Artiga 2014a). (Artiga 
uses this conclusion to argue in favour of an account according to which only descrip-
tive content is attributed to simple representations: p. 552.) For there to be descriptive 
content in the first place, there has to be some range of behaviours which representa-
tion R is supposed to prompt its consumer to produce. That range may be very wide: 
O1vO2v . . . On. Nevertheless, it follows, according to Artiga, that R has the directive 
content to produce O1vO2v . . . On.
2 In Millikan’s terminology, C is a Normal condition in the most proximate Normal explanation of the 
behaviour of the consumer system prompted by R (Millikan 1984).
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This kind of disjunctive condition is unlikely to arise as a directive content in my 
framework, since correlating with O1vO2v . . . On is a poor candidate for exploitable 
correlational information or for explanation, on usual approaches to causal explanation. 
First off, highly disjunctive properties are generally poor candidates to figure in nomo-
logical generalizations, hence in exploitable correlational information. Furthermore, 
think about candidate algorithms for performing S’s input–output function. No such 
algorithm is likely to call for a stage of processing where such a nondescript fact is rep-
resented. In any event, the fact that a very general umbrella condition like O1vO2v . . . On 
obtains is unlikely to explain why a particular output F is robustly produced, nor to 
explain why it has been stabilized. My focus on how a collection of available internal 
states collectively explain task functions also means that there will generally be different 
contents for different vehicles (§6.2f), whereas Artiga’s proposed content attribution 
results in very many representations having just the same (highly disjunctive) directive 
content. So, Artiga’s objection does not apply to my account: a representation’s having 
descriptive content does not entail that it has directive content.3
A second broad family of approaches identifies the descriptive–directive difference 
with an asymmetry in the coupling or decoupling that exists between a representation, 
on the one hand, and inputs and outputs, on the other. According to this approach, 
directive contents are still outputs that the system is supposed to produce, but there has 
to be a certain amount of decoupling between the representation and behaviour for it 
to count as a representation at all. So Price (2001) says directive content only arises 
when a representation has been selected to produce a particular outcome via a range of 
different behaviours in different circumstances (Price 2001, p. 141). It acts as a goal, on 
the basis of which the system selects, from a range of possibilities, a sequence of move-
ments that is suitable for achieving that goal, performing a simple inference that also 
relies on descriptive representations about conditions in the environment. If the medi-
ating behaviours are not themselves produced by a range of different means (if they are 
not robust outcome functions of the system, in our terminology), then they cannot be 
directively represented on Price’s view. As well as lacking directive content, the motor 
programs driving these behaviours need not have descriptive content either. So, the 
important role of motor programs would be left out in the representational explanation 
of behaviour if we follow Price’s definition.
Sterelny (2003) distinguishes between two kinds of decoupling (2003, pp. 30–40). 
Representations with ‘response breadth’ are not tightly functionally coupled to specific 
types of response (like Price’s condition on having directive content). Representations 
that show ‘robust tracking’ are those which function by making use of a variety of 
cues so as to correlate with a feature of the environment. Sterelny argues that 
response breadth is a defeasible way of distinguishing descriptive from directive 
3 A similar reply is available to Millikan since directive contents derive from the ‘most proximate 
Normal explanation’ of behaviour, which will both count against disjunctive outputs figuring in the expla-
nation, and count in favour of different representations in the same range having different contents.
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representations: descriptive representations tend to be strongly decoupled from 
producing any specific type of response.
By making the converse point about directive representations, we would have an 
asymmetry in decoupling which differentiates between descriptive and directive 
representations. Kevin Zollman makes just this distinction, working within the sender–
receiver models developed by Skyrms (Zollman 2011). Zollman differs from Skyrms 
who embraces the idea that all signals have both descriptive and directive content, 
content for Skyrms just being a function of the correlational information carried 
about inputs and outputs (Skyrms 2010). Zollman (2011) argues that an asymmetry 
between the correlational information carried about inputs and that carried about 
outputs must exist if a representation is to have only one direction of fit (2011, p. 163). 
He describes a signalling game in which such asymmetries arise. Descriptive represen-
tations are more tightly tied to inputs—they carry more information about world 
states—and directive representations are more tightly tied to outputs—they carry more 
information about acts.4
My distinction tends to go along with this kind of decoupling. Where R has directive 
but not descriptive content, production of outputs figures in the explanation of task 
function performance, so R will tend to carry stronger correlational information 
about outputs and to be decoupled from any specific input. The converse applies 
to a representation that carries descriptive and not directive content. It will tend to 
be more decoupled on the output side. I noted above that it would be a mistake to make 
these causal facts the basis for the distinction. Furthermore, doing so fails to capture 
the descriptive contents that are present in the kind of case mentioned in §7.2, where a 
motor program for movement B is relied on in generating further kinds of behaviour 
which make sense in the light of the fact that B is produced (the motor program thereby 
acquiring secondary descriptive content).
My view differs more markedly from a different kind of decoupling proposal, where 
decoupling is not just a causal matter, but depends on the kind of psychological pro-
cesses that are performed on a representation. This idea stretches back to the way Lewis 
draws the distinction (Lewis 1969), and gets its intuitive support from the way hearers 
interpret and react to linguistic commands. Characteristic of a command is that the 
hearer doesn’t have to deliberate about what to do (e.g. ‘attack by sea’). The hearer can 
comply just by following the command. Assertions also have consequences for action 
(e.g. if ‘the British are coming’, there is probably something you should do about it), but 
the hearer has to deliberate about what to do in the light of that information. Huttegger 
(2007) models the distinction in this way by building the possibility of deliberation 
into his model.
4 This is not Sterelny’s distinction, since ‘robust tracking’ implies strong correlation with (distal) inputs, 
but it is compatible with Sterelny’s view if we take his ‘robust tracking’ condition to be a requirement on 
being a cognitive internal state at all, rather than a tool for distinguishing between directions of fit.
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Artiga suggests something similar when he says that decoupling is not just a causal 
matter, but that imperative representations are those that produce their behavioural 
results automatically (2014a, p. 558–9). That calls for a distinction between automatic 
and non-automatic use of a representation. The latter presumably involves deliber-
ation, but as ordinarily understood, none of our case studies involve deliberation by 
the subject. There is processing involved in generating representations and in acting 
on them, but it is hard to see how a distinction between automatic and non-automatic 
processing can be applied. So, if ‘not automatic’ means something more than just 
‘decoupled’, this is not a promising way to differentiate between descriptive and directive 
content in our cases.
A third general approach picks up on a different feature of a goal, which is that there 
is no point in pursuing it further once it has been brought about. On this view it is 
constitutive of having directive content about output C not only that the system is 
disposed to bring about C, but that it is sensitive to whether C obtains, so that 
behaviour prompted by the representation should cease once the system detects that C 
does obtain (Dickie 2015, p. 282).5 Millikan makes this a criterion, not of having 
directive content at all, but of being a pure directive rather than a pushmi-pullyu 
representation (Millikan 2004).
That is a demanding constraint if it is taken to be a condition on having directive 
content at all, since it requires the system to have separate descriptive and directive repre-
sentations about condition C, and to compare them. So, it would deny directive content 
in many of our simple cases, even when it is clear that it is the correlation with out-
puts that is explanatorily relevant, and whose coming to obtain (or not) explains the 
success or failure of behaviour. My approach is compatible with the intuition behind 
this view, however, because my distinction entails that representations which meet 
this demanding condition will have directive content. The toy model in Chapter 3 is 
an example (§3.6a and §4.1b). Where a comparator mechanism takes as input two 
vehicles and drives behaviour until they match, if the pattern of behaviour is such 
that one correlates strongly with the current state and the other with the output 
that tends to be produced, then the first will come out as descriptive and the second 
as directive (provided, as always, those correlations figure in an unmediated explan-
ation of the system’s performance of task functions). In short, there being a com-
parator mechanism is not a plausible requirement on the existence of directive 
content, but it is one way in which a system can come to have pure directives that are 
different from its pure descriptives. It is one way of making a system more sophisti-
cated. The next section looks more closely at various kinds of cognitive sophistication 
that arise in directive systems.
5 Smith (1987) is in the same spirit: it is constitutive of being a desire that p (having the directive mode 
of representing) that the state tends to endure in the face of the perception that not-p and dispose the 
subject in that state to bring it about that p (at p. 54).
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7.5 Further Sophistication
(a) More complex directive systems
When we look at human beliefs and desires we see further layers of sophistication, 
which go beyond simply having separate descriptive and directive representations. 
This section briefly mentions four kinds.
In the human belief-desire system, orthodoxy holds that the same vehicle of content can 
be entertained with different attitudes. The vehicle of a belief can be redeployed to form a 
corresponding desire, and vice versa. That is not generally true in our case studies, but we 
did see two examples where it does arise: when place cells are used to guide action; and 
when the SINBAD network is used both to represent what is the case and to direct behav-
iour. We also saw, in the case of motor programs, that the correlational information carried 
by a directive representation could be made use of by other systems for its exploitable cor-
relational information about outcomes so as to give it additional descriptive content.
The phenomenon of conditioned reinforcement is another example. In instrumental 
conditioning, obtaining a reward—that is detecting a certain kind of feedback—cements 
or promotes an internal configuration that encourages the disposition to produce the 
same kind of behaviour in same circumstances (Dretske 1988).6 A stimulus that has 
never elicited a reward can itself become a reinforcing feedback if it has been repeatedly 
paired with a primary reinforcer. For example, if a rat has repeatedly observed a light 
paired with the delivery of food, then the light becomes a secondary reinforcer. The rat 
will then learn to act in ways that cause the light to go on, even if the light is not paired 
with food during that learning phase (Colwill and Rescorla 1988). The phenomenon of 
secondary reinforcement strongly suggests that a representation that descriptively 
represents that a condition C obtains can come to be a directive representation that 
functions to make the animal bring it about that C obtains.
Dickie’s account of directive content (Dickie  2015) and Millikan’s account of 
purely directive content (Millikan 2004) rely on a directive representation producing 
behaviour until the system detects that its satisfaction condition has come to obtain. 
It is usually assumed that this is achieved because the same vehicle is used for the 
descriptive and directive representation, making them readily comparable. On my 
account, keeping track of whether you have reached your goal is not required for 
having directive content, even for having purely directive content. Keeping track of 
satisfaction is an additional level of cognitive sophistication which, where it arises, 
does produce a descriptive–directive difference in the way that is usually assumed. 
The general-purpose redeployability arguably found in the belief-desire system is a 
further level of sophistication again.
One final level of sophistication is worth mentioning. Sometimes directive repre-
sentations conflict: they concern conditions in the world that exclude one another, or 
the actions required to bring them about are different and cannot both be performed at 
6 See §4.2 and §8.2e.
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once. Many organisms have a system for sorting between their directive representations 
to prioritize which ones to act on. That is not the same thing as being able to engage in 
practical reasoning: to reason from a directive representation (bring about C) and a 
conditional belief (C is likely if B) to a new directive representation (bring about B). 
(Arguably secondary reinforcement is a simple instance of that pattern.) The ability to 
sort amongst and prioritize goals is a further characteristic feature of the human belief-
desire system. Although not constitutive of a representation’s having directive content, 
its operation is a set of functional roles that is likely to imply that the vehicles so 
deployed have directive content. A characteristic way of doing that is for desires to 
have different strengths.7 Relative strength can vary over time, for example through the 
vehicles being more or less active.8 The choice of action then depends both on the relative 
strength of the agent’s desire for q and the agent’s assessment of how likely it is that they 
can bring about q.
Taking stock, there are at least four levels of sophistication involving directive 
representations. (There are doubtless others too.) First, there is having separate repre-
sentations with purely descriptive and purely directive content, something not found 
in the simplest pushmi-pullyu systems. Secondly, there is the ability to keep track of 
when a directive representation has been satisfied, hence to compare descriptive and 
directive representations concerning the same worldly condition. Thirdly, there is the 
ability to redeploy the vehicle of a descriptive representation in a mode that gives it 
directive content concerning the same condition, and the converse. Fourthly, there is 
the ability to calculate over directive representations in order to prioritize which ones 
to carry out. I have argued that none of levels two, three, or four are needed in order to 
have representations at level one, pure directives and pure descriptives.
(b) Another mode of representing
Propositional attitudes admit of other modes of representing in addition to the 
descriptive and the directive, for example supposing. Something like supposing may 
be at work in one of our cases. When the rat navigation system is run offline to calcu-
late the shortest route, place cell activation does not correlate with or represent where 
the animal is at that moment. Instead, activation represents somewhere it might be. 
Co-activation still represents the spatial relations between places, so when one place 
cell causes the activation of another offline, that represents that one location is near 
another, or that being at one location the animal could move directly to the other. So, 
the relation between vehicles is still a descriptive representation of spatial structure. 
The system is using that representation to do a kind of conditional reasoning: if you 
were at x, then you could get to y, and then to z, and so on.
7 An agent engaged in planning or means-end reasoning has to have some motivating state, some directive 
representation. If it has two or more, and they call for control of the same effectors, then there must be facts 
about how likely each is to bring about its outcome in the presence of the others. That is their relative strength.
8 We saw something similar with descriptive representations where the level of activation represented 
the probability that a particular world state obtains (§4.8).
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Activation of an individual place cell in this process has neither descriptive nor 
directive content. One possible explanation for that is that it has unsaturated content, 
as we have seen (§6.3). Here I want to look at a second possible explanation, namely 
that it has content in a different mode of representing, a kind of suppositional or hypo-
thetical content. Activation of a place cell offline concerns the same condition C as 
when it is activated online with descriptive content (Chapter 5) or directive content 
(§7.4 above), but it has a different overall content. It says something like suppose you 
were at x. That causes another place cell to fire, by virtue of the connection between 
vehicles. Instantiation of the co-activation relation represents, under the UE structural 
correspondence, that location y is near to location x. And the second place cell is also 
saying something hypothetical: y would be nearby. That is the conclusion of a little 
chain of reasoning: from suppose you were at x, and y is near x, to y would be nearby.
Now I have offered two possible explanations for why the activity of an individual 
place cell offline does not have a correctness condition: because it is unsaturated (§6.3) 
or because it has suppositional content (here). Which should we prefer?9 It seems to me 
to count slightly against the unsaturated view that online place cell activity has a satur-
ated content (you are at x). The suppositional view says that, when the vehicle is reused 
offline, the same saturated condition is in play, albeit in a different mode of representing 
(suppose you were at x). The unsaturated view calls for a switch from saturated content 
online to unsaturated content offline. On the other hand, the unsaturated proposal 
seems like a simpler account of the offline reasoning, since it just runs off straightforward 
descriptive representations like location x is near location y. I don’t propose to resolve 
the issue. Either way, offline place cell activation introduces kind of sophistication 
which might, at first pass, be thought to be the preserve of propositional attitudes.
I won’t speculate here on whether the suppositional content I have just described 
corresponds to the mode of representing of any propositional attitude state (e.g. suppos-
ing), or whether it can be captured properly by any linguistic term. I will rest with noting 
the interesting functional role of the representations involved in this offline reasoning.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter draws the descriptive–directive distinction in a non-theory-neutral way: 
it shows how a distinction along these lines arises straightforwardly within the varitel 
framework. The account retains the virtues of the standard teleosemantic treatment of 
mode of representing, while being preferable to other existing theories, and also claim-
ing some advantages of its own. Neither decoupling, nor the ability to keep track of 
goal satisfaction, are constitutive of having directive content. However, my account 
does imply that, where they exist, these features will give rise to a descriptive–directive 
difference as expected. The account can readily be applied to the case studies based on 
9 At the cost of some complexity, it is even possible to combine the views, so that an unsaturated 
constituent is used suppositionally, rather as we might say ‘consider Nisha for a moment’.
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UE information (Chapter 4) and UE structural correspondence (Chapter 5), with plaus-
ible consequences. There are several other kinds of sophistication which, while going 
along with a descriptive–directive difference, are not fundamental to it. Interestingly, the 
rat navigation case gives us a possible subpersonal example of a mode of representing that 
goes beyond the descriptive or the directive. Something like supposing may be involved 
when place cell activity is used offline in calculating shortest routes. In short, the varitel 
framework supports a useful way of understanding the descriptive–directive 
distinction.

8.1 Introduction 197
8.2 How Content Explains 198
(a) Explanatory traction in varitel semantics 198
(b) Non-semantic causal description? 200
(c) Doing without talk of representation 204
(d) Other views about the explanatory  
purchase of content 205
8.3 Causal Efficacy of Semantic Properties 208
8.4 Why Require Exploitable Relations? 209
8.5 Ambit of Varitel Semantics 210
(a) Representation only if content is explanatory? 210
(b) Are any cases excluded? 213
8.6 Development and Content 216
8.7 Miscellaneous Qualifications 218
8.8 How to Find Out What Is Represented 221
8.9 Differences at the Personal Level 222
8.1 Introduction
This chapter offers some theoretical reflections on the accounts of content presented 
in previous chapters. First, in this section I briefly reiterate some of the distinctive 
features of my view.
One unusual feature of the book is that it devotes so much space to a series of 
detailed case studies. The aim of that was to understand how representation is used 
right across the cognitive sciences. Where it leads is pluralism. With two exploitable 
relations and a variety of task functions, my ‘theory’ of content is in fact a collection of 
different theories. Pluralism has been suggested before, but not until now worked up 
into a collection of detailed, mutually compatible accounts. My approach is unusual in 
focusing exclusively on subpersonal cases, and in the extent to which I’m interested in 
neural representation. Renouncing representation consumers is a new way to develop 
teleosemantics. We can get the benefits of representationalism—the explanatory 
benefits that flow from having vehicles of content—without consumers, and also 
without collapsing into an instrumentalist or ascriptionist view.
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Being careful about the value of RTM led to the view that content arises from 
convergence between task functions, internal processes and exploitable relations: it 
arises when internal processing over vehicles standing in exploitable relations to the 
environment implements an algorithm for performing the organism’s task functions. 
The idea of vehicles being processed in virtue of non-semantic properties in ways that 
respect their contents is of course not new; nor is the idea of exploitable relations 
(Godfrey-Smith 2006). However, the way varitel semantics puts these ideas together as 
the basis for content determination is distinctive. The focus on explaining the explana-
tory purchase of representational content is also a new emphasis, leading to an original 
proposal about why the world affords us the representational scheme of explanation—
because of there being a natural cluster in which stabilizing processes go together with 
robust outcomes and internal mechanisms for producing them.
Section 8.2 returns to the question of content’s explanatory purchase and shows that 
the accounts in Chapters 3–7 do deliver on the promissory note in Chapters 1 and 2. 
The varitel accounts allow us to see how the practice of representational explanation 
works and why content has an explanatory role to play. Section 8.3 looks at the causal 
efficacy of semantic properties, on the varitel view. Section 8.4 asks whether exploitable 
relations are doing any substantive work in the accounts, or whether they are dispens-
able in favour of an output-only approach to content. Section 8.5 asks how far varitel 
semantics extends, whether it applies to cases where content is un-explanatory, and 
whether it applies too widely. Section 8.6 remarks on the tight connection that exists 
between content determination and the circumstances in which a representational 
capacity develops, suggesting that this fits well with other issues in the literature. 
Section 8.7 goes through a list of clarifications and qualifications that couldn’t easily 
be dealt with earlier. Section 8.8 draws out some epistemological consequences from 
our (metaphysical) accounts of content determination. Finally, section 8.9 suggests 
some ways that differences at the personal level may turn out to be relevant to content 
determination there.
8.2 How Content Explains
(a) Explanatory traction in varitel semantics
The varitel framework was motivated by the desideratum that we should be able to 
explain how content-based explanation works. The answer sketched in Chapter  2 
started with the idea that contents have real vehicles because content explanation is 
partly concerned with explaining how a system manages to generate appropriate 
behaviour. Contents are externalist because the patterns of behaviour to be explained 
are world-involving: achieving distal effects in the world by reacting to distal objects 
and properties. The extrinsic properties that are relevant to explaining how the organ-
ism does that are exploitable relations that vehicles of content stand in to features of 
its environment. These externalist properties are suited to explaining how internal 
how content explains 199
processing implements an algorithm for carrying out an organism’s distal functions. 
That was all effectively a promissory note: if I can devise a theory of content that fits 
within the framework, then that should allow us to see how representational contents 
are suited to explaining behaviour.
Now that I have pinned my colours to the mast and set out a series of accounts of 
content, the time has come to assess whether the accounts deliver. Do they allow us to 
see how contents explain behaviour? In particular, do they throw light on the charac-
teristic explanatory grammar of representational explanation (§2.2): that correct 
representation explains successful behaviour, and misrepresentation failure?
That explanatory grammar arises naturally from my accounts of content. Take the 
analogue magnitude system as an example (§4.6a). Consider a primate trained to 
choose between two sets of objects, being rewarded for selecting the more numerous 
collection. The training has used and tuned the animal’s analogue magnitude subsys-
tem, giving the animal a disposition to pick the thing in the world corresponding to 
whichever analogue magnitude register in its parietal cortex is more active. The train-
ing also gives rise to a standard of success and failure for the animal’s actions in these 
contexts. When presented with two buckets containing collections of objects, picking 
the more numerous collection is a successful behaviour. Behaving in this way is a task 
function of the organism.
This task function not only constitutes a standard for success and failure of behaviour. 
It also specifies a mapping from distal situations (e.g. objects in buckets) to distal 
outcomes (e.g. picking up the fuller bucket), a mapping mediated by the animal. The 
monkey in its environment is disposed to instantiate this input–output mapping (at 
least approximately). There may be more than one algorithm that would generate 
this input–output performance, but there is a fact of the matter about which algo-
rithm is at work inside the monkey. The algorithm is specified in world-involving 
terms: individuate the objects in one bucket, add up the total number of objects on 
that side, compare the total number of objects on each side, choose the collection 
with the largest number of objects. Internal processes inside the monkey are specified 
in intrinsic terms: patterns of neural firing here cause patterns of neural firing there 
cause . . . cause bodily movements. What makes it the case that this internal process 
implements an algorithm for performing the task is the correlational information 
carried by each component. Each component correlates with a distal fact called for 
by the algorithm (e.g. the number of objects on one side). Furthermore, the way 
internal processes operate over these vehicles implements the transitions called for 
by the algorithm. Thus, having content constituted by the convergence between 
exploitable relations and task functions, in the ways set out in previous chapters, 
both implies that there is a  difference between successful and unsuccessful behav-
iour, and also makes for contents suited to explaining how an organism responds to 
distal facts in its environment so as to produce the distal outcomes which count as 
successes. Correlatively, misrepresentation by an internal component will explain 
unsuccessful behaviour.
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I argued in Chapter 3 that this whole explanatory practice gets traction because of a 
deep fact about the world we live in. Things produced by natural selection tend to be 
disposed to produce outcomes robustly, because when an outcome is the target of 
selection, evolution can find ways for it to be achieved more robustly. Evolution’s greatest 
robustness trick is the organism itself: a complex system that differentiates itself from 
its environment and continually maintains itself in a state that is out of equilibrium 
with the environment. Organisms produce the conditions needed for their own 
persistence, including by modifying their dispositions to achieve that end through 
learning. Furthermore, learning itself is a stabilizing process by which an individual 
can come to produce outcomes more robustly. So it is no accident that the biological 
realm is full of goal-directedness in the Aristotelian sense: robustly produced out-
comes that have been stabilized by natural selection, learning, or contributing to the 
persistence of an organism.
One very common way—although by no means the only way—that organisms 
produce outcomes robustly is by having an internal mechanism that keeps track of 
aspects of the environment and thus implements an algorithm for performing the 
input–output mapping that has been the target of stabilization. That is, they do it by 
using representations. Nature has given us a widely implemented cluster: stabiliza-
tion and robustness achieved by internal workings bearing exploitable relations. 
Representational explanations take advantage of the generalizations and inductions 
afforded by this natural cluster. Artefacts that humans have designed, like control 
mechanisms and computers, also often fall into the cluster, and for the same reasons. 
Tying representation to this cluster, rather than something more liberal, is the source 
of its inductive power: UE information and UE structural correspondence get 
explanatory purchase from the fact that their instantiation goes along with a cluster of 
other properties.
(b) Non-semantic causal description?
In addition, varitel semantics allows us to answer a familiar challenge to the status 
of representational explanation (§2.3). Isn’t there an entirely non-semantic causal 
description of how any organism or system will react to inputs, undergo internal 
changes, and produce outputs? Realists about representational vehicles are committed 
to there being a non-semantic (vehicle-based) causal description at the same level as 
the semantic description.1 If we can give a non-semantic causal description of the 
internal operation and outputs of a system moment-by-moment, what does represen-
tational content add?2
1 I.e. at the same level of aggregation: semantic properties are properties of the very same objects 
(i.e. vehicles) as are found in a vehicle-based causal description of a system’s operation.
2 The non-semantic, vehicle-based description says how inputs to the system effect changes to internal 
vehicles, how those in turn influence further vehicles, and how that internal process eventuates in bodily 
movements. It is simplest to think of this as a complete causal description, saying how the system would 
react to any kind of influence on it. However, the syntactic description is itself a set of special science 
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Advocates of the explanatory force of representational explanation can point to all 
the successes of representation-based psychology—a huge body of work containing 
rich generalizations about representations in general, and especially about specific 
kinds of representation (motor programs, reward prediction errors, analogue magnitude 
representations, etc., etc.). But the vehicle-based challenge threatens to undermine the 
seemingly obvious explanatory traction of psychology by showing that it has no auton-
omy from a non-semantic element in its foundations. The aim of this subsection is not 
to catalogue the rich generalizations that give representational explanation its explana-
tory potency—we can turn to any psychology textbook for that. It is to show how 
varitel semantics answers the challenge. Varitel semantics has a feature which allows 
representationalism’s commitment to non-semantic vehicles to be compatible with 
content having distinctive explanatory purchase.
To return to Ramsey’s example (§2.2), consider the firing mechanism of a rifle 
(see Figure 2.2). Some theories of content imply that the displacement of the firing 
pin represents that the user’s finger has been pulled back and instructs the cartridge 
to fire a bullet. If semantic contents were like that, then representational explanation 
would march exactly in step with a ‘factorized’ causal chain:
(i) The user’s finger moves backwards.
(ii) The trigger moves backwards.
(iii) The firing pin shoots forwards.
(iv) The charge in the cartridge ignites.
(v) The bullet flies off at speed.
Steps (ii)–(iv) form a causal chain given in terms of intrinsic properties of the rifle. Step (i) 
is external to the rifle and causes (ii), which is a process intrinsic to the rifle. Step (iv) is 
also intrinsic to the rifle and causes step (v), which is an outcome external to the rifle. 
The causal chain is factorized into events in the external environment, on the one hand, 
and events intrinsic to the rifle, on the other. If movement of the firing pin were to carry 
semantic content, then there would be another explanation of the rifle’s behaviour: 
movement of the user’s finger leads to a representation being tokened with the content 
the user’s finger has been pulled back, fire a bullet, which leads to a bullet being fired. 
That explanation marches exactly in step with the non-semantic explanation above. 
It is just a semantic relabelling of the process (i) → (iii) → (v).
Varitel accounts of content imply that semantic explanations of behaviour do 
not march exactly in step with a factorized causal explanation of how an organism 
generalizations, and as such there will usually be things that can happen to the system that it overlooks, 
that appear as exceptions to its generalizations. For example, a stronger gravitational field might modulate 
the way a system performs actions, without that change being mediated by any differences in the vehicles 
involved in internal processing. A different kind of example is where an unusual influence on internal 
vehicles—e.g. through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)—makes changes to an intermediate step 
of internal processing in a way that bypasses changes to upstream vehicles and so shows up as an exception 
to the causal transitions described by the algorithm.
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responds to proximal inputs with bodily movements. Task functions are robust outcomes, 
so the same outcome is produced in response to a range of different proximal inputs. 
That means that vehicles of content will enter into generalizations that ‘bridge’ across 
multiple proximal conditions and involve distal states of affairs (see Figure  8.1).3 
Connections like the one between steps (i) and (iii) above, rather than being mediated 
by a single proximal input (ii), will be mediated by a range of different proximal inputs 
(ii*), (ii**), etc. There is a distal exploitable relation without a matching proximal 
exploitable relation. The representational explanation does not then simply march 
in step with the factorized explanation. Causal steps which show up as different in 
the factorized explanation are unified in the representational explanation. The repre-
sentational explanation is picking up on patterns in vehicle–world relations that the 
factorized explanation would miss. The same is often true at output since outcomes 
that count as task functions tend to be produced by the organism in a variety of different 
ways in different circumstances; that is, via a variety of different bodily movements 
(§3.3 and §3.6). Those are further patterns, captured by the representational explan-
ation, that a factorized explanation would miss.
This bridging means that there are real patterns in organism–world relations—in 
relations of internal states to distal causes and outcomes—that are treated disjunctively 
in the factorized explanation. The effect of past processes of stabilization has been to 
key the organism into the world so that generalizations do not just concern how 
proximal causes affect the organism and how the organism affects its immediate prox-
imal environment. A purely factorized explanation would miss the distal patterns. 
Dennett argued that belief-desire explanation picks up on real patterns in the way 
3 This is not a novel feature of varitel semantics; e.g. a requirement for robust tracking (Sterelny 1995) 
or constancy mechanisms (Burge 2010) has the same effect.
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Figure 8.1 A schematic depiction of bridging at input and output.
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agents interact with the world (Dennett  1991). Not only would prediction of agents’ 
behaviour be impossible in practice if we treated them as collections of molecules 
interacting with other molecules in the environment, but also such a low-level physical 
description would fail to capture real patterns that exist—that are an interpreter-
independent feature of a world full of agents.4 My approach to content similarly shows 
how content-based explanation takes advantage of real patterns in the world, patterns that 
exist because of regularities in biological and physical processes, and which exist 
irrespective of the existence of observers to notice them.5
In the absence of a robust outcome function this argument does not get off the 
ground. Then a factorized explanation may march exactly in step with the putative 
representational explanation. We saw that in the case of the rifle. That is not a case 
where representational content would give any additional explanatory purchase, and 
indeed varitel semantics does not imply that movement of the rifle firing pin would 
carry representational content. The same point applies to the magnetotactic bacteria. 
As the case is standardly described (Dretske 1986, Millikan 1989, Cummins et al. 2006), 
moving in the direction of oxygen-free water is a stabilized function of the bacterium’s 
behaviour, but not a robust outcome function.6 Our accounts do not imply that the 
bacterium or its magnetosome carries representational content. Nor is it a case where 
content would afford a better explanation than a non-semantic causal description 
(one involving functions but not representational contents).
We can see bridging at work in our case studies. Consider again a monkey that 
deploys its analogue magnitude system to choose the more numerous set of objects 
in a range of different circumstances. At input, analogue magnitude registers in the 
parietal lobe correlate with the numerosity of distal collections of objects, a correl-
ation that is mediated by a variety of proximal inputs: many different kinds of visual 
patterns, auditory patterns, etc. At output, the action of reaching out to touch or grab 
the more numerous collection is mediated by a variety of different motor outputs in 
different circumstances. So, there is bridging at input and at output. The rat’s system 
for spatial navigation, using the hippocampus and other areas, also shows bridging. 
The input sensitivity of place cells bridges across multiple patterns of sensory input 
(e.g. visual input from different orientations). Behavioural output also exemplifies 
4 The question of the observer-dependence or observer-independence of these patterns is orthogonal to 
another feature of Dennett’s view, the fact that it does not commit to there being vehicles of content 
(‘ascriptionism’, §1.3). RTM’s commitment to vehicles could be combined with the view that the contents 
represented by those vehicles are observer-dependent.
5 To be part of a real pattern, a content property underpinned by the bridged relation needs to show up 
in generalizations connecting it to others (e.g. in psychological theories). I am not committed to Dennett’s 
particular way of theorizing real patterns in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. I am just relying on the idea 
that the generalizations are based on the underlying system mostly being organized in a particular way, and 
on that being a non-observer-dependent feature of the world (contra for example perspectivalism; 
Craver 2013). Many real patterns do compress information in the sense that they only allow a ‘probabilistic 
recovery of the underlying system’ (Ladyman 2017, p. 153).
6 It also probably lacks sufficient internal structure to count as implementing an algorithm by which 
it achieves its functions. Indeed, dead bacteria continue to rotate into alignment with a magnetic field 
(Cummins et al. 2006, Schulte 2015).
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bridging. The rat can reach a baited or rewarded location from a range of different 
starting positions by a range of different routes, relying on structural correspondence 
in the way described in §5.3.
If we were just to look at the rat’s limb movements taken in isolation, without 
considering how those bodily movements produced locomotion or where the animal 
was in space, we would see a variety of nearly uninterpretable movements of different 
limbs with different speeds and in different directions at different times. It would 
be  like watching the bodily movements of a teenager playing a video game on a 
smartphone, but without being able to see the screen. The two thumbs move rapidly in 
seemingly arbitrary ways, with no apparent pattern. Only once the relation of those 
movements to what is happening on the screen comes into view do they become inter-
pretable. The real patterns are not found in when the thumb moves, but in what 
happens to the character on the screen, and how that relates to movements made by the 
game-player, and to her intentions. There are real patterns in what is happening in 
the player’s environment. The thumb movements act as ‘bridging’ causal intermediates. 
Similarly, there are very clear patterns in the rat’s behaviour if we consider it in relation 
to its environment. Those patterns are mediated by and generalize—bridge—across a 
diversity of bodily movements output by the rat.
The content-based generalizations in psychological theories link representation 
with representation, often of specific types, representation with neural substrate, and 
representation with world. These are by no means all cases of bridging. What bridging 
does is to show how content-based explanation can break free from non-semantic 
vehicle-based explanation, allowing the rich and detailed theories of psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience to have their own explanatory purchase.
Bridging exemplifies one explanatory virtue, generality. It groups together things 
that would otherwise be classified as different. But the previous subsection (§8.2a) 
argued for a seemingly contradictory virtue, specificity. An account that made content 
very liberal would be problematic and an advantage of varitel semantics was that its 
contents only arise when a special cluster of properties occurs (which it often does, for 
natural reasons). There is in fact no contradiction because the advantage claimed for 
the cluster is its inductive potential. Finding UE information or UE structural corres-
pondence implies many other things about the system in question. In fact, bridging relies 
on inductive power as well. Content is based on a bridged relation but shows up in gener-
alizations with other properties. With explanation, there is always a balance between 
properties that apply widely enough to support good generalizations and properties that 
are specific enough that they support rich inductions. Our accounts show how content 
properties strike a balance that gives them genuine explanatory traction.
(c) Doing without talk of representation
Another kind of challenge is faced by any theory of content which offers non-semantic, 
non-mental, non-normative conditions under which representational content arises. 
Suppose it is granted that correlation, correspondence, and function come together in 
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the special way I have claimed, so that their convergence affords generalizations and 
inductions. However, the objection runs, we can recognize all that without ever men-
tioning representation or content.7 Why can’t we do all the explanatory work directly 
in terms of correlation, correspondence, and function? Indeed, the accounts of content 
set out above give us precisely the tools we need in order to do just that.
There are two versions of this challenge, which should be answered in different 
ways. The first rival to content-based explanation only helps itself to the resources that 
appear in my definitions—correlation, correspondence, robustness, stabilization, 
etc.—and does not advert to the fact that these properties tend to come together in the 
packages I have pointed to. Instead of contents, they offer explanations directly in 
terms of the properties in the explanatory base. They replace content-based general-
ization with much more fine-grained explanations. The trouble with these views is 
their complexity. More complex properties are generally less good candidates for 
explanation. Furthermore, it is not clear why relational properties like correlating or 
producing outcomes robustly get any explanatory purchase, if the motivation I have 
offered in terms of a natural clustering of properties is absent. Such a rival would also 
miss the inductive potential that exists—the fact that robustness and stabilization do 
tend to converge (so as to constitute task functions) and the fact that internal workings, 
correlation, correspondence, and task function do tend to converge in regular ways 
(which is what I say constitutes content).
The second version of the challenge recognizes the clusters set out in our accounts of 
content, but objects to these being identified as representations. We can do all the same 
explanatory work by recognizing that there are these real clusters and making general-
izations and performing inductions over instances of them. This supposed challenge is 
not really a challenge at all, because it concedes everything we need, leaving only a 
dispute about the appropriateness of the label ‘representation’. A distinctive style of 
representation-based explanation that our theories of content need to explain is that 
correct representation explains successful behaviour and misrepresentation explains 
failure; that is a form of explanation where the obtaining or otherwise of facts that are 
distal to the organism or system make a difference to explaining its behaviour. 
Explanations like that are part of what made representational content puzzling, even 
mysterious. Recognizing that the clusters I point to are real and important features of 
the natural world, and accepting that they underpin world-involving explanations of 
this kind, just is to accept that properties of the kind I have characterized do exist, and 
do explain behaviour in the way I have claimed.
(d) Other views about the explanatory purchase of content
Now that I have laid out my view about the explanatory purchase of representational 
content, I will compare it briefly to some other views in the literature. William Ramsey 
7 E.g. Hutto and Satne (2015) with respect to some forms of intentionality; Egan (2014) with respect to 
cognitive content.
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identifies two broad ways in which representational properties have been argued to 
earn their explanatory keep (Ramsey 1997, p. 37). First, they may have heuristic value 
in allowing us to think about a system in a useful way. They can play that role despite 
having no causal relevance to how the system operates.8 Some adopt this view about 
the computational theory of mind: syntax does all the causal work, but semantics 
allows us to see why a system’s syntactic processes are suitable for performing certain 
computations. The second option is that contents are causally explanatory of behav-
iour; for example, because they are a structuring cause of dispositions to behaviour, as 
argued by Dretske (1988). (A further view is that representational content does not 
earn its explanatory keep at all, and so should be abandoned, e.g. Stich 1983.)
Frances Egan is in the first camp (Egan 2014). Content for Egan (her ‘cognitive 
content’) is useful because it allows the theorist to understand how a computational 
system can perform a cognitive task; for example, the task of seeing what is in the 
nearby environment. Different contents will be useful for explaining how the same 
computational system performs different cognitive tasks. In each case, content is just 
a gloss, useful to the theorist. Oron Shagrir falls in the same camp, but with a more 
realist take on content (Shagrir 2006). For him too, theorists adopt the representa-
tional approach in order to explain semantic tasks performed by a system. These 
views are similar in one way to Tyler Burge’s theory, since Burge takes the target of 
representational explanation to be the capacity for perception and the computations 
and transformations involved in perception (Burge 2010). In all these cases the task 
that calls for explanation is already stated in semantic terms. Contentful states enable 
us to understand how an organism can perform a cognitive, semantic task.
Dretske (1988) exemplifies the second camp, since he argues that contents are 
causally explanatory. Content arises when an internal state R has been recruited as a 
cause of behavioural output M in virtue of the fact that R carries information about9 
condition C. The fact that information has converged with learning in the past—the 
fact encapsulated by the existence of content—causally explains why the organism is 
configured as it is today, and hence forms part of an explanation of why it produces 
behaviour M on a particular occasion.10
Another way that contents can have causal relevance arises specifically for conceptual 
contents. Possessing concepts can explain why certain capacities of an organism are 
systematically related. The compositionality of concepts is then the source of a special 
8 That is not of course to deny that non-semantic properties of vehicles of content can be causally relevant. 
Causal relevance: an apple on the greengrocer’s scales causes the spring to extend. Here the apple’s mass 
is causally relevant and its colour is not.
9 Dretske says ‘indicate’, which is a more restrictive species of correlational information. Godfrey-
Smith (1992) objects that natural selection does not require indication but often makes use of weaker kinds 
of correlational information about adaptively relevant facts.
10 Those who point to the relevance of externalist properties to explaining the behaviour of an organism 
in its environment—e.g. to sorting behaviour (Davies 1991) or action guidance (Peacocke 1993)—are also 
arguably in the causal relevance camp, although theorists who object to a causal role for externalist 
properties will see these as being cases where content has merely heuristic value.
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explanatory value of representational locutions, because it allows us to explain the 
systematicity of cognitive capacities, although here too non-semantic vehicle proper-
ties are rivals for causal relevance (Camp 2009, Fodor 1987b).
Varitel semantics partakes of elements of both camps. Within the second camp, like 
Dretske I rely on considerations about why the system has been configured the way it is 
and behaves the way it does.11 In varitel semantics content arises when an organism has 
a disposition to produce certain outcomes because exploitable relations converge with 
stabilizing processes that have operated on those outcomes in the past. Ramsey (2007, 
pp. 132–40) objects to Dretske’s theory on the basis that it over-generates: not all cases 
where indicator properties are a structuring cause of behavioural outputs should count 
as representational. My accounts have stronger requirements than Dretske’s and so 
avoid this liberality objection. Nevertheless, part of the explanatory power of content, 
on my view, traces to the kind of causal process identified by Dretske.
My accounts share with the first camp the view that contents are useful because they 
allow us to see why an organism’s internal workings are suited to performing certain 
tasks. Unlike Egan and Shagrir, I characterize those tasks in non-semantic terms in the 
first instance. Mine are not cognitive tasks but mappings from worldly conditions to 
distal outputs (outputs which qualify as task functions). But like Shagrir, contents for 
me are partly a matter of how an organism can perform the computations needed to 
produce appropriate outputs in appropriate circumstances. I reject Egan’s contention 
that contents are merely a theorist’s gloss, with a different gloss being appropriate when 
a system is located in different contexts. The context in which a system is operating is a 
property of the system, just as much as its intrinsic properties are, and I take that con-
text to have a content-determining rather than merely a pragmatic role.
Since concepts have not been part of our investigation, I have said little about the 
role of representations in explaining systematicity. Nevertheless, we saw in §6.3 that 
the representations in some of our case studies do have semantically significant 
constituent structure. Even without semantically significant structure at the level of 
representational vehicles, the division of an organism’s internal workings into a series 
of algorithmic steps has some of the flavour of systematicity (§5.7a, §6.3).12 In both 
cases, facts about vehicles and how they interact explain certain systematic patterns in 
the organism’s behaviour. The point I have laboured about vehicle realism and internal 
workings (§1.3, §2.5, §3.2, §8.2a) is in fact a generalization of others’ observations 
about systematicity of structured representations and the explanatory purchase of 
content (Fodor 1975, 1987b; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Camp 2009).
In short, varitel semantics can adopt sound arguments about explanatory purchase 
drawn from both of the broad camps identified by Ramsey (1997, p. 37).
11 Dretske argues that this form of explanation of behaviour is unavailable when it is natural selection 
in  ancestors, rather than learning, which explains why the organism acts on R to produce M as output 
(Dretske 1988, p. 94; 1991, pp. 206–7). My framework covers both cases. Godfrey-Smith (1992, pp. 294–6) 
argues that natural selection should be assimilated to Dretske’s scheme of explanation.
12 But recall that ‘computational structure’ is not a case of structural representation: §5.7a.
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8.3 Causal Efficacy of Semantic Properties
The previous section showed why representational explanations are partly autonomous 
from purely vehicle-based explanations, and hence why semantic properties can afford 
us some additional purchase in explaining behaviour. But are content properties 
causally efficacious, or simply explanatorily relevant? Jackson and Pettit distinguish 
between process explanation and program explanation (Jackson and Pettit 1988, 1990). 
They argue that the properties cited in a program explanation can be explanatorily 
relevant without being causally efficacious—when it is the properties cited in the 
process explanation that do the real causing. For example, the squareness of a wooden 
peg explains why it won’t fit into a round hole of the same surface area. However, the 
causally efficacious properties, it is argued, do not involve squareness or roundness, 
but other physical properties of the material of the peg and hole.
Jackson and Pettit introduce their distinction in order to save the explanatory 
relevance of broad contents, and it is equally applicable to our case. The vehicle-based 
explanation of behaviour may be telling us where the real causal work is going on, but 
nevertheless content properties can be explanatory. This casts varitel accounts of content 
as picking up on opportunities for program explanation. When the explanandum 
occurs in a range of cases, and so is more general than any specific causal process, a pro-
gram explanation tells us that what matters for achieving a result is that some relational 
state of affairs obtains, irrespective of which particular state of affairs causes it to obtain. 
Program explanations ‘tell us about the range of states that do or would produce the 
result without telling us which state in fact did the job’ (Jackson and Pettit 1988, p. 396).
If contents are fixed in the way I have claimed, then the argument in the previous 
section shows why semantic properties figure in program explanations, hence are 
explanatory of behaviour. That they are not causally efficacious is a further claim. 
One challenge is faced by all special science properties, the challenge that the ‘real’ 
causal work is being done at some more fundamental level. But if we thought that 
the real causal work was captured by the factorized, vehicle-involving explanations 
mentioned above, then we would face a further challenge: vehicles are realized by physical 
properties (e.g. neural firings). Surely the vehicle-based description is only a program 
explanation, with the causal work really going on at a more fundamental neurophysio-
logical level? But, of course, the same move arises there, with a molecular, chemical, and 
electrical explanation threatening to displace the causal efficacy of neural depolarizations. 
The descent continues, until we reach the level, if there is one, of the most fundamental 
physics (where, incidentally, it is arguable that causation does not figure at all).
An alternative is that causation—‘real’ causal efficacy—is found at more than one 
level in this hierarchy. There may be no good reason to think that causal processes that 
are connected by relations of constitution should exclude each other (Bennett 2003). 
Thus, even if it is granted that some patterns of explanation deal in explanatory rele-
vance rather than causal efficacy, it would be hasty to conclude that content-based 
explanations are not a locus of causal efficacy.
how content explains 209
If causal efficacy is a tenable position for some special science properties, there are 
further obstacles to making that case for content properties. Contents are partly his-
torically based, and are partly tied to the kinds of effects they are called on to explain 
(Shea 2007b). I have argued that these are not obstacles to explanatory purchase, but it 
is a further step to show that these features are compatible with the causal efficacy of 
content. We would have to see that the world-involving generalizations that contents 
are involved in support counterfactuals and interventions in the right way, and pos-
sibly that they count as figuring in a causal process (on process-involving views of 
causation). We would also need to establish that the relation between content properties 
and the vehicle-based story does not generate causal exclusion, especially in the light 
of the fact that some of the representation-to-representation transitions (or inferences) 
featuring in the semantic-level explanation have an exact parallel in the syntactic 
explanation. Nevertheless, it could be that the forms of generalization, counterfactual-
dependence, and underlying process that embed these transitions in world-involving 
patterns amount to set of genuinely causal relations.
These are large issues, well beyond the scope of this book. For now I want to remain 
neutral about whether contents are causally efficacious. Varitel semantics allows us to 
see why semantic properties figure in program explanations, so I rest with the positive 
claim that content properties are at least explanatorily relevant.
8.4 Why Require Exploitable Relations?
My accounts require that representations bear exploitable relations to the things they 
represent. More carefully, exploitable relations have to be in place when behaviour is 
stabilized (when the stabilizing process, which makes it the case that the system has a 
function that is partly constitutive of content, is operative). The leading teleosemantic 
theories of Millikan and Papineau eschew any requirement of this kind. Contents are 
an output-only matter, determined by the functions of behaviour prompted by a repre-
sentation, and by evolutionarily normal conditions for performing those functions. 
Are exploitable relations dispensable? It is not in dispute that exploitable relations will 
normally be in place during stabilization. For example, dances of incoming honeybees 
would have correlated with nectar location at the time of selection. But do correlations 
need to figure in the content-constituting story?
My account agrees with teleosemantics that functions are an essential part of the 
story. They furnish an explanandum to which representational explanation is directed, 
namely successfully producing distal effects in the environment, or failing to do so. 
Teleosemantics says that contents are a matter of functions and conditions under 
which functions will be successfully performed. Varitel semantics goes further. It says 
that content is partly a matter of explaining how a system achieves its functions—of 
how its internal workings implement an algorithm for performing its functions. That 
is why exploitable relations get into the picture.
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Without exploitable relations, representational contents are effectively a way of 
typing internal states by patterns in the outputs they (historically) produce. Adding 
exploitable relations on the input side furnishes a reason why, when the representation 
is tokened, it is likely that its correctness condition obtains.13 That will be true at the 
time of stabilization and, to the extent that things haven’t changed, will also be true of 
current behaviour. That is, our accounts do not just produce correctness conditions 
that are a typing of behaviour. They give us a reason to think that those correctness 
conditions obtain—a stronger reason than teleosemantics is committed to.
That difference gives varitel accounts more predictive power: we can use content 
to predict what the system will do because, if the environment is stable in relevant 
respects, representations will continue to correlate or structurally correspond with the 
world, giving us stronger predictions about the distal results that are likely to flow from 
outputs produced by the system. That difference is not profound, however, because 
teleosemantics can appeal to something very similar: an empirical generalization that, 
where there are contents of the teleosemantic sort, exploitable relations are usually in 
place. So the predictive advantage of varitel semantics only arises in somewhat exotic 
cases where teleosemantics would ascribe contents to states that are generated at ran-
dom (Shea 2007b, pp. 427–30).
The advantage of varitel semantics is more substantial when we come to explanation. 
My accounts show why contents are suited to explaining how systems perform their 
functions—they do so by making use of exploitable relations carried by their compo-
nents. Teleosemantics is more in the business of typing representations by the behaviour 
they produce than in the business of explaining how a system produces behaviour.14
8.5 Ambit of Varitel Semantics
(a) Representation only if content is explanatory?
Is content in the eye of the beholder? Does the question of whether a system has 
representational properties depend upon whether it is useful for some observer to 
treat it as such? Not according to my accounts of content. Each account of content that 
falls within the varitel framework is given in terms of correlation, structural corres-
pondence, robust outcomes, stabilization, and so forth. Why is that complex property of 
interest? Because it arises in the world for natural reasons and, where it arises, it generally 
13 It is agreed on all sides that representations produce correlations on the output side at the time of 
selection/stabilization: correlations with the distal effects they produce. This is a form of exploitable rela-
tion. However, that is not enough for there to be content according to my accounts. Exploitable relations at 
input also have to be in place: see §4.2a.
14 Godfrey-Smith (1996, pp. 171–95) argues that teleosemantics makes representational explanation 
of behaviour akin to explaining why a sleeping pill put a person to sleep by citing its dormitive virtue. 
In Shea (2007b) I argue that, while dormitive virtue explanations are not empty, adding an exploitable 
relation requirement—in that case a correlation requirement—makes the representational explanation 
more substantial.
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affords distinctive kinds of generalization and induction. Saying these properties allow 
us to engage in a distinctive form of explanation does not imply that the existence of 
these properties is relative to the existence of an observer, able and willing to go in for 
explanations of this kind. The existence of these patterns is an observer-independent 
fact, as is the fact that some properties explain others (§4.2b).
Since contents are not constituted by the explanatory practices of an observer, there 
is no requirement that contents should afford useful explanations in every case. 
Contents constructed in the ways I have set out are suited to getting explanatory 
purchase in many cases, but may not do so across the board. Consider for example a 
thermostat, one that is only slightly more sophisticated than the philosopher’s standard 
example. At input, it has two ways of gauging room temperature, a sensor for levels of 
sunlight and a sensor for thermal expansion. At output it controls the temperature 
through operating a radiator valve and an external air vent. Its capacity to keep a room 
at a set temperature is slightly better than a normal single input thermostat. It predicts 
the warming effect of sunlight and so smooths out some of the bumps in temperature 
that a standard thermostat would produce. But it is only slightly better. Arguably, 
holding the room temperature constant is a robust outcome produced by thermostat. 
Deliberate design may constitute that outcome as a task function. And it is a task func-
tion achieved by (simple) internal workings that make use of exploitable relations 
between internal states and distal states of the environment (there is some bridging).
However, this is a case where we would get little or no additional explanatory 
benefit from the representational explanation than we get from a non-semantic 
causal explanation of how proximal inputs generate proximal outputs, and how that 
affects the temperature of the room. It is a case where there is representational con-
tent but not one where representational explanations are substantially better than 
non-representational or vehicle-based explanations of behaviour.
Part of the reason why representational contents vary in their explanatory purchase 
is that the features which give them explanatory bite come in degrees. A system can 
produce outputs more or less robustly: across wider or narrower ranges of proximal 
inputs, and by more or fewer different proximal bodily movements. Furthermore, task 
functions can arise from a range of different stabilizing processes: natural selection, 
feedback-based learning, and simple contribution to persistence of a biological organism. 
In paradigm cases all three stabilizing processes will be at work and will be pulling in 
the same direction. In less paradigmatic cases they may come apart, so there can be 
different contents constituted relative to different task functions. In marginal cases, or 
in thought experiments like swampman, maybe only one of these processes comes into 
play; for example, contribution to persistence on its own. Such cases will have repre-
sentational content if they meet one of the conditions above. However, in these more 
peripheral cases representational content may well have less explanatory purchase 
than in paradigm cases.
Task functions constituted only by design, as in the thermostat example above, may 
also give rise to contents that are less explanatorily useful, depending on the amount of 
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robustness and internal vehicle-based complexity that has been built into the system. 
On the other hand, some designed artefacts like a sophisticated computer-guided 
missile, with a high degree of internal complexity and the capacity to produce outputs 
very robustly, may be cases where the representational description is practically indis-
pensable for explaining behaviour, in roughly the way Dennett claimed beliefs and 
desires are indispensable in practice for explaining human behaviour.
In short, representational contents are not in the eye of the beholder. They are 
constituted by the coming together of the properties mentioned in the conditions set 
out in previous chapters. The extent to which the representational explanations they 
afford are useful or practically indispensable will vary with the facts of the case.
Finally, I briefly assess whether the accounts of content put forward here are 
pragmatist. This label is sometimes associated with the claim that the brain exists to 
guide action, that it is therefore not in the business of building models of the world 
(Barrett 2011), and that we should not therefore expect representation to play a central 
role in the cognitive sciences (Anderson and Chemero 2016). Varitel semantics largely 
agrees with—indeed is based on—a version of the first claim. But it strongly rejects the 
second and third. The brain forms representations, and builds models of the world, 
and does so in the service of guiding action. Representational content in our case studies 
depends ineliminably on action, its functional significance, and the role of representa-
tions in guiding action. So varitel semantics has contents that are pragmatist in the 
sense that their content is action-derived, while rejecting the anti-representationalist 
conclusion that is drawn by those who claim that enactive engagement with the world 
displaces representational content (Hutto and Satne 2015).
The regularity with which I use the word ‘explanation’ suggests pragmatism of 
another kind; my emphasis on the observer-independence of content properties 
suggests otherwise. Simon Blackburn offers a useful characterization of what pragma-
tists are often up to (Blackburn 2010). The pragmatist aims to explain why we go in for 
a certain kind of discourse. I am certainly doing that. A major explanandum for my 
project is the pattern of representational explanation found in the cognitive sciences. 
I can be seen as offering a (realist) explanation of why psychologists and cognitive 
neuroscientists engage in that kind of discourse and think about organisms and 
systems in that way.
What divides my approach from pragmatism is the kind of explanation I offer. 
An explanation is pragmatist, according to Blackburn, when it eschews any use of the 
referring expressions of the discourse but proceeds by talking in different terms about 
what is done by the discourse; for example, by showing that it serves a particular func-
tion (Blackburn 2010, pp. 1–2). By contrast I argue that, in order to explain behaviour 
in the kinds of cases I am interested in, we do have to refer to representations (as real 
vehicles) and their contents. What I have offered is a meta-semantic metaphysical 
account of what various theoretical terms in use in cognitive science refer to—terms in 
the family of representation, semantic information, content, correctness condition, 
satisfaction condition, and so on. In explaining how this discourse works I use the 
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terms representation and content as referring expressions, so my accounts of content 
are not pragmatist by Blackburn’s lights.
(b) Are any cases excluded?
Does varitel semantics imply that every natural system is processing internal represen-
tations? Won’t any system designed by natural selection, learning, or human design 
end up having internal states that count as representations? We have already seen that 
magnetotactic bacteria do not have representations (§8.2b). Similarly, the ‘two compo-
nent’ signalling processes that are ubiquitous in bacteria (Lyon 2017) will be excluded 
when they depend on detecting just a single proximal cue.15 Varitel semantics does 
extend readily to non-psychological cases, but there are principled reasons why many 
cases are excluded.
Consider the way plant roots follow local concentration gradients so as to move 
towards water (Takahashi 1997). Is the root (or the plant) representing the direction 
of water? No, because here the story about stabilization does not involve distal facts, 
but just how the root reacts to the proximal availability of water. Or consider a ger-
minating seed that uses gravity to grow upwards towards the surface of the soil. The 
adaptively relevant fact here is distal, the availability of sunlight. Must it not have an 
internal representation of the direction of the sun? Must a plant that rotates in the 
direction of solar radiation have an internal representation of the direction of the 
sun? These input–output mappings, as described, are not the basis of task functions 
because they are not robust outcome functions. The output is modulated just by 
intrinsic properties of the sensory input. Distal features of the environment are adap-
tively important, but there is no task function (stabilized function + robust outcome 
function) that concerns distal features of the environment, and no mechanism that 
‘bridges’ across multiple sensory inputs in correlating with a distal feature of the 
environment.16 The representational content that would be attributed by standard 
teleosemantic accounts marches exactly in step with a factorized explanation of the 
plant’s behaviour. These are not representing systems according to varitel semantics.
Which is not to say that plants never go in for representation, let alone that represen-
tational content is restricted to psychological systems. Consider a plant that opens 
its flowers in the day and closes them at night. Suppose it just relies on changes in 
temperature, which alter internal biochemical processes. The opening and closing 
behaviour is produced in response to only one input, and so would not be a task func-
tion. It would be an evolutionary function of the plant, but would lack the robustness 
to be a task function. Now supplement the case slightly, making it more biologically 
realistic, so that the plant is also sensitive to light levels, giving it a second way of detecting 
15 Even if the mechanism is very complex, as described in Hsieh and Wanner (2010).
16 It is the absence of a distal-involving task function that stops representation arising. It is not a requirement 
on being UE information that the correlation should concern something distal (§8.7). (However, because 
of the requirement for a distal-involving task function, some items of UE information in the system need 
to concern distal features of the environment.)
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that evening has arrived. Then the plant has two ways of detecting that it is evening, and so 
the flower-closing behaviour would be a (very simple) task function of the plant. Internal 
processes in the plant could then well be representations with descriptive content about 
the time of day and with directive content telling it when to open and close its flowers.
But surely robustness is not unusual, but an absolutely ubiquitous feature of bio-
logical organisms? Cells have robust metabolic networks (Krasensky and Jonak 2012). 
Cells are even able to explore and sample new possible metabolic networks when they 
are put under conditions of severe stress (Szalay et al. 2007). During cell development 
the spindle microtubules that structure the cell grow in the right places robustly—they 
do so because of a process of selection in which many spindles are started and only 
those that reach their targets are preserved (Kirschner and Gerhart 1998, pp. 8422–3). 
Both metabolism and cell development produce outcomes robustly, and do so as a 
result of stabilizing processes that operate on both the phylogenetic and the ontogen-
etic timescale. Surely these are paradigm cases of robust outcome functions? Not as 
I have been using the term. Our target is cases where the same outcome is produced in 
response to different external inputs and is robust in the face of changes in the distal 
circumstances in which it is produced. These cellular and metabolic examples are cases 
of robust internal processes. They do show adaptive responses to things happening at 
the cell surface, such as damage to the cell wall, but the functions there are described in 
terms of intrinsic properties of the cell and changes happening to it. These are not cases 
of the kinds of functions that can ground representational content, which is what my 
definition of task functions was designed to capture.
There is no reason why hormonal signals should be excluded from being represen-
tations within the varitel framework. Sometimes their operation will be explicable in 
purely intrinsic functional terms, but in many cases hormones are involved in tracking 
adaptively relevant distal facts by multiple routes (e.g. about conspecifics), part of the 
basis of task functions. Another set of cases is found in the immune system. It has 
complex mechanisms for detecting threats and responding adaptively, so it is very 
likely to help the organism perform task functions, and it would not be at all surprising 
if representations were involved in carrying out those task functions. In short, cases of 
internal subpersonal representation in organisms extend well beyond the psycho-
logical. Furthermore, these are cases where representation gets explanatory purchase: 
world-involving contents allow us to see how the hormonal system or immune system 
enables the organism to achieve certain distal outcomes in its environment.
Another way that subpersonal representations may arise internally is when there are 
task functions of systems that are smaller than the whole organism. For example, an 
individual cell is likely to have task functions, as may a larger unit like the immune 
signalling system. That system may have robust outcome functions concerning facts 
about other parts of the body distal to it. For example, an individual cell may have 
multiple ways of detecting the overall physiological state of the organism it is in 
(e.g. stressed vs. non-stressed) and responding appropriately. If so, the cell could have 
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a task function, one that could be representationally mediated. By this route some 
processes going on within an organism might count as task functions, functions for 
systems that are smaller than the organism as a whole. Caution is needed here, though. 
Not all evolutionary functions will count. To be a task function, an output of a system 
needs to have been the target of a stabilizing process operating on that system as such. 
Learning-type processes within a cell count. The process of generate-and-test used 
by the immune system may also count. But outputs of an internal system that are 
stabilized only because of the way they contribute to a stabilizing process operating 
at the level of the whole organism do not thereby count as task functions of the 
internal system.
Hormonal signalling may be like that, its functions deriving from task functions of 
the organism in which it operates. It may not be sufficiently distinct to count as a system 
in its own right; and if it does, there may be no stabilizing process acting at the level of 
the hormonal system as such, independently of those operating at the level of the 
whole organism. The same may apply to the brain. There are lots of processes of select-
ive retention going on in the brain, of course, but these play a role in whole-organism 
stabilizing processes (various kinds of learning), which counts against them having an 
intra-organism task function of their own.
Varitel semantics is more demanding than theories of content that are based just on 
evolutionary functions or just on correlational information. But that is not because it is 
designed to capture only a class of cases which seem, a priori, to count as calling for 
representations. So, it is no kind of desideratum that only psychological systems should 
be capable of forming representations. Instead, we took psychological systems as studied 
by cognitive science as a paradigm and aimed to account for what gives representa-
tional contents their explanatory purchase in those cases. We then find that that 
distinctive explanatory scheme extends more widely (§6.5b). For example, it includes 
the kinds of internal signalling in plants we’ve just discussed. It also covers many cases 
of between-organism animal signalling. Both the vervet’s alarm call and the honeybee’s 
nectar dance are cases where the representation producer integrates multiple cues in 
order to produce the signal. So, output behaviour is a task function, both in the 
monkeys and the honeybees.
When we come to the most familiar examples of representations in psychological 
systems, namely human conscious states and human beliefs and desires, it is very likely 
that there are things that set them apart from representational contents in non-
psychological cases. They have further features relevant to content determination 
(§8.9), that are missing in non-psychological cases like animal signalling, plant trop-
isms, and hormonal signalling. My pluralism allows that the right account of content 
determination applicable to these cases might well be different. The special features of 
consciousness, or of the practice of offering and assessing reasons for action at the 
personal level, for example, might well make an important difference to content 
determination. If so, there will be an account of personal-level content (or more than 
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one) which applies only to psychological cases. However, I would resist the urge 
to identify these as the real or true accounts of content, since they would not apply 
to many other, subpersonal, psychological cases, where representational contents do 
have a clear explanatory role to play. Accounts of content that are plausibly restricted to 
the psychological are too narrow, and we have seen that accounts of content adequate 
to capturing the way representational explanations work in subpersonal psychology 
do indeed extend to some non-psychological cases.
8.6 Development and Content
Various theorists writing about concepts have noted that there is a tight connection 
between the circumstances in which a concept develops and the object or property it 
refers to. With representations less sophisticated than concepts a similar connection is 
often apparent. In previous work on artificial neural networks I explored the way that 
vehicles of content themselves develop as a result of training, that is as a result of reacting 
to samples in the environment and being tuned based on feedback about performance 
(Shea 2007a). This developmental process leads clusters to form in hidden layer state 
space. Those clusters are vehicles of content. They represent properties of the samples 
that caused their development.
If content is fixed by synchronic properties of a system, for example its causal 
sensitivity, then it is far from obvious why there should be any connection between the 
circumstances in which a representational vehicle develops and what it represents. 
Fodor was so puzzled by this phenomenon that he gave it a name, the doorknob-
doorknob problem (Fodor 2008). For Fodor the problem arises because it seems that 
many concepts are neither innate (i.e. unlearned), nor constructed out of existing 
concepts. (The problem is discussed in Shea 2016.) The concept doorknob is neither 
present at birth, nor is it plausibly constructed out of other concepts like round, 
attached to a door, for turning, etc. Instead, it is acquired by a thinker as a result 
of experience, a particular kind of experience: interaction with . . . doorknobs. Fodor was 
puzzled as to why that should be; puzzlement that arises in part, I suggest, from implicitly 
rejecting the idea that the circumstances in which the concept develops could play a role 
in fixing its content. After all, for Fodor a knock on the head could fortuitously put a 
thinker in a new brain state such that they have the concept doorknob.
There are many empirically studied cases where the causes of the development of a 
new representational resource figure in its content. An example is recognizing new 
people by their faces. We acquire the ability to recognize an individual by seeing and 
perhaps interacting with that individual for a short time. The new recognitional cap-
acity that results is probably dependent on a neural representation in the fusiform face 
area of the brain (Kanwisher 2000, Cohen and Tong 2001). The person who caused the 
development of this new recognitional capacity, which is mediated by a new vehicle of 
content, ends up being its referent. This is very similar to my neural network example 
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(Shea  2007a), where new state space clusters represent properties of the samples 
that  caused their development. Game-theoretic sender–receiver models also show 
how new representations arise as a result of stabilizing processes (Skyrms  2010); 
for example, the replicator dynamics can lead senders and receivers to coordinate on 
a way of categorizing a range of stimuli (O’Connor 2014).
Laurence and Margolis (2002) have an account of the acquisition of natural kind 
concepts that links their content closely to the circumstances of their development. 
The child develops a new natural kind concept as a result of seeing a member of 
the kind:
She sees a new object that has features that suggest that it is a natural object of some sort . . . 
upon encountering the item, the child releases a new mental representation and begins accu-
mulating information about the object and linking this to the representation. [2002, p. 42]
So, an object which falls under a new kind causes the child to acquire a representation 
which refers to the kind, a representation which is used to store information about the 
new kind. Laurence and Margolis picture a process in which an existing contentless 
mental symbol is taken off the shelf and put into the right mind–world relations to 
constitute it as a concept of the kind. In my neural network case, interaction with sam-
ples in the world causes the development of a new vehicle which has the appropriate 
mind–world connections to have a certain content. Vehicle development and content 
development occur in tandem, due to the same causal process. In both cases there is a 
tight connection between the circumstances of development and the content of the 
new representations that result.
My accounts of content make that conclusion entirely unsurprising. Contents are 
fixed relative to task functions. Task functions arise as a result of some stabilizing pro-
cess. Learning is a key case. I argued that outcomes that are the target of stabilizing 
processes are often stabilized and robustly produced as a result of internal mechanisms, 
mechanisms that make use of exploitable relations between internal components and 
the world. One common way that can happen is when the stabilizing process—for 
example, learning—gives rise to the internal mechanism which is responsible for an 
outcome being produced robustly and stabilized. Since contents are fixed by reference 
to outcomes that were stabilized and conditions that obtained which explain why those 
outcomes were stabilized, it is entirely unsurprising that contents should often con-
cern properties of the objects the system was interacting with during development of a 
new representation (i.e. during the process of stabilization, that being the process by 
which content is constituted).
So, a feature which proponents of a synchronic metaphysics of content need to 
explain, and which poses a puzzle for Fodor, turns out to be readily explicable in the 
varitel framework. When a new representation develops as a result of interactions 
between a system and its environment, it will often end up representing the objects and 
properties causally involved in its development.
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8.7 Miscellaneous Qualifications
In this section I go through a miscellaneous series of clarifications and qualifications.
In §2.3, ‘Externalist Explanandum, Externalist Explanans’, I argued that we should 
expect contents to be fixed by some complex relational property of representational 
vehicles. That would make contents suited to explaining how a system achieves distal 
outcomes in its environment. I have just argued that my accounts fulfil that promise 
(§8.2). A system will have representational contents based on relational properties that 
bridge across a variety of different inputs and outputs, and thus are part of world-
involving real patterns. Does it follow that contents can only concern distal features of 
the organism’s environment and distal outcomes?
The answer is no. Proximal inputs like sensory properties, and proximal outputs 
like bodily movements, can be represented. UE information can concern internal 
states of the system. The point about explanatory purchase requires that the system 
should have some task functions that concern distal outcomes. It follows that it should 
have some descriptive representations about distal features of its environment. But 
that does not imply that every representation must concern something distal. An 
organism may also represent proximal inputs and outputs, as a means for calculating 
what is the case and what to do. For example, it may represent possible motor pro-
grams and use them in  calculating which motor program needs to be executed in 
order to achieve some directively represented distal outcome in the current circum-
stances. Or it may keep track of sensory properties as a means for learning how to 
behave in new circumstances. Whether proximal features are represented in addition 
to distal ones depends on what is called for by the algorithm the organism is using in 
order to achieve its distal task functions.17 Task functions are world-involving, and 
some representations in a system must be too, but it is not a requirement on being UE 
information that the correlation should concern a condition distal to the system (nor 
for UE structural correspondence).
A clear example of that is meta-representation. Some computations call for repre-
sentations which represent the content of other representations. That arises in the 
relatively low-level system that does model-free reinforcement learning, since the 
algorithm involves a stage where the reward expected for an action is compared to the 
reward actually received and the difference is used to update reward expectations for 
the future (Shea 2014c). Varitel semantics can readily accommodate, both representa-
tions whose content concerns the content of other internal states, and representations 
that concern non-contentful internal states of the system (e.g. sensory states, bodily 
states and other internal properties).
A second caveat: I need to qualify the way I have discussed outputs produced by an 
organism. I have talked as if all outputs are bodily movements or the consequences of 
17 There is a rough parallel here with Burge’s view. He argues that the capacity to represent properties 
like time, for which there is no constancy detection mechanism, is derivative from the capacity to represent 
properties for which there is a constancy detection mechanism (Burge 2010).
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bodily movements. In fact other kinds of output can also qualify; for example, releasing 
a chemical, producing an electrical discharge, or changing colour. Although move-
ments have taken centre stage in all our discussions, everything I have said should be 
taken to cover outputs in general (when the other conditions for content are met, 
e.g. the output is or leads to an outcome which is task function of the organism).
Another significant oversimplification is found in the way I have talked about 
 vehicles of content as constituent parts of an organism or other system. That is, I have 
pictured them as proper parts, or components of a mechanism. Those are the easiest 
cases to understand, and this conception covers all of our case studies, however the 
account is not restricted to such cases. Vehicles need not be proper parts of the system. 
Syntactic types can depend on properties of the whole system.
I don’t know of any actual cases, but for illustration imagine a cell that is simultan-
eously undergoing three cyclical physiological processes, each something like the 
Krebs cycle, but involving the whole cell rather than a series of constituents. Take a 
dynamic systems approach to the cell. Each cyclical process can be occurring in a range 
of ways, which I’ll call states of the cycle. Cycle C can be in various cyclical states C1, or 
C2, and so on; cycle D in states D1, D2, etc. Cycle C undergoes changes between cyclical 
states in a way that is affected by the states of cycles D and E, and vice versa. The whole 
system exhibits attractors, and perhaps bifurcations, and is affected by states of the 
environment. Dynamic properties of the whole cell, like being in state C1 and state D2, 
could in principle be vehicle properties, carrying world-involving contents, and inter-
acting in ways that, by obeying generalizations about dynamic interactions amongst 
the Ci, Di and Ei, are faithful to their contents. So, vehicles need not be proper parts of 
the system doing the representing. Furthermore, they need not form a mechanism 
(assuming not every causal interaction calls for a mechanism).
Next, a brief note on how my approach relates to evolutionary game theoretic 
 models of signalling, communication, and meaning. These models were developed by 
Brian Skyrms and others (e.g. Skyrms 2010), following David Lewis’s decision-theoretic 
treatment of signalling games (Lewis 1969). For Skyrms, the meaning of a signal in a sig-
nalling game is just a matter of the correlational information it carries, in particular how 
much it changes the probability that world states obtain or actions will be performed.
Shea et al. (2017) argue that these models need to be supplemented with a richer 
conception of meaning in order to account for phenomena like misrepresentation 
and deception. These phenomena arise in discussions of the models but are not given a 
formal treatment. We call this kind of meaning ‘functional content’, contrasted with 
the purely informational content put forward by Skyrms. In our treatment, functional 
content only arises at an equilibrium. It would be possible to apply our definition to 
non-equilibrium states. Functional content is essentially a matter of how signals are 
involved in generating rewards in certain world states, given the way receivers act on 
the signals. Signals are involved with generating rewards whether or not the popula-
tion is an equilibrium. However, Shea et al. (2017) focus on a kind of content that only 
arises in an equilibrium state. Varitel semantics is broadly similar. Content depends on 
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task functions. Task functions must be stabilized functions, which means they must 
have contributed to a stabilizing process like natural selection, learning, or contribu-
tion to an organism’s persistence (leaving aside task functions based on deliberate 
design). So, they must, in some broad sense, have been attractors of the dynamic inter-
actions between system and environment. The system need not currently be in an 
attractor state, but it must have been in one for its states to have content.
Tying functional content to stabilizing processes might seem problematic in the 
light of recent work showing that, in finite populations, signalling can arise in non-
equilibrium states (Wagner 2012, 2015). For example, Wagner (2015) analyses a 
signalling game where populations converge on an attractor that is not a Nash equilib-
rium. Senders send signals that are informative about the world state and receivers 
act on them accordingly. My answer is simple. A stabilized function in my sense 
need not be a Nash equilibrium. The states Wagner identifies, being attractors to 
which the model converges, can thereby generate stabilized functions of the sender-
receiver system. There may be a legitimate role for defining a notion of functional 
content for game theoretic models which applies to all states of the game, attractors 
and transients. However, my framework is motivated by the need to explain suc-
cessful and unsuccessful behaviour. The parallel in game theoretic models is content 
that arises from attractor states. So, the restriction to defining functional content 
only in cases where there is or has been a stabilizing process (attractor) is suited to 
our purposes.
Moving on, there are some important issues about the nature of content, which 
should certainly be central to an account of conceptual content, that I have overlooked 
entirely. One is whether there is a level of content at the neo-Fregean level of sense; 
for example, a mode of presentation. I have been working only with referential content. 
Referential content, plus facts about vehicles—for example, that a system has two 
different vehicles concerned with representing colour—have together been adequate 
to explain all our target phenomena. Nevertheless, I want to remain neutral on whether 
a second level of content is justified in our simple cases, or indeed whether it turns out 
not to be needed even when we come to beliefs, desires, and concepts.
I am also setting aside questions of indexicality. For example, I assumed that par-
ticular locations figure in the content of the rat’s spatial representations, but have not 
said whether they are picked out indexically or by non-indexical singular terms 
(§6.2d). Similarly, in the analogue magnitude case, the monkey’s choice between two 
buckets of objects is correct if it picks the more numerous collection, but I have not 
said whether the analogue magnitude register for each bucket has the indexical 
content that bucket contains n objects, or whether the collection is picked out non-
indexically as in bucket A contains n objects (or indeed whether the content is 
indeterminate between these possibilities). There may be representations which the 
organism itself reuses in a variety of different contexts, where the right account says 
that content is a character, that is, a kind of content that combines with a context to 
deliver a truth condition. I remain neutral about how these issues should be dealt with.
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8.8 How to Find Out What Is Represented
My accounts of content say what makes it the case that a simple system has representa-
tions with a certain content. It is concerned with the metaphysics of content, not with 
how we should find out what is represented. Nevertheless, varitel semantics has some 
straightforward implications for the epistemology of content.
The varitel framework is an elaboration of a procedure that is often used to establish 
content in cognitive science. Look at patterns of behaviour that are purposeful or 
adaptive and consider how the organism could perform in those ways by keeping track 
of aspects of the environment and calculating what to do when. That is, consider what 
algorithms could be producing the observed behaviour. Then search for evidence 
about internal workings in order to decide which possible algorithm is actual. Evidence 
of internal processes may be direct, through imaging, recording, or intervening in the 
brain; or indirect, through observing patterns of error, interference, and facilitation, 
like priming effects. When an algorithm which would produce the observed behaviour 
plausibly maps onto internal workings in the organism, then those elements are good 
candidates for vehicles of content, and the algorithm tells you what they represent. 
According to this picture, an early step is to look for robust outcome functions and 
assess whether they are also stabilized functions, and thus amount to task functions 
(i.e. outputs that are susceptible to representational explanation).
Considering task functions to be the target of representational explanation is sel-
dom very explicit in cognitive scientific practice, however it is often implicit, regulating 
which kinds of behaviour are taken to be interesting and in need of representational 
explanation. More obvious is the search for information. Cognitive neuroscience directs 
a lot of energy at measuring the correlational information that is carried by different 
individual neurons, distributed arrays of neurons, and neural areas. My approach 
implies that not all information is relevant. Only information that is potentially ger-
mane to the task should be of interest. That restriction is often implicit in the scientific 
practice. Single unit recording investigates selectivity in respect of natural features of 
the distal world like lines, edges, and surfaces. Imaging usually looks for selectivity in 
respect of tasks or task-related features like faces, locations, object categories, and so on. 
So, in practice scientists are often in fact only interested in information that is potentially 
relevant to explaining how the organism behaves.
It is also implicit that information, to be relevant, has to be carried in a way that 
can be detected by downstream processing. When asking whether some neural area 
uses a rate code or a phase code, for example, a key consideration is whether the 
putative code can be read out by downstream processes. Katz et al. (2016) undermined 
the widely assumed importance of a signal in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) by 
showing that knocking it out pharmacologically made no difference to behaviour. 
Hunt et al. (2012) formulate this requirement explicitly, noting that the information 
that can be decoded by an observer recording with an imaging technique or electrode 
can be quite different from ‘the functional representations in the network, those used 
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by the brain’ (p. 474). This makes explicit a constraint which is usually at work implicitly 
in cognitive neuroscientific practice.
The varitel framework does recommend some tweaks to current practice. When 
measuring correlational information, studies focus heavily on input sensitivity. 
Correlations with actions and outcomes are not completely overlooked, but they 
deserve greater emphasis, since output correlations almost always play a role in con-
tent determination. Furthermore, there could be a more explicit focus on the way 
behaviours are stabilized so as to underpin stabilized functions. In reward-based 
learning experiments, input correlations with reward delivered are always considered, 
output correlations with reward generated less so, although those output correlations 
are equally relevant. Indeed, it may be possible to generate quantitative measures, not 
just of correlational information, but of the way representational vehicles are involved 
with generating variable amounts of reward, along the lines of the reward-involving 
functional content vector defined by Shea et al. (2017).
Another mainstream way that content is investigated sits very naturally with varitel 
semantics. Investigators look for illusions and other systematic patterns of error. One 
might think that an error can only be identified once representational content has been 
ascertained, but in many cases problems at the level of behaviour, like vacillation, 
delay, or doing something clearly maladaptive, can be identified before being traced 
back to errors in what is being represented. My framework shows how we can be more 
rigorous about success and failure of behaviour. We need to consider the stabilization 
processes that have been at work; that is, what the organism has evolved and learned to 
do, and how its behaviour contributes to its persistence. These provide the standards 
against which success and failure of behaviour and its consequences should be judged. 
It follows that appeals to ethology and comparative psychology are of more than back-
ground interest. They throw light on evolutionary functions, which play a central role 
in constituting content.
8.9 Differences at the Personal Level
The book has not attempted to tackle personal-level contents. We have focused instead 
on the hopefully simpler question of how content arises in subpersonal representa-
tional systems. In this final section we look briefly at how various features of the per-
sonal level might make a difference to content determination.
First off, consciousness. The phenomenal character of conscious mental states may 
be fixed by intrinsic properties of the subject. More controversially, consciousness may 
in turn determine the representational content of those states. A naturalistic theory 
of consciousness seems a distant prospect. If so, we may be a long way from a theory of 
content for conscious states. On the other hand, there is some hope that the represen-
tational content of conscious states may determine their phenomenal character, in 
which case a theory of content for conscious states will be a route to a theory of con-
sciousness. To follow that route, we need a better understanding of the distinctive 
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functional role of consciousness in order to see which aspects of the way conscious 
states operate may play a content-determining role. Relevant functional features could 
include: a global workspace, a drive for consistency between information from differ-
ent modalities and subsystems, integration of descriptive information with valence 
and motivation, practical grasp of the enabling conditions for forming a representa-
tion reliably, a role in practical reasoning and learning for the future, storage in 
episodic and semantic memory, and feelings of confidence. Any or all of these features 
may play a role in content determination for conscious states. None is obviously 
reducible to the ingredients we have been working with so far.
A second potentially relevant feature is meta-representation or metacognition. 
On some views a thinker’s object-level conscious state of seeing a red rose is simultan-
eously a meta-level state with a content along the lines of I am currently seeing a red 
rose. There could also be non-conscious mental states that have meta-representation 
built in. In either case, the fact that object-level and meta-level content are fixed in 
 parallel would form an important part of the theory of content determination.
Thirdly, many theorists of concepts have thought that relations amongst concepts 
play an important role in determining content. A concept may encode information 
about how entities and properties are related causally and hierarchically, for example. 
This gives rise to deductive and inductive entailment relations between concepts. 
Alternatively, information about relations between categories may be encoded in a 
thinker’s disposition to draw inferences between concepts. Furthermore, some ranges 
of properties are mutually exclusive, and some objects physically exclude one another 
in space. The relations of entailment and exclusion instantiated in a network of beliefs, 
or of concepts, may play a role in content determination in a way that has not been 
covered by the framework we have been using.
There may be an important difference between implicit and explicit connections 
between representations.18 Suppose that when I see that is a brown furry object of xyz 
shape/size I am thereby disposed to think that is a dog.19 This disposition implicitly 
encodes the information that objects that are brown, furry and of xyz shape/size tend 
to be dogs. That implicit representation is true. It’s being true partly explains why I 
successfully behave in a dog-appropriate way on this occasion. My dog concept also 
figures in some of my explicit representations; that is, beliefs about dogs. I believe that is 
okay to leave a docile dog alone with a young child. Suppose that belief is false. That has 
potentially disastrous consequences once I become responsible for young children. 
But I can modify my explicit belief by reasoning and reflecting on it. Becoming a parent, 
I start being aware of reports of seemingly docile dogs attacking when left alone with 
young children. So, I change my belief. Information represented implicitly in my disposi-
tions to apply my dog concept can also change as a result of experience. I can retrain 
18 The contrast between implicit and explicit representation I am using here is spelt out more carefully 
in Shea (2015).
19 xyz shape/size is some set of shape and size properties represented in visual experience.
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my inferential dispositions. But that is a different process from the way conscious 
deliberation changes my explicit beliefs. Both kinds of connection may be important 
in the story about content-determination for concepts. In particular, the special func-
tional role of conscious deliberation in forming and changing explicit beliefs may have 
a special role in content-determination.
The meaning of beliefs and desires may also depend on interpersonal norms, and/or 
on the meaning of words, which may in turn depend on social processes (§6.5b). For 
content determination we would then have to cast the net more widely than a single 
individual, so as to include culturally based stabilizing processes like the patterns of 
transmission and use of a word in a social group.
As well as beliefs and desires that figure in episodes of thinking, people also have 
standing beliefs and desires. I have long believed that Lima is the capital of Peru, even 
though it is many months since I entertained that thought occurrently (until just now). 
There may be vehicles of the standing beliefs, stored away in long term semantic 
memory in the same way as data is stored on a computer disk. Or ascriptionism may 
be the best account (§1.3); for example, Dennett’s intentional stance (Dennett 1981; 
see also Williams 2016, Williams 2018). Either way, standing beliefs may have observer-
relative contents. On ascriptionist views there is no straightforward connection between 
the contents of standing beliefs and the contents of occurrent beliefs that are tokened 
in episodes of thinking. The content of standing beliefs could be observer-relative 
while occurrent states of thinking have non-observer relative contents (perhaps fixed 
in part by social processes, in the way just suggested). These are important content-
relevant features of standing beliefs.
Even if additional functional features of the personal level play a content-determining 
role, should we nevertheless expect the overall varitel framework to apply, perhaps 
with an augmented menu of exploitable relations? Or, more minimally, should we 
expect that the explanatory purchase of representational content will still depend on a 
convergence between task functions and internal workings which form an algorithm 
for their achievement? The answer is I don’t know. It may do. But the richer features 
found at the personal level may underpin a different kind of account of content consti-
tution. For example, if consciousness, fixed by intrinsic properties, fixes the content of 
conscious states, then content determination there works quite differently.
A natural thought here, but one that should be resisted, is the idea that subpersonal 
contents are picked up and used by personal-level processes. Subpersonal vehicles are 
constituted as contentful because of their relations: relations to features of the distal 
environment, to outputs of an algorithm implemented in the organism, and to stabilizing 
processes that have operated on the organism. Personal-level processes may capitalize 
on some of those same relations, for example the correlational information carried by 
a concept may be important to fixing its content. But that is not to make use of the con-
tent of a subpersonal representation. The contents of subpersonal representations are 
not things that are sitting around ready to be used by personal-level processes. It is 
a mistake to think of the content of a vehicle as a property that is routinely portable, 
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a property that would automatically be carried around if that vehicle is deployed in a 
different cognitive process. The absence of a straightforward connection here means 
there is no simple way that personal-level contents are determined by contents of any 
subpersonal representations they make use of. On the other hand, it frees our theorizing 
about subpersonal content from the need to play a role in accounting for personal-
level content.
So I am remaining open-minded about what kinds of insight, if any, varitel seman-
tics will offer into the nature of personal-level content. Might pluralism, at least, come 
in handy at the personal level? Not just a pluralism which allows that content at the 
personal level will be different, but a pluralism that expects different kinds of personal-
level state to have their content determined differently? That, too, is open to debate. 
Close connections—for example, between belief content and the content of conscious 
states—may make it inappropriate to leave pluralism open about content determin-
ation as between occurrent beliefs and conscious states.
While I think it’s too soon to venture an opinion about how the personal-level story 
will go, I would argue that the varitel accounts of content represent a substantial 
advance. We started the book with the question ‘what is a thought process?’, and with 
the worry that the powerful answer offered by the representational theory of mind 
would be undermined if we were unable to answer the related question ‘what is repre-
sentational content?’ Now we have an answer to the content question that works for 
large swathes of the cognitive sciences. Our optimism that we can answer the same 
question for representation at the personal level should therefore increase.
And it’s not just general optimism that naturalism is taking us in the right direction. 
The varitel accounts of content give us a staging post, a fixed point from which to 
build. Intentionality is less mysterious now that we can see how cases of it arise 
through the coming together of some relatively well-understood natural properties. 
Psychology and cognitive neuroscience have excavated the computational processes 
that underlie some quite complex patterns of human behaviour. The foundational 
worry that those theories are based on a false assumption about meaning can now be 
assuaged. We can see correlation, correspondence, and function at work in these 
cases, giving rise to representational content in a completely un-mysterious way. 
So, we are now in a position to ask what needs to be handled differently to deal with 
personal-level cases. We have a reasonably detailed understanding of how personal-
level representations are different, in ways that are relevant to content, as even the 
brief discussion above indicates. So, we have a good list of resources to draw on. 
Rather than being stuck at an impasse, with the lurking suspicion that the question 
is intractable, or representationalism entirely misconceived, we are now faced with a 
workable research programme—substantial and challenging, but with a clear sense 
of how to make progress.
That is a valuable payoff; however, the most important achievement of varitel 
semantics, if it succeeds, is to elucidate the nature of content in subpersonal cases. 
Subpersonal representation is a big challenge in its own right. The manifest success of 
226 How Content Explains
the cognitive sciences has seen representational theories deployed ever more widely. 
It is now pressing to understand the intentionality at the heart of these theories. I have 
argued that varitel semantics allows us to understand how those explanatory practices 
work. Huffing and puffing with information, function and structural correspondence 
can do the job. We can indeed give a naturalistic account of content in the brain and 
other subpersonal representational systems.
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part i
Chapter 1—Introduction
1.1 A Foundational Question
Announcing a mystery: what is thinking, what is a thought process? 3 
To Descartes, producing appropriate strings of words was just as mysterious as free 
will or consciousness. 3
Computers do that. 3–4
Insight: thinking is processing of mental representations. That is RTM. 4
This isn’t an agreed answer to our problem because we don’t know how mental 
representations get their meaning. 4
There is good evidence for the claim about processing; but I agree we don’t fully 
understand meaning. 4
Fig. 1.1 Babbage’s difference engine. 5
The question is: how do mental states get their aboutness? 5
That is the ‘content question’. 6
Mental representation is still a powerful idea; there is no serious reason to doubt 
their existence. 6
But the lack of an answer does lend support to eliminativism, which would be a 
mistake—it misses something explanatorily important. 6
Fig. 1.2 Typical explanatory scheme from cognitive neuroscience: computation, 
implemented in brain areas, to perform a task. 7
We leave aside consciousness (too hard). There is non-conscious information 
processing to get to grips with. 7–8
An answer will also be useful for content disputes in cognitive science. 8
This chapter is a broad overview of existing treatments of the problem (with little 
argument). 8
1.2 Homing In on the Problem
Brentano identified the problem of intentionality: how can thoughts be about things 
in the world? 8–9
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Intentionality of words may derive from our thoughts. The same story cannot apply 
to our thoughts, on pain of regress. 9
Giving the content of a concept in terms of perceptual states calls for underived 
intentionality there. 9
We need an account of underived content determination, in the metaphysical 
sense—a meta-semantic theory. 9–10
I am offering an answer to both the content question and the representational status 
question at the same time. 10
A theory of content should be consistent with and if possible illuminate behavioural 
explanation: correct representation explains success, misrepresentation failure. 10
Misrepresentation is puzzling: if it makes no difference to processing, how can it 
make a difference to explanation? Our theory should show how. 10
The theory needs to be applicable to psychological cases and to deliver determinate 
contents there. 10–11
The determinacy problem has incarnations as the proximal/distal, qua, and disjunc-
tion problems. 11
We are aiming for naturalism: an account in non-semantic, non-mental, and non-
normative terms. 11–12
1.3 Existing Approaches
This section discusses existing approaches to content and the main challenges they 
face. 12
We can appeal to correlations and mathematical information theory (as founded by 
Shannon). 12
Correlational information on its own is not enough: not determinate; the strongest 
correlation may not be the right one; and it does not rule out disjunctions. It is just one 
ingredient. 12–13
Inferential role semantics faces problems of holism, and of identifying sets of infer-
ences that are shared and individuative. 13
Structure mirroring structure is another candidate. Too liberal on its own, but 
another plausible ingredient. 13–14
Davidson: having beliefs and preferences is a matter of being so-interpretable. 14
Dennett: the intentional stance is applicable because of real patterns, and so is 
realist. 14
I reserve ‘realism’ for cases where there are real vehicles of content, which is our 
target, and explains more (see §2.6). 14–15
1.4 Teleosemantics
Teleosemantics is my main precursor. It founds content on etiological functions. 
Leading theories are also committed to an identifiable representation-consumer 
playing a content-constituting role. 15
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Commitment to consumers defines the ‘basic representationalist model’: a consumer 
conditions its behaviour on an intermediate representation. 15–16
Fig. 1.3 The basic representationalist model. 15
Content of representation R = condition presupposed given the behaviour output 
by a consumer in response to R. 16
Millikan’s version: content = success condition = condition which explains why the 
prompted behaviour led systematically to survival and reproduction. 16
This is illustrated by the honeybee nectar dance. 16–17
Fig. 1.4 Honeybee nectar dance. 17
Millikan’s ‘least detailed Normal explanation’ of the pattern of dances homes in on 
a particular condition for each dance type, e.g. there being nectar 400 metres from 
the hive. 18
This excludes various general and background conditions from the content. 18
Teleosemantics is the core of a plausible account of content in animal signalling and 
some other simple cases. 18
1.5 Challenges to Teleosemantics
This section discusses challenges faced by teleosemantics, so my later accounts can 
be assessed against them. 18–19
First challenge: leading versions require an identifiable consumer whose outputs 
can play a content-constituting role. 19
It is especially hard to identify consumers in the case of neural representations. 19
Second challenge: to formulate a notion of etiological function that is suited to 
playing a content-determining role, general enough to cover the cases, and specific 
enough to do explanatory work. 19–20
Fig. 1.5 Complex functional interconnections in the brain. 20
Relational evolutionary functions do not deliver very specific functions when the 
function of the learning mechanism is very general (e.g. classical conditioning). 20–1
Instrumental conditioning can found functions in its own right, irrespective of its 
evolutionary function, as in Dretske (1988). 21
The challenge is to generalize this, and to show the right way to delimit the kinds of 
etiological functions that should figure in a theory of content. 21
Third challenge: swampman, which raises the question: why should content depend on 
history? 21
Behaviour is caused by vehicle properties; therefore we could predict the behaviour 
of an intrinsic duplicate. 21–2
Millikan argues that inductions are based on historical kinds. But that does not 
explain why we couldn’t do induction on synchronic kinds, properties shared between 
duplicates. 22
Better move: if the explanandum is successful behaviour, that is absent in the case 
of swampman. 22
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That does not rescue views based on evolution by natural selection. As a swamp 
creature interacts with its environment, the explanandum will come into place. 22–3
Fourth challenge: how does content get explanatory purchase? See next chapter. 23
Chapter 2—Framework
2.1 Setting Aside Some Harder Cases
Cognitive science relies on representations well beyond the doxastic and the con-
scious cases. It would be a considerable achievement to give an account of content for 
these. 25
I set aside four complicating features of everyday representations: consciousness; 
relations of  justification for the person; being reported to others as reasons; and 
requiring natural-language-like structure. 26
I use ‘subpersonal’ simply as shorthand for representations where these four fea-
tures are not important to content determination. 26
We now have a wealth of data about representation in the brain against which to test 
our theories. 26–7
Fig. 2.1 A typical case where neural areas are picked out both anatomically and in 
terms of what is represented and computed. 27
Neural representations are central cases for us, but the aim is for an account that 
applies widely in the (subpersonal) cognitive sciences. 27
The overall strategy is to start with the subpersonal, both because this dissolves 
some of the puzzle of intentionality in its own right, and as a significant step towards a 
theory of the more complex cases. 27–8
2.2 What Should Constrain Our Theorizing?
We should not rely on intuitions, especially in subpersonal cases. 28
A theory of content should show how correct representation explains successful 
behaviour and misrepresentation explains unsuccessful behaviour. 28
That requires us to get into the details of a wide range of case studies from cognitive 
science. 28
Our theorizing is constrained by the need to make representational explanation 
intelligible. 28–9
Desideratum: an account of content should show why representational properties 
 underpin better explanations of behaviour than would otherwise be available. 29
Content has to be more explanatory than an explanation factorized into a causal 
chain from input through internal working to output. 29–30
E.g. with a rifle, if the firing pin has content, that explanation marches exactly in step 
with one in terms of non-representational properties of the causal chain. 30
Demanding that representational explanations be indispensable is too strong. 30–1
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Fig. 2.2 The mechanism for firing a rifle. 30
The task is to come up with a definition that picks out properties which are realized 
in the natural world, and to show why the possession of those properties by internal 
vehicles affords behavioural explanation. 31
2.3 Externalist Explanandum, Externalist Explanans
A commitment to vehicles of content—mental representations as physical 
 particulars—means there will be a full non-semantic causal story. 31–2
For an externalist explanandum—explaining a system’s reaction to and distal effects 
in its environment—externalist contents can provide an explanation that could not be 
given in terms of intrinsic properties. 32
The interactions (mappings from distal features to distal outcomes) that call for 
representational explanation are a subset: performing functions. 32–3
Fig. 2.3 ‘Moniac’—which uses water to compute the way money flows through the 
UK economy. 33
A function is a mapping. It can be achieved in many ways. 34
An ‘algorithm’ is the way a system achieves a given function. 34
Transitions called for by an algorithm must map onto internal processing going 
on in the system, non-semantically described. 34–5
E.g. an algorithm to track surfaces by first tracking colour and motion properties of 
a portion of surface separately. 35
Which extrinsic properties of vehicles determine content? Exploitable relations 
they bear to the environment. 35–6
Fig. 2.4 An input–output mapping does not fix what goes on inside the box. 35
The algorithmic explanation calls for a convergence between intrinsic properties 
that account for the processing with extrinsic properties that account for the content. 
This is the dual nature of content. 36
2.4 Representation Without a Homunculus
It is a mistake to see mental representations as requiring interpretation or an under-
standing homunculus. 36
Instead, dispositions to produce, process, and act on these vehicles in a certain way, 
without understanding, is what constitutes them as having content. 36–7
Content arises out of a constellation of interpreter-independent natural properties, 
so does not depend on the organism being interpretable in a certain way. 37
2.5 What Vehicle Realism Buys
There being a fact of the matter about which algorithm a system is following depends 
on realism about representation, i.e. upon intrinsically individuable vehicles of 
content. 37–8
Realism predicts that errors produce further errors downstream. 38
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Realism explains why representational resources are stable and change piecemeal 
(when observed). 38
All three patterns of explanation depend on there being non-semantically individu-
able content-bearers. 38
Vehicles are content-bearers, but vehicle types are not necessarily the content-
bearing types; the latter are ‘syntactic types’. 39
Vehicles are individual bearers of content picked out in terms of processing-relevant 
non-semantic intrinsic properties. Syntactic types are types that are processed the 
same way by the system, and so are guaranteed to have the same content. 39
Syntactic individuation is partly externalist, but still vehicles within a system share 
processing-relevant properties, which is what underpins the three patterns of explan-
ation above. 39–40
Dynamical properties can be syntactic properties—interacting in ways that are 
faithful to their contents. 40
Nothing in dynamicism as such counts against dynamical properties being repre-
sentational properties. 40
A note on metaphysics of mind. A naturalistic theory of content need not be reduc-
tive. 40–1
An illuminating sufficient condition for content can admit of exceptions, exceptions 
that can only be explained at a more fundamental level. 41
Nor need we get a necessary and sufficient condition for content. A series of differ-
ent sufficient conditions applicable to different cases would be fine. 41
2.6 Pluralism: Varitel Semantics
My framework has two variable elements: functions and exploitable relations. 41
Exploitable relation is a disjunctive category for me, with no unifying cover-all 
definition. If a condition that covers both correlation and structural correspond -
ence were too liberal, that would rob representation of its distinctive explanatory 
 purchase. 41–2
Functions are a second source of pluralism. Any theory that covers all four types 
may well over-generate. 42
Since the definition of task function is disjunctive, it is not really a single condition. 42
A final source of pluralism is that content may well be constituted differently at the 
personal level. 42
I am not here making a positive argument for pluralism, but resisting the call for a 
cover-all necessary and sufficient condition. 43
‘Varitel’ semantics marks the variety of exploitable relations, and of functions, hence 
the varietal set of accounts of content. 43
Distinctive features of the view: pluralism; restriction to the subpersonal; no 
consumer; tested not by intuition but another desideratum; and my take on realism, 
exploitable relations, and the dual nature of content. 43
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part i i
Chapter 3—Functions for Representation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the functions that underpin content, ‘task functions’. These 
are characterized, not by relation to intuition, but by the need to underwrite the 
explanatory role of representation. 47
Swampman, and the fact that the evolutionary functions of some learning mechan-
isms are highly unspecific, both motivate a notion of function-for-representation wider 
than just evolution by natural selection. 47–8
My account combines two elements: producing an outcome in a range of circum-
stances (robustness) and having a consequence etiology (stabilization). 48
3.2 A Natural Cluster Underpins a Proprietary Explanatory Role
Outcomes being robustly produced and the target of stabilization processes are 
two features that cluster naturally with a third: having internal representations that 
produce such outcomes. 48–9
Producing robust outcomes is often non-accidental. It occurs for a reason. 49
Survival of an organism, with its behavioural dispositions, is a fundamental robust-
ness tactic. 49
Learning is nature’s other great robustness trick, a route to achieving important 
outcomes more robustly. 49
An outcome F’s having been the target of these stabilizing processes (natural selec-
tion, learning and/or contribution to the persistence of an organism) naturally clusters 
with F’s being robustly produced. 49–50
Food retrieval in mountain chickadees is a robustly produced outcome that has 
been the target of all three stabilizing processes. 50
Stabilization and robustness come together to constitute task functions. 50
How are outcomes produced robustly? 50–1
Often that is due to processing over internal states, internal components that stand 
in exploitable relations to relevant aspects of the environment (i.e. over representa-
tions). This forms the third element of our natural cluster. 51
This cluster supports a host of defeasible inferences. It forms a natural kind. 51–2
Fig. 3.1 Clustering of these three features (schematic). 52
3.3 Robust Outcome Functions
Robust outcome functions, roughly, are outcomes that result from behaviour we are 
inclined to see as being goal-directed. 52–3
234 Paragraph-by-Paragraph Summary
Motor control is a good case where we know about the synchronic and diachronic 
mechanisms responsible for producing outcomes robustly. Online control tunes the 
action during execution. 53
Diachronic mechanisms recalibrate reaching dispositions when input or output is 
altered (e.g. by prism goggles or an artificial force field). 53
Fig. 3.2 Subjects adjust their reaching trajectory during action execution. 53
This case illustrates two key features: the outcome is produced in response to a range 
of different inputs and the outcome is robust across perturbations during execution 
(i.e. in external circumstances that obtain). 54
Some propose an additional requirement: that the organism should use different 
means in different circumstances. 54
Stabilizing processes can result in a cover-all strategy, where an outcome is pro-
duced by just one means, and when it is produced is sensitive to relevant external 
circumstances, so we should not require that robust outcomes must be produced by a 
repertoire of different means. 54–5
Sensitivity to inputs does not imply that the organism has to be interacting with an 
object on which its behaviour is targeted (a requirement that is a weakness of cyber-
netic accounts of goal-directedness). 55
Pursuing a single means whatever the circumstances does not count. 55
Definition: robust outcome function. 55
‘Output’ covers bodily movements, actions, and their consequences. 55–6
What counts as a different input for clause (i), and not just a different instantiation of 
the same type of input, is a subtle issue. 56
The idea of ‘relevant’ external conditions in clause (ii) also needs careful handling. 56
3.4 Stabilized Functions: Three Types
(a) Consequence etiology in general, and natural selection
Stabilized functions are based on natural selection and/or learning and/or contribu-
tion to an organism’s persistence. 56
‘Consequence etiology’ is where an output F is generated because of its conse-
quences: F occurs because it is produced by a system S, and S is present because it 
produces or has produced F. 56–7
Fig. 3.3 General treatment of consequence etiology. 57
This draws the category of function too broadly for our purposes. 57
I draw it disjunctively. Evolution by natural selection is the first case. 57
(b) Persistence of organisms
A ubiquitous enabling condition for producing an outcome F robustly is the persist-
ence of an organism disposed to produce F. 57–8
Several accounts of biological function base it in contribution to a system’s per-
sistence. 58
To define the class of systems, contributions to whose persistence should count, 
I help myself to the category organism. 58
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Bacterial chemotaxis exemplifies contribution to the persistence of an organism. 58–9
An outcome F which is like that occurs partly because of the consequences which 
flowed from the individual organism producing F in the past. 59
The effect is not specific to F (unlike natural selection or learning), since it preserves 
S with all its behavioural dispositions. Persistence is an indirect route, when combined 
with learning, towards making F more robust. 59
(c) Learning with feedback
Learning need not be driven by outcomes that contribute to persistence of the 
organism. 59 
With feedback-based learning, the consequences of producing F (e.g. of pressing a 
key) account for the disposition to produce F (in certain circumstances), and to do so 
robustly. 59–60
Fig. 3.4 Subjects learn from feedback to make reaching movements that maximize 
reward. 60
Learning is a form of diachronic flexibility in the service of being able to achieve 
important outcomes robustly. 60
Learnt behaviours have derived evolutionary functions, derived from the function 
of the learning mechanism, e.g. to track people by their faces. 60–1
Derived evolutionary functions can be quite unspecific, e.g. when learnt by classical 
conditioning. 61
A learning process can explain stabilization without explaining why certain out-
comes (e.g. getting money) reinforce/modulate dispositions to behaviour. 61
This encompasses one-shot learning, negative reinforcement, and cases where 
achieving outcomes close to O increases the organism’s tendency to achieve O. 61–2
Behaviour learnt by imitation may involve feedback, or may have a stabilized 
function as a result of cultural transmission and selection. 62
In sum: feedback-based learning is a third source of stabilized functions. 62
(d) A ‘very modern history’ theory of function
Stabilizing processes are not like kinematic equilibria: forces holding a pattern in place 
at a time. 62
So, it is tempting to treat them counterfactually or in terms of what is likely to be 
stabilizing. 62
Whether an outcome will contribute to persistence (or learning or natural selection) 
is unsuitably open-ended. 62–3
Forward-directed functions are also poorly suited to being part of an explanation of 
why outcomes are produced; historically based functions can. 63
So, I define stabilized function in terms of an actual causal history of natural selection, 
learning or contribution to an organism’s persistence: a ‘very modern history’ theory 
of function. 63
Definition: stabilized function. 64
Evolution covers cases of cultural transmission and selection. 64
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Outputs on the way to, or downstream of, some output F that is stabilized do not 
thereby also count as stabilized functions. Outcomes that have contributed to stabil-
ization unsystematically also don’t count. 64
3.5 Task Functions
The functions-for-representation that will figure in our theory are task functions. 
A task function is a robust outcome function that is also a stabilized function or the 
product of intentional design. 64
Functions based on intentional design do not meet our criteria for naturalism, so 
while noting that they share features with the others, I mostly set them aside. 65
I also set aside representational contents that are the direct result of design, as when 
a designer intends that x should represent y. 65
Definition: task function. 65
This is not offered as a definition of biological function, and I don’t follow previous 
theorists in aiming to reduce the supposed normativity of content to the supposed nor-
mativity of biological function. 65
Task function works in the subpersonal cases we will examine. Other notions of 
function (or none) may be needed elsewhere. 65–6
Task functions vary in ways that affect the explanatory bite of the contents they gen-
erate. For example, robustness and stabilization come in degrees. 66
They also vary in how many of the alternative bases of stabilized function are 
 present: all three in paradigm cases, but they need not line up and may underpin differ-
ent (and contradictory) contents. 66
In the balance between generality and informativeness, our cluster is encoun-
tered often in nature while still having the benefit of underpinning a rich set of 
inductions. 66
3.6 How Task Functions Get Explanatory Purchase
(a) Illustrated with a toy system
This section looks at a toy system based on the comparator circuit for motor control of 
reaching. 67
Our system will move along a line, from a range of initial positions, to a set position 
T, where it stops. 67–8
Fig. 3.5 The toy system. 67
We can explain how the system achieves that outcome by reference to the processing 
of internal components that bear certain exploitable relations to features of its environ-
ment. 68
Reaching T is a robust outcome function. 68
If it recharges at T, then reaching T also becomes a stabilized function; also if it 
learns, so that recharging cements an initially randomly set behavioural disposition. 
Reaching T is then a task function. 68
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An interaction between four internal components, given how they correlate with 
things in the environment, explains how the system achieves this task function. 
68–9
Successfully reaching T is explained in terms of components correlating as they 
did during stabilization, i.e. representing correctly; failure to reach T is explained in 
terms of misrepresenting. 69
(b) Swamp systems
What if our toy system were assembled by chance? It would have a robust outcome 
function, e.g. reaching the location T, but none of the possible robust outcomes seems 
to count as a success. 69
Suppose there happens to be a power source at T and the system has been moving 
around for a while, during which time it has recharged at T. Reaching T again would 
then count as a success. 69
Going beyond that intuition, we can see that the success/failure distinction arises 
because of our cluster. Then the successes are outcomes for which it is explicable both 
why and how they are produced. 69–70
The same goes for organisms: a robust outcome function of a swamp monkey would 
not count as success or failure until the individual’s interactions with the world had 
contributed to persistence or learning. 70
These thought experiments illustrate how task functions, and the success/failure 
distinction, can arise independently of evolutionary history. 70
Learning-based task functions are the same, e.g. clapping because it makes a parent 
smile. 71
Task functions still depend on history, but unlike standard teleosemantics, not on 
deep evolutionary history. 71
The robust outcome aspect of task functions means that there are real patterns in 
system–world interactions that generalize across distinct proximal properties. That 
contributes to the proprietary explanatory purchase of representational content, cp. 
§8.2b. 71
Unlike in the case of the rifle firing pin (§2.2), robust outcome functions ‘bridge’ to 
common outcomes across a range of proximal conditions. 71
Standard teleosemantic accounts do not include a robust outcome requirement, 
although their motivating examples would support it. 71–2
3.7 Rival Accounts
Griffiths argues that function should not be analysed in terms of contribution to 
persistence, because natural selection is aimed at reproduction and that can work 
against persistence of the individual.72
Our account still applies in such cases. Task functions will be based on evolution 
rather than persistence. 72
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Griffiths offers a rival forward-looking account. 72–3
The objections above to forward-looking accounts (§3.4d) apply equally here: they 
are too open-ended, and are unsuited to figure in a causal explanation of  behaviour. 73
A consequence of my account is that representations based on an evolutionary his-
tory of stabilization (reproductive fitness) can conflict with those based on persistence of 
the individual (survival). Task functions can also arise based on contribution to per-
sistence without any evolutionary benefit. 73–4
3.8 Conclusion
Three features cluster together for a natural reason: robustness, stabilization, and 
processing over internal components bearing exploitable relations. This constitutes 
some behavioural outcomes as successes and allows us to explain both how and why 
they are produced. It is this cluster that gives rise to the kind of representational con-
tent found in our case studies. It allows us to see why content has a distinctive explana-
tory role, thus satisfying our desideratum (§2.2). 74
Chapter 4—Correlational Information
4.1 Introduction
(a) Exploitable correlational information
The next two chapters turn to the internal algorithm; in this chapter, where correl-
ation is the relevant exploitable relation. 75–6
The account does not call for dedicated representation consumers that play a con-
tent-constituting role. 76
Definition: correlational information. 76
Correlations are useful. Behaviour can be conditioned on a correlate. 76
The exploitable correlations—ones that can be relied on, and where things going 
well is explicable rather than accidental—are nomologically underpinned by a single 
reason. 76–7
Definition: exploitable correlational information. 77
The regions in which a correlation subsists can be very local. 77–8
Exploitable correlational information may be carried by a range of states about a range of 
states. 78
Definition: exploitable correlational information carried by a range of states. 78
Cases of exploiting a correlation: animal signalling; equilibria in Skyrms-style signal-
ling games. 79
Exploitable correlational information is liberal: it exists with respect to many dif-
ferent regions, with different strengths. 79
The relevant correlation strength is that within the region encountered by organism/
system (individual or type). 80
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(b) Toy example
We will look at a toy example to see the way correlations are exploited. 80
Table 4.1 Useful correlational information carried by the four internal com-
ponents. 81
Fig. 4.1 Toy system discussed in the text. 81
Given the correlational information carried by the internal components, the way 
they are processed constitutes a simple algorithm for moving to a power source.  They 
meet our desideratum for the explanatory role of content. 81
The components carry other information, e.g. about sensory stimulation or rotation 
speed of the wheels, but that information cannot explain task performance so directly. 82
Correlation of internal components with light intensity would also offer a less direct 
explanation. 82
Some content indeterminacy remains, e.g. as between distance to a power source 
and distance to something worth reaching. 82
4.2 Unmediated Explanatory Information
(a) Explaining task functions
Our motivation for representationalism implies that the content-constituting cor-
relations are those which explain S’s performance of task functions. 83
We are not asking which content assignment gives the best representational explan-
ation of behaviour. We are asking which correlations offer the best causal explanation 
of robustness and stabilization. 83
To explain S’s performance of task functions is to explain how outcomes were stabil-
ized and robustly produced. 83–4
Definition: explanandum: S’s performance of task functions. 84
Definition: unmediated explanatory information (UE information). 84
A correlation with C plays an unmediated role in the explanation if its role does not 
depend on C correlating with some further condition C’. 84
UE information constitutes content. 84
Condition: for content based on correlational information. 85
The theory closely parallels the use of model-based fMRI to find representations in the 
brain. 85
To choose between candidate algorithms that would account for the observed 
behaviour, we examine which algorithm best accounts for trial-by-trial variations in 
neural activity. 85
As well as keying into external conditions, explanatory correlational information 
also has to fit with internal processing: with (locally caused) transitions between the 
information-carrying vehicles. 85–6
Algorithms usually call for processing steps in which different vehicles have  different 
 contents. ‘Unmediated’ does not count against the computation being mediated by a 
series of steps. 86
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UE information covers output correlations too. These give rise to directive contents. 
But there has to be some descriptive content in the system somewhere. 86
There are some internal states whose tokening correlates with achieving an output 
that is itself a task function, e.g. getting sugar. When it forms part of a wider story, that 
will count as UE information. 86–7
My account is in the spirit of Dretske (1986, 1988), where correlational information 
is a structuring cause of behaviour. 87
But my account is more general: it is not restricted to instrumental conditioning; 
correlations need not pre-exist; and it applies when several vehicles need to interact to 
produce the stabilized behaviour. 87–8
The latter is important because real cases have many representational vehicles that 
interact in complex ways. 88
(b) Reliance on explanation
As in other sciences, I am assuming a realist account of causal-explanatory rela-
tions. 88
So, it is not an interest-relative matter whether UE information exists. It may be 
interest-relative whether we go in for representational explanation (i.e. appeal to the 
property we have theorized). 88
If causal-explanatory relations are interest-relative throughout the sciences, then 
they would be in my theory too. 88–9
We do need to ask whether the property picked out by the definition of UE informa-
tion is any use. It is, because it is in fact the property that figures in many representa-
tional explanations of behaviour. 89
(c) Evidential test
UE information makes performing task functions more likely. That gives us a test 
for UE information. 89
Evidential test for UE information. 89
In the toy system, strengthening the correlation of r with location directly affects the 
chance of reaching T. 89
Strengthening the correlation with light intensity would have a less strong effect on 
achieving that outcome. 89–90
The test also applies to correlations at output (e.g. noise in the motor system). 90
It is only an evidential test, not always satisfied, and not necessarily giving the right 
result. 90
The test is restricted to correlations with conditions involving natural properties, 
since these are the best candidates to figure in causal explanations of a system’s per-
formance of task functions. 90
To apply the test, keep fixed how the vehicles interact, and consider what would 
happen if the world was in a particular state more or less often. 90–1
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The test can be applied to the system in the past (during stabilization) or, less ideally, 
applied to current circumstances. 91
4.3 Feedforward Hierarchical Processing
Here we look at a simple case: the ALCOVE feedforward neural network. 91
Its task function is to put objects of category A into box A. 91
Nodes at the hidden layer (‘exemplar nodes’) correlate with individual objects and 
carry information about many other things (i)–(vi). 91–2
Fig. 4.2 The ALCOVE network. 92
At the hidden layer, the unmediated explanatory information is about exemplar 
identity. 92
According to the evidential test, the UE information at output concerns object cat-
egories; at input, perceptual features. 93
At the hidden layer, exemplar and category are tied on the evidential test, but 
exemplar content gives us a better understanding of how the system achieves its task 
functions. 93
UE information chooses between coextensive correlations and tends to home in on 
distal properties, e.g. in another model JIM, the geons are about objects rather than 
sensory features. 93
A further development of ALCOVE has reciprocal connections. We turn to feed-
back in §4.8. 93
This account of content makes good on my earlier claim that there is no need for a 
representation consumer that plays a content-constituting role. 93
4.4 Taxonomy of Cases
Neural processing takes place in complex ways. 94
Fig. 4.3 Diagram of the primate visual system. 94
Fig. 4.4 The four kinds of case exemplified in §§ 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 respectively. 95
I will pick out four kinds of cases and look at an example of each. 95
It is very hard to identify a single consumer system when there are feedback loops 
and no simple hierarchy. 95
In Case 1, one vehicle is used by two different output subsystems. In Case 2, two dif-
ferent representations are used by a single subsystem. 95–6
In Case 3, information is processed via two routes, one direct and one indirect. 
Case 4 features feedback and cycles. 96
The case studies below consider each in isolation to show that none presents an obs-
tacle to the UE approach. 96
4.5 One Vehicle for Two Purposes
It is common to find one animal signal used by different receivers for different infor-
mation it carries (e.g. mates and predators of a firefly). 96
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A cooperative example of that is a chicken signalling to conspecifics and to a 
predator. 96
Corollary discharge tells the motor system to act and tells perceptual systems that 
the organism is acting. 96–7
C. elegans contains a simple example of this. 97
Arguably the contents are of different kinds here, descriptive and directive (see 
Chapter 7). 97
In our case studies, where there is reuse it turns out that the same content is being 
used by different subsystems. 97
4.6 Representations Processed Differently in Different Contexts
(a) Analogue magnitude representations
The analogue magnitude system looks at first as if it represents different contents in 
different contexts, but actually there is probably a common representation of numer-
osity. 97–8
It acts as an (imperfect) correlate of the numerosity of many kinds of array, with 
discrimination displaying the characteristic Weber’s law set-size signature. 98
There is evidence for a common numerosity register—comparisons across modal-
ities, interference, common neural basis—while also registering whether the items are 
objects, tones, flashes, etc. 98
Consider a stylized system with one register R for numerosity and another R’ for 
stimulus type. 98–9
Fig. 4.5 Case 2. 99
Rather than separate domain-specific contents for different downstream uses, the 
UE approach implies that R is a common register for numerosity tout court. 99
These considerations mean that UE information will often ‘triangulate’ on a com-
mon content. Being decoupled from specific outputs, perceptual representations are 
pushed towards having purely descriptive content. 99–100
The systematic relationship between activation and numerosity means that the 
system can represent numerosities beyond those encountered during stabil-
ization. 100
(b) PFC representations of choice influenced by colour  
and motion
We turn to the prefrontal cortex for a case where the two different kinds of informa-
tion are carried in the same register and used in different contexts. 100
Subjects see an array of random dots in varying proportions of two different colours 
and with varying motion directions. Their task is either to judge preponderant colour 
or preponderant motion direction. 100
Fig. 4.6 Behavioural task in Mante et al. (2013). 101
Neural evidence accumulates for both colour and motion, in a distributed neural 
pattern. 101
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The context affects whether the evidence that accumulates to drive choice (move-
ment in the choice direction) is colour or motion. 101–2
Fig. 4.7 Schematic representation of the processing in Mante et al. (2013). 102
Simplify: representational processing of two vehicles at input, one at output (pro-
gramming saccades). 102
Task function: to get juice; relevant condition is colour in some trials, motion in 
others. 102
List of correlations with distal features that explain performance of the task func-
tion, hence constitute content. 102
Correlations with properties of sensory input would be less explanatory. 102–3
Lumping all the inputs together in a single space is less explanatory of how the sys-
tem computes. 103
Some indeterminacy remains. That is appropriate to the case. 103
4.7 One Representation Processed via Two Routes
Case 3 is where a single representation is processed by two routes, one direct and one 
indirect. 103
We look at an example of that in the visual system, from van Essen and Gallant 
(1994). 103–4
Fig. 4.8 Case 3. 103
Fig. 4.9 A detail from van Essen and Gallant (1994). 104
We focus on the interaction between V2 Thin stripe, V2 Thick stripe, and MT, with a 
simplified computational interpretation. 104
MT detects plaid motion: motion of overlapping surfaces moving in different direc-
tions. 104
There are two routes from V2 Thin stripe to MT. 104–5
We consider a simplified system with the task function of intercepting moving 
objects. 105
MT correlates with direction of motion of encountered objects, V2 Thick stripe 
with local motion direction, and V2 Thin stripe with a chromatic invariant of 
 surfaces. 105
Different components are doing different jobs. 105
A consumer-based approach could bundle these together into a single intermediate 
representation, but that would not account for how the system manages to compute 
motion direction. 105–6
In short, the UE information approach is appropriate for cases of one vehicle pro-
cessed via two routes. 106
4.8 Feedback and Cycles
Bogacz (2015) describes a probabilistic calculation for deciding between options on 
the basis of sensory evidence. The model involves cyclical information processing en 
route to action selection. 106
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The circuit calculates probabilities that various possible actions will be rewarded. 
When one of these crosses a threshold the system outputs the corresponding action. 106
To see how the UE approach can apply to probabilistic representations, first notice 
that fine-grained information about the probabilities of a range of world states can be 
useful information to have. 106–7
Fig. 4.10 The neural computation proposed by Bogacz (2015). 107
The joint probability distribution of a range of putative representations X and a 
range of world states Y, if based on a univocal reason, is a fine-grained exploitable cor-
relation carried by X about Y. 107
Correlations like that, which figure in explaining performance of task functions, 
qualify as UE information, hence fix content. 108
Conditions Y about which X carries more mutual information are, ceteris paribus, 
better candidates to be UE information carried by X. 108
We need to replace correctness with a graded notion of accuracy. The Kullback-
Leibler divergence of the true distribution from the represented distribution is one 
appropriate measure. 108–9
In Bogacz (2015), the system takes a sensory input and uses it to calculate posterior 
probabilities that available actions will be rewarded. If none crosses a threshold, they 
act as priors that are updated with the next sensory input. 109
The system has been trained by feedback to produce the action that is mostly likely 
to be rewarded in the current context. 109
Bogacz’s probabilistic computational model captures the UE information used by 
the system to perform the task. 109–10
Fig. 4.11 Case 4. 109
This case shows that the varitel framework can discern content processed in feedback 
loops. 110
4.9 Conclusion
For a relevant input–output mapping (and Chapter 3 told us that task functions are 
the relevant ones), content is fixed by exploitable relations carried by components 
which make internal processing an implementation of an algorithm to perform the 
input–output mapping. 110
For correlations, the content-constituting ones are those which unmediatedly 
explain, through implementing an algorithm, how a system performs its task func-
tions. That works in a series of case studies. It does not call for a content-constituting 
consumer system. 110
Chapter 5—Structural Correspondence
5.1 Introduction
This chapter: structural correspondence is an exploitable relation and can be content-
constituting. 111
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A correspondence: maps entities from domain 1 to entities in domain 2; and there is 
a relation between the entities in domain 1 that is mirrored by a relation between the 
entities in domain 2 to which they map. 111–12
The thin notion of relation makes the existence of a structural correspondence 
between relations too undemanding. Here I develop principled restrictions to candi-
date relations on both sides of the correspondence. 112
For every relation on entities in the world, and any way of mapping a set of vehicles 
onto them, there is a corresponding relation on the vehicles. 112
In general, a structural correspondence of this kind is not something that will help a 
system perform task functions. So, it cannot be content-constituting while meeting our 
desideratum. 112
Fig. 5.1 For any relation on entities in the world, there is a corresponding relation 
on vehicles. 113
The cognitive map in the rat hippocampus exemplifies a more substantive kind of 
correspondence, an exploitable structural correspondence. These can be exploited, thus 
constituting content, or go unexploited. 113
5.2 The Cognitive Map in the Rat Hippocampus
Rat place cells fire when the rat is at a specific location. 113–14
Fig. 5.2 Place cells in the rat hippocampus are tuned to specific locations. 114
This is useful information to have, e.g. to learn what to do in different locations, but 
that would not be to make use of a relation between place cells. 114–15
Taken on its own, place-specific firing does not show that any relation on the place 
cells is being exploited. 115
Cells for nearby locations tend to activate one another when active offline, showing 
replay or preplay of routes through space. 115
Co-activation is used to compare different routes to a rewarded location and pick 
the shorter one. 115–16
This is a matter of achieving task functions robustly, stabilized by interaction with 
the environment, part of the explanation for which is the structural correspondence 
between  co-activation and space. 116
So, this is a case where use of a structural correspondence to perform task functions 
is the basis of representational content. 116
5.3 Preliminary Definitions
This section defines ‘structural correspondence’ and ‘structural representation’, and 
says what it is for a structural correspondence to be content-constituting. 116
Symbols: the structural correspondence obtains between relation V on vehicles vi 
and relation H on worldly entities xi. 116–17
Fig. 5.1 shows an isomorphism, but I define structural correspondence in terms of 
the slightly looser notion of homomorphism, which allows for two different represen-
tations with the same content. 117
Definition: structural correspondence. 117
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This does not imply that the parts have to be representations. For simplicity I use the 
standard definition of structural representation, which assumes that they are, but my 
approach could still apply if they’re not. 117–18
What it takes to be a structural representation is that a relation on representations 
represents a relation on the entities represented. 118
Definition: structural representation. 118
We are interested in cases where a relation on vehicles represents a relation in the 
world because the relation on vehicles bears a structural correspondence to the world. 
The definition of structural representation does not entail that. 118
Definition: structural correspondence as content-constituting. 118
For a system to make use of a structural correspondence, the relation V between 
vehicles has to make a difference to downstream processing. 119
For contrast, consider vervet alarm calls and, somewhat arbitrarily, the relation 
H, higher than, between predators (i.e. how high off the ground the predator usually 
is). 119
A relation on the alarm calls corresponds to H, but vervets are not sensitive to that 
relation (nor to any relation between alarm calls). The structural correspondence 
exists, but is not content-constituting. 119
The requirement that a structural correspondence be used, therefore usable, 
cuts down very considerably on the problematic liberality of structural corres-
pondence. 119
5.4 Content-Constituting Structural Correspondence
(a) Exploitable structural correspondence
This section sets out the substantive notion of structural correspondence we 
need. 120
In the rat case, co-activation made a difference to processing, and its correspond-
ence to distance was being used. 120
Having a relation that processing is sensitive to correspond to a task-relevant rela-
tion in the world is a major achievement. 120
Definition: exploitable structural correspondence. 120
Downstream processing is sensitive to co-activation, but not to the colour of the cell 
bodies, nor to where they are located within a hippocampal layer. 120–1
The place cells on their own are useful because they enable acquisition of a co-
activation structure, but I reserve ‘exploitable structural correspondence’ for when the 
relation on vehicles is already in place. 121
NB: the exploitable relation is not the co-activation relation. It’s the overall structural 
correspondence. 121
Neural processing is sensitive to relations between firing rates, and temporal 
relations between spikes; possibly also to phase offset. 121
Plasticity can alter downstream processing so that a merely potentially exploitable 
structural correspondence turns into an exploitable one, i.e. one where processing is 
systematically sensitive to the relation between vehicles. 121–2
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The relation on vehicles should make a systematic difference to downstream 
processing—which can be spelt out. 122
The worldly relation has to be significant for the system, given its task functions. 
That will usually exclude gruesome and disjunctive properties. 122
Notice that there are different restrictions on the two sides of the correspond-
ence. 122–3
A structural correspondence is instantiated when an instance of the relation V is 
instantiated between two vehicles, together with an instance of relation H being 
instantiated between the two worldly entities to which they correspond. 123
We have identified the useful structural correspondences. This captures the sense in 
which the Survey of India was useful. 123
(b) Unmediated explanatory structural correspondence
For an exploitable structural correspondence to be exploited is for it to figure in a 
causal explanation of a system’s performance of task functions. 123
Definition: unmediated explanatory structural correspondence (UE structural corres- 
pondence). 123
For the rat, getting to a particular location again is a task function, performed by 
using the structural correspondence between co-activation and space. 124
This gives rise to content based on UE information and UE structural correspond-
ence. 124
Definition: condition for content based on structural correspondence. 124
So structural correspondence, of an appropriate kind, is part of what gives represen-
tations their content. 124
The definition is neutral between descriptive and directive content—see Chapter 7. 
124
Exploitable structural correspondence is not (circularly) defined in terms of being 
exploitable. 125
A UE structural correspondence can determine content about entities xn and a rela-
tion H on them all at once. 125
Fig. 5.3 Points on a simple map pick out locations, and do so in virtue of their 
spatial relations to other things on the map. 125
A new exploitable structural correspondence can be created by creating new rela-
tions amongst existing vehicles, e.g. learning the (arbitrary) count words by rote. 126
Putting together a series of vehicles so that the sequence becomes automatized is a 
common way to create new structure. 126
In short, new exploitable structural correspondences can be created by constructing 
new relations on vehicles or by making downstream processing newly sensitive to an 
existing relation on vehicles. 126
5.5 Unexploited Structural Correspondence
In some cases an obvious structural correspondence is not being exploited and is 
not a basis for content. 126–7
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Many deliberately designed representations are set up so as to make an obvious 
relation usable, e.g. spatial relations. 127
Colour is another easily used relation on representational vehicles. 127
Many cognitive science cases are like the honeybee nectar dance in that a structural 
correspondence which obviously exists is not being exploited. 127
The bee dance is, however, an ‘organized sign system’ (Godfrey-Smith  2017). 
127–8
Organization in this sense is an important feature. It allows a compact mechanism to 
extend to a range of cases (cp. §4.1a), and to extend to new cases. It also makes the system 
error-tolerant. 128
Organization is different from structural representation. 128
Cummins’s ingenious driverless car example is a case of structural representation. 
The structure is the relation between subsequent pin positions on the guide-card. 128
Fig. 5.4 Cummins’s case of a driverless car guided by a slot in a card. 129
The distance moved by the pin correlates with how far the car has moved on the 
ground. The car uses spatial relations between positions on the card to program appro-
priate actions. 129
Fig. 5.5 One step of the computation being performed in Cummins’s driverless car 
case. 130
This is a case of UE structural correspondence: relations between pin positions on 
the card represent relations between locations of the car on the ground. 130
Gallistel’s concept of a functioning isomorphism inspired, and is much like, my 
notion of UE structural correspondence, but is more permissive in one important 
respect. 130–1
Gallistel allows that ‘indirect’ isomorphisms, ‘created only by way of an interpret-
ative code’, are a sufficient basis for content. 131
That is too liberal. The interpretative code could work on each representation 
piecemeal. Then relations between representations would lose any significance for 
content. 131
I agree that which relations count depends on downstream processing, but this 
must be a matter of sensitivity in a systematic way to some interpreter-independent 
relation on the representations. 131
So, I allow some but not all of Gallistel’s indirect isomorphisms. 131–2
5.6 Two More Cases of UE Structural Correspondence
(a) Similarity structure
We examine two more case studies in which a structural correspondence is 
exploited and is thereby constitutive of content. The first is exploitation of similarity 
structure. 132
Similarity in neural activation patterns can be measured by distance in activation 
state space. 132–3
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Fig. 5.6 Illustration of neural similarity space. 132
A neural similarity structure, e.g. as observed in BOLD repetition suppression 
effects, is relevant if subjects’ task is to judge the similarity of objects presented to 
them. 133
When similarity in neural activation space is being used for the way it corresponds 
to some objective dimension(s) of similarity between objects, this is a case of UE 
structural correspondence. 133–4
Note: this is not based on a claim about subjectively experienced similarity. 134
(b) Causal structure
The second case involves representation of causal structure, which has been so 
significant for human evolution. 134
Action selection can be based simply on whether an action led to reward in the past 
(model-free) or on an understanding of the causal connections between actions and 
their consequences (model-based). 134–5
The two-step task tests for model-based choice, hence causal understanding, but 
does not require structural representation. 135
Huys et al. (2012, 2015) tested causal planning using a more complex multi-step 
task. 135
This causal planning capacity may be an elaboration of the capacity to represent the 
sequential order of events. When the sequential structure mirrors causal structure, 
that correspondence is exploitable to do causal reasoning. 135–6
Fig. 5.7 The structure of the task studied by Huys et al. (2012, 2015). 136
If subjects doing causal planning rely on sequential order between brain states 
corresponding to causal accessibility between world states, then this is a case of UE 
structural correspondence. 136–7
5.7 Some Further Issues
(a) Exploiting structural correspondence cannot  
be assimilated to exploiting correlations
Often the representing relation will also correlate with what it represents. Is correl-
ation doing all the content-constituting work? 137
Using a relation between vehicles ≠ using it because it corresponds to a relation 
between the entities represented by those vehicles. Example: the difference between 
the firing rates of neurons representing the gaze direction of each eye correlates 
(inversely) with the distance of the object of focal attention. 137
Fig. 5.8 The difference in firing rate between gaze-direction neurons for each eye 
correlates inversely with the distance to the attended object. 138
But this is being used for its correlation with object distance, not because it cor-
responds to a relation between the things represented by the two gaze-direction 
neurons. 138
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A second objection is that the cases of computations involving UE information in 
the last chapter already depend on structural correspondence: that the functional 
transitions in the computation correspond to the structure of the world. But that is not 
a case of structural representation at all. 138–9
UE structural correspondence is a special kind of case, with two consequences:
 (i) add a new vehicle to the structure and it acquires content irrespective of any 
correlations;
 (ii) the relation can be used to compute across a range of vehicles in a systematic 
way. 139
An entirely accidentally corresponding structure could be used for its correspond-
ence to the world. 139–40
In sum, UE structural correspondence is a separate basis of content from UE 
information. 140
(b) Approximate instantiation
Correspondences that are only approximately instantiated can still explain per-
formance of task functions. 140
A structural correspondence I is approximately instantiated when the actual relation 
between the objects represented is approximately equal to their relation under I. 140
Since we have put strong constraints on the objects and relation that can figure in 
I, it is very unlikely that I is ever exactly instantiated. 140
Allowing approximate instantiation opens up a wide class of candidate exploitable 
structural correspondences. We need to ask how exactly/approximately each was 
instantiated. 140–1
The degree of approximateness should match the degree to which behaviour con-
tributed to stabilization. 141
This does not trump considerations about which objects and properties are explana-
tory of task performance. 141–2
Representational redundancy, where two vehicles map to the same object, is pos-
sible in a candidate structural correspondence, but this will reduce the accuracy with 
which the relation between objects in the world is represented. 142
(c) Evidential test for UE structural correspondence
With this notion of approximate instantiation we can formulate an evidential test 
for content (cp. §4.2): the correspondence whose accuracy of instantiation is most dir-
ectly connected to the likelihood of achieving task functions is a good candidate to be 
the content. 142
Evidential test for UE structural correspondence. 142
The test is epistemically helpful in dealing with indeterminacy. 143
The test does not imply that the more accurate correspondence is always the better 
candidate. 143
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Applied to the similarity space on bird images in Constantinescu et al. (2016), the 
evidential test delivers the content assignment argued for above. 143
5.8 Conclusion
The liberality of isomorphism is a problem because it would rob representation of its 
explanatory power. From our perspective, liberality is a symptom of a deeper problem: 
most correspondences are not usable, let alone used. This chapter delimited a restricted 
class of exploitable structural correspondences. We saw that these are a plausible basis 
for content determination. 143–4
part i i i
Chapter 6—Standard Objections
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to make more explicit the way varitel semantics deals with 
standard philosophical challenges faced by theories of content. 147–8
6.2 Indeterminacy
(a) Aspects of the problem
The plan is to look at determinacy problems in the standard case (the frog prey-
capture system), the analogue magnitude system and, in subsection (d), cognitive 
maps in the rat. 148
We’ll work with a simplified version of the frog’s tongue-dart prey-capture 
 system. 148
Consider representation R, in the retinal ganglion, which responds to flies at loca-
tion (x,y,z) and causes a tongue dart to that location. 148
Distality problem: does content concern the fly and the action of catching it, or more 
proximal stimulation and bodily movement? 148
Specificity problem: which of a nested set of co-instantiated properties is repre-
sented? 149
Disjunction problem: why is content not a disjunction of relevant conditions? In my 
terminology, all three are aspects of the determinacy problem. 149
Answers are tested, not against intuitions about the case, but by whether they 
deliver the right amount of determinacy for explaining content-based explanation of 
behaviour. 149
(b) Determinacy of task functions
First move: task functions contribute some determinacy. 150
Task function and a (simple) algorithm are in place in the case of the frog. 150
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Its task function is to catch flies, not little black moving things—based on which 
properties are directly responsible for survival and reproduction (selection for). 150
This also counts against background conditions (e.g. strength of gravity) and 
fine-grained qualifications (e.g. not poisonous) figuring in the content. 150–1
The task function is however indeterminate as between fly (biological taxon), flying 
nutritious object (ecological category) and object worth eating. 151
In the analogue magnitude system, its (learning-based) task functions home in on 
numerosity. 151
(c) Correlations that play an unmediated role in explaining  
task functions
The requirement for unmediated explanation of task functions also contributes 
some determinacy. As a result, distal conditions are often better candidates. 151–2
In the analogue magnitude system, correlation with numerosity explains directly. 
Correlation with sensory properties figures only in a mediated explanation. 152
Asking how a collection of correlations explains an ensemble of task functions also 
helps, e.g. it homes in on flies rather than food in general. 152
Varitel semantics cannot appeal, for determinacy, to facts about what the organism 
can discriminate; nor to which correlation is strongest. 152
Convergence between correlational information and task function provides some 
constraint: exploitable correlational information must be nomologically underpinned, 
for a univocal reason. That favours a non-disjunctive category like fly over a disjunct-
ive category like species 1 or species 2 or species 3. 153
Indeterminacy remains, e.g. as between fly and flying nutritious object, and as 
between various ways of precisifying the category fly. 153
Driving towards determinacy in the analogue magnitude case is the fact that the 
representations are used across a range of different downstream computations and 
behavioural outputs. 153–4
The account does not require a representation to be caused by what it represents. 154
Pietroski’s case does not prove the contrary once we consider simple non-conscious 
systems and foreswear problematic intuitions. 154
(d) UE structural correspondence
In the rat, the relevant correspondence is with distal features, for the reason we have 
just seen, but there may be indeterminacy between various ways of understanding 
what locations are, e.g. as between absolute and relative spatial positions. 154–5
It may be indeterminate whether place cells pick out locations indexically or non- 
indexically. 155
(e) Natural properties
The approach tends to favour natural properties. That counts against arbitrary dis-
junctions. 155
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Such properties tend not to figure in causal explanations, which stops Peacocke-
style reduced content arising in these simple systems. 155–6
More complex representations, like human conceptual representations, clearly can 
represent such contents, using the combinatorial power of concepts. 156
(f) Different contents for different vehicles
A soft constraint deriving from the definition of UE information is that different 
 vehicles in the same range should generally have different contents. 156
E.g. with the frog, ascribing the content there is a fly nearby to the firing of all retinal 
ganglion cells would be less explanatory of the frog’s performance of its task functions. 
156
My constraint: different contents for different vehicles in the same range will gener-
ally be more explanatory. 156
Soft constraint: different contents for different vehicles. 157
It follows that location is represented in the frog; numerosity (rather than many) in the 
analogue magnitude system. 157
Different components within the overall system tend to have different jobs, there-
fore carry different contents, although redundancy is possible. 157
(g) The appropriate amount of determinacy
We should expect more indeterminate contents in lower level systems. 157
Components have a family of relational properties in the frog case, with not enough 
complexity in the system to support a way of distinguishing between them. 157
This is either indeterminacy between multiple closely related contents, or a deter-
minate content that cannot be captured precisely in natural language. 157–8
An indeterminacy for the whole system, about a collection of UE information for a 
collection of internal vehicles, does not imply each content is indeterminate independ-
ently of the others, since they must fit with each other in an explanation. 158
In a system with multiple interacting components, the need for a mesh between UE 
information carried by different components is a significant constraint on indeter-
minacy. 158
(h) Comparison to other theories
Like in Millikan, indeterminacy is reduced by appealing to causal explanation, which 
selects amongst coextensional properties, and by rejecting mediated explanations of 
stabilization. 158–9
My account adds: convergence with information; being more explicit about the 
constraint that different representations should have different contents; and the fact 
that some indeterminacy is a virtue in our subpersonal cases. 159
Papineau argues that indeterminacy is ruled out by the determinacy of desires, and 
by appealing to a component’s specific function (following Neander). 159
254 Paragraph-by-Paragraph Summary
My account is like Price: content is constrained by explanatory role; having an infor-
mation-carrying requirement; and adopting a high church view (contra Neander and 
Pietroski). 159–60
Price’s immediacy and abstractness conditions have roughly the same effect as my 
call for correlations that feature in an unmediated explanation of task function per-
formance. With multiple components, my account also favours correlations that are 
specific to a component. 160
Neander is the leading proponent of low church teleosemantics, tying content to 
conditions that an organism can discriminate between. I don’t agree that contents, or 
long-armed functions, are restricted to things a component is responsible for on its 
own. 160
Neander’s second argument is based on the science of how toads manage to discrim-
inate their prey. That practice does not imply—indeed I would argue counts against—
content being tied to discriminative capacities. 160–1
My account does allow that sensorily specific properties are represented in suitably 
articulated systems (e.g. §4.7), but that is not the case in the (stylized) frog/toad prey-
capture mechanism. 161
Ryder, Martinez, and Artiga all fix contents in terms of properties that explain statis-
tical regularities amongst worldly conditions, in different ways. 161
Objection: the property that explains co-occurrence in the world need not be the 
one which explains successful behaviour. 161–2
6.3 Compositionality and Non-Conceptual Representation
Some features of concepts are found in the simpler systems in our case studies: 
semantically significant structure, unsaturated components and (limited) generality. 162
‘Non-conceptual’ covers all cases outside ‘concepts’, which are personal level, 
expressed in language, and constituents of beliefs and desires. 162
Concepts obey a wide-ranging generality constraint. 162
I extend ‘saturated’ to non-conceptual representations, without semantically sig-
nificant constituent structure, that have a complete correctness and/or satisfaction 
condition. 162
Most of our case studies do not involve predication; although many have semantic-
ally significant structure of a simpler kind, but only limited generality. 163
The plaid motion detection system (§4.7) has different layers for colour and motion. 
Neither has semantically significant constituent structure. 163
The PFC colour-motion case (§4.6b) and the bee dance case do have multiple com-
ponents, but the components stand alone and make claims separately. They are not 
unsaturated. 163
These representations do have semantically significant structure, unlike the two 
separate representations in the plaid motion case. 163–4
Neither the PFC case nor the bee dance case involves unsaturated elements or 
predication. 164
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There may be unsaturated elements when place cells are used offline. 164
Our case studies do show some systematicity, and so meet a restricted, domain-
specific generality constraint. 164–5
Time and place are not semantically significant features in the bee dance or PFC 
case (pace Millikan). 165
We should distinguish a different kind of ‘systematicity’, the kind found in a sign 
system exhibiting ‘organization’ (§5.5): there being a systematic mapping relation-
ship from a vehicle dimension to a content dimension (e.g. more waggles = further 
away). 165
Concepts are reused in a wide range of contexts. Lacking that, the representations in 
our case studies are likely to have less determinacy. 165–6
Recap: three features of concepts are also found, to some extent, in our case 
studies. 166
6.4 Objection to Relying on (Historical) Functions
(a) Swampman
My accounts must overcome the standard challenges to relying on history in a theory of 
content. 166
This is made vivid by considering an intrinsic duplicate system with no history: a 
swampman. 166–7
All our case studies could have swamp duplicates. Why aren’t the robust outcome 
functions of these systems enough to ground content? 167
Because, without appeal to history, there is nothing to undergird a distinction 
between success and failure of behaviour, in such systems. 167
E.g. consider a swamp system like the one in §4.7 that catches a ball, and another 
that just misses. 167
Neither would be making an error. Without stabilized functions, there is no room 
for a system that robustly produces an outcome in error. 168
The historical basis of stabilized functions allows us to make this distinction. Success 
is beneficial. 168
That intuitive argument is supported by the argument in Chapter 3 that selection, 
learning, and contribution to an organism’s persistence are part of the cluster that gives 
explanatory purchase to representational content. 168–9
The stabilization process could be very recent, so a swamp system that starts inter-
acting with its environment will rapidly acquire some task functions. 169
Other mental properties like memory would also build up rapidly in a swamp sys-
tem. (Interactions with the environment would soon ground a substantial difference 
between Catcher and Misser.) 169
In sum, I cut down the scope of the challenge, since my view does not imply that 
swamp humans have no contents, and because content builds up rapidly during inter-
actions; and then I make a positive argument that in the simple systems in our case 
studies content should be based on history in this way. 169
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(b) Comparison to Millikan and Papineau
Millikan says content-based generalizations depend on the historical kind human, 
so do not carry over to swampman. 169–70
But why don’t content-based generalizations run off some currently constituted cat-
egory (as other generalizations about swampman do)? 170
According to varitel semantics, that is because swamp systems do not fall in the nat-
ural cluster that underpins content-based explanation. 170
Papineau says the best a posteriori reduction of content, in our world where there 
are no swamp systems, is historical. 170
This undershoots: the current properties are positively less explanatorily powerful 
because they miss the distinctive cluster, so apply more widely and support fewer 
inductions. 170–1
6.5 Norms of Representation and of Function
(a) Systematic misrepresentation
For me, representing correctly, and well-functioning, are merely descriptive distinc-
tions to which norms can be applied. That is all we should expect in these cases. 171
Even so I face the argument that, because fitness interests are sometimes best 
served by systematically misrepresenting what is the case, representing correctly 
cannot be equated with promoting fitness. 171–2
Peacocke’s example: systematically misrepresenting the predator as closer than it is, 
so as to run away faster, gives a selective advantage. 172
These examples typically assume that the representation in question is involved in a 
second pattern of behaviour, which fixes the correct content. If so, two different con-
tents could arise on my view. 172
Fig. 6.1 The structure of the case from Peacocke (1993). 172
Our case studies do not have that kind of structure. It has not been shown that a 
challenge based on systematic misrepresentation is tenable in such cases. 173
A reason to think it is not is that, without further articulation, content ends up being 
fixed so as to align with whatever story is told about evolutionary benefit (cp. a repre-
sentation theorem in decision theory). 173
Even though I reject the possibility of radical disconnection, misrepresentation 
and  malfunction do come apart on my view, and can do so systematically (e.g. sys-
tematic false positives). 173
(b) Psychologically proprietary representation
Burge (2010) makes three arguments, on normative grounds, against teleological 
approaches to content. Subsection (a) covered his first argument. 174
His second argument is that they are too liberal, extending to cases where content 
has no real explanatory value. I argue elsewhere that my contents do have explanatory 
value in such cases (§2.3, §8.2). 174
Burge’s third argument is that contents should be distinctively psychological and 
normative. 174
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I accept that some psychological cases are more sophisticated, but some psycho-
logical cases are covered by my approach. I argue that the requirement that representa-
tion be psychologically proprietary is not well-motivated. 174–5
On normativity, Burge has a non-reductive approach, and argues that there is no 
need for an account in non-semantic, non-mental, and non-normative terms. 175
I agree with Burge that such an account is not required to believe that there are rep-
resentations. But such an account is more illuminating, when it is available, as I argue it 
is here. 175
6.6 Conclusion
Varitel semantics produces less indeterminacy than informational semantics and 
teleosemantics. The remaining indeterminacy is what we should expect in the sys-
tems we have been considering. 175–6
The historical component of task functions is needed just to get the explanandum—
successful behaviour—into the picture. But misrepresentation is not reduced to mal-
function. 176
In short, varitel semantics does a reasonable job of avoiding the standard challenges 
in the literature. 176
Chapter 7—Descriptive and Directive Representation
7.1 Introduction
A descriptive representation is supposed to match the world; a directive repre-
sentation is supposed to make a condition obtain. 177
This chapter draws the distinction in a non-theory-neutral way, within the varitel 
framework. 177
‘Descriptive’ and ‘directive’ are better terms than ‘indicative’ and ‘imperative’ because 
the latter are used in linguistics for the grammatical mood of a sentence. 177–8
Even our simple case studies may contain other modes of representing, e.g. the suppos-
itional. 178
With beliefs and desires, the shared condition is sometimes called the content 
(that p), and the mode of representing is separated out, as an attitude to that con-
tent. 178
My terminology uses ‘content’ more broadly, for a full specification of representa-
tional import, including mode of representing. 178
A bodily movement can also count as a ‘condition’ C that the organism brings 
about. 178
7.2 An Account of the Distinction
The accounts of content in Chapters 4 and 5 are based on exploitable relations 
explaining task function performance, without distinguishing between relations to 
inputs and relations to outputs. 179
258 Paragraph-by-Paragraph Summary
We can supplement the accounts of content to classify the exploitable relations as 
playing a descriptive or directive role (or both). 179
A tempting first thought is to rely on an asymmetry in causation: caused by the 
world or causing an outcome. 179
But for varitel semantics the distinction should turn, not on causation, but on an 
asymmetry in how exploitable relations and their associated conditions figure in 
explaining task function performance. Descriptive representations need not be caused 
by their contents at all. 179
Directives are representations R where the role of the vehicle in explaining task func-
tions depends on the fact that R produces condition C; for descriptives its explanatory 
role depends on C’s obtaining already at the point when the behavioural outputs 
prompted by R occur. 179–80
The case of corollary discharge introduces a complication which means that it is 
easier to define directive content first. 180
Definition: directive content (based on UE information). 180
For directive content, R’s role in explaining stabilization and/or robustness is to 
cause condition C to obtain. 180
Production of an outcome which is itself task functional can be explanatory as part 
of explaining how the whole system comes to produce this outcome in a way that was 
stabilized and robust (§4.2a). 180
Descriptive content concerns a condition C whose obtaining when R is tokened 
figures in explaining robustness and stabilization, but we need to exclude cases where 
the explanation is that R has the causal role to produce condition C. 180–1
Definition: descriptive content (based on UE information). 181
We don’t want the definition to imply that all directives also have descriptive con-
tent, but we do want that to be possible (e.g. in some cases of corollary discharge). 181
Where a motor command for C has a second functional role leading to behaviour 
whose explanation depends on condition C obtaining independently, then it should 
have additional descriptive content. 181
Our definition delivers that result. 181–2
For the structural correspondence case, consider a structural representation R that 
has a UE structural correspondence with condition H(x1,x2). 182
Definition: directive content (based on UE structural correspondence). 182
Definition: descriptive content (based on UE structural correspondence). 182
Applied to rat navigation, offline place cell co-activation descriptively represents 
that location x is near to location y. 182–3
7.3 Application to Case Studies
(a) UE information
The honeybee nectar dance is a pushmi-pullyu according to my definitions of 
descriptive and directive content. 183
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The ALCOVE model has pushmi-pullyus at output and descriptives at the input and 
exemplar layers. 183
Motor programs are sometimes pushmi-pullyu, with matching directive and 
descriptive contents. 183
The ‘model state estimate’ in Miall and Wolpert’s (1996) predictive comparator 
model is in fact a pure descriptive, since it is the result of transforming the (directive) 
motor program into another representation. 183–4
Fig. 7.1 A predictive comparator model from Miall and Wolpert (1996). 184
The PFC colour/motion system (§4.6b) splits into some pure descriptives and some 
pure directives. 184–5
Pure descriptives arise in the analogue magnitude system, face recognition system 
and plaid motion tracking system. 185
The evidence accumulation system (§4.8) has descriptives in the cycle then direct-
ives that drive action. 185
(b) UE structural correspondence
In rat navigation, the system relies on the corresponding spatial relation obtaining. 
So, the correspondence has a descriptive content. 185
A directed causal graph programming a sequence of actions would have directive con-
tent. 185–6
Ryder’s SINBAD model produces cells that are tuned to sources of mutual informa-
tion in the inputs it has encountered. 186
Operation of the SINBAD model can be inverted so as to use descriptive representa-
tions in directive mode to drive action. 186
So far, we just have reliance on multiple exploitable correlations, both at input and at 
output, not reliance on structural correspondence. 186–7
However, if the network were to make use of the fact that directed connections 
amongst its cells correspond to causal links in the world, then we would have a case of 
directive UE structural correspondence. 187
It is interesting to note that this model supports something like a content–attitude 
distinction. Each vehicle can be deployed in either descriptive or directive mode. 187
The rat place cell system may use place cells with directive (correlational) content to 
drive behaviour. 187
7.4 Comparison to Existing Accounts
This section makes comparisons with three existing accounts: standard teleoseman-
tics, decoupling, and detecting achievement of a directive. 188
Teleosemantics: R has directive content when it has the function of producing C, 
and descriptive content when the producer has the function of producing R when C 
obtains. 188
My approach falls into the same broad camp as teleosemantics. 188
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Artiga argues that there will always be some, possibly very disjunctive, set of outputs 
that a representation R is supposed to produce; hence Millikan’s view implies that all 
simple representation will have directive content. 188
My account does not have that consequence because disjunctive conditions do not 
generally qualify as content. 189
Price says a directive has to be a goal, something that is produced by a variety of 
means. Objection: that would exclude motor programs, which play an important role 
in how an organism calculates how to act. 189
Sterelny uses response breadth to pick out descriptives: they are not tightly coupled 
to any particular response. 189–90
Zollman distinguishes this way: descriptives are more tightly coupled to world 
states, directives are more tightly coupled to outputs. 190
My view tends to go along with decoupling in this way. But that is not the basis of the dis-
tinction. 190
A different view relies on deliberation: with directives, the consumer does not 
deliberate about how to act. 190
That is not a promising way to draw the distinction in our case studies because 
deliberation is not ever involved. 191
Third approach: a representation is directive when the organism can detect whether 
C obtains and stops pursuing C when it does. 191
This is too demanding for directive content in general, but where a system has this 
sophistication, my account implies that the representation is directive. 191
7.5 Further Sophistication
(a) More complex directive systems
This section looks briefly at four further levels of cognitive sophistication, beyond 
simply separating descriptive from directive representations. 192
We saw two cases where, as with beliefs and desires, the same vehicle can be used 
with different directions of fit. 192
In the phenomenon of secondary conditioning, a descriptive representation of 
condition C has come to be a directive representation causing the organism to bring 
about C. 192
Detecting when you have reached your goal is a further level of sophistication. The 
general-purpose redeployability of every desire as a belief and every belief as a desire 
is a further level again. 192
Many organisms have a system for sorting amongst and prioritizing potentially con-
flicting directive representations, including through having directives with different 
(and maybe variable) strengths. 192–3
So, there are at least four levels of cognitive sophistication in which descriptive and 
directive representations can be embedded. 193
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(b) Another mode of representing
Propositional attitudes admit of other modes of representing, e.g. supposing. There 
may be something like that involved when place cells are active offline. 193
Offline activation of one place cell may have a content along the lines of suppose you 
were at x. Combined with the descriptive representation that location y is near location 
x, the system concludes that y would be nearby. 194
So, offline place cell activity is either unsaturated or suppositional. Either way, the 
case introduces a kind of sophistication which might have been thought to be the pre-
serve of propositional attitudes. 194
I remain neutral as to whether the functional role described here is the same mode 
of representing as the propositional attitude of supposing. 194
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the descriptive–directive distinction can be drawn 
within the varitel framework. 194–5
Chapter 8—How Content Explains
8.1 Introduction
Three paragraphs highlight some distinctive features of varitel semantics and intro-
duce the chapter sections. 197–8
8.2 How Content Explains
(a) Explanatory traction in varitel semantics
In order to see how content explains behaviour, the framework in Chapter 2 had 
contents as relational properties of real vehicles. 198–9
Now: do our accounts of content show how contents explain success and failure of 
behaviour? 199
For a primate in a numerosity experiment, picking the more numerous collection of 
objects constitutes success. 199
Contents are relational properties of components which thereby instantiate an algo-
rithm for producing successful behaviour. 199
This explanatory practice applies to many cases—because evolution produces 
organisms in which robustly produced outcomes have been the target of stabilizing 
processes. 200
Representation arises when stabilization and robustness are achieved by internal 
workings (over vehicles bearing exploitable relations to distal objects and proper-
ties). 200
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(b) Non-semantic causal description?
Further challenge: what role is there for content, when a non-semantic causal 
description is always available? 200
The field of psychology looks to be full of rich content-based generalizations, but a 
non-semantic causal description threatens to undermine their prima facie explanatory 
force. 201
Rifle firing example: the putative semantic description marches exactly in step with 
the non-semantic description. 201
Varitel semantics implies that the representational explanation has vehicle–world 
patterns at input, and often at output, that a factorized explanation misses. 201–2
Fig. 8.1 A schematic depiction of bridging at input and output. 202
The representational explanation is based on real patterns in the way a system and 
its components are involved with the distal environment. 202–3
This bridging is exemplified in the analogue magnitude and rat navigation case 
studies. 203–4
Bodily movements considered independently of their relations to distal out-
comes are often uninterpretable, e.g. the moving thumbs of someone playing a video 
game. 204
Bridging shows why content-based explanation breaks free from non-semantic vehi-
cle-based explanation, allowing detailed psychological theories to have their own 
explanatory purchase. 204
Explanation calls for a mix of generality (breadth of application) and specificity 
(inductive power). Bridging delivers some generality. Specificity is offered by the 
rich psychological theories in which so-based contents figure. 204
(c) Doing without talk of representation
Different challenge: why not do all the explanation in terms of correlation, corres-
pondence, and function directly? 204–5
One version: give more fine-grained explanations, just in terms of correlation, 
correspondence and function. That is less explanatory. 205
Second version: accept that the clusters I point to are present and the complex proper-
ties I have constructed are important. But that is to concede everything except the term 
‘representation’. 205
(d) Other views about the explanatory purchase of content
Ramsey argues that representational properties can earn their explanatory keep 
through heuristic value or causal relevance. 205–6
Egan, Shagrir, and Burge say representational contents come in to explain how an 
organism performs cognitive tasks. Thus, the explanandum is already given in seman-
tic terms. 206
Dretske (1988) has contents that are causally relevant, because they are a structuring 
cause of behaviour. Content based on sorting behaviour (Davies) or world-involving 
action (Peacocke) might also be causally relevant. 206
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Causal relevance might also be based on the compositionality of concepts, because 
that explains the systematicity of representational capacities or of behaviour. 206–7
Part of the explanatory purchase of content for varitel semantics is that content 
explains why the system is configured in the way it is and behaves the way it does (like 
Dretske 1988, but without the liberality). 207
I agree with Egan and Shagrir that contents allow us to see how a system can per-
form a task, although in my case the tasks are characterized non-semantically, not cog-
nitively. 207
Vehicle properties also play a role, in showing how an algorithm works. This is a 
generalization of the point that compositionality of representational vehicles can 
explain systematicity of behaviour. 207
8.3 Causal Efficacy of Semantic Properties
Are semantic properties causally efficacious, or merely explanatorily relevant, on 
this view? 208
Varitel semantics fits Jackson and Pettit’s account of why broad contents are explana-
torily relevant. 208
One approach has it that both semantic properties and vehicle properties are 
explanatorily relevant and neither causally efficacious, with causation only in basic 
physics. 208
An alternative is that there can be real causal efficacy at more than one level. 208
Even if some special science properties have causal efficacy, there are further obs-
tacles to establishing the causal efficacy of content properties. 209
My view shows why content properties are explanatorily relevant and is neutral on 
causal efficacy. 209
8.4 Why Require Exploitable Relations?
Are exploitable relations a necessary part of the content-constitution story? 
(Standard teleosemantics has no correlation requirement.) 209
Exploitable relations figure in my story because content is partly a matter of explain-
ing how a system achieves its functions. 209
Output-only theories type representations by the type of behaviour produced; my 
account gives a reason to expect correctness conditions to obtain. 210
This means my account makes stronger predictions about the results of tokening a 
representation; but output-only teleosemantics can appeal to equivalent empirical 
generalizations, so the difference is not profound. 210
My account does a better job of showing why contents explain how a system per-
forms its functions. 210
8.5 Ambit of Varitel Semantics
(a) Representation only if content is explanatory?
The complex properties my accounts depend on exist whether or not there is an 
observer able to make use of their explanatory potential. 210–11
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There is no requirement for contents to be explanatorily beneficial in every case where 
they arise. 211
E.g. they may give little or no additional explanatory purchase in a simple thermo-
stat. 211
Robustness comes in degrees; different stabilizing processes may be co-present and 
align, or not. There is less explanatory purchase in the more marginal cases. 211
Where task functions are constituted by design, the other elements may be very 
marginal; or these can be clear cases. 211–12
In sum: representational contents are observer-independent. The explanatory util-
ity of the representational explanations they afford will vary. 212
Finally, is my account pragmatist? It is pragmatist in the sense that content is 
action-derived. But it denies that starting with action guidance implies that the role of 
representation should be marginalized or eliminated. 212
My emphasis on the explanatory role of content suggests pragmatism of another 
kind. My account certainly aims to explain the discourse of representational attribu-
tion. 212
Blackburn: the pragmatist explains by mentioning not using the referring expres-
sions of the discourse. By those lights, varitel semantics is not pragmatist. It uses the 
terms ‘representation’, ‘content’, etc. (and shows what they refer to). 212–13
(b) Are any cases excluded?
Does varitel semantics imply that every natural system is a representer? 213
Simple reactions to proximal inputs, e.g. plant tropisms, do not count, because there 
is no robust outcome function. 213
But a plant can have representational states, e.g. if it has two ways of detecting even-
ing, closing its flowers accordingly. 213–14
Robustness in general, e.g. in cell physiology, is not robustness in the face of differ-
ent inputs, so does not in general found content. 214
Internal subpersonal cases do extend beyond the psychological, to hormonal sig-
nalling and the immune system, for example. 214
Subsystems can have robust outcome functions where the ‘external’ conditions 
are states of other parts of the organism, but these are only task functions if there is 
a stabilizing process (e.g. learning processes in the cell) operating below the level of 
the whole organism (which is where evolution by natural selection is likely to be 
powerful). 214–15
The functions of hormonal signalling are probably derivative from its role in serving 
task functions of the whole organism, not because it has task functions as a system in 
its own right. Similarly for the brain. 215
Although my account is more restricted than some other theories of content, it is 
not restricted to the psychological. 215
The kinds of content found in personal-level cases may be restricted to the psycho-
logical, but these do not cover the subpersonal-psychological. Accounts that cover the 
subpersonal-psychological extend more widely. 215–16
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8.6 Development and Content
Both with concepts and with neural networks, content often concerns the circum-
stances in which a vehicle develops. 216
If content is just fixed by synchronic properties, it is puzzling why there should be 
this connection to the circumstances of development. 216
There are empirically studied cases like that. With face recognition, new vehicles 
arise as a result of learning/stabilizing processes and refer to their causes. 216–17
Laurence and Margolis (2002) have a theory of natural kind concepts that links the 
content of a new concept to the object that caused its development. 217
That connection arises, according to my accounts, because content is fixed by fea-
tures of the stabilization process (task function), and because stabilization processes 
often give rise to representational vehicles. 217
In sum: we can see why a new representation often represents features of the things 
in the environment that caused it to develop. 217
8.7 Miscellaneous Qualifications
Can contents only be about distal objects and properties? 218
A system must have distally involved task functions, so some contents must concern 
distal features of the environment, but it can also have representations about proximal 
and internal conditions. 218
A clear example of that is meta-representation, which can arise in relatively simple 
systems (Shea 2014c). 218
Outputs are not restricted to bodily movements and the effects of bodily move-
ments. Chemical and electrical outputs, for example, are included. 218–19
In the case studies, vehicles have been proper parts of a mechanism. 219
In principle, properties of the whole system could interact in content-preserving 
ways. 219
Functional content is a supplement to informational treatments of evolutionary sig-
nalling games. It only arises because of a stabilizing process, as do my stabilized func-
tions. 219–20
Some game-theoretic models have meaning at attractor states that are not Nash 
equilibria, but as attractors they can potentially form the basis of stabilized functions, 
hence task functions. 220
I’m neutral about where Fregean sense or mode of presentation is needed, in add-
ition to referential content and vehicle properties. 220
Indexicality is an important issue, but I set it aside. 220
8.8 How to Find Out What Is Represented
My account is a metaphysics of content, but it has implications for how we should 
find out what is represented. 221
Procedure: establish behaviour that has been stabilized, consider algorithms, find 
which one maps onto internal processes. 221
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The role of task functions in specifying the explanandum is often implicit. The 
search for correlational information is explicit, but the restriction to information rele-
vant to performing task functions is usually only implicit. 221
Information has to be carried in a way that is detectable by downstream processes. 
This is sometimes acknowledged. 221–2
There should be more emphasis on output correlations. Also on the circumstances 
that stabilize behaviour. 222
We can see why investigating illusions and errors is important. Ethology and com-
parative psychology are relevant to stabilization. 222
8.9 Differences at the Personal Level
How might features of the personal level make a difference to content determin-
ation? 222
Consciousness makes a difference. It could play a role in determining content; or, if 
it is determined by content, then various functional features of consciousness are 
potentially relevant to content determination (listed). 222–3
If for conscious states, or other mental states, object-level and meta-level content are 
fixed simultaneously, that would be relevant to content determination. 223
Relations of entailment and exclusion in a network of beliefs or concepts may play a 
content-constituting role. 223
For concepts, the special functional role of conscious deliberation in forming 
and changing our beliefs involving a concept may be relevant to content determin-
ation. 223–4
Norms applicable to belief/desire content may be interpersonal and may depend on 
stabilizing processes in a social group. 224
An ascriptionist theory like Dennett’s intentional stance may be the right account of 
content for standing beliefs. 224
Will the varitel framework, at least, still be applicable? Too early to say. 224
It is wrong to think that personal-level processes could make use of subpersonal contents 
directly. 224–5
Pluralism amongst different kinds of personal-level representations may not be 
appropriate. 225
Having answered the content question for subpersonal representation should give us 
optimism. 225
It gives us a fixed point from which to build. Deploying our understanding of the 
ways in which personal-level representations are different, understanding their nature 
becomes a tractable research programme. 225
However, the most important achievement, if it succeeds, is that varitel semantics 
allows us to understand the nature of content in subpersonal representational sys-
tems. 225–6
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